

**THE ROLE OF TELEVISION IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
IN KIBERA DIVISION, KENYA**

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APPROVAL

This project has been submitted with my approval as the University supervisor.

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Date... *01/02/08*

DECLARATION

I Malava Geoffrey Waudo declare that this is my original work and it has never been produced by anyone in any other university

Signature 

Name of the student MALAVA GEOFFREY WAUDO

DEDICATIONS

This dissertation is dedicated to my parent Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert Malava for all their support they have given me and their prayers. My brothers and sisters and relatives and also my friends Sniper, Mzee, Nash, Simon, Amos, Mamba, Polo, Robert, Sisqo, Ester, Janet, Selina and any other person who helped me through this project.

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Special thanks to the Almighty God for His sufficient grace, love and kindness He has always granted me

I give thanks to the people and the organizations that made it possible for me to compile this report.

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For all those who supported me indirectly and directly supported me may God bless you all.

ABBREVIATIONS

KBC	Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
KTN	Kenya Television Network
NTV	Nation Television
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
PNU	Party of National Unity

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ABSTRACT

This research was carried out in Kibera in Kampala Uganda. This research examined the role of the media in conflict management and how to handle emergencies in their reporting.

In handling the issue of conflict management, the media has been in the front line in highlighting the rights and concern of those affected. This includes being impartial in their reporting of matters so that they are not seen as favoring a certain group over others, reporting on human rights violation, reporting on the suffering of people to put into light their plight so that they get the necessary assistance they need.

Although the media has done a lot to avert this, it is to some extent to blame for the situation. Therefore by disseminating conflicting messages which could have fuelled the hatred. Therefore the media should act according its role of being the watchdog of the society so that issues like this don't arise in the future.

CHAPTER 1

1.0 BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

Since the birth of communication, media has been used to convey information to those willing to absorb it. Beginning with publications and simple spoken words, and soaring to new heights in the twentieth century with radio, television, and the internet, media have been made accessible to people in every aspect of their daily lives. With such a strong hold on modern society, mass media have been able to shape popular culture and often influence public opinion. However, when abused, the power of media can harm the general population. A new report reviews the large body of research that has investigated the ways in which violent media influence behavior. Across all media genres, the authors found that the research consistently shows that even short-term exposure "increases the likelihood of physically and verbally aggressive behavior, aggressive thoughts, and aggressive emotions." In the short-term, media violence can increase aggression by priming aggressive thoughts and decision processes, increasing physiological arousal, and triggering a tendency to imitate observed behaviors. In the long-term, repeated exposure can produce lasting increases in aggressive thought patterns and aggression-supporting beliefs about social behavior, and can reduce individuals' normal negative emotional responses to violence for example permanent hatred btw tribes.

Conflict over the media is an important dimension of any conflict. One way to view it is like a particular arena in which actors compete to control or influence the media in various ways in order to secure or gain political influence. For example in Kenya during the recently held controversial elections, the Opposition (ODM) was using KTN to air their grievances while the government (PNU) was using KBC and NTV to air their side of the story. It is an essential arena where success in winning the 'hearts and minds' of the target audience can be crucial. It is a continuous dynamic competition that involves, above all, being able to communicate to the audience (or prevent from communicating) in an attempt to promote their version of the story. For example, in order to be able to point out who is "good", who is "bad" and thereby justify policies and actions.

The pervasive nature of violent media in society makes it difficult to minimize children's exposure. Even with parental supervision, interpretation, and control of children's media use, the available research suggests "no one is wholly immune to the effects of media violence.

The basic components of a conflict can be summarized to include four crucial components. Together these components make up a political conflict, which can escalate to armed conflict. Apart from the *incompatibility*, which is where the heart of the issue lies, the three other components are the *actors*, and the actors' *attitudes* and their *behavior*. Actors are often separated into primary and secondary actors. *Primary actors* are the most important; because it is between these that the incompatibility lies.

For there to be conflict there has to be an incompatibility and for it to be an armed conflict actors' behavior has to be manifest and violent. More traditional perceptions of armed conflict focuses primarily on military actors, incompatibilities, behavior, and power based on threat.

Precisely because they involve whole societies and deep-rooted psychological effects. Conflict management that aims at sustainability cannot focus exclusively on the basic incompatibility or root cause, but must address the dynamics related to attitudes. The media is both a particular arena and an actor in its own right particularly influential in this type of dynamic process as in the Kenyan post election violence.

The research aims at establishing the role of the media in relation to conflict management with regard to the post general election violence that was experienced in Kenya.

Media in Peace Research

Scholars in Peace and Conflict research are well aware of the communications revolution and the media is often mentioned as an important factor. Having said this, like many policy-makers, the media is either assumed to be all-powerful or irrelevant. There are relatively few systematic studies concerning the media and conflict, although interest and the number publications concerning the issue continue to increase and accumulate.

At one end of the spectrum, roughly the one that represents the more traditional school of thought, media and the communications revolution is mainly seen as a technological revolution with important implications for warfare technology and strategy. In other words, having access to high-tech media equipment gives a military advantage, which may require strategic adjustments. But other than that armed conflicts are basically the same and if changes have occurred it is not due to the media itself, but rather, to changes in systemic power balances.

At the other end of the spectrum, scholars claim that conflicts today are fundamentally different in nature and that these changes are directly related to the communications revolution and the media. The state as a political entity has largely played out its role and government armies, territorial boundaries, and nations are useless because communication between peoples cannot be confined. Other political actors are quickly replacing states including the media, transnational companies, non-governmental organizations and other informal transnational networks.

Despite the attention and importance accredited to the media, compared to other disciplines the connection between media and conflict has been neglected. While the number of studies and the volume of research concerning this issue continue to accumulate, most researchers still complain of the lack of a concerted effort at creating a unified field of study. There has been an important increase in data availability but this has not been accompanied by an adequate improvement in theoretical, methodological, or even statistical quality. This is particularly true when it comes to the media in internal conflicts.

The great majority of studies focus on international media in conflict, and comparatively rarely on national media. Furthermore, there is a flagrant predominance of research concerning specifically Western and international media even though a majority of these studies claim that the relevance of this media is greatly exaggerated.

1.1 Statement of the problem

For a long time, the tribal clashes in Kenya have continued to take its toll, both in economic and humanitarian terms, while dialogue and reconciliation have done very little in helping the country. Kenya has witnessed the worst kind of ethnic violence since its independence. The people of these areas have been deprived of their political, social, and economic development. There is hardly any peace in the land.

The human cost of this ethnic violence has been huge. A lot of people have been killed, maimed, injured, traumatized and thousand displaced. Families have been broken and scattered. Hundreds of youths, women and children have fallen victim of rape, defilement, and abduction, and that has increased the risks of contracting diseases like HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.

It is a common belief among those affected and to a larger extent, the entire Kenyan population that the media should have been in the fore front in the conflict management. Because they have a wider reach of the population especially in this case in Kibera where it is difficult for the government to reach the masses. The media is a more appropriate tool.

But the truth of the matter is that, although the media has played a role in conflict resolution, On the one hand, it has been said that the media, which could have played a crucial role in de-escalating the conflict, have been fuelling the conflict through their use of rumors and their dissemination of non-reliable information.

Geographically, this study was restricted to Kibera division in Kenya, which has been badly hit and affected by the on-going clashes in the region.

Study objectives

- To discover why some media houses are seen to be the main instigators of conflicts in society.

- To analyze the extent to which the media influence its audience in disseminating information?
- To examine why the different media organisations incline on one side in the coverage of conflicts both internal and external.

1.3 Research Questions

- What are the implications of the media having so much influence in society?
- What are the major differences between private owned media and government owned media in conflict management?
- Why do the government try to regulate what is aired by the media?
- What kind of relationship exists between the media and the society?
- What is the outcome of media products to society?


1.4 Scope of the study

Kibera has a violent history of ethnic and religious conflict. Five of Kenya's six largest ethnic groups (Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo, Luhya, and Kamba) call Kibera "home." The Nubians claim land tenure rights to the slum. Kibera has experienced several intense, bloody ethnic clashes between these groups. In each case of collective violence in Kibera, the combatants were predominately unemployed youth, aged 16-30 years.

The study is to be conducted in Kibera division of Nairobi in Kenya. The division is relatively dense in terms of population and social status. But according to research carried out by Steadmans Group, about 70 percent of the people who live in Kibera have access to television sets. Also due to the rise of technological advancement, television sets which use the silicon batteries have come up and they are affordable and don't require electricity. However, levels of poverty are greatly realized.

1.5 Conceptual framework

Conceptual framework indicates the themes of the study, the concepts, the themes and relationships between the themes. It also shows the thesis under the line of argument.



CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

That the media's role is ambiguous, unclear, and often misconstrued. This is a crucial corrective to the conventional wisdom that a direct correlation exists between media coverage and political (therefore military) action in conflict prevention and management. Most important, the result is a government decision to commit itself publicly to the *appearance* of action by way of palliative humanitarian operations, rather than through a firm political commitment to do everything possible to prevent or end a conflict, using military force if necessary. As the controversial five-volume findings of the **Committee for Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda** concluded: "War was the extension of failed diplomatic effort. Humanitarian aid was a substitute for political action in Rwanda."

Too often a direct cause-and-effect relationship between media coverage and apparent action is assumed. But the absence of national strategic interest, and therefore of political will, is conveniently forgotten and ignored. Signals and actions are often misconstrued. Ministers or government officials signal *apparent* willingness to engage when essentially the political will and strategy are otherwise. This reality is not helpful if the media reporting seems to create a moral imperative to prevent or halt a conflict.

The Rwanda evaluation report was an important exercise. It raised core issues relating to all media coverage of conflict. On Rwanda, it drew this vital conclusion:

"The international media played a mixed role in the Rwanda crisis. While the media were a major factor in generating worldwide humanitarian relief support for the refugees, distorted reporting on events leading to the genocide itself was a contributing factor to the failure of the international community to take more effective action to stem the genocide. Many in the media despise the minimalist view implicit in government calculations of

national interest. For reasons of self-interest and/or conviction, many journalists who risk their lives to report on a looming or exploding conflict will not be deflected from the view that the CNN factor either directly influences policy, or, if it doesn't, then it should."

2.1 Chechnya, 1994: Media Coverage but International Inaction

Chechnya in December 1994 is probably the most tragic example of lack of action. On the day that images of Russian bombing and burning aircraft at the Grozny airport were being transmitted worldwide, the 52 heads of state and government of the OSCE were in Budapest debating European security and crisis prevention measures, no less. The TV images from Grozny were broadcast in the national mission rooms of the conference center as the debate on the principles of European conflict prevention continued. But despite mutterings of concern, the flames and horror of Chechnya created little public resonance among the European leaders. There was certainly no decisive will to intervene to prevent the "limited" Russian military action from spiraling out of control.

2.2 Burundi, 1996: The Impotence of Media Coverage

From 1993 through 1996, the prolonged bloodletting in Burundi illustrated the illogical and inconsistent nature of the media's role in conflict. During these three years a combination of international editorial indifference and the physical dangers of visiting Burundi meant there was virtually no international media coverage of the unending murder and terror producing about 100 deaths a day. Other stories elsewhere in the world took precedence.

Rare reporting like the emotive TV coverage by the **BBC's George Alagiah** of a period of mass slaughter in Burundi in October 1993 created no international resonance. The international community only gave signs of stirring after the massacre of at least 304 people in Bugendana in July 1996. President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was then stoned at the mass funeral and forced to seek refuge at the U.S. embassy. Journalists and television satellite dishes descended on Bujumbura. The Tutsi army pulled off a coup. On the night President Ntibantunganya was deposed, the UN secretary-general's

spokesperson, Sylvana Foa, urged that the international community act before they saw appalling TV images of slaughter. "Unfortunately, it is not until we see babies being macheted to death on TV, that public opinion forces their governments into action," Ms. Foa appealed explicitly on one TV news programme with an air of desperation. "We do not want to see that this time."**(Sylvana Foa on BBC News, 25 July 1996.)**

“Why so little international media coverage of events in Burundi? How many Burundians have to be murdered before the story becomes newsworthy? It is difficult to believe in claims that we live in an era of global communications; when none of the major TV channels appears even to have sent a camera crew to Burundi. (**"Burundi Slides Towards Civil War"** by Michela Wrong, 1996.)”

2.3 Northern Iraq and Southern Turkey, 1991

In February 1991, having won the Gulf War, the Western allies had not even begun to contemplate what possible revenge Saddam Hussein might exact on oppressed ethnic groups like the Shias and Kurds. His Iraqi army forced tens of thousands of Kurds into the freezing mountains of southern Turkey. Their plight would have remained unseen by the outside world had the Turkish government not made the rare concession of allowing TV satellite dishes into border mountains usually closed to outsiders. The resulting heartrending TV images of the squalor, mud, and death were key factors in moving Western leaders to set up an urgent humanitarian mission, and ultimately the military protection of Operation Provide Comfort. It can be argued that this operation has prevented renewed conflict and slaughter in northern Iraq.

2.4 Srebrenica, 1993

Similarly, in April 1993, the Hi-8 video images, taken by a single freelance cameraman of General Morrillon pledging to save the encircled Moslem population of Srebrenica, were a key factor in persuading the UN Security Council to set up Safe Areas. France, the U.S., and the United Kingdom objected. They said the safe-area concept was a bad precedent to set and a bad principle to adopt.

But the emotional impact of the TV images on nations holding rotating seats in the Security Council overcame the powerful political objections of the three nations with permanent seats. The less powerful, nonaligned nations, without the benefit of extensive resources for intelligence gathering and analysis, relied to a great extent on the emotional power of the TV images. As a result, the Safe Area was authorised by Security Council resolution, even though the Venezuelan president of the council, Diego Arria, admitted in 1994: "I did not know that what we were creating was a trap."(**Gowing, *Real-Time Television Coverage***.) The nature of the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, and the consequent mass slaughter of fleeing Moslem men, justified Dr. Arria's belated forebodings.

2.5 Rwanda, 1994

TV pictures showing the slaughter of at least half a million Rwandans between April and July 1994 produced the opposite political response. Horrifying, intermittent TV images of people being hacked to death and piles of bodies and cadavers floating down rivers shocked ministers of major Western governments. The kind of "true heart of darkness" emotions, referred to by Foreign Secretary Hurd, pricked diplomatic consciences fleetingly. But they did not lead to any *major or fundamental* policy change, even though senior officials, especially in the U.S. government, like to believe that they did. The international community virtually ignored the terror of Rwanda, just as it chose to overlook a series of apocalyptic warnings via the UN and NGOs in late 1993 and early 1994. It refused even to provide aircraft to transport the 5,500 peacekeepers eventually pledged to the UN early in the post-April 1994 bloodletting.

Decisions subsequently taken were often misguided, having been too influenced by skewed media coverage. Military commitments and the high-profile interest were soon scaled down once the media interest died. Therefore a, hate radio -- Radio Mille Collines -- had systematically laid the groundwork for mass slaughter from the moment it was licensed in July 1993. ("**Media of Hate**" by **R.M. Connaughton. Camberley, 1996.**) On the buildup to the Rwanda genocide, it must be concluded that the media were unbriefed, ill-informed, ill-prepared, and therefore unaware of what might be looming.

Similarly, in the former Yugoslavia, there were plenty of signals in the official media during the late 1980s and the period 1990 -- 91 of Serb strategic intentions. The media's incitement of hatred is well documented. At some level, foreign governments noted the signals, but by either design or default, they chose to do nothing.

2.6 Partiality in Conflict Reporting: The Media's Secret Shame?

Few media people want to discuss partiality and the resulting distortions. To do so would undermine the perceived integrity and objectivity of correspondents who report from battle zones. It would also challenge the motives of the organisations that print and broadcast their material in the name of objectivity and balance.

2.6.1 *Bosnia*

In Bosnia, above all, there is more evidence than many media personnel care to admit that journalists embarked on crusades and became partial. (**Bell, *In Harm's Way***.) They empathised with the Bosnian government because of personal outrage at Serb aggression. *Prima facie*, this partiality distorted the reporting and led either to a refusal to include certain qualifying facts in stories or to distorting the overall impression.

2.6.1 *Rwanda*

In Rwanda, misreporting stemmed from both the emotions created by the number of deaths and a misunderstanding of what was happening. The complexities of Rwanda's social structure of Hutus and Tutsis could never be translated adequately by the media, especially by TV news, in a simple, understandable, presentable form. ("**The Third Genocide**" by **Alain Destexhe, 1994**) As the Rwanda Steering Committee report makes clear: "Inadequate and inaccurate reporting by international media on the genocide itself contributed to international indifference and inaction." (**Steering Committee for Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Vol. E.**)

It is dangerous to generalise. There are reporters who cover conflicts at great personal risk and with the greatest degree of objectivity they can muster, especially given the often

miserable conditions in which they find themselves. It is also professionally risky for a senior journalist to cast aspersions on the integrity of some fellow journalists' work. A few journalists have made great efforts to investigate and refute allegations of misreporting by news correspondents and misrepresentation by the UN military. (**"Blaming the Victim" by Tom Gjelten, 1993**)

But in Bosnia, there is compelling evidence that coverage has been skewed due to both the personal emotions of correspondents and the corporate policies of some leading news organisations. Under the apparent veil of objectivity, they have taken sides, often unashamedly. Coverage has not been balanced, yet no "health warning" or personal declaration has accompanied the coverage. As the BBC's TV correspondent Mark Urban wrote: "Few of the British-employed journalists -- with some exceptions -- seem to have been concerned with telling us the tales of the Serbian housewives blown away by Muslim snipers' bullets, or the Croat villagers whose throats were slit by the Muslim raiders from nearby villages in central Bosnia." (**"Selling the Bosnian Myth to America: Buyer Beware."1995.**)

The question is where do the media fit in to this illness and/or curative process? The media transmit information, but does the information help prevent the slide into violent conflict? When a patient informs a doctor of symptoms of an unknown condition, does that information mean that the doctor can either prevent deterioration from the illness or cure it? Or is that condition essentially incurable?

If the limited medical analogy is sustainable, then the measured caution and pessimism of this author's analysis remains justified. It seems that beyond the mere fact of reporting conflict, or signs pointing to a looming conflict, the media have significant limits on their influence. The same is true for big governments in the developed world. Beyond a certain point, they are powerless to prevent a conflict that at least one potential belligerent is determined to start and see through to its awful, premeditated end.

Many authors believe that quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy is the way to achieve conflict prevention. That we should shun any involvement with the media, and without

the media, we that he can make progress. This is a wrong notion since its important for such conflicts to be aired so that the public can know what is taking place so as to look for resolutions/answers as well as preventing a repeat of the same.

2.7 HISTORY OF KIBERA



Kibera, east Africa's largest slum, is a microcosm of many of the world's most vexing issues – poverty, poor healthcare, severe water shortage, the spread of HIV infection, and lack of women's rights. Kibera started as a settlement of Sudanese in 1912 of military personnel by the British. They wanted to have a force of soldiers who would be at hand to put down rebellions. More than 700,000 people live in a 630-acre area (about 2.5 square kilometers) outside of Nairobi, Kenya. It is one of the most densely populated urban settlements in the world. The vast majority of Kibera's residents live in abject poverty with few government services.

Kibera slums is one of the oldest and largest slums in Kenya and Africa. Kibera is ranked the largest slum in Eastern and Central Africa. The name Kibera was driven from Nubian

word (Kibra), which means forest. During those days the place was covered with a large forest, hence the name – Kibra .It is belived that the first people to settle in Kibera were the Nubians from the Nuba Mountains in Sudan.

In 1928 the Nubians were declared crown tenants and could be expelled at any time. All of the structures built in Kibera could only be temporary, of dirt and waddles and the government had the right to demolish any structure at any time. Kibera began to fill up in the thirties and forties as it was an ideal sanctuary for Africans who wanted to escape the rules and regulations of the colonial government. Although there was large population there, the British never felt any need to develop the area. The British issued edicts forbidding permanent water supplies and other amenities. in the 60's the government wanted to develop the area into a housing estate but it never saw the plans through. In 1974 a chief Kinia Kamau was appointed who engaged in a very lucrative scheme of bribes and kickbacks to build new temporary housing. Since he was appointed by the Nairobi City council he had little resistance. The result was huge increase in the size of Kibera. Today the 110 acres of Kibera are totally filled with housing

Kibera also faces an exploding youth population, which now represents over half of the slum's entire population. According to a 2003 study by Oxfam, 37% of school-going age children were not even in the educational system and 70% of the children attending school only have limited access to informal schools and community centers. Approximately 80% of all youth in Kibera lack formal employment, while the UN estimates that 35-45% of the entire slum population is unemployed or underemployed.

Kibera has a violent history of ethnic and religious conflict. Five of Kenya's six largest ethnic groups (Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo, Luhya, and Kamba) call Kibera "home." The Nubians (a Sudanese Muslim group that first settled Kibera after being recruited to fight on behalf of the British in World War I) claim land tenure rights to the slum. Kibera has experienced several intense, bloody ethnic clashes between these groups. In each case of

collective violence in Kibera, the combatants were predominately unemployed youth, aged 16-30 years.

An estimated 12 to 15% of Kibera's population is infected with HIV/AIDS, a situation exacerbated by the lack of basic human rights for girls and young women. Like billions of people in the world, even the most exceptional and Taka promising youth in Kibera lack opportunities to get an education, live healthy lives, and lead others as agents of social change. Carolina for Kibera's core projects – the Youth Sports Program, Tabitha Clinic, the Binti Pamoja Center, and Ni Pato – help address the many needs in the community.

Kibera initially grew as a village housing the Nubian soldiers of the demobilised arms of British East Africa at the end of the Second World War, in 1947. Subsequently, as rural-to-urban migration increased, many people moved into the area where they put up temporary structures to live in. Gradually, the initial inhabitants gained various forms of rights to the land and began building mud-and-wattle structures for renting. The slum is largely made of these today. There is a tendency for people to live in sections of the slum in ethnic groupings, sometimes called villages although there are no identifiable boundaries. At the moment there are 17 villages in total. The Kisumu railway line passes through the long axis of the slum in an approximately south-east to north-west direction and to the south is the Nairobi dam.

As in other slum areas, poverty is widespread in Kibera. Most residents are employed either in the informal sector or in low paying jobs in the industrial area and in the city. The informal sector predominates, including petty business, open-air garages, hawking of various wares, and the informal manufacturing of small articles by artisans known as Jua kali (Swahili for 'under the hot sun', because most work is in the open air).

Out of the 17 villages, Kibera has only two health centers i.e. Kicoshep health center and AMREF Kibera Community Health Center. These two health centers are not able to cater for all the residents of Kibera forcing some to seek services outside Kibera.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter shows how the researcher carried out the research on the topic “The effect of television on a society in conflict. The case study being Kibera.

3.1 Research design

Both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection were employed by the researcher to carry out analysis of the information. Since one research methodology alone is not sufficient to produce an authentic and a more balanced scientific report.

3.3 Population sample

This study was conducted among residents of Kibera Division. Kibera Division was chosen purposely and specifically because of the relatively high level of illiterate and the literate, different social status and employment and consequently highest effect of the media to the population.

In short Kibera division was chosen due to the fact that they were the highest percentage of people in which the media had the highest negative effect leading to killing of people, destruction of property.

3.3 Area of study

The study was conducted in Kibera division of Nairobi province in Kenya. The district is relatively dense in terms of population and comprises of a conglomeration of different people, tribes, preferences, occupation and social status, with high levels of poverty. And due to the rise of technology, it has made television sets accessible to every one since it's cheap.

3.4 Selection of study participants

Selection of study participants

Sampling method

Random sampling method was used to choose 50 participants who were obtained from households from the division. This was done due to the large population of the study area. Not everybody was included.

Purposive sampling strategy was used to choose 10 respondents each for every key informant and focus group discussion members. This was done due to the large population of the study area. Not everybody was included.

3.5 Data Collection

Data collection process included both qualitative and quantitative methods.

3.5.1 QUANTITATIVE

Questionnaires

Structured questionnaires were used to collect information from respondents who are educated. Similarly, structured questionnaires were also used to gather information from key informants who are equally not educated. The researcher also gave room for probing during interviews where necessary and to clarify on understanding. Comments were recorded at the margins and transcribed consistently so as to be able to improve on the areas needing further analysis and follow up.

3.5.2 QUALITATIVE

The researcher also used focus group discussions to collect data and seek clarification from respondents. The researcher guided and directed the discussion to avoid quarreling.

Further, a research guide was developed with adequate room for clarification and probing. The researcher also guided and directed the discussion to avoid quarreling, use of inappropriate language and directing the good course of the discussions. Also, a tape recorder was used for further clarification after discussion and for future reference incase there was need be.

3.6 Data Analysis

Quantitative and qualitative methods were used. Data collection was continually transcribed and analyze right from data collection to presentation stage. Qualitative data was presented by the use of statistical method graphs and charts. This was aimed at making the result easy and simple to comprehend. Quantitative data was analyzed and results presented according to the statistic gotten from the research for example constitutional inconsistencies, economic blockade and propaganda. The researcher also analyzed qualitative and quantitative data carefully to make sure respondent's opinion and views was not be misrepresented during the writing of this final research report. This was ensured by reviewing the notes written during discussions and a fulltime research assistant was employed during the entire time of the research.

3.7 Limitations

As anticipated the following the setbacks were encountered during data collection.

- There was a problem of non-response whereby many respondents frankly said they had no time to read through and answer the questions due to their tight daily schedules.
- Another setback was also the unavailability of some respondents whom they had not scheduled the time for meeting (interview/questionnaires) with the excuse of having commitments elsewhere.
- Another setback was the hostility the people towards each other and towards me due to my ethnic background.
- Also another set back was the high rate of insecurity in the area.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE DATA

INTRODUCTION

Descriptive analysis was used to analyze the data. Interviews were carried out in the affected areas. Also questionnaires were used. This chapter describes the analysis and presentation of research findings data collected from the field was coded to allow easy interpretation. The data here will be analyzed inform of table under the following questions:

- **The media and the conflict**
- **The government and the violence**
- **The population affected by the violence**
- **Is enough being done to avoid violence?**

4.1 THE MEDIA AND THE CONFLICT

In Kenya, the media paired with a "robust" civil society has been the key force for democratization. Throughout history Kenya has ranked the media as the most trusted institution coming ahead of the church even! Public institutions such as the courts and parliament have never won the peoples confidence. The international media helped in showing the world and fellow Kenyan's about the situation, but what did the local media do? The media could and should have provided useful information regarding the issues and the numbers in disputed constituencies. People questioned why the Kenyan media failed to play the role of the watchdog and use the publicly announced votes to ensure there was no allegation of meddling with the votes. Both The Nation and Kenya Television Network (KTN) showed figures before suddenly withdrawing figures, they initially showed Odinga with over 4.5 million votes and Kibaki with just fewer than 4.2 million votes. The media played such a large role in

getting the people to vote on the notion that "yote yawezakana", which means all is possible.

The media was put in the limelight after it was accused of airing conflicting results and messages which led to the conflict between various ethnic groups. The government of Kenya through Waki Commission found out that on one hand the media dispense of information that confused the public. For example the media was dispensing of the results from the polling stations but the results which were read out at the central station were different from the one read at the polling station. As a result, people saw that a certain ethnic group was being favored over others.

According to the table below, of the 50 people interviewed, 70% of them expressed that the media played a part in the poll violence that gripped the country early in the year.

4.1.1 Table showing the percentage of the population that believed the media was to blame for the poll violence.

	YES	NO
Men	35 %	5 %
Women	25 %	10 %
Youth	5 %	15 %

Source: Primary data

From the above data, we can see that the majority of the population blamed the media for their role in the post election violence. Also we can see that a fraction of them did not believe that the media played a part in the post election violence. They argue that the media played a part in the quelling of the violence by being in the forefront in spreading peace messages and an arena where people expressed their concern about the deteriorating situation in the country.

4.2 THE GOVERNMENT AND THE VIOLENCE

According to the table below, some people also expressed their view that the government was the main instigator in the post election violence. The government gave out a media silence especially to those independent media houses and use only the government sponsored station. The independent media was not allowed into the central tallying station and during the announcing of the final presidential results. When the information was given out the results did not match the results released by the media and this raised eyebrow on the authenticity of the results.

Also at one time the media were denied information concerning the results of the election. At one point Raila was in the lead and then there was a media blackout and then all of a sudden Kibaki was in the lead. Some people saw this as the work of the government in action in rigging the election thus igniting violence amongst the people.

The media plays a vital role in the way people perceive the world, a situation, a story and even an individual. In terms of war, violence and political dismal - the media's role is crucial. The media must be able to give both sides of the story, attempt to be fair and present the events rather than making, exaggerating or changing a story in order to catch the attention of people. This goes against everything assume journalists are taught. When the Kenyan elections were taking place, for a moment in time the media was completely shutdown.

Further more, the masses blame their Mps for the poll violence. In fact 90% of them blame their Mps for inciting them not to accept and vote for a person who is not from their own tribe thus creating animosity and enmity between the different groups.

4.2.1 Table showing the percentage of those who did or did not blame the government.

	YES	No
Men	30 %	5 %
Women	20 %	4 %

Youth	40 %	1 %
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4.3 THE POPULATION AFFECTED BY THE VIOLENCE

According to the tale below, it shows the extent to which people were affected by the violence. Families lost their loved ones, they lost the bread winners of the family, were displaced from their homes, children orphaned, women raped and many more atrocities. Almost the whole populations of people living in Kibera were affected by the post election violence. This goes to show how serious the situation was and would have been worse if the media and the government didn't work together to resolve the situation.

4.3.1 Table showing the percentage and how the population was affected

	Percentage	Degree affected
Men	99%	Murdered Shot Animosity Joblessness Loss of property Displacement from their homes
Women	75%	Raped Murdered Loss of property

		Widowed Death of children Displaced
Children	90%	Orphaned Killed Homelessness Starvation

Source Daily Nation

The media should have focused on those people who were involved and should not have turned the election into a Kikuyu-Luo affair as this is the main reason that led to the breakout of violence. This was because they Luo thought that the Kikuyu wanted to remain in power at any cost and wanted to remove them but the Kikuyu thought that they were being sidelined thus they retaliated leading to the violence.

4.4 IS ENOUGH BEING DONE TO AVOID VIOLENCE?

Although the public blame both the media and the government for the post election violence with regard to the discussed points, 50% of them believed that the government and the media should work together to see that there is harmony and peace among the different tribes in Kenya. This is being done through the various recommendations put forth for example, regulating on the amount of information to disseminate and not to disseminate, imposition of a delay method to allow time to remove unwanted scenes, objectivity and impartiality in information dissemination freedom from government influence etc. This is a type of method where any live broadcast is delayed for a few minutes which will be discussed in chapter five.

On the hand, others don't believe that enough is being done in improving the situation. This aspect is represented in the figure below:

4.4.1 Table showing the feeling of the people concerning what is being done to improve the situation.

Gender	YES	NO	NO IDEA
Men	15 %	15 %	2 %
Women	25 %	10 %	1 %
Youth	10 %	20 %	2 %

Source : primary data

CHAPTER FIVE

RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

This research was carried out in Nairobi Kenya and aimed at evaluating the role of the media in conflict management. It is important to take note that the local media -- at least the mainstream media without regulation can be a very powerful tool in influencing the behavior of people and make them act in a certain way that is not acceptable. And also on the other hand, the state may also cause a negative impact on the population when it seeks to use violence and chaos to restrict media freedom -- as in the case of the ban on live broadcasts; when the state seeks to use violence and chaos as a reason to restrict constitutional freedoms; when the state seeks to use violence and chaos as a reason not to dialogue. This included on both print and broadcasting media. The study is discussed by looking at each aspect and conclusion and subsequent recommendations for remedies are made.

5.1 SUMMARY

In summary therefore we can say that there is room to improve the co-ordination, information sharing and long term strategic planning of media support and the government within Kenya, including ensuring that it is both the information that is passed out is one that promotes peace, harmony and unity within the different tribes of Kenya.. In particular, support could be focused on the development of community radio stations; and media training, particularly for talk show hosts in facilitating public debate as well as on. And with the help of donors we should be able to proactively seek to maximize the opportunity, working in co-operation with civil society, the government of Kenya and especially the Kenyan media to promote the emergence of a most robust national peace building architecture, including through revision, adoption and implementation of the Policy on Peace building and Conflict Management.

5.2 CONCLUSION

Although the media is to blame for the rising tribal conflict being experienced in the country, credit should be given to them for their role in trying to rectify the situation and preaching peace amongst the people.

Ten million, predominantly poor people, went to vote in December elections with the promise that "yote yawezakana" (all is possible). The media was in the forefront telling these people that it was only their vote that counted. After the announced results -- for good reason -- people thought that their vote didn't count, and the media was not telling them why. The country was obviously heading for trouble.

As Kenya moves forward and out of this chaos, the media will have a special role in focusing the country and international community on long-term solutions and the dangers of short-term political fixes and also be instrumental in delivering of peace messages country wide in a bid to stop the escalating violence. With the help of the government the media will be able to quell the escalating violence that is threatening to destroy Kenya.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

After carrying out the study the following recommendations were brought into focus

The media should be regulated on the amount of information to disseminate and not to disseminate. By doing so the government would be in a better position to regulate any hate message that may be disseminated out and also to prevent any message or information that may be misunderstood.

Media personality should also be vetted by the Media council of Kenya. This will enable them know the background of each and every media personality so as to be in a better position to tackle any problem that may arise in the future concerning the person involved.

The media should also impose a delay method. This is a type of method where any live broadcast is delayed for a few minutes i.e. like 5 minutes so as to prevent any unprecedented issue to go on air. For example if a person says something to incite the public, the media house will be in a better position to edit the message before it goes out.

The media should also be impartial in their reporting of matters so that they are not seen as favoring a certain group over others.

The government should also treat all the existing media houses in Kenya as the same. They should not show any favoritism as this will decrease the public opinion on them thus may not pay attention to any important message the government may want to broadcast in the future.

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APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

INTRODUCTION

I am Malava Geoffrey Waudu a student from Kampala International University department of Social Science. Am conducting an academic research on the role of the media in conflict management my case study been Kibera Location in Nairobi.

These questions have been planned and structured in order to investigate what the role media in conflict management with regard to the 2007 post general election clashes.

By filling in the questions asked in this form, you are not giving up any of your legal rights and after reading the entire booklet, please feel comfortable to ask any questions as you wish before answering the questions. This information will be treated with confidentiality.

PART A

1. AGE between

A. 15-25

B. 26-35

C. 36-45

D. 46 and above

PART B

2 a. Were you affected by the post election violence?

Yes No

b. How

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3a. Do you think the media played a positive or negative role in the post election violence?

a) Positive b) Negative

b. How?

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4a. Do you think the government is to blame for the post election violence?

a) Yes b) No

b) Why do you think so?

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5. Do you think that enough is being done to assist those affected? If so why

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6. What steps do you think the media can take to help in the situation?

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7. What steps do you think the media can take to help avert the same situation from arising up in the future?

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8. Do you think the media should be regulated?

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9. Do you think the media is impartial and objective?

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10. Do you think the media is free from government control? Explain your reasons?

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11. What kind of relationship exists between the media and the society?

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