

**THE PROBLEMS OF SUSTAINING FRIENDLY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
BETWEEN SOMALIA, KENYA AND ETHIOPIA**

**BY**

**MAHAD ABDULLAHI HUSSEIN**

**MIR/41103/133/DF**

**A MASTER THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE COLLEGE OF HIGHER DEGREES AND  
RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR  
THE AWARD OF THE MASTER DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY OF  
KAMPALA INTERNATIONAL  
UNIVERSITY**

**OCTOBER, 2015**

### Declaration

I the undersigned do declare that this is my original work and effort and has not been presented for a degree or any other academic award in any university or institution of learning.

Name of the Candidate: Mahad Abdullahi Hussein

Signature: Mahad

Date: 19/10/2015

### Approval

"I confirm that the work reported in this research thesis was carried out by the candidate under my supervision".

Name of the supervisor: Dr. ONKOPIN A. EKOMDST

Signature Onkopi A. Ekomdst

Date : 11 / 10 / 2015

## **Dedication**

This work is dedication to our parents who taught us discipline, patience, and self-righteousness. May Allah reward and keep them prosperous and wellbeing.

## **Acknowledgement**

### **“In The Name of Allah the Most Gracious and the Most Merciful”**

**Firstly,** I would like to convey our gratitude to Allah S.W.T for giving us the drive and motivation to complete this study.

**Secondly,** from the inception until the completion of this research, my sincere appreciation and innumerable thank you goes to my supervisor Otanga Rusoke whose guidance, careful reading, constructive comments, support and advice has enabled me to gain a deep understanding throughout the whole process of the study.

**Thirdly,** I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge with gratitude the cooperation received from all respondent in Ministry of interior affairs committee, Parliament committee and other community members for continued support, time, and cooperation and took deep interest by giving information to complete our study.

**Finally,** I would like to express my deep gratitude to helpful dear wife NASTEHO ALI HASHI for all her care, support, and encouragement throughout the entire process of this study.

## Table of contents

Declaration .....	ii
Approval.....	iii
Dedication .....	iv
Acknowledgement.....	v
Table of contents .....	vi
Abstract.....	x
CHAPTER ONE .....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY .....	1
1.1.1 Historical Perspective .....	1
1.1.2 Theoretical Perspective .....	2
1.1.3 Conceptual Perspective .....	3
1.1.4 Contextual Perspective.....	4
1.2 Statement of the Problem .....	6
1.3 Purpose of the study.....	7
1.4 Objective of the Study .....	7
1.5 Research Questions .....	7
1.6 Scope of the Study .....	8
1.6.1 Content Scope.....	8
1.6.2 Time scope .....	8

1.6.3 Theoretical scope .....	8
1.6.4 Geographical scope.....	8
1.7 Significance of the Study.....	8
CHAPTER TWO .....	10
LITERATURE REVIEW.....	10
2.0 Introduction .....	10
2.1 Theoretical Review .....	10
2.3 Empirical Review .....	14
2.3.1 Factors contributing to the need for friendly international relations.....	14
2.3.1.1 KENYA .....	17
2.3.2 Impacts of the international relations in the region .....	18
CHAPTER THREE.....	24
METHODOLOGY .....	24
3.0 Introduction .....	24
3.1 Research Design.....	24
3.2 Research Population .....	24
3.3 Sample size.....	25
3.4 Sampling procedure.....	25
3.5 Sources of data .....	26
3.6 Data collection instruments .....	26

3.7 Reliability of the instruments of data collection.....27

3.7 Data Gathering Procedures .....28

3.8 Research Procedure.....29

3.9 Data Analysis .....30

3.10 Ethical Considerations .....30

3.11 Limitations of the Study .....30

CHAPTER FOUR .....32

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION.....32

4.0 Introduction .....32

4.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents.....32

4.2 Factors contributing to the sustaining of Friendly International Relations between  
Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia.....35

4.3 Impact of the friendly international relations in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia to the  
people .....38

CHAPTER FIVE.....43

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....43

5.0 Introduction .....43

5.1 Discussions for the Results.....43

5.2 Conclusions.....45

5.3 Recommendation .....45

REFERENCES .....46



APPENDIX: A .....	49
INFORMED CONSENT .....	49
APPENDIX: B .....	50
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESPONDENTS.....	50
QUESTIONNAIRE .....	51
APPENDIX: C .....	57
TIME FRAME.....	57
APPENDIX: D.....	58
BUDGET .....	58
APPENDIX E.....	59
CURRICULUM VITA (CV).....	59

### **Abstract**

The purpose of this study is to identify the problems of sustaining friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. The research aim is to explore the impact of their relationship. The researchers conducted correlation in this study. Correlation is a research design where the researchers determine of whether or not and to what extent an association exists between two or paired variables. The researchers' purpose is to contrast two or more characteristics from the similar set and give details how characteristics vary together (Osa & Onen, 2008). The relationship between the government of Somalia and Kenya, The result indicated that there is positive correlation as indicated **r. value** .567 and the **sig. value** .000 in this study the researchers reject their hypothesis and accept the alternative, which is the existence of positive correlation between government of Somalia and Kenya. And association between the variables showed a high statistically significant result. This is the relationship between government of Somalia and Ethiopia. Results indicated a positive and significant relationship between the government of Somalia and Ethiopia, and this was indicated by the **r** and **sig values**(**r-value=.327**and**sig=.003**), this was so because the sig-value was less than 0.05 which is the required level of significance in social sciences in order to declare a significant relationship. The study therefore recommends that Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia continue to keep the Diplomatic leaders and promoting democratic peace of these neighboring countries as it will aim on improving the socio-livelihood of the three nations.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

##### 1.1.1 Historical Perspective

The Ethiopian–Somali conflict was a territorial and political dispute between the territories of present-day Ethiopia and Somalia. Lasting from the late 1940s until 2009, the tensions culminated in three wars and numerous military clashes alongside the borders. During the 16th century, Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (Ahmad Gurey or Gragh) led a Conquest of Abyssinia (*Futuh al-Habash*), which brought three-quarters of the Christian polity under the power of the Muslim Adal Sultanate. With an army mainly composed of Somalis, Al-Ghazi's forces and their Ottoman allies came close to extinguishing the ancient Ethiopian kingdom. However, the Abyssinians managed to secure the assistance of Cristóvão da Gama's Portuguese troops and maintain their domain's autonomy. Both polities in the process exhausted their resources and manpower, which resulted in the contraction of both powers and changed regional dynamics for centuries to come. Many historians trace the origins of hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia to this war.<sup>[4]</sup> Some scholars also argue that this conflict proved, through their use on both sides, the value of firearms such as the match lock musket, cannons and the arquebus over traditional weapons. (ABBINK, 2003)

In the 19th century, the Ethiopian King Menelik II invaded the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region. The move directly contributed to the birth of a major Somali anti-colonial campaign led by Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan's Dervish State. Hassan's polity eventually collapsed a quarter of a century later in 1920, following heavy British aerial bombardment. (ABDUSSAMAD, 1999)

In 1948, under pressure from their World War II allies and to the dismay of the Somalis, the British "returned" the Haud (an important Somali grazing area that was presumably 'protected' by British treaties with the Somalis in 1884 and 1886) and the Ogaden to Ethiopia, based on a treaty they signed in 1897 in which the British ceded Somali territory to the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik in exchange for his help against raids by Somali clans. Britain included the proviso that the Somali residents would retain their autonomy, but Ethiopia immediately claimed sovereignty over the area. This prompted an unsuccessful bid by Britain in 1956 to buy back the Somali lands it had turned over. Disgruntlement with the 1948 decision led to repeated attempts by Somali parties to re-unite the ceded Ogaden region with the other Somali territories in Greater Somalia.

In 1998-2003 The first incursion by Ethiopian troops after the fall of the central Somali government took place in August 1996. In March 1999, Ethiopian troops reportedly raided the Somali border town of Balanballe in pursuit of members of the *Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya* group which has been fighting to unite Ethiopia's eastern Ogaden region with Somalia. Later, in April 1999 two Somali leaders, Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aideed, said in an official protest to the United Nations Security Council, that heavily armed Ethiopian troops entered the towns of Beledhawo and Doolow on Friday, April 9, 1999. They further alleged that the Ethiopian troops had taken over the local administration and detained officials in the towns. In May 1999, Ethiopian soldiers, with the help of a pro-Ethiopian Somali faction occupied the town of Luuq in southwestern Somalia, close to the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. In late June 1999, Ethiopian soldiers, supported by armoured vehicles launched an attack from Luuq that resulted in the capture of Garba Harre in the Gedo region, which was previously controlled by the Somali National Front led by Hussein Aideed. The attack was apparently aimed at flushing out Ethiopian rebels based in Somalia. (AGHEMELO & BHASEBHOR, 2006)

### 1.1.2 Theoretical Perspective

The research was guided by a **Normative Theory** by Smith, Baylis & Owens (2008), this theory presupposes that actors in the practice of international relations do have

alternatives and real choices, and can change their conduct. In sum, normative theory faces with a wide range of ethical questions to deal with such as: to what extent is state sovereignty more important than human rights? Do human rights override state autonomy? What is our responsibility for preserving human rights and justice? What kinds of wars are just? What are the justifications for intervention? To what extent is environmental issues a global concern? We can add many more to these.<sup>1</sup> As Frost points out, "there are no easy answers to these questions and engaging in normative theory is complicated, difficult and of great practical importance, (Smith 2008).

Until the last decade or two, theoretical attempts made by IR theorists have been mostly focusing on explaining and predicting general trends and certain prior conditions under which inter-state practices occur. In the inter-paradigm debate each paradigm which "is itself part of a general mental map" (Banks, 1985: 7) rely on its own assumptions.

The traditional/rational theories of IR presuppose a positivist approach, which underlines a scientific explanation of their object of inquiry in a value-free way avoiding any ethical judgments. In this positivist formulation of theorizing, normative theory has been neglected in IR for a number of different reasons, which involve the predominance of positivism in social sciences, the dominance of realism in the discipline of IR, and the blocking effects of the Cold War politics. (Brown, 1994).

### **..1.3 Conceptual Perspective**

In February 2003, Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, admitted that Ethiopian troops were occasionally sent into Somalia to battle the militant Islamist group, Al-Ittihad and stated that the group was linked to Al-Qaeda. He also claimed that Ethiopia's government had lists of Al-Ittihad members who were, at the time, in the Transitional National Government and parliament of Somalia; a claim that TNG President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan has consistently denied. President Hassan has in turn, accused Ethiopia of destabilizing Somalia, interfering daily in Somali affairs and violating the arms embargo on Somalia by supplying weapons to warlords opposed to the Transitional Government at the time; Ethiopia denied these charges. (ASIWAJU, 1985)

Although an attempt was made to improve relations between Ethiopia and the TNG in June 2001, relations only really improved in 2004 when Abdullahi Yusuf became the TNG president. Then Ethiopia reversed its position and began to support the interim government, especially against various Islamist militias in Somalia, most recently the Islamic Courts Union. In 2006 Ethiopian involvement in Somalia gained widespread public attention when Ethiopian troops moved into Somalian territory on July 20, 2006. Somalia's interim government was then resisting advances by the Islamic Courts Union forces north to the last unoccupied city of Baidoa.

A Somali Islamist leader has ordered a "jihad" to drive out Ethiopian troops, after they entered the country to protect the weak interim government, however, Sharia courts in Ethiopia condemned the ICU's declaration of holy war. Meles Zenawi has agreed to withdraw Ethiopian forces at arrival of the African Union. Ethiopia has been a long-term ally of President Abdullahi Yusuf and in the 1990s helped him defeat an Islamist militia led by Mr Aweys. (ASIWAJU & PAUL NUGENT (1993)

Five hundred years ago, an Imam who ruled much of what is now Somalia, led a daring invasion of Christian Ethiopia, looting monasteries, burning down churches and slaying all who resisted. Centuries on, memories of Imam Ahmad Gragn still haunt both countries, and echoes of that long and bloody history still ripple across the Horn of Africa region which considers Somalia the greatest threat to its stability. (ABBINK, 1998)

#### **1.1.4 Contextual Perspective**

Somalis in Kenya have historically inhabited the Northern Frontier District (NFD), later renamed the North Eastern Province. The NFD came into being in 1925, when it was carved out of the Juba land region in present-day southern Somalia. At the time under British colonial administration, the northern half of Juba land was ceded to Italy as a reward for the Italians' support of the Allies during World War I. Britain retained control of the southern half of the territory, which was later called the Northern Frontier District.

On June 26, 1960, four days before granting British Somaliland independence, the British government declared that all Somali-inhabited areas of East Africa should be unified in one administrative region. However, after the dissolution of the former British colonies in the region, Britain granted administration of the Northern Frontier District to Kenyan nationalists despite an informal plebiscite demonstrating the overwhelming desire of the region's population to join the newly formed Somali Republic. On the eve of Kenyan independence in August 1963, British officials belatedly realized that the new Kenyan administration was not willing to give up the Somali-inhabited areas it had just been granted administration of. Led by the Northern Province People's Progressive Party (NPPPP), Somalis in the NFD vigorously sought union with their kin in the Somali Republic to the north. In response, the Kenyan government enacted a number of repressive measures designed to frustrate their efforts in what came to be known as the Shifta War.

In October 2011, a coordinated operation between the Somali military and the Kenyan military began against the Al-Shabaab group of insurgents in southern Somalia. The mission was officially led by the Somali army, with the Kenyan forces providing a support role. In early June 2012, Kenyan troops were formally integrated into AMISOM. By September 2012, the Somali National Army and allied Kenyan African Union forces and Raskamboni militia had managed to capture Al-Shabaab's last major stronghold, the southern port of Kismayo, during the Battle of Kismayo. (DANIEL, 1999)

In October 2011, the coordinated Operation Linda Nchi between the Somali military and the Kenyan military began against the Al-Shabaab group of insurgents in southern Somalia. The mission was officially led by the Somali army, with the Kenyan forces providing a support role. In April 2014, the Somali federal government officially recalled its ambassador to Kenya and his Deputy Consul in protest of the consular official's detainment in the Kenyan capital Nairobi.

Relations between Kenya and Somalia have historically been tense. Agitations over self-determination in the Somali-inhabited Northern Frontier District culminated in the Shifta War during the 1960s. Although the conflict ended in a cease-fire, Somalis in the region still identify and maintain close ties with their kin in Somalia. In October 2011, a

coordinated operation between the Somali military and the Kenyan military began against the Al-Shabaab group of insurgents in southern Somalia. The mission was officially led by the Somali army, with the Kenyan forces providing a support role. In early June 2012, Kenyan troops were formally integrated into AMISOM. (Godfrey Mwakikagile, 2007).

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The provisional government of Somalia established in February 1991 inherited a legacy of problematic relations with neighboring states and economic dependence on aid from Arab and Western nations. Relations between Somalia and its two neighbors-- Ethiopia, and Kenya--had been poisoned for more than two decades by Somalia's irredentist claims to areas inhabited by ethnic Somalia in each of these two states. (ZEWDE, 2002). The Ethiopian–Somali conflict was a territorial and political dispute between the territories of present-day Ethiopia and Somalia. Lasting from the late 1940s until 2009, the tensions culminated in three wars and numerous military clashes alongside the borders. The 1977–78 Ogaden War with Ethiopia, although a humiliating defeat for Somalia, had created deep suspicions in the Horn of Africa concerning the intentions of the Siad Barre regime. The continuing strain in Somali-Ethiopian relations tended to reinforce these suspicions. (BARBOUR, 1961)

The Kenyan–Somali conflict within Kenya has been a consistent issue since the colonial period. Problems have ranged from petty skirmishes between the two communities, to police harassment, extortion, home invasions, physical violence, and massacres perpetrated against the Somali community. And also the government of Kenya's military adventure cannot usefully be considered solely in terms of an external threat from Somalia. There is, as with all conflicts, no single reason why the country finds itself at war.

A complex mix of local politics and economics is at play, as well the activities of al-Shabaab. The problems of sustaining friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia are due to their similarity in ethnical, cultural, geographical and even religious because the identity of Somalis is principally shaped by Islam and cultural



practices that collectively form the everyday decisions and lives of the Somali government. Therefore the researcher intends to identify the problems of sustaining friendly relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. In the current atmosphere of mistrust, occupation, lack of control of internal rebel groups within Somalia, and the tendencies of the neighboring countries to militarily interfere with the running of Somalia state administration.

### **3 Purpose of the study**

The purpose of this study is to identify the problems of sustaining friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. The research aim is to explore the impact of their relationship.

### **4 Objective of the Study**

- I. To establish the factors that contribute to the sustaining of friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia.
- II. To establish the impact of the friendly relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia to the people of all three countries.
- II. To establish the relationship between the factors and impacts of friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia.

### **5 Research Questions**

- I. What are the factors that contribute to the sustaining of friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia?
- II. What are the impacts of the friendly relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia to the people of all three countries?
- II. What is the relationship between the factors and impacts of friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia?

## **..6 Scope of the Study**

The researchers divided the scope into three categories.

### **..6.1 Content Scope**

The study focuses on the problems of sustaining friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. With precise and detailed analysis on the problems that contributes sustaining friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Primary and secondary data ranging from March 2014- September 2015 is considered relevant for this study.

### **..6.2 Time scope**

The research was carried out in a period of six months, the researcher began formulation of the proposal earlier and collected the data that is presented in the research from the months of March to September when the final research was completed.

### **..6.3 Theoretical scope**

The research utilized the Normative theory of Smith, the theory guided the research till its completion.

### **..6.4 Geographical scope**

The study was carried out in Somalia, whereas the study also focused on documentations from Ethiopia and Kenya since it focused on the relations of the three countries.

## **1.7 Significance of the Study**

The findings of this study will be helpful to the Somali government members to learn the level of the relationship and late challenges faced between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. Also it will help Somalia society to be familiar about relationship history that Somali government have its neighbors, it also assist other researcher use different time reference.

inally, the research is hopeful that the study achieved will form a basis for further research and cover a way for future studies to be made by other potential researchers.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the review of related literature on the problems sustaining friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. It describes concepts, opinions, ideas, and theories from Authors and experts who reviewed different source of the literature related to this topic through their perspectives towards research variables.

#### 2.1 Theoretical Review

Normative theory suggests that the positivist tenet of the 'value-free' nature of scientific knowledge has been challenged. Moreover, it has been claimed that positivism also has a 'hidden normative content' (Neufeld, 1995: 98-106). Primarily, researchers using a positivist approach within the study of IR have to choose a research field as well as a theory in order to examine the topic they have chosen. At this stage, they "may be influenced by their personal values in the pre-scientific choice of topic" (Neufeld, 1995: 99).

Moreover, the theory which social scientists use to explain their research topic is already embedded in certain normative preferences. So the chosen theory determines the facts, which will be taken into account according to its mainstream assumptions. In the next stage, in order to explain the issue faced with, it is required to make an interpretation viewing from the each side of the problem. For a comprehensive understanding of each side's claims, value systems should be considered. Furthermore, the researcher's act of interpretation itself should be interpreted in the highlighting of his own values.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, as Frost points out, "International Relations scholars have to take normative positions" (Frost, 1994: 118).

Moreover, he asserts that "there is no way in which social scientists may legitimately avoid becoming involved in normative theory" (Frost, 1996: 34). This is primarily due to the fact

that "the material which social scientists study is human actions and that these actions cannot be simply observed but need to be understood" (Frost, 1996: 40).

In order to do this, the observer or the investigator must engage in normative theory. Neufeld expresses a similar view asserting that, "the nature of positivism's hidden normative content is now manifest ... [since it contains] explicit and implicit value judgements, and controversial normative and ideological claims" (Neufeld, 1995: 105) despite its value-free and objective talk. Another reason, which contributed to keep normative theory in the margins of the discipline, has been the dominance of realist theory in the field of IR. Briefly, realism defines a 'balance of power' system in which the primary actor, namely the state, pursues its own national interests (often defined in military terms), utilising a rational decision-making process. In this sharp view of the world, there is no space left for ethical judgements in the realm of 'high politics'. However, "realist concern with power and the balance of power

This approach is known as the *Verstehen* approach to social sciences, which is also referred as 'interpretative social science' and sometimes as 'humanist social science'. In 1958, Peter Winch combined the insights of these earlier theorists and published his conclusions in his work called *The Idea of a Social Science*. It is closely related to the value commitments of statesmen who see order as essential to national security" (Viotti/Kauppi, 1993: 536).

The rational-actor model, which is central to realist thinking, is not value-free itself. Firstly, determining the national objectives requires value choices; and secondly, the means, which will be used to achieve these goals, has to be chosen according to the decision on which one is the best or more efficient. This type of decision-making underlines a value choice. Additionally, Frost claims that the primary actor-state, in its origin, has built into certain normative implications. Frost draws attention to the deep value commitments such as sovereignty and the right to self-determination that have been claimed by states: "participating in a (social) practice (be it a game or a political arrangement like the state or the system of states) requires that the participants recognise themselves as bound by a set

if rules; that is as bound by certain norms. Thus where a state exists there must be a group of people who see themselves as constituting a state through their mutual recognition of a specified set of rules. ...Thus a state is not a reality which exists independently of the ideas (including normative ones) that people adhere (Frost, 1996: 10).


According to Frost and Brown, another reason that has invalidated normative theory is the Cold War system itself. In the Cold War period, it was meaningless to make ethical claims within a bipolar system of power and nuclear deterrence. As Frost puts it, "in a 'life or death' struggle there did not appear to be much point in spending time and effort discussing the shape of a just world order" (Frost, 1996: 5). Therefore, the end of the Cold War, the emergence of new states bringing new ethical problems, and the rise of ethical concerns in world politics paved the way for normative theory to flourish in the last two decades.

*Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (1996)* offers many insights into the IR theory and the practice of world politics. In his work, Frost attempts to construct a 'background theory', which will provide guidelines and justification for the consideration of what he calls 'hard cases' of IR. To this end, he applies Dworkin's jurisprudential constructivist method to IR. By using Dworkin's theory of legal argument in order to cope with the hard cases in law (which are not clearly covered by any settled rule of law or precedent but come up for decision before a judge), Frost tries to generate solutions to the hard cases of IR: "According to Dworkin's model, it is possible to settle hard cases, ...but not without getting involved in "deep" discussions about the basic justifications for the institutions within which these issues arise" (Frost, 1996a: 98).

This entails, according to Frost, the construction of a background theory for the institution within which the hard case in question arises. In his construction of a normative theory of international relations, Frost identifies the following steps: First, we must list all those norms in international relations that are considered settled in terms of the modern state domain of discourse. Second, we must attempt to construct the best possible background

Justification for this settled body of norms. Third, following through on step two, we must apply the procedure of reflective equilibrium. [This is a back-and-forth procedure, by moving back and forth between the settled rules and the background theory the judge seeks equilibrium.] Fourth, with the aid of the background theory we must generate answers to some of the hard cases facing international relations theorists (Frost, 1996a : 04).

**2.2 Conceptual Review**



**Source:** *Primary Data 2015*

Somalia has experienced external intervention armed conflict since its independence on 1 July 1960. In addition to a number of inter-state wars over the years, it has suffered immensely from military coups and gross human rights violations. Despite a number of attempts to end the violence in Somalia, including 15 peace processes (e.g. partial peace processes, roadmaps, etc.), the security challenges remain demanding and have prompted further external intervention. Following a visit to Somalia in mid fall 2013, UN Deputy Secretary Jan Eliasson expressed support for an African Union (AU) proposal to triple

peacekeeping troops in Somalia to 45,000 from the current 17,551. Although there are challenges to such a large increase, the UN Security Council in mid-November 2012 authorized an increase of 4,000 peacekeepers. The increase of number of troops, suggests that the situation in Somalia is too vulnerable to lose sight of despite the political gains made in recent years.(Siyad, 1980).

### **2.3 Empirical Review**

#### **2.3.1 Factors contributing to the need for friendly international relations**

Over the years these security dilemmas have amplified. Today there are signs that these are somewhat decreasing. Negative spirals are becoming more positive. Yet, the overall challenges posed by these security dilemmas remain. Long-term security in Somalia is dependent on having these transcended. (Hassan, 2011). As a result of these regional security puzzles, Kenya and Ethiopia have had a historical security presence in Somalia. All two countries have supported or fought armed groups inside Somalia. Neighboring states have also harbored groups that have rebelled against various rulers in Mogadishu. At times, external interventions in Somalia have been carried out due to a need to fight domestic groups harbored in Somalia. At other times external interventions have been conducted to steer dynamics inside Somalia in a neighbor-friendly direction. Thus, Somalia has been used as a proxy theatre. Over the years, Ethiopia has had the most immediate stakes in Somalia as a result of perceived threatsAnd Kenya has had fewer stakes. Dynamics in recent years have shifted somewhat in this regard. Kenya has been increasingly challenged by Al Shabaab. (Zubeyr, 2010)

Today the conflict in Somalia is mainly about the domestic rebellion lead by Al Shabaab. In mid-2013, this armed Jihadist group conducted a number of seemingly well-planned attacks in Mogadishu. Despite months of security improvements, continued attacks signaled the movement's military presence and attempt to further foment discontent and undermine the Somali government. Instability in the capital and elsewhere in Somalia, including the inability of the government to prevent sustained attacks from armed groups,



Also means that external intervention in Somalia is likely to continue in the years to come. This view was exacerbated by the attack by Al SHABAAB in Nairobi in late September 2013.

Henceforth, further efforts will be needed by the international community to bring domestic and regional actors together in a durable peace. The political framework that currently exists, regarding constitutional referendum and general elections, provides a platform for such prospects. Assisting the government in Somalia to provide stability and basic welfare will decrease support for armed groups in the long term. It is against this backdrop that it is important to consider what regional conditions and alternatives there are to tackle the conflict in Somalia. (Yusuf, 2004)

At the outset of this study, a question was posed that dealt with regional initiatives to tackle the conflict in Somalia. Given the complex and violent history in the region and in Somalia in particular, were external interventions in Somalia by its neighbors the only option? Having outlined a number of explanations for why external interventions in Somalia have taken place, it is important to note that regional stakeholders could have chosen a different, less violent path.

After all, a path more focused on diplomacy and peace negotiations is essential to resolve outstanding issues. Such talks need to be conditioned by far-reaching disarmament programmes and verification. How then could a political process more focused peace negotiations look like? Before, summarizing some of the key conclusions from the cases examined in this study, a brief recap of some theoretical insights could be valuable in this context. (Jeffrey, 2000)

Well-grounded research suggests that parties choose to end an armed conflict when the moment is ripe. The "ripe moment concept" was introduced by Professor William Zartman a few decades ago. It suggests that parties to a conflict occasionally find themselves with joint interests to end hostilities and engage in peace talks. Usually, a ripe moment comes about when there is a "hurting stalemate". Such a stalemate is likely to occur when parties to a conflict find themselves locked into conflict positions in which no one gains or loses influence and the conflict becomes costly to both sides. In such a situation, both sides

realize that the conflict is not likely to be won and therefore perceive an interest in trying to overcome their incompatibilities. Parties in such a situation are often helped by a two-party mediator. Although a two party is neutral for the most part, it may also have its own interests in shaping the outcome to its advantage, and these cannot be disregarded. (William, 1998)

Two main positions in the literature describe conflict resolution. On the one hand, a war can be resolved if one party is simply destroyed or eliminated. This suggests a situation of victory by one side. It is open to question whether such an outcome leads to a durable peace. On the other hand, the warring parties can transcend their destructive and violent behavior and adopt more constructive activities. This outcome is more common and typically involves mediation and peace agreements. (Daniel, 2003)

In the case of Somalia, the complexity of actors makes it pertinent to include both domestic and external actors in negotiations if the peace agreement is to be just and durable. In recent years, key outside parties have not committed themselves to a viable Somali peace. A number of groups did not participate or were excluded from the peace talks. At the same time, a number of Islamists and other groups were left out of the political process or chose not to participate and grant the process legitimacy. Meanwhile, actors such as Kenya and Ethiopia have pursued their own political interests in Somalia, which risk not only prolonging the conflict, but also becoming a problem for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Clearly, none of the parties perceive a ripe moment to resolve their incompatibilities by more peaceful means. Nor has any external group experienced a hurting stalemate. (Siyad, 1983)

Yet, various parties are experiencing a security dilemma. As a result, both domestic and external actors are caught in a negative security and armed conflict spiral. Security for one actor is simply leading to a perceived decrease in security for the opponent. This in turn prompts further security measures among the two. The security dilemma is found at many different levels: between states (e.g. Ethiopia and Eritrea including their engagement with Al SHABAAB and thereby with consequences for Somalia), and between various clans and

rebel groups. Given this security dilemma it seems crucial that all parties further engage in regional talks to settle their differences. Put differently, peace and stability for Somalia depend as much on the dynamics inside Somalia as on the dynamics in the region. (Meles, 1988).

Having initially asked whether these states intervened out of an interest in promoting regional security or in defense of national interests, the chief conclusion of this study is that there is a clear mix of both these policies. However, each state reviewed has laid more or less weight on these strategic goals. Some key observations are set out below based on the country case studies presented in the Annex to this report. (Siyad, 1989)

**2.3.1.1 KENYA**

Kenya is deeply embroiled in Somalia’s politics. Aside from the military engagement in Somalia, there are a number of regular and shadow relations between the two states. This both enables and complicates the relationship between them (i.e. political, economic and social). Kenya shares a long border with Somalia and, unlike other states in the region; Kenya hosts a large number of Somali migrants and refugees. As is also highlighted in the Kenya case study, this link has given rise to the “Kenyan factor” in Somalia and equally a “Somalia factor” in Kenya. In this sense Kenya has for the past two decades been an “actively passive neighbour” of Somalia’s armed conflict.<sup>74</sup> Rather than engaging itself militarily in Somalia, Kenya has made use of the instability in Somalia to establish itself as a politically pivotal state and an economic hub. In recent years this has changed as Kenya has become an active neighbour not least militarily. However, Kenya’s engagement has come with a price of further spillover. Nairobi needs to consider whether its current military engagement in Somalia is viable in the long run. (Sebastien, 2004)

**2.3.1.2 ETHIOPIA**

Little information is available about Ethiopia’s military engagement in the Horn of Africa apart from the previous direct confrontation with Eritrea. Thus, little is known about Ethiopia’s military engagement in Somalia. Nonetheless, Ethiopia, like Uganda and Kenya,

has played a key role in Somalia's long civil war. Perhaps more than any other state in the region, Ethiopia's engagement in Somalia must be seen as part of a broader regional and historic conflict dynamic that transcends both the wider Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Ethiopia is pivotal to the settlement of Somalia's civil war not because of its role as a security provider, but because of its national interests.

Ethiopia's unilateral involvement in Somalia furthers calls for a regional political settlement. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) could well work as a conflict-diffusing platform under its role as a "regional arrangement" under chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, was it not for Ethiopia's domination of the organization – a domination that is likely to make other members hesitant about giving the regional organization a strong political role in the region. At the moment, however, most parties are looking for strong African Union (AU) engagement. (Davit, 2002)

**2.3.2 Impacts of the international relations in the region**

The intervention has not gone down well in the wider Horn of Africa, despite official statements of support. There is a rift over the regional strategy to pacify Somalia and contain Al-Shabaab. Unless the rivalry between Ethiopia and Kenya is tackled and a common stabilization strategy developed, each may seek to undermine the other's efforts, a prospect that would compound Somalia's political and security crisis. In the absence of improved international coordination, Somalia could in effect be carved into spheres of influence. AMISOM, dominated by Uganda, might have influence in Mogadishu and Lower and Middle Shebelle; and Ethiopia in Galgaduud, Hiraan, Bakool and Gedo; while Kenya would want influence in Lower and Middle Juba and parts of Gedo. (DANIEL, 2000)

Nairobi seeks to cast its decision to send in troops as part of an ongoing Western-led counter-terrorism struggle. Many in the West privately say a Kenyan campaign to weaken Al-Shabaab might not be a bad thing, though they are apprehensive about possible blow-back. There is modest covert Western support for the Kenyan military. Some form of specialized combat and logistical support is crucial, but increased Western involvement

could inflame Somali sentiment; catalyze radicalization and help Al-Shabaab's attempts to revive its political fortunes. (JEFFREY, 2000)

A number of high-level meetings have been held, including an AU summit at the end of January, one goal of which was to gain continent-wide consensus on the way forward, as well as to press for Security Council authorization to increase the AMISOM troop level from 2,000 to 17,000. On 23 February, the UK will host the London Somalia Conference, bringing together senior officials from over 40 countries and organizations to create a long-term stabilization plan, including support for: (JEFFREY, 1989) Security: sustainable funding for AMISOM and backing for Somali security and justice sectors; Political process: agreement to what should succeed the transitional institutions in Mogadishu in August 2012 and the establishment of a Joint Financial Management Board; Local stability: a coordinated package of support to Somalia's regions; Counter-terrorism: renewed commitment to tackle collectively the terrorist threat emanating from Somalia; Piracy: breaking the piracy business model; Humanitarian: renewed commitment to tackling the humanitarian crisis; and Coordination: agreement on improved international handling of Somalia issues.

Throughout history Abyssinia and Somalia were perceived as two diametrically opposed collectives, identities, and principles.<sup>4</sup> In stereotypical yet politically instrumental terms, Ethiopians and Somalis identified themselves as opposites in linguistic (Semitic vs. Cushitic), religious (Christian vs. Muslim), economic (settled cultivators vs. transhumant pastoralists), and political (hierarchical feudalism vs. egalitarian segmentary kinship) respects. From Ahmed Ibrahim al-Ghazi's (Gran or Gurey) 16th century jihad against highland Ethiopia to Mahammad 'Abdille Hasan's Dervish fighters at the end of the 19th century and from the Somali-Ethiopian Ogaden war (1977-78) to the recent presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia's Gedo, Bay, and Bakool regions, Ethiopians and Somalis generally viewed one another as members of mutually exclusive social universes. (Raage, 1977).

This holds particularly true for those Somali clan lineages that inhabit and migrate within the 250,000 km<sup>2</sup> territory of Region 5. The invention of an Ethiopian-Somali identity thus bears symbolic significance, as it had hitherto been regarded as something out of the question. In addition, to the critically minded observer, Sultan Korfa's statement raises a second problem: despite their newly found status as Ethiopian citizens, the political destiny and identity of the Somalis inhabiting Ethiopia's southeastern lowlands remain heavily contested. (CAROLA, 2003)

Although fifteen years have passed since the end of the military-socialist Derg regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, our review of the political and institutional dynamics in the Somali Region demonstrates that the issue of Ethiopian-Somali self-determination, within or outside the Ethiopian framework, is far from settled.

As we shall argue, for political, economic, and genealogical reasons, Ethiopian-Somalis are torn between integration into Ethiopia, independence on the basis of the right to self-determination, and the irredentist claims of the now defunct Somali Democratic Republic to Somali-inhabited territories beyond its borders. This article argues that the recognition of an Ethiopian-Somali polity has neither translated into democratic or effective working relations between the federal government and its Somali regional state nor, for that matter, increased mutual appreciation between highland Ethiopians and Somalis. In the first section of the essay, we review important developments in the formal political arena of the region since 1991, with a special focus on party politics.

The second section looks at how the new principle of "ethnic federalism" was implemented and how it affected Ethiopian-Somalis in Ethiopia's Somali region. The third part outlines the federal government's interventions and evolving agenda towards its Somali periphery. Fourthly, we discuss the contested political identities of Ethiopian-Somalis alluded to in the introduction. Finally, this article concludes with a discussion of the historic continuities and ruptures of the relations between highland Ethiopia and its Somali subjects-cum-citizens. (Peggy, 2000)

In 2006, Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), with political support and military assistance from the United States, entered the sovereign state of Somalia to bolster the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against the increasingly powerful Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Although the allied forces easily routed the ICU by January 2007, the struggle for control of Somalia had only just begun. Immediately after the dissolution of the ICU, an eclectic mix of former ICU loyalists, al-Shabaab Islamists and various Somali militias launched an insurgency campaign against the ENDF-TFG. The ensuing violence would last for over two years, inflict significant losses on all parties to the conflict and result in a catastrophic deterioration of humanitarian conditions for the Somali populace.

The purpose of this analysis is to determine the problem for sustaining friendly international relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. And also Ethiopia's military intervention on the civilian population of Somalia, An examination of civilian casualties, displacements and emigration prior to, during and after the ENDF-TFG campaign provides an estimate of the immediate costs of the conflict. A study of the tactics employed by all parties involved in the conflict is also relevant in determining the severity of the conflict's effects on Somali civilians. This analysis also poses a counterfactual: had the ENDF intervention not occurred, could the ICU have provided the stability necessary to improve humanitarian conditions? Finally, this analysis examines the impact of the Ethiopian intervention on the humanitarian situation in Somalia in the immediate wake of the ENDF's withdrawal. (DAVID, 2002)

In 1969, as the result of a military coup, former Vice Commander of the Somali army Siad Barre was installed as President. Barre initially experienced a measure of success in consolidating authority in the central government and limiting the divisiveness of inter-clan tensions through comprehensive political reforms. However, the ill-fated 1977 military campaign to liberate the Ogaden, a region of Ethiopia inhabited largely by Somalis, marked the beginning of the slow unraveling of Barre's regime.

The Somali Republic's decisive defeat in the Ogaden War of 1977-1978 by the Soviet-backed Ethiopians undermined Barre's domestic authority, and Barre's inability to address

he subsequent political fall-out from the debacle paved the way for the reintroduction of clannism, while the return of Western aid and assistance (to counter the Soviet presence in Ethiopia) renewed and fueled corruption.” Domestic opposition to the Barre regime sprang up among clans, and a series of challenges to Barre’s authority were met with harsh repression. This violent cycle contributed to the gradual erosion of Barre’s power until his ultimate fall in 1991. (Robert h & Roseberg, 1982)

Chaos and violence swept Somalia upon Barre’s abdication—Somalia’s declaration of independence, the fragmentation of the population along clan and sub-clan lines, the ensuing civil war and the rise of warlords such as Mohammed Farah Aidid all contributed to the displacement of three million Somalis.<sup>3</sup> The efforts of the international community to provide humanitarian relief to the Somali population have been well-documented: UNOSOM I in 1992, a UN Ceasefire Observer Force operation that “failed to make any impact” during the civil war;<sup>4</sup> the US-led UNITAF task force in 1992, which made progress in “securing the main relief centers in the starvation area but did not attempt to disarm the Somali clan militias or warlords;”<sup>5</sup> and UNOSOM II in 1993, which resulted in the deaths of eighteen US soldiers, prompting the withdrawal of US forces in 1994 and all remaining troops in March 1995 after the loss of thousands of Somalis and 70 UN peacekeepers (BARBARA, 2001)

With the ostensible purpose of facilitating dialogue between the TFG and the ICU, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1725 (UN-SCR 1725) in December 2006. The Resolution called for the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force made up of Intergovernmental Authority on Development and African Union personnel to facilitate peace talks between the TFG and ICU, maintain security in TFG-controlled Baidoa, protect TFG government officials and train TFG security personnel.<sup>8</sup> Immediately after its passage, the ICU, adamantly opposed to the measure, began attacking TFG-held territories in and around Baidoa.

These attacks catalyzed the offensive deployment of the ENDF-TFG forces towards Mogadishu and marked the beginning of the end for the ICU. The result was that by the



end of December the ICU had folded under an Ethiopian-led TFG advance, with some ICU leaders and troops retreating south from Mogadishu, and others melting back into the city's population. (ADEKUNLE, 1983)

Despite the defeat of the ICU, violence persisted largely unabated for the next two years as former ICU loyalists, Islamist militias such as al Shabaab and elements of the newly formed Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somali (ARS) waged an insurgent campaign against the UNDF-TFG. The power vacuum left by the ICU's collapse turned Somalia into a proxy battlefield of sorts, as a host of combatants sought to achieve a diverse set of aims in the resulting chaos: (1) the US targeted suspected al Qaeda members;<sup>10</sup> (2) Eritreans armed and trained Somali militias to inflict losses upon their chief rival, Ethiopia; (3) Islamist militias and foreign jihadists waged war to dislodge the US-supported ENDF and establish a foothold in the Horn of Africa; and (4) Somali warlords sought to aggrandize their power. Many of the belligerent parties committed flagrant violations of international humanitarian law, and the effects of the violence upon the civilian population were catastrophic. (BARBARA, 2001)

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents the research methodology used to investigate the problems of sustaining friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. In this chapter, the research was discussed the research design, the research population, sample size, sampling procedures, research instruments, validity and reliability of the instrument, data gathering procedures, data analysis, ethical considerations and finally the limitation of the study was discussed.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

The study utilized a descriptive survey design. Descriptive research is used when the problem is structured and well understood. In the third type of design mentioned by Ghauri and Gronhaug, the problems under investigation are also structured but in contrast to descriptive research, the researcher must deal with cause and effect problems and the researcher must isolate the causes and effects (explanatory research). The research design of this thesis is mainly descriptive in nature as the problem that we are dealing with is well structured and understood. Therefore, the researchers selected this design as it provides rigorous and replicable procedure for understanding relationships. Therefore quantitative data analysis was used in this study.

#### **3.2 Research Population**

The target population of the study was Somali diplomats and diplomats and nationals of all three countries. The study specifically focused on literate people such as the Embassy of Kenya, the Embassy of Ethiopia and other nationals in Somalia; since the questionnaire is in English and the researchers could not find standard translation for the terminology set out in the literature of the study. Thus, the researchers were gone to avoid errors or bias in

he findings that may result from the misunderstanding of the questionnaire by the respondents.

**3.3 Sample size**

The study utilized Solven’s Formula to establish the sample size of the research. The formula is as follows

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(0.05)^2}$$

<b>Categories</b>	<b>Target Population</b>	<b>Sample size</b>
<b>Diplomats from three countries</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Parliament committee</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Nationals from the three countries</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>60</b>

**3.4 Sampling procedure**

The sampling procedure of this study used non probability sampling procedure particularly; purposive sampling was used to select the sample. Purposive sampling is a method of sampling where the researchers intentionally choose who to include in the study based on their ability to provide necessary data (Osa & Onen, 2008). The rationale for choosing this approach is that respondents who are suitable to participate in this study are purposively chosen as target respondents of the study. Also the researchers realized the justification is that they select typical and useful respondents. Purposive sampling will save time and money for the researchers.

### 3.5 Sources of data

#### Primary data

Primary source of data collection were the original and first hand information which has not existed before. This involved interviewing and use of questionnaires to get the first hand information from the respondents.

Interview; Interviews will be provided to some of the members of the company and the customers to establish the contribution of rewarding on customer satisfaction and employees performance.

Questionnaire; There will be systematic designed questionnaires which will be closed ended questions printed on the piece of paper to be answered by the participants. So printed questionnaires will be given out to the selected respondents who can understand the questions clearly and are able to answer them then after to be retrieved for the analysis.

#### Secondary data

Secondary data refers to re-analyzing data that has already been collected for some other purposes other than the one at hand. The data in literature review was mostly obtained from this source such as text books, and internet.

Documentation and library; The researcher will also gather information from other related literature from various documentations concerning the study topic which will be used in the research.

### 3.6 Data collection instruments

These are the tools used for getting the data which have been collected. For this case the researcher used the following instruments in the data collection exercise interview guide, key informant guide group discussion topics, observation and check lists.

**interview guide and key informants guide:**

According to Ahuja (2001), an interview guide and key informants as a data collection techniques, sets of structured questions in which questions are asked and the answer are recorded by the interviewer. These approach normally enables in depth probing which is very vital in carrying out the research.

**Group discussion topics:**

These are the chosen topics by the group members to guide them about the research being under taken by them

**Observation:**

This is physically watching the experiments set and these and then gathering the information from the experiment which was being carried out by the researcher.

**Documentary analysis:**

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (1999), documentary checklists outlines the detailed characteristics of defined collection process. These instruments covered the information sources like secondary data such as published information.

**3.7 Reliability of the instruments of data collection**

**3.6.1 Validity**

The researcher ensured content validity of the questionnaire by constructing items that were in conformity with the study conceptual framework. Questionnaire pre-tested were carried out to identify and eliminate those questions that could pose problems. Inputs were obtained from human resource experts and senior lecturers in the field of management in College of Higher Degrees and Research of Kampala International University who calculated the relevance and clarity of items in the instrument. Content validity index (CVI) was calculated using the formula:

$$\text{CVI} = \frac{n}{N}$$

Where N represents total Number of items (questionnaires) and n represent Number of items declared valid in the questionnaire.

### 3.6.2 Reliability

Reliability of the instrument on multi-items variables was tested using reliability statistics. It was very consistent and realistic. The instruments were finally checked for accuracy, consistency and completeness using Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient (Sikaran, 2003). The instrument had a high degree of reliability, with all Cronbach's Alpha coefficients for all items tested. The standardized Cronbach's alpha can be defined as;

$$\alpha_{\text{standardized}} = \frac{K\bar{r}}{(1 + (K - 1)\bar{r})}$$

Where  $K$  is as above and  $\bar{r}$  the mean of the  $K(K - 1)/2$  non-redundant correlation coefficients (i.e., the mean of an upper triangular, or lower triangular, correlation matrix).

### 3.7 Data Gathering Procedures

Data gathering procedures will be divided into three phases, these will include before, during and after. The researcher will follow these phases to reach to the conclusion of the data gathering procedures.

**Before,** before the research, the researcher will be required to get an introductory letter from the College of Higher Degrees and Research. After this letter, the researcher will be required to present this letter to the field officials before carrying out the data gathering.

**During;** in the process of collecting data, the researcher will educate the respondents about the research and also inform them about the future use, benefits and outcomes of

the research report. This will be done by the researcher with the help of three to five people by distributing the questionnaires to the respondents.

**After;** after collecting the data from the field research the analysis process and presentation will emerge. The researcher will make sure she collects all the questionnaires from the respondents since the questionnaires will be vital in data analysis procedures and presentation.

### **3.8 Research Procedure**

The researcher acquired an introductory letter from the department which was presented to the relevant authorities in order to grant her permission to administer the instruments or tools for data collection. The researcher then introduced himself to the participants and briefly told them about the purpose and objectives of the study. At the same time, the researcher will prepare the research assistants whom to go with the work and period of the work and advice them to keep confidentiality while carrying out this work. The completed questionnaires will be cross checked to find out whether all the questions are answered. The researcher will appreciate the respondents and research assistants for their generous participation and continue with the second phase.

**3.9 Data Analysis**

The data of this research was analyzed with the help of the statistical program SPSS version 20 (Statistical Package for the Social Science). This program was chosen because it is capable of processing various statistical analyses that are not available in Excel. The frequency and percentage distribution was used to determine the demographic characteristics of the respondents.

The following table presents the mean ranges and their interpretation

Mean range	Interpretation
3.28 - 4.03	Excellent
2.52– 3.27	Very Good
1.76 - 2.51	Good
1.00 - 1.75	Poor

**3.10 Ethical Considerations**

The researchers thought about the ethical issues throughout the research project, and kept the secrecy and confidentiality of the respondents from the public. The private information was kept confidential; the research team used it only for academic purposes. Anonymity and confidentiality of the undisclosed information have high priority. And also the research was fully conducted ethically and all copyrights were observed and where permission was required for reproducing materials was sought.

**3.11 Limitations of the Study**

Accessibility of the data may be limited, some of the respondents were not willing to share with the researcher some of the information that they consider confidential but the researcher promised to keep the information gathered as confidential and only to be used for



academic purposes. There may be a language barrier because some of the respondents may feel difficult in understanding the questions in the questionnaire, to enhance the validity of the study the researchers used a simple language that any respondent can understand clearly and easily, but the researcher was too patient to explain fully when need arises and finally some of letters of the questionnaires may be loss but this was identify in the findings chapter.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

#### 4.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the researchers talked about in depth the explanation of the research methodology. In this chapter, the collected data was analyzed using the statistical technique namely, correlation method. The findings were analyzed by SPSS package and were based on the research findings. The objectives of the study included the factors contributing to international relations in Somalia, the impact of international relations in Somalia and the relationship between the three countries namely; Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia.

#### 4.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

This part presents the background information of the respondents who participated in this study the purpose of this background information is to find out the characteristics of the respondents. Furthermore, the respondents have also been given the promise that all the data they provided is used for the purpose of Academic research and the identities of the respondents were confidential. In total, 60 respondents of politician people in Mogadishu-Somalia. They filled in the questionnaire 60 Politicians people in Mogadishu-Somalia. The shape of the questionnaire in the demographic section is looked upon in terms of Gender, Age, Education, Occupation, and Duration of stay in area.

**Table 1: Demographic Characteristics**

Categories	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Gender of the respondents</b>		
Male	40	66.7%
Female	20	33.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Age:</b>		
18 up to 30	5	8.3%
31 up to 40	11	18.3%
41 up to 50	20	33.3%
51 above	24	40.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Educational level:</b>		
Secondary	5	8.3%
Diploma	12	20.0%
Bachelor	21	35.0%
Master	15	25.0%
Other	7	11.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Occupations:</b>		
Parliament	20	33.3%
Diplomacy	6	10.0%
Ministry affairs	21	35.0%
Politician	10	16.7%
Other	3	5.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>100%</b>

<b>Duration of stay in area:</b>		
below 1 year	8	13.3%
up to 5 years	22	36.7%
up to 10years	24	40.0%
above 11 years	6	10.0%
<b>total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Primary data, 2015

### **Gender of the respondents**

The above table 4.1 shows results indicated that majority of respondents were Male 40 (66.7%) and only 20 (33.3%) were female, Based on data gathered, the majority of the respondents are male, while a small number of the respondents are female.

### **Age of the respondents**

The above table 4.1 Still results show that majority of respondents in this sample were between 51 above years of age (40.0%), these were followed by those between 41-50 years (33.3%), implying that majority of respondents in this sample are youths.

### **Educational level of the respondents**

The above table 4.1 Concerning the respondents academic qualification, majority of them are bachelor degree holders (35.0%), 25.0% were Master degree holders and these were followed by Diploma degree holders (20.0%), implying that respondents in this sample were generally qualified.

### **Occupations of the respondents**

The above table 4.1 shows the most of respondents department is Operations Parliament (8.3%), Diplomacy (20.0%), and Ministry affaires (35.0%). Politician (25.0%) and other (11.7%) the majority of the respondents were stay politician and Diplomacy.

**Duration of stay in area of the respondents**

The above table 4.1 shows With respect Duration of stay in area, results indicate that majority of these respondents had stay 6-10 years 24(40.0%), these were followed by those who had stay for 2-5 years 22(36.7%), implying that these workers have enough working experience.

**4.2 Factors contributing to the sustaining of Friendly International Relations between Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia.**

After background information, the researchers went ahead to present the correlation and descriptive analysis from the opinions of the respondents. The first objective of this study is to identify the factors that contributes to the sustaining of friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia, the respondents were requested to indicate the size to which they agree with each of the items by expressing their perception.

To achieve this objective, the respondents were asked to respond several statements related to the factors that contributes to the sustaining of friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. Although this study, the researchers selected is based on Somali politician as a sample of the other Society, the result from this sample can be generalized to all Somalia Politicians.

**Table 2: Mean index of the factors that contributes to the sustaining of friendly international relations**

No	The factors that contributes to the sustaining of friendly international relations.	Mean	Std. Deviation	Interpretation
1.	Government of these countries have so far focused and decided to cooperate so that to protect their territories against and Terrorist movement especially AL_SHABAB.	2.90	.951	Very good
2.	Kenya and Ethiopia joined force and delayed solders (troupes) to <b>fight AL_KHAIDA</b> in Somalia so as to establish peace in Mogadishu.	2.98	1.049	Very good
3.	After the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia, Ethiopia at first not recognize the inversion government and reportedly continued its roads against AL_SHABAB and <b>supporting warlord faction</b> . Hence accusations on both sides.	2.97	.863	Very good
4.	Mostly, terrorist movements have their basis in both Somalia and Ethiopia. But now Kenya is threatened and underdid some Terrors caused by terrorist coming from these countries. Hence Diplomatic cooperation and creation of neutral new military force is needed to neutralize that said movement.	2.85	.936	Very good
5.	Kenya and Ethiopia joined force and delayed solders (troupes) to fight AL_KHAIDA in Somalia so as to establish peace in Mogadishu.	1.38	.666	Poor
<b>Mean Index</b>		<b>2.62</b>	<b>.893</b>	<b>Very good</b>

Source: Primary Data 2015

According to the above table 4.2 presented the total mean index of the factors that contributes to the sustaining friendly relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia is 2.62. This indicates that there is a very good of sustaining friendly relations between these

countries. The researchers where fund the factors that contributes to the sustaining friendly are fight AL\_KHAIDA and supporting warlord faction as indicted the mean index (2.98) and (2.97) respect. Three major factors have been explained by most scholars as the root causes of Somalia's conflict and the followed breakdown and statelessness of the country. These are the A) colonial legacy, B) economic factors and C) politicized clan system. Similar to many other conflicts in Africa. Somalia's conflict is related to the colonial wars. The colonial powers of Somalia (Britain, France and Italy) divided the Somali inhabited territories into five segments. Britain took two regions, (the British Somaliland, and Northern territory of Kenya) while Italy colonized one part (The Italian Somaliland) whereas France took one part (The Northern coast, currently the republic of Djibouti) and the rest was occupied by Ethiopia (The Ogaden region) (Mulugetta, 2009: 9).

Successive attempts to unite the Somali-inhabited territories under one state produced the republic of Somalia which of consisted only two parts of the five (The British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland) in 1960. After the emergence of Somalia, efforts to gain the other three Somali-inhabited territories continued, this time spear-headed by the Somalia state which went to inter-state wars and disputes with the neighboring states (Ethiopia and Kenya) (Mulugeta, 2009: 9). However, these wars are regarded to have partially caused the downfall of the Somalian state. Devastation caused by the war with Ethiopia and severe droughts in 1978 weakened the military government. Consequently, sections of the military forces who got disappointed with their ruler attempted an abortive coup against Siyad Bare in 1978. This led the state to oppress clans and regions where leaders of the coup hailed from, which in turn led the armed opposition against the regime to increase. Armed rebel groups had been established (Harper, 2012: 55).

Amongst the most popular armed factions that also ousted the military government in 1991 were Somali National Movement (SNM) Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), United Somali Congress (USC) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).

**3.3 Impact of the friendly international relations in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia on the people**

This section seeks to establish the impacts of the friendly relations in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia to the people of Somalia and how these relations have impacted on their social and economical wellbeing.

**Table 3: Impacts of the friendly relations to the people**

Sl. No	Impacts of the friendly relations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Interpretation
1.	Socio economic development is achieved between the people of the three countries	2.80	.951	Very good
2.	Peace and harmony between the three countries is experienced	2.78	1.049	Very good
3.	Trade is achieved	2.57	.863	Very good
4.	Tourism is achieved	2.35	.936	Very good
5.	Stability of the nation is experienced	1.18	.666	Fair
	<b>Mean Index</b>	<b>2.34</b>	<b>.893</b>	<b>Very good</b>

Source: Primary Data 2015

Somalia's conflict is characterized by both typologies of conflicts that are explained above. Since this conflict broke out because of "bad domestic problems" it is also a "mass-Level" conflict because of the multiplicity of actors in it including regional states that involve in this conflict because of the problems flooding over borders to neighbor states (Brown, 1996: 580).

Somalia's case is a classical example of regionalized conflict since almost all states in the region have suffered "spillover" problems from Somalia. However, almost all states in the region have military and political involvement in this conflict. Kenya and Ethiopia have both explained their concerns about willingness to create security "Buffer Zones" inside Somalia to protect their national security (Eriksson, 2013: 4).



#### **1.4 The relationship affects the friendly relations between these neighboring countries.**

The last objective of this study is to identify the relationship affect the friendly relations between these neighboring countries, the respondents were requested to indicate the size to which they agree with each of the items by expressing their perception.

To achieve this objective, the respondents were asked to respond several statements related to the relationship affect the friendly relations between these neighboring countries. Although this study, the researchers selected is based on Somali politician as a sample of the other Society, the result from this sample can be generalized to all Somalia Politicians.

**Table 4: Relationship between the friendly relations of Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia**

No	The relationship affects the friendly relations between these neighboring countries.	Mean	Std. Deviation	Interpretation
1.	The tension in relations with Somalia led imposing Ethiopia to draw close to Kenya (The Somalia did not decline either from demanding the unification with Somalia of the northern border region of Kenya, which is populated by Somalis) on anti-Somalia basis.	2.25	1.083	Good
2.	<b>Diplomatic leaders</b> of these countries through their stress that the issues between countries must be resolved by peaceful means to reduce displacement of people from country to country.	2.45	.907	Good
3.	The vision that Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia have for the continent is similar with regards to <b>promoting democratic peace</b> through processes which are driven by African themselves supported by AU and UN.	2.38	1.059	Good
4.	Kenya and Ethiopia they extended the territory of Somalia, is that broken or affect the relationship between those neighboring countries.	2.37	.882	Good
5.	Somalia has to join Easter African countries union as to facilitate their neighboring diplomatic relationship.	1.73	.578	Poor
	<b>Mean Index</b>	<b>2.23</b>	<b>.902</b>	<b>Good</b>

Source: Primary Data 2015

According to the above table 4.5 presented the total mean index of the relationship affect the friendly relations between these neighboring countries is 2.23. This indicates that there is an existing the relationship affect the friendly relations between these countries. The

researchers where fund the affect friendly relations are Diplomatic leaders and promoting democratic peace as indicted the mean index (2.45) and (2.38) respect.

Ethiopia is regarded as an influential external actor in the Somali conflict. The country has a long undemarcated border with Somalia in the east. Ethiopia and Somalia have a long hostile history over the Somali inhabited Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia which has resulted in interstate wars between the two countries (Afyare and Barise, 2006: 8). While the hostility between the two countries is unresolved officially in an interstate process, the civil war broke out in Somalia 1991. This created a new security concern for Ethiopia. Groups of different identity in Somalia threatened and carried out attacks in Ethiopia (Abink, 2003: 8).

Ethiopia has been following and involved the Somalia conflict which continues over two decades. This study tries to understand what issues and interests Ethiopia has in the Somali conflict and how this affects the overall situation of Somalia. The hostile history between the two countries followed by the nature of conflicts to "spill over" in nearby countries and affect them in different ways motivated the Ethiopian involvement in the Somali conflict. As Brown explained, conflicts have important implications for regional stability in many aspects (Bown, 1996: 591). This is because; conflicts spread quickly and create instability in the neighboring states in a variety of ways including transfer of weapons and cross border attacks. In the case of Somalia, Al-Itihad, a popular and one of foremost Islamist groups in Somalia declared war against Ethiopia and waged terrorist attacks in that country (Mulugeta, 2009: 12).

Even though Kenya hosts the largest number of Somali refugees in the world, Kenya's role in the Somali conflict remained quite neutral for many years. It has been involved in mediation processes between internal actors and hosted several peace processes meant to reconcile conflicting parts in Somalia. This included the one held 2002-2004 in under the auspices of IGAD member states and international community producing the TFG (Moller, 2009: 3). Regardless of its role in the conflict, Kenya always experienced insecurity incidents posed by this conflict since it broke out in 1991 (Miyandazi, 2012:2). This relates

o Brown's explanation about provocative actions of internal conflicts against neighboring states arguing that problems of refugee and insecurity "spill over" are amongst factors that can lead regional states to involve in local conflicts (Brown, 1996:591).

Furthermore, Brown (1996: 599, 600) explained that local conflicts have great potential to "spill over" and create military problems for neighboring states. He argues that internal conflict generates instability in neighboring states, creating political and economic instability. In the case of Somalia, Al-Shabaab abducted aid workers and tourists in Kenya creating security and economic instability in that country. The group kidnapped two Danish aid workers in northern Kenya and wounded several others. This created a crisis for aid organizations to help refugees and other aid dependent people in Kenya (Markowden, YouTube: May.21-2014).

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the findings of the study as presented in chapter four. It also presents the conclusions arising from the study as well as the recommendations; this chapter has the following sections. Section 5.1 discussion for the result, Section 5.2 introduces conclusions arising from the study. Section 5.3 presents the recommendations of the study. The study investigates the problem of sustaining friendly international relation between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia.

#### 5.1 Discussions for the Results

##### 5.1.1 Factors contributing to the friendly international relations

This study analyzes the Somali conflict and the involvement of the most influential external actors, notably Ethiopia and Kenya, and how their intervention in the conflict and peace process impacted the overall situation in Somalia in post 2000. Using Paul Wehr's conflict mapping model, which helps to understand the origin, nature and dynamics of a conflict, this study examined the Somali conflict with the help of Kaldor's theoretical framework of 'new wars' and Brown's concept of regional dimensions of internal conflict. Accordingly, the study found that the two countries in question have transnational security concern and their actions and behavior within this particular conflict is necessitated by their national security threats posed by the conflict in Somalia.

This is evident not only because Somalia's conflict gave sanctuary to rebel groups of neighboring states and international terrorist or radical groups involving proliferation of arms supplies and streaming of refugees, but also has become a regional one as it crosses the borders posing a clear and present danger on the national security of neighboring states and the entire eastern African region. Moreover, the "spill over" of the Somali conflict has created a clear threat to the international peace and security causing violence

ar beyond the region i.e. piracy in the international waters. This confirms Brown's assertion that an internal conflict becomes international issue when it crosses its borders and poses a threat to international peace and security (Brown, 1996).

### **3.1.2 Impact of the international relations**

Although Ethiopia played important role in the peace process for Somalia, its behavior sometimes undermined some of the efforts in which her interest was at stake; the Cairo peace process (see pp.38) is a prime example of this. Moreover, the Ethiopian and Kenyan military intervention, particularly the war between ENDF and insurgent groups in Somalia in 2006-2009 has created a mass of internal displacement (IDPs) and refugees fleeing to neighboring countries, including Ethiopia and Kenya. As a result, the already deteriorating humanitarian situation in Somalia has become difficult for the international aid organizations. This is how the behavior of these external actors affected Somalia.

Based on Brown's assertion of the regional dimension of internal conflict, this study sees a prospect for peace if a relevant resolution scheme is designated; thus it strongly suggests an international commitment to restore peace, rule of law and ensure long term stability in Somalia. The international actors, including the regional and neighboring states should map out the Somali conflict and come up with a single approach targeting a holistic resolution to the conflict. Although bilateral approaches can complement the international effort, conflict of interest may arise in the process, which can possibly prolong the conflict lifetime. In this case, any attempt to resolve the crisis in Somalia should be regarded as part of the broader interest of the international community and such process should be inclusive of all relevant stakeholders, which are involved or mapped in the entire conflict. In sum, it should be understood that resolving the Somali conflict is equivalent to bringing peace in the threatened neighbors, the region and beyond.

Finally, the author of this thesis admits that the study does not cover and elucidate every issue and aspect of the Somali conflict; hence suggests further field research on this topic from a broader perspective which investigates the cooperation and contradictions among the many local and external actors and oversee the potential for peace within Somalia as well as in the region. More importantly, further study would help to understand

ow both the Somali conflict and the interventions of external actors, affect the livelihoods of the ordinary people on the ground.

## **4.2 Conclusions**

This study was examining the problem of sustaining friendly international relation between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. The target population of this study was 70 included managers and employees. This study has four objectives: the first objective of this study is to identify the factors that contributes to the sustaining of friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The total of mean index is 2.62. The researches concludes the factors that contributes to the sustaining friendly are fight AL\_KHAIDA and supporting warlord faction as indicted the mean index (2.98) and (2.97) respect. The Last objective of this study is the relationship affects the friendly relations between these neighboring countries. The total mean index of the relationship affect the friendly relations between these neighboring countries is 2.23. This indicates that there is an existing the relationship affect the friendly relations between these countries. The researchers where and the affect friendly relations are Diplomatic leaders and promoting democratic peace as indicted the mean index (2.45) and (2.38) respect.

## **4.3 Recommendation**

After data are collected, discussed and closed up, the researchers of this study recommended the following:

1. The researchers recommend to keep the Diplomatic leaders and promoting democratic peace of these neighboring countries.
2. The researcher recommends that cooperation should always involve collaboration of parties working together to solve issues concerning international relations between neighboring countries.
3. Also the researchers recommend to work together or collaborate to fighting AL\_KHAIDA and supporting warlord faction.

## REFERENCES

- BBINK, J (1998): "*Briefing: The Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Dispute*", African Affairs 7(389), 551-565.
- BBINK, JON (2003): "*Badme and the Ethio-Eritrean border: The challenge of demarcation in the post-war period*". Africa [Rome] LVIII, (2) (Jun): 219-31.
- BDUSSAMAD H. AHMAD (1999): "Trading in Slaves in Bela-Shangul and Gumuz, Ethiopia: Border-Enclaves in History 1897-1938", In: The Journal of African History, 40, pp. 433-446.
- GHEMELO, A. (2006): "*Colonialism as a Source of Boundary Dispute and Conflict among African States*", Journal of Social Sciences. 13(3): 177-181.
- JALA, A. (1983): "*The Nature of African Boundaries.*" Afrika Spectrum, 18: 177-188.
- SIWAJU, I. (1984): "*Artificial Boundaries.*" Inaugural Address, University of Lagos: Lagos, 2 December.
- SIWAJU, I. (1985): "*The Conceptual Framework.*" In: Partitioned Africans, ed. A. I. siwaju. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1-18.
- SIWAJU, I. (1993): « *The Paradox of African Boundaries.* » in African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities. A. I. Asiwaju and Paul Nugent (eds.) London: Pinter.
- ACH, D. (1999): *Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Disintegration.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- AHRU Z. (2002): *A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855–1991.* Addis Ababa. Addis Ababa University Press, 2nd edition.
- ARBOUR, K. (1961): "*A Geographical Analysis of Boundaries in Inter- Tropical Africa.*" In: Essays on African Population, ed. K.M. Barbour and R.M. Prothero. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 303-323.
- ELLO, A. (1995): "*The Boundaries Must Change.*" West Africa, 10 April: 546.



MENTSI-ENCHILL, K. (1976): "The Traditional Legal Systems of Africa," Property and Trust, vol. 6, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. Tubingen, Germany: J. C. B. Mohr, 1-38.

MERRY, L. (1968): *The Sudan's Contact with East Africa*, International Conference on Sudan in Africa, University of Khartoum- Faculty of Arts Sudan Research Unit.

WZUREK, D. (2000): "What Makes Some Boundary Disputes Important?" IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, 83-95.

WZUREK, J. (1996): *Eritrea-Yemen Dispute over the Hanish Islands*, IBRU, Boundary and Security Bulletin.

WZUREK, J. (1999): "Gulf of Guinea Boundary Disputes" IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin.

WIERBST, J. (1989): "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa." International Organization 43, no. 4 (Autumn 1989): 673.

WIERBST, J. (2000): *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

WIOILE, D. (2002): *The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council "The Search for Peace in the Sudan"*. The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London.

WYOYLE, P. (2000): *Somaliland: Passing the Statehood Test?* IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin.

WYACKSON, R. (1982): "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood." World Politics 35: 1-24.

WYONES, S. (1945): *Boundary Making*, Washington: Carnegie Foundation for International Peace.

WYAPIL, L. (1966): "On the conflict potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa", World Politics, 18 (4), 656-673.

UM, M. (1993): "*The Central African Sub region.*" Disarmament: Workshop on the Role of order Problems in African Peace and Security. New York: United Nations, 1993, 49-71.

WIATKOWSKA, B. (2001): *The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress In The acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation.* Ocean Development and International Law, 32(1).

ENTZ, C. (2003): '*This is Ghanaian territory!*' land conflicts on a West African border. American Ethnologist 30, (2) (May): 273-89.

OISEL, S. (2004): *The European Union and African Border Conflicts: Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation.* UACES Student Forum Regional Conference, Cambridge, May 2004.

**COLLEGE OF HIGHER DEGREES AND RESEARCH  
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES**

July, 9<sup>th</sup>, 2014

**INTRODUCTION LETTER FOR MAHAD ABDULLAHI HUSSEIN REG.NO.  
MIR/41103/133/DF TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN YOUR ORGANISATION**

The above mentioned candidate is a bonafide student of Kampala international University pursuing a Master's of International Relations and diplomacy Studies.

He is currently conducting a field research for his dissertation entitled "**The Problems of Sustaining Friendly International Relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia**".

Your organization has been identified as valuable source of information pertaining to his research project. The purpose of this letter then is to request you to avail him with pertinent information he may need.

Any information shared with him will be used for academic purposes only and shall be kept with utmost confidentiality.

Any assistance rendered to him will be highly appreciated.

Yours truly,



**Dr. E.S Kasenene**  
**Deputy Principal, CHDR.**

## APPENDIX: A

### INFORMED CONSENT

I am giving my consent to be part of the research study of Mr. MAHAD ABDULLAHI USSEIN that will focus on **the problems of sustaining friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia**

I shall be assured of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality and that I will be given the option to refuse participation and right to withdraw my participation any time.

I have been informed that research is voluntary and that the results will be given to me if I ask for it.

Initials: \_\_\_\_\_

Date:        /        /2015

## APPENDIX: B

### QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESPONDENTS

Dear respondent,

I am a graduate at Kampala International University (KIU). I am conducting this study in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Master's degree of social science, department of international relations and diplomacy studies. The intention is to gain an understanding **the problems of sustaining friendly international relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia**. Answering this questionnaire is a valuable contribution.

This questionnaire is designed to share with your opinion. It is not a test, so there are no right or wrong answers. Please answer each item as carefully and accurately as you can by marking (✓) the appropriate option.

I assure that the data you provide solely sought for academic purpose and the information you provide will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank you

Yours sincerely

## QUESTIONNAIRE

### SECTION A: Demographic Profile of the respondents.

Kindly tick on the blank space before each category

#### 1. State your Sex:

- a) Male \_\_\_\_\_
- b) Female \_\_\_\_\_

#### 2. Age:

- a) 18 up to 30 \_\_\_\_\_
- b) 31 up to 40 \_\_\_\_\_
- c) 41 up to 50 \_\_\_\_\_
- d) 51 above \_\_\_\_\_

#### 3. Educational Level:

- a) Secondary \_\_\_\_\_
- b) Diploma \_\_\_\_\_
- c) Degree \_\_\_\_\_
- d) Master \_\_\_\_\_
- e) Other \_\_\_\_\_

#### 4. Occupations:

- a) Parliament \_\_\_\_\_
- b) Diplomacy \_\_\_\_\_
- c) Ministry Affaires \_\_\_\_\_
- d) Politician \_\_\_\_\_
- e) Other \_\_\_\_\_

#### 5. Duration of stay in area:

- a) Below 1 years \_\_\_\_\_
- b) 2 up to 5 years \_\_\_\_\_
- c) 6 up to 10 years \_\_\_\_\_
- d) Above 11 years \_\_\_\_\_

**SECTION B:FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTES SUSTAINING FRIENDLY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SOMALIA, KENYA AND ETHIOPIA.**

**Direction:** please respond to the statement below and use the respond mode below to the answer the following questions by indicating

**Respond mode:** Strongly Agree (SA) =4, Agree (A) =3, stronglyDisagree (SDA) =1. If not write down you. "Comment"

Scale	SA	A	DA	SDA
Government of these countries have so far focused and decided to cooperate so that to protect their territories against and Terrorist movement especially AL_SHABAB.				
Kenya and Ethiopia joined force and delayed solders (troupes) to fight AL_KHAIDA in Somalia so as to establish peace in Mogadishu.				
After the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia, Ethiopia at first not recognize the inversion government and reportedly continued its roads against AL_SHABAB and supporting warlord faction. Hence accusations on both sides.				
Mostly, terrorist movements have their basis in both Somalia and Ethiopia. But now Kenya is threatened and underdid some Terrors caused by terrorist coming from these countries. Hence Diplomatic cooperation and creation of neutral new military force is needed to neutralize that said movement.				

5. Kenya and Ethiopia joined force and delayed solders (troupes) to fight AL\_KHAIDA in Somalia so as to establish peace in Mogadishu.

a. Yes:

b. No:

c. Any Suggestion: .....

.....

.....

**SECTION C: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOMALIA AND KENYA.**

**Direction:** please respond to the statement below and use the respond mode below to the answer the following questions by indicating

**Respond mode:** Strongly Agree (SA) = 4, Agree (A) = 3, strongly Agree (SA) = 2, strongly Dis-agree (SDA) = 1. If not write down you. "Comment"

lo	Scale	SA	A	DA	SDA
.	Somalia and Kenya do not have deals, they both want to promote business activity have been at the fore front of mediation efforts.				
.	Trade imbalance and economic competition informs problems areas but careful policy consideration can help deal with this problems.				
.	Somalia and Kenya have mediation and negotiation experiences in order to help troubled countries find solution to their problems.				
.	The issue of norms and values which are promoted by both Kenya and Somalia shows that foreign policy is not primarily drive by "real Politic" self-interest.				



10. Somalia and Kenya can also resolve a conflict situation involving in their borders.

a. Yes:

b. No:

c. Any Suggestion: .....

.....

.....

**SECTION D: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA.**

**Direction:** please respond to the statement below and use the respond mode below to the answer the following questions by indicating

**Respond mode:** Strongly Agree (SA) = 4, Agree (A) = 3, strongly Dis-agree (SDA) = 2, Strongly Dis-agree (SDA) = 1. If not write down you. "Comment"

10	Scale	SA	A	DA	SDA
10.	Somalia and Ethiopia contribute to an understating of their foreign relations with moving from countries to countries.				
10.	Both of these countries asses or promote the strategic relevance of foreign policy and democratic peace in their public policies.				
10.	Authorities of both these countries investigate and explain the nature of foreign policy towards Somalia and Ethiopia.				
10.	Somalia and Ethiopia strive to fight any suspicion of any terrorist movement within the country as well as on their borders.				

5. Most of Somalia and Ethiopia citizens are now aware about the diplomatic relations of the above countries.

a. Yes:

b. No:

d. Any Suggestion: .....

.....

.....

**SECTION E: THE RELATIONSHIP AFFECTS THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THESE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.**

**Direction:** please respond to the statement below and use the respond mode below to the answer the following questions by indicating

**Respond mode:** Strongly Agree (SA) =4, Agree (A) =3, stronglyDisagree (SDA) =1. If not write down you. "Comment"

lo	Scale	SA	A	DA	SDA
.	The tension in relations with Somalia led imposing Ethiopia to draw close to Kenya (The Somalia did not decline either from demanding the unification with Somalia of the northern border region of Kenya, which is populated by Somalis) on anti-Somalia basis.				
.	Diplomatic leaders of these countries through their stress that the issues between countries must be resolved by peaceful means to reduce displacement of people from country to country.				
.	The vision that Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia have for the continent is similar with regards to promoting democratic peace through processes which are driven by African them-				

selves supported by AU and UN.				
Kenya and Ethiopia they extended the territory of Somalia, is that broken or affect the relationship between those neighboring countries.				

5. Somalia has to join Easter African countries union as to facilitate their neighboring diplomatic relationship.

a. Yes:

b. No:

c. Any Suggestion: .....

.....

.....

**PPENDIX: C**

**IME FRAME**

**PPENDIX D: Time frame**

o.	Activity	Time Frame
.	Research Proposal reading	Feb 1– March 10, 2014
.	Proposal writing	March 11 – April 20, 2014
.	Proposal submission	April 22, 2014

**APPENDIX: D**

**BUDGET**

**APPENDIX E: Budge**

No.	Items	Amount in dollar
.	Carrying / Transportation cost	\$ 50
.	Printing and binding	\$ 60
.	Stationary and supply material	\$30
.	Internet access	\$40
	<b>Total</b>	<b>\$180</b>

## APPENDIX E

### CURRICULUM VITA (CV)

To document the details of the researcher, his competency in writing a research and to recognize his effort and qualifications, this part of the research report is thus meant.

#### **Personal Profile**

**Name:** MAHAD ABDULLAHI HUSSEIN

**Gender:** MALE

**Nationality:** SOMALIA

**Telephone:** +252612225155 (Mogadishu-Somalia) +256793659965 (Kampala-Uganda)

**mail:** [Mahadcxa2011@gamil.com/@hotmail.com](mailto:Mahadcxa2011@gamil.com/@hotmail.com)

#### **Educational Background**

- In progress: Master of international relations and diplomacy studies at (KIU)
- Bachelor degree of Business Administration at SIMAD UNIVERSITY (2013)
- High school Certificate SHEIKH ABDISAMAD COMMERCIAL (2009)