

**COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN  
MOGADISHU SOMALIA**

**BY**

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## DECLARATION

I, MOHAMED SHUEIB MUSSE, declare that this research report is my original work; and it has not been submitted to any university or other institution of higher learning for the award of a Master degree or any other academic award. Any materials incorporated in this study have duly been acknowledged.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

## **APPROVAL**

This is to certify that this research report titled, “counter terrorism measures and national security in Somalia” has been submitted to the University Academic Board with my approval.

**Dr. John Adams**

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

**Supervisor**

## **DEDICATION**

I would like to dedicate this work to my Aunt Mrs. Fowzio Muse Mohamed her dreams for me have resulted in this achievement, and if it wasn't her tireless guidance, loving, friendly advices, I would not have been where I am today or who I am today. Had it not been for my aunt's relentless insistence and support, my dreams of excelling in education would have remained mere dreams. This achievement which she always wanted for me is now complete.

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## ABSTRACT

This study was aimed at examining the impact of Somalia Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia. It was guided by three objectives of; (i) To examine the effect of the pursue strategy of Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; using Mogadishu City as a case study, (ii) To explain the impact of the prevent strategy of Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; using Mogadishu City as a case study, and (iii) To determine the impact of the prepare and protect strategy of Counterterrorism on national security in Somalia; using Mogadishu City as a case study. The study adopted both descriptive and correlations research designs to investigate the parameters of the study. In this case, both qualitative and quantitative. The target population of this research was 29,057 from which a sample of 205 was selected from, using Scott Smith, (2013):  $(Z \text{ value})^2 X$ . The collected data was edited, coded, organized and entered into the computer for analysis. After data entry, all errors were eliminated and frequency analysis was done such that descriptive analysis was computed. The study findings indicated that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of pursue strategy of Counter Terrorism on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City ( $r = .610$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implied that pursue strategy of counter-terrorism, it will result into a corresponding good and improved National Security in Somalia. Further, the study shows that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City ( $r = .597$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implied that effective prevent strategy mechanisms of Counter Terrorism will lead to improved national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City. And lastly, The study shows that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of Prepare and protect strategy of Counter Terrorism and national security in Mogadishu City, Somalia ( $r = .582$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implied that improved Prepare and protect strategy of Counter Terrorism or a positive change in the Prepare and protect strategy mechanisms of Counter Terrorism will have a relatively positive impact on national security in Mogadishu City, Somalia. The study however, recommended that the government of Somalia should empower citizens who have the skills, knowledge and attitudes to participate, including the ability to organize themselves. It also recommended that the government of Somalia should effectively implement laws, regulations and policies that enable participation and social accountability. In conclusion, the study had it that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of pursue strategy of Counter Terrorism on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City ( $r = .610$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). Further, the study concluded that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia ( $r = .597$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ), and that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of Prepare and protect strategy of Counter Terrorism and national security in Mogadishu City, Somalia ( $r = .582$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ).

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the background to the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, objectives of the study, research questions and assumptions, scope of the study, significance of the study, and the operational definitions of terms and concepts as applied to suit the context of the study.

### 1.1 Background to the study

#### 1.1.1 Historical perspective

Since the terrorist attacks on 11/9/2001, (9/11) in the United States of America, the role of foreign intelligence liaison has taken center stage in the global war on terror (Chris, 2016). Intelligence acquired through foreign liaison is widely credited with having helped to thwart attacks in Bahrain, arrests al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, and chase complicit Taliban from hideouts in Afghanistan. It is also blamed for deception and failure. The United States Congress's Joint Intelligence Committee Report on 9/11 noted that, prior to the attacks, the US government had come to rely excessively on poorly sourced foreign liaison information for its threats assessments (Crumpton, 2012). Preliminary reports commission also criticized intelligence relationships with liaison partners such as Saudi Arabia, as insufficiently productive prior to the attacks. The 9/11 terrorist attacks have been intensively examined as both tactical and strategic intelligence failures but less attention has been paid to the policy failures which preceded them. Perhaps this is due to the presumption that intelligence analysis influences decision-making as a precursor to and foundation for policy (Dahl, 2013).

In Africa, throughout the 20th century, weak, corrupt, and colonial regimes branded opponents 'terrorists' as a way to delegitimize their objectives (Hoehne, 2019). The colonial powers labeled independence movements as terrorists to retain power, demonize their adversaries, and justify the use of extreme retaliatory measures. This was true of the French authorities in Algeria, the British in Kenya during the 1950s, the Rhodesian government during the 1970s, and the South African Apartheid regime (Olsen, 2018). Only relatively recently have western nations'

perceptions of terrorism in Africa become focused on Islamic jihadism. In 1998, truck bombs at US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania killed more than 200 people, bringing Al-Qaeda to the attention of the US public for the first time (Olsen, 2018).

Most of Sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely to become a location for radical Islam despite widespread poverty and oppression (Elliot & Holzer, 2019). But the region is nonetheless increasingly providing the conditions to which terrorism has historically been a response. Since then, and especially following the 9/11 terror attacks, a new narrative of a global jihadist threat became dominant, sometimes pushing the international community to intervene in local conflicts that have little to do with global terrorism or religious indoctrination. The causes of violence and insurgency in African nations vary a great deal (Elliot & Holzer, 2019). The continent is vast with tremendous cultural and language differences at work, and the only truly shared experience is a history of European colonialism.

In Somalia, the ‘War on Terror’ did much to feed terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The 2006 Ethiopia invasion of Somalia was encouraged by the US as it sought to oust the Islamic Court Union – an alliance of Sharia Courts – and Al-Shabaab – a militia – which had seized control of capital city, Mogadishu (Menkhaus, 2019). The invasion led to a spiral of worsening violence on both sides. Human rights groups accused Ethiopian forces of war crimes while Al-Shabaab developed into a full insurgency in the south of the country and declared its allegiance to Al-Qaeda. Calling for a Sharia Law state, it began launching suicide attacks in 2007, a new element in the conflict. Despite US air strikes aimed at its leadership, Al-Shabaab retains influence over significant parts of Somalia, enforcing a brutal form of sharia law, funding activities through taxation of the population it controls, smuggling, and other means (Olsen, 2019). It continues to take responsibility for major terror attacks, such as a bomb on a flight departing Mogadishu in February 2016, a massive truck bomb in Mogadishu in October 2017, and on the US base at Baledogle in September 2019.

Therefore, Somalia has since the rise and fall of the militant Islamist movement in Somalia, an array of actors has intervened in Somalia with disparate aims and implications in terms of the post-transition period (August 2012 up to the present) (Ibrahim, 2020). It has been the site of internationally sponsored political engineering. Both regional states (Ethiopia and Kenya) and organizations (IGAD and AU) have contributed to the international re-engagement with Somalia,

the most notable being the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM since 2007). Al-shabaab, among other insurgent movements, continues to forcefully resist external-led interventions aimed at rebuilding the Somali state. Outside the region, the European Union has been particularly involved in providing support to state-building efforts with a focus on the security sector, especially the maritime dimension of security (through EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and EUCAP Nestor since July 2012) and the creation of security forces (through EUTM Somalia) (Marchal, R. 2017). The current governments have signaled the end of the 8-year transition period since August 2012. However, in order to survive, it still depends on external protection from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and its leadership at the time of writing still faces the challenge of bringing the al-shabaab led insurgency to an end Marchal, R. 2017).

### **1.1.2 Theoretical perspective**

The study is based on International Relations Theory that can be traced to E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, which was published in 1939. Firstly, the relevance of International Relations Theory, extends to how intelligence and intelligence-related phenomena (such as, intelligence co-operation) - can be studied, are explored (Ermarth, 2013). These theories, and equally, approaches, are arguably most appropriate when deployed in an arrangement of 'complex co-existence plurality' across the different interrelated levels of experience and analysis, and they offer more effective explanations when intelligence liaison is disaggregated into at least eight systemic attributes or variables. More broadly, the suggestion that international relations theory, and indeed theory generally, is 'irrelevant' to intelligence studies is simultaneously challenged. Intelligence liaison increased exponentially during the so-called 'War on Terror'. Today it continues as the most significant dimension of intelligence, including effecting on accountability and oversight considerations (Forest, 2016). Nevertheless, the intelligence liaison phenomenon remains largely under-studied and substantially under-theorized. Preliminary suggestions are offered concerning how this dearth of theory can be addressed

This theory examines the organization, personnel and selected operations of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in New York during and immediately after the First World War. Under the leadership of Sir William Wiseman, SIS agents successfully combated German intrigues as well as Irish and Indian nationalists (Gazit, & Handel, 2016). The greatest challenges, however, were managing the shifting relationship with American authorities and the encroachments of rival

British agencies such as MI5. The roles of Guy Gaunt, Robert Nathan and Norman Thwaite's are given particular attention. It examines the interest activities of one double agent, the Czech-born Maximilian Wechsler, who in the early 1970s successfully infiltrated two socialist organizations (Gerecht, 2017). Wechsler was engaged by the Australian Security Intelligence Organization. However, he was 'unreliable': he came in from the cold and went public. It seeks to throw some light on the recruitment methods of ASIO, on the techniques of infiltration, on the relationship between ASIO and the Liberal Party during a period of political volatility in Australia, and on the contradictory position of the Labor Government towards the security services (Gerecht, 2018).

To evaluate ethically the practices of international intelligence liaison collection have been prompted by debate over the decision to go to war in Iraq and by consideration of how best to respond to terrorist threats. Recently, they have been bolstered by allegations of prisoner abuse that some have linked to international intelligence organizations. Such demands for judgment are articulated with equal measures of urgency and apprehension: there is a perceived need to make clear statements about what constitutes morally prohibited and permissible conduct with regard to international intelligence liaison gathering, and yet the tools with which one might perform such a task are not readily apparent (Gerecht, 2013). Therefore, to begin with three basic assumptions. First, intelligence collection does not exist in an amoral realm of necessity, but, rather, is a human endeavor involving choice and deliberation and, therefore, is vulnerable to ethical scrutiny. Second, there is no consensus on the moral guidelines to be invoked to engage in such scrutiny. There are many distinct ethical perspectives from which intelligence liaison collection might be evaluated - and from which one might provide disparate judgments of the same action (Gerecht, 2016). Finally, the practices involved in international intelligence liaison gathering are equally multifarious and it would be unhelpful to attempt to cover them with a blanket justification or condemnation (from any perspective). Following on from these assumptions, this sets out a simple typology of 'realist', 'consequentialist' and 'deontological' ethical approaches to international intelligence liaison collection and explores how different practices might be variously evaluated from each. The aim is to provide an initial step towards thinking about ethics and intelligence liaison collection (Gosler, 2015).

### 1.1.3 Conceptual Perspective

**Terrorism** is defined by Martha, (2016) as the use of violence and fear to achieve an ideological aim. The term is used in this regard primarily to refer to intentional violence during peacetime or in the context of war against non-combatants.

Terrorism is defined as a destructive method of political action which uses violence to cause fear for political ends (Ashford, 2012). While some political goals may be achieved only through the use of terrorism, terrorists often kill or injure noncombatants or the innocent in order to maximize terror and to seek widespread publicity for their actions. Contemporary terrorism is often conceived in terms of war. While terrorism may be perpetrated by individuals against a state, states can enact policies of terrorism against their own citizens or subjects of another nation or country.

Terrorism is an intentional form of violence that involves targeted attacks which are designed to intentionally scare, intimidate, to ‘terrorize’ for a political purpose. Attacks are usually directed at immediate targets such as people, events, or institutions and a wider audience whom protagonists aim to intimidate shock or threaten. By so doing, terror groups intend to arouse support for their political discourse while undermining rival, usually dominant, ideologies as part of an overarching strategy to win concessions or defeat the declared enemy (Menkhaus, K. (2013).. These forms of political violence can be relatively inexpensive and undertaken by small numbers of activists. Hence acts of terrorism are considered to be a form of asymmetrical warfare, committed by marginalized groups who often resort to such tactics because they lack more conventional political resources and avenues for engagement.

Samuel M, (2020) defines **security** as “the preservation of the norms, rules, institutions and values of society” appears to be useful. He further argues that all the institutions, principles and structures associated with society, including its people are to be protected from “military and non-military threats”.

While, **National security** refers to the ability of the government to utilize military force to protect its citizen's safety, economic welfare, and social institutions from the threat of attack by foreign or domestic invaders (Thoughtco.com, 2021). It can also be described as the ability of a state to cater for the protection and defense of its citizenry.



The field of national security safeguards against such threats. National security protects not only citizens but also the economic stability of national institutions. In the U.S., national defense has been a guiding principle of the government at least since 1947, when then-President Harry S. Truman signed into law the National Security Act. Among other things, this legislation created the secretary of defense cabinet position, under whose leadership all branches of the military operated.

#### **1.1.4. Contextual perspective**

In a war-torn urban environment, some zones were numerically dominated by a clan. In several cases, because of gang violence, the clan elders decided to form an Islamic Court. When naming members, they were careful to choose judges who represented the diverse spectrum of Islam in Somalia (this is post 9/11!) (Ali, A. M. (2018, April). The militias had no connection to a particular religious trend. Islamic and Islamist movements were obviously present in these institutions because their leaders had prestige and often had the organizational skills that were otherwise lacking. These Courts, which numbered less than ten before 2006, led a determined struggle against bandits and gangs (Parrin, A. 2016). The situation did not improve because of the return of the faction leaders. The improvement was the result of the actions of these Courts.

In January 2006, the TFG president and the president of Parliament met in Aden and reached an agreement for the reunification of transitional institutions in the city of Baidoa (Baydhabo). The revolt of the faction leaders in Mogadishu was cut short. They were unable to secure the capital, and if they returned to Baidoa they would be politically marginalized. In this context, a conflict erupted between what was soon called the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, and the Islamic Courts.

Several tensions merged into a series of extremely violent confrontations between January and June 2006 (Marchal, R. 2017). First, there was the clan element: faction leaders tried to establish a local parliament in Mogadishu in the fall of 2005 but refused to give it an elected president. In the ensuing debate, threats were made against certain clans, which could explain their participation in the war against the factions (Mantzikos, I. 2019). These tensions, however, were not enough to provoke such violence and the Courts did not even take part in this dispute. Simultaneously, there was a conflict between two groups of businessmen, one led by an American ally (Bashir Rage) and one by an ally of the Courts (Abuker Omar Adane) (Mantzikos, I. 2019). These two men were

each members of the same sub-clan. Their increasingly violent skirmishes in fact concerned a piece of land on the coast that was to house a port for exporting charcoal, one of Somalia's most profitable and environmentally destructive exports. This bloody competition began in 2005, but in 2006 the Islamic Courts became involved. They had received substantial donations from Abukar Omar Adane and he requested their assistance (Hesse, 2019). Bashir Rage used his American allies in the CIA and established the famous Alliance against international terrorism.

American involvement changed the nature of the war (Parrin, 2016). Anti-American sentiment brought the local population together along with its hostility to a series of assassinations and kidnappings of religious figures that were thought to be ordered by the Americans and Ethiopians and carried out by the factions (Parrin, 2016). American involvement mobilized Islamic movements well beyond Mogadishu. While these movements were very different in terms of rites, ideology and recruitment, they were united in their opposition to the United States. Hundreds of combatants arrived from Somaliland and others came from southern Somalia. In the less populated Puntland, there were fewer recruits but large donations were collected; the diaspora supporting the Courts also made substantial donations (Mantzikos, 2019). The heterogeneity of the war meant that support did not come solely from radicals and Islamists. Some factions, like the Juba Valley Alliance based in Kismaayo, joined in the combat.

The victory of the Islamic Courts was the result of a very particular situation. It was a popular uprising even though the population was not unanimous (Marchal, R. 2017). Members of the faction militias were pressured by their relatives not to fight "for the Americans." The streets of the capital were suddenly littered with large stones left by civilians that prevented military coordination. And military coordination itself indeed was problematic (Mantzikos, I. 2019). The mutual distrust between members of the Alliance lasted until its fall and could be explained by their inability to measure the strength of the popular mobilization even though they knew that the military strength of the Islamic Courts was not a real threat.

When the faction leaders fled the capital, the Islamic Courts were the only ones who could take advantage of the victory since the clans and the businessmen supporting the war effort were not organized (Parrin, A., 2016). It was a victory by default and the leaders of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hasan Dahir Aweys, were well aware of it from the start. It is crucial to come back to the details of this period. It inaugurated a radical

transformation of the political arena in Mogadishu and, quickly, beyond the capital. It also changed the balance and reshaped the relationships between the Courts and their components. Just as in 1991 when Mohamed Siyad Barre was overthrown and the militiamen close to General Aydiid gained strength by looting barracks, some Islamic groups took control of faction arsenals and methodically consolidated their influence in the movement. Hizb al-Shabab, the Youth Party characterized by its radical Islamist populism, gained a strength and appeal from the arsenals that it did not have in prior months (Parrin, A., 2016). The inhabitants of the capital had not appreciated the desecration of the Italian cemetery in February 2005 by its leader, Adan Hashi Farah Eyro, when Italy was giving an almost official and religious burial to Somali immigrants who had drowned during their Mediterranean crossing. But his involvements in the front lines of the war and his control of a powerful arsenal changed public opinion for a time (Parrin, A., 2016).

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

Militia groups are historically a defining feature of Somalia's conflict landscape, especially since the ongoing civil war began three decades ago (Fisher, J. (2018). Communities create or join such groups as a primary response to conditions of insecurity, vulnerability and contestation. Somali powerbrokers, sub federal authorities, e.t.c, have all turned to armed groups as a primary tool for prosecuting their interests (Menkhaus, K. 2019). State-aligned militias help to offset the weakness of Somalia's official security forces, produce greater motivation and better intelligence and enhance bonds with local communities, perhaps even suppressing crime and intraclan violence.

However, Somalia's State-aligned militia groups are also an underlying source of insecurity, violent contestation, abusive rule, impunity and pernicious outside manipulation (Ahmed B.K, 2021). They give rise to and allow the entrenchment of powerful militant groups such as the Al-Qaeda- supporting, jihadist Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, commonly referred to as al-Shabaab (Menkhaus, K. 2019). As such, their increasingly central role in the fight against al-Shabaab is a double-edged sword: short-term military gains must be balanced against the militias' longer-term, destabilizing impact. This study will however, concentrate on Somalia Counter Terrorism efforts and its impact on National Security. Hence, this study.

### **1.3. General objective**

The study was aimed at examining the impact of Somalia Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia:

#### **1.3.1. The specific objectives are as follows:**

1. To examine the effect of the pursue strategy of Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; using Mogadishu City as a case study.
2. To explain the impact of the prevent strategy of Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; using Mogadishu City as a case study.
3. To determine the impact of the prepare and protect strategy of Counterterrorism on national security in Somalia; using Mogadishu City as a case study.

### **1.4. Research questions**

1. What is the effect of the pursue strategy of Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Somalia?
2. What is the impact of the prevent strategy of Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu?
3. What is the impact of the prepare and protect strategy of Counter Terrorism on national security in Mogadishu?

### **1.5 Research hypotheses**

- i. There is no significant impact of the pursue strategy of Counterterrorism efforts and national security in Mogadishu.
- ii. There is no significant impact of the prevent strategy of Counterterrorism efforts and national security in Mogadishu.
- iii. There is no significant impact of prepare and protect strategy of Counterterrorism and national security in Mogadishu.

## **16 Scope of the Study**

### **1.6.1 Geographical scope**

The study was conducted in Mogadishu the Capital city of Somalia, officially the Federal Republic of Somalia; a country in the Horn of Africa. The country is bordered by Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti to the northwest, the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east, and Kenya to the southwest. Somalia has the longest coastline on Africa's mainland. Mogadishu City was chosen for this study because it is known for its widespread unending civil wars, territorial conflicts, and unstable government since the overthrow of Siade Barre in 1991; and as a fragile state which has become an epicenter for extremist groups like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al-Shabaab, etc, in the horn of Africa.

### **1.6.2 Content scope**

The study focused mainly on examining the impact of Somalia Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu Somalia. This was achieved through ascertaining the impact of the pursue strategy, prevent strategy and prepare and protect strategy of Counterterrorism on national security in Mogadishu.

### **1.6.3 Time scope**

The study mainly considered reviewing the available literature for the period of 5 years between 2017-2021, as an era of relative peace in Somalia with the military support of AMISOM against insurgency in Mogadishu. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been operating for over twelve years in one of the world's most complex and challenging security environments, with a mandate to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

## **1.7 Significance of the study**

### **To academicians**

The research would be useful to other researchers who may be interested in studying a similar area and would become in as a spring board for further study in the area. The study would contribute to filling the gap in the area under study as it will provide useful insights with regards to the impact of Somalia Counterterrorism efforts measured by; pursue strategy, prevent strategy and prepare and protect strategy on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia, and horn of Africa. Finally, it would also serve in as a source of information for other readers who are interested on studying the casual effect of counterterrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu Somalia.

The study findings fill the research gap on the impact of Somalia Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu Somalia, and this study is important in an effort to bring about peace and enhance people's wellbeing. This study adding literature in the field of study, these study findings would be of great important to policy makers and peace keeping missions in addressing the concerns related to peace and stability.

### **To policy makers**

The study would be of great importance to international bodies like the UN, AU and the government of Somali, among others, on the best way to formulate better arrangements suitable for managing, and avoidance of terrorism and insurgency attacks in Somalia.

Additionally, the research will be of fundamental importance because it will assist government and other necessary organs/ agencies to ascertain the better effective ways of fighting terrorism in Somalia. This will therefore enable the various partners to concoct proof- based arrangements and program interventions to tackle the issue.

### **To the UN Security Council, AU, and the newly elected Government of Somalia**

It would avail information to the UN Security Council and other bodies on how best they can intervene and or support the struggle and fight against terrorism in Somalia. Furthermore, the study findings are expected to be useful to various groups of people, organizations and states as it will lay a basis of evaluation of the contribution of foreign actors in restoring the political stability among destabilized states like Somalia.

## 1.8. Definition of key terms

The following concepts, as used in the study, are defined as follows:

**National security, or** national defence, is the security and defence of a sovereign state, including its citizens, economy, and institutions, which is regarded as a duty of government.

**Political stability** is the durability and integrity of a current government or regime. This is determined based on the amount of violence and terrorism expressed in the nation and by citizens associated with the state.

**Terrorism** is the use of violence and fear to achieve an ideological aim. The term is used in this regard primarily to refer to intentional violence during peacetime or in the context of war against non-combatants.

**Civil wars** are a violent conflict between a state and one or more organized non-state actors within the state's territory.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter addresses a review of the existing literature related to the study. It mainly centers on highlighting the gaps in the existing literature, which the study seeks to fill in. The chapter is also aligned to the objectives and research questions of the study.

#### 2.1 Theoretical review

The study was based on International Relations Theory that can be traced to E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, which was published in 1939.

The theory stipulates that the importance of intelligence liaison relationships for counterterrorism was recognized well before 9/11 but such arrangements are becoming increasingly important today in what Michael (2011) calls the “internationalization” of intelligence. Not everyone believes, however, that intelligence efforts have yet become sufficiently “international.”

Dahl, (2013) for example, argues that international intelligence relationships and trust among intelligence services, are lacking today. He suggests that the United Nations, in particular, needs to develop an effective intelligence capability to combat international terrorism. This theory examines the organization, personnel and selected operations of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in New York during and immediately after the First World War. Under the leadership of Sir William Wiseman, SIS agents successfully combated German intrigues as well as Irish and Indian nationalists (Gazit, & Handel, 2016). The greatest challenges, however, were managing the shifting relationship with American authorities and the encroachments of rival British agencies such as MI5.

The roles of Guy Gaunt, Robert Nathan and Norman Thwaite's are given particular attention. It examines the interest activities of one double agent, the Czech-born Maximilian Wechsler, who in the early 1970s successfully infiltrated two socialist organizations (Gerecht, 2017). Wechsler was engaged by the Australian Security Intelligence Organization. It seeks to throw some light on the recruitment methods of ASIO, on the techniques of infiltration, on the relationship between ASIO



and the Liberal Party during a period of political volatility in Australia, and on the contradictory position of the Labor Government towards the security services (Gerecht, 2018).

Many experts believe that the most important source of intelligence on terrorist groups is human intelligence (HUMINT). Human intelligence is not seen as the complete answer to the problem of terrorism, of course, and some authors argue that other sources can be very useful, such as signals intelligence (Dahl, 2014a) or open source intelligence (Dahl, 2014b). It is also frequently pointed out that other types of intelligence community improvements are needed, such as increasing the numbers of interpreters and officers with critical language skills, developing databases to handle the new information, and experimenting with new (and often not-so-new) analytic methods such as red-teaming (Dahl, 2015). But the most commonly heard argument is that technical intelligence collection methods such as imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) are not very useful against terrorist targets, while HUMINT is critical.

In this context of this study, national security in Somalia depends on counter terrorism measures based on; prepare and protect strategy, prevent strategy and pursue strategy (Danis, 2017). This affects of counter terrorism measures on national security in terms of; Food security, Human Security and Diplomacy in mainly Somalia (Davies, 2013). Therefore, this theory was used to establish the association that exist between counter terrorism measures (prepare and protect strategy, prevent strategy and pursue strategy) on one hand while national security in terms of; Food security, Human Security and Diplomacy on the other hand (Menkhaus, K. 2013).

## **2.2 Conceptual Framework**


The conceptual framework diagrammatically shows the effect of the different variables in the study. The independent variable is perceived as counter terrorism measures and dependent variable is national security.

**Figure 1: Conceptual Framework**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE                      DEPEDENT VARIABLE

**Independent variable**

**Dependent variable**



**Source:** Adopted from Emahr, (2015) and modified by the Researcher, (2022)

## **2.3 Conceptual Review**

### **2.3.1. Counter terrorism efforts**

#### **2.3.1.1 Pursue Strategy**

To deny terrorists the means and opportunity to carry out their activities in order to protect citizens and national interests, Intelligence and law enforcement actions, prosecutions, and domestic and international cooperation are important to mitigate vulnerabilities and aggressively intervene in terrorist planning (Hoehne, M. V. 2019). The end goal is to make nationals and their interests a more difficult target for would-be terrorists. The deny element of the strategy employs a layered approach to security (Marchal, R. 2017). It begins with programs and activities abroad aimed at denying terrorists the means and opportunities to carry out their attacks abroad and in that particular country. It also includes activities at and within the country's borders to deny terrorists the means and opportunities to act in the country boarders (Marchal, R. 2017).

This is due to the fact that terrorism does not respect national borders (Elliot, A., & Holzer, G. S., 2019). Domestic efforts to deny terrorists the means and opportunity to prepare for, and carry out their activities must be matched by similar efforts around the world. Otherwise, terrorists will simply move their operations to a safe haven. Safe havens facilitate capacity building and attack planning. For this reason, the deny element involves a strong degree of international cooperation. Therefore, countries like USA, Russia, UK, Canada etc also partners with the international community to promote security in other states, including fragile states, under its whole-of-government approach, which involves defence, development and diplomacy (Elliot, A., & Holzer, G. S., 2019). Counter-terrorism capacity building assists other states with training, funding, equipment, technical and legal assistance to deny terrorists the means and opportunity to carry out attacks at home, and to deny them the ability to attack targets elsewhere (Elliot, A., & Holzer, G. S., 2019). Through Digital Reference Information for Training (DFAIT) projects, and with the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, the Charities Directorate of the CRA has contributed to capacity building initiatives in other jurisdictions to support the combatting of terrorist financing through charities.

### **2.3.1.2 Prevent Strategy**

This element focuses on the motivations of individuals who engage in, or have the potential to engage in, terrorist activities at home and abroad (Hoehne, M. V. 2019). Canada aims to target and diminish the factors contributing to terrorism by actively engaging with individuals, communities and international partners, and through research to better understand these factors and how to counter them.

The threat from violent extremism is a significant national security challenge. Radicalization, which is the precursor to violent extremism, is a process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extremist views (Marchal, R. 2017). This becomes a threat to national security when individuals or groups espouse or engage in violence as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious objectives. The prevent Strategy articulates a country's commitment to addressing the factors contributing to terrorism, including radicalization, leading to violence (Ali, A. M. (2018, April). The threat of violent extremism does not originate from a single source, but a diverse range of groups and individuals who either actively participate in or

who support violent extremist activities. For this reason, the Prevent element of the Strategy focuses primarily on building partnerships with groups and individuals in communities (Ali, A. M. (2018, April). Working closely with local-level partners will help foster a better understanding of preventative and intervention methods to stop the process of radicalization, leading to violence.

To effectively counter violent extremism, a culture of openness must exist between citizens and government (Marchal, R. 2017). This will require the government to share knowledge with Canadians about the nature of the terrorist threat in order to foster a deeper understanding of the need for particular actions (Hoehne, M. V. 2019). The role of law enforcement and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is pivotal. They can offer knowledge and analysis of the threat, which can assist governments and communities to develop more effective responses.

### **2.3.1.3 Prepare and Protect Strategy**

To counter the terrorist threat, knowledge is required on the terrorists themselves, their capabilities and the nature of their plans. It is also necessary to identify who supports their activities (Bildirici, M. E., Lousada, S., & Yılmaz Genç, S. (2022). Canada does this through investigation, intelligence operations and analysis, which can also lead to criminal prosecutions. Detection requires strong intelligence capacity and capabilities, as well as a solid understanding of the strategic drivers of the threat environment, and extensive collaboration and information sharing with domestic and international partners.

The primary governments' collection organizations like CIA and FBI for USA, MOSAD for Isreal, MI16 for Britain, FSB for Russia, ISO for Uganda and the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) for Canada, etc, use a full range of collection methods. They acquire and provide foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT) in accordance with the Government's intelligence priorities and provide technical and operational support to law enforcement and security intelligence agencies. In Canada alone, millions of financial transaction reports are sent to FINTRAC each year by banks, credit unions and other financial intermediaries, resulting in financial intelligence that assists in the investigation and prosecution of money laundering, terrorist activity financing and other threats to the security of Canada. These measures strengthen Canada's financial system by deterring individuals from using it to carry out terrorist financing or other criminal activity (Papale, S. 2022). To further strengthen Canada's anti-terrorist financing regime,

an Illicit Financing Advisory Committee, comprised of several federal partners, has been developed to identify illicit financing threats from abroad and to develop targeted measures to safeguard Canada's financial and national security interests. Thus, once information is collected, it must be analyzed to produce intelligence. Government departments and the security intelligence agencies have their own analysis and assessment units, reflecting their particular responsibilities. The key organizations within the assessment community are discussed below. Other organizations provide assessments reflecting their particular responsibilities. The Privy Council Office International Assessment Staff (PCO IAS) plays a leading role in coordinating the efforts of the Canadian assessment community and provides Polycystic ovary syndrome PCO and other senior government clients with policy-neutral assessments of foreign developments and trends that may affect Canadian interests.

### **2.3.2. National security**

National security, or national defence, is the security and defence of a sovereign state, including its citizens, economy, and institutions, which is regarded as a duty of government (Biegon, R., & Watts, T. F. 2022). National security has also been described as the ability of a state to cater for the protection and defence of its citizenry. Makinda's definition of security fits into this confine of national security (Piombo, J., & Englebert, P. 2022). Global security, on the other hand, evolved from the necessity that nature and many other activities, particularly globalization, have placed on states. These are demands that no national security apparatus has the capacity to handle on its own and, as such, call for the cooperation of states. The global interconnection and interdependence among states that the world has experienced and continues to experience since the end of the Cold War, makes it necessary for states to cooperate more and work together (Piombo, J., & Englebert, P. 2022).

Originally conceived as protection against military attack, national security is widely understood to include also non-military dimensions, including the security from terrorism, minimization of crime, economic security, energy security, environmental security, food security, and cyber-security (Papale, S. 2022). Similarly, national security risks include, in addition to the actions of other nation states, action by violent non-state actors, by narcotic cartels, and by multinational corporations, and also the effects of natural disasters (Papale, S. 2022). One of the major challenges that the field of global security has to contend with is the concept of security complex, a situation

in which the security concerns of states are deeply interconnected to the point that one state's security needs cannot be realistically considered without taking into consideration the security needs of the other states (Piombo, J., & Englebert, P. 2022).

The fear or threat content of security complex breeds rivalry among states (Biegon, R., & Watts, T. F. 2022). The remedy for such rivalry lies in cooperation which can only be found in global security initiatives among states (Campbell, H. G. (2020). With the advocacy of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) human security elements have acquired a wider dimension, for they go beyond military protection and engage threats to human dignity (Biegon, R., & Watts, T. F. 2022). Accordingly, it has become necessary for states to make conscious efforts towards building links with other states and to consciously engage in global security initiatives. Governments rely on a range of measures, including political, economic, and military power, as well as diplomacy, to safeguard the security of a nation state (Bildirici, M. E., Lousada, S., & Yılmaz Genç, S. (2022). They may also act to build the conditions of security regionally and internationally by reducing transnational causes of insecurity, such as climate change, economic inequality, political exclusion, and nuclear proliferation.

## **2.4 literature review**

### **2.4.1. The pursue strategy of counterterrorism efforts and national security**

Nearly four years after 9/11, hardly a day passes without the "war on terrorism" making headlines, with Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia and now London holding Centre stage (Muibu, D. 2022). But away from the spotlight, a quiet, dirty conflict is being waged in Somalia: in the rubble-strewn streets of the ruined capital of this state without a government, Mogadishu, al-Qaeda operatives, jihadi extremists, Ethiopian security services and Western-backed counter-terrorism networks are engaged in a shadowy and complex contest waged by intimidation, abduction and assassination (Muibu, D. 2022). The U.S. has had some success but now risks evoking a backlash. Ultimately a successful counter-terrorism strategy requires more attention to helping Somalia with the twin tasks of reconciliation and state –building (McIntosh, C. 2022).

During the 1990s, jihadism in Somalia was synonymous with al-Itihaad al-Islami, a band of Wahhabi militants determined to establish an Islamic emirate in the country (Kamau, J. W. 2021). Al-Qaeda also developed a toehold, contributing to attacks on U.S. and UN peacekeepers in the

early part of the decade and using the country as a transit zone for terrorism in neighbouring Kenya; some leading members of al-Qaeda's East African network continue to hide in Somalia.

Since 2003, Somalia has witnessed the rise of a new, ruthless, independent jihadi network with links to al-Qaeda (Brankamp, H., & Glück, Z. 2022). Based in lawless Mogadishu and led by a young militia leader trained in Afghanistan, the group announced its existence by murdering four foreign aid workers in the relatively secure territory of Somaliland between October 2003 and April 2004 (McIntosh, C. 2022). Western governments, led by the U.S., responded to the threat of terrorism in and from Somalia by building up Somali counter-terrorist networks headed by faction leaders and former military or police officers, and by cooperating with the security services in Somaliland and neighbouring Puntland (Muibu, D. 2022). The strategy has netted at least one key al-Qaeda figure, and as many as a dozen members of the new jihadi group are either dead or behind bars.

Despite these successes, counter-terrorism efforts are producing growing unease within the broader public (Kamau, J. W. 2021). Few Somalis believe there are terrorists in their country, and many regard the American-led war on terrorism as an assault on Islam (Brankamp, H., & Glück, Z. 2022). Unidentified surveillance flights, the abduction of innocent people for weeks at a time on suspicion of terrorist links, and cooperation with unpopular faction leaders all add to public cynicism and resentment (Campbell, H. G. (2020). Without public support, even the most sophisticated counter-terrorism effort is doomed to failure.

Militants have responded by assassinating at least a dozen Somalis working for Mogadishu's Western-backed counter-terrorism networks (Kamau, J. W. 2021). Meanwhile, an Ethiopian intelligence network hunts Islamist militants and insurgents among Somalia's small, fearful community of Oromo migrants and refugees (Prestholdt, J. 2020).

Since the formation of the new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for Somalia, in October 2004, the dirty war between terrorists and counter-terrorist operatives in Mogadishu appears to have entered a new and more vicious stage that threatens to push the country further towards jihadism and extremist violence unless its root causes are properly addressed (McIntosh, C. 2022). Urban terrorism has claimed the lives of a female BBC producer, two young Somali footballers and a Somali woman working for an international NGO (Prestholdt, J. 2020). Eager to earn the

support of Western governments as an ally in the war on terrorism, the TFG leadership has attributed the attacks to Islamist extremists but some of the evidence appears to implicate supporters of the interim president instead.

The threat of jihadi terrorism in and from Somalia is real. But attempts by the new Somali leadership and its regional allies to exploit this threat for short-term political gain risk plunging the country into even greater crisis (Maza, K. D., Koldas, U., & Aksit, S. 2020). Several key leaders in the deeply divided transitional government are notorious for smearing adversaries and critics with allegations of terrorist linkages, conduct that threatens to deepen the schisms within the government (Maza, K. D., Koldas, U., & Aksit, S. 2020). More alarmingly, the faction of the TFG aligned with the interim president has tried to use the threat of terrorism to justify deployment of a regional intervention force to Somalia -- a widely unpopular and deeply divisive proposition that would not only irrevocably split the government and trigger renewed conflict, but would also dramatically strengthen the jihadis.

Ultimately, the threat of jihadi terrorism from Somalia can only be addressed through the restoration of stable, legitimate and functional government. Dealing with that threat requires Somalia's friends to do more to assist in bringing Somali society together again and rebuilding the state (Biegon, R., & Watts, T. F. 2022). But such assistance must be carefully planned and finely calibrated in order to ensure that it does not empower one faction of the TFG at the expense of another or otherwise destabilize a fragile peace process Markovic, V. (2021).

A successful counter-terrorism campaign requires more engagement with the broader public, including civil society organizations and more moderate Islamist groups (Bildirici, M. E., Lousada, S., & Yılmaz Genç, S. (2022). Somalis must be persuaded not only that some individuals guilty of terrorism are indeed in their country but also that the counter-terrorism agenda does not involve subjugation by factional or foreign interests (McIntosh, C. 2022). At the same time, Somalia's partners must become involved with the peace process, helping to overcome the TFG schisms and to forge a genuine government of national unity. If they fail to do so, jihadis will gradually find growing purchase among Somalia's despairing and disaffected citizenry, and it will only be a matter of time before another group of militants succeeds in mounting a spectacular terrorist attack against foreign interests in Somalia or against one of its neighbors (Papale, S. 2022).



#### **2.4.2. The prevent strategy of counter terrorism efforts and national security**

According to Olsen, G. R. (2017), as counter-terrorism law and measures have developed substantially over the last decade, humanitarian actors, including United Nations (UN) agencies and international and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have begun to feel, or fear, their impact on their work. A number of studies and reports have indicated potential incompatibility between neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action and counter-terrorism objectives (Ali, A. M. (2018, April). Key problem areas have been identified and some legal analysis has been carried out. The framework for humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict is provided by international humanitarian law (IHL), a body of rules that aims, among other things, to protect the life, health and dignity of civilians. Humanitarian action is provided for as a means to that end (Menkhaus, K. (2019). IHL obliges the parties to an armed conflict to undertake relief actions themselves or allow impartial and humanitarian organizations to do so.

A number of well-established principles are also relevant to humanitarian action (Fisher, J. (2018). Key among them is the principle of humanity, the aim of which is to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found (Mantzikos, I. 2017). Closely related to the principle of humanity is that of impartiality, requiring that no discrimination be made on the basis of nationality, race, religion or other similar criteria and that assistance and protection be given only in proportion to need (Parrin, A. 2016). Additionally there are principles of neutrality between the parties to an armed conflict and independence from political agendas, both of which enable the other core principles to be translated into action on the ground. The legal framework and these humanitarian principles require humanitarian actors to treat state and non-state parties to an armed conflict on an equal basis and to respond to all victims in proportion to their needs, without consideration of political or other factors (Hesse, B. J. 2019). This approach can clash with that of counter-terrorism which designates certain armed actors as terrorist, and therefore criminal, and may impose liability for engaging with them even for humanitarian purposes.

Among the principal concerns of humanitarian actors is that counter-terrorism measures will obstruct principled humanitarian action. The fear is that people in areas controlled by non-state armed groups designated as terrorist may have no or diminished access to humanitarian assistance and protection (Menkhaus, K. (2019). This may be because fewer funds are available, because of conditions attached to funding or because operational agencies are unwilling to run perceived or

actual legal risks. One example of this is the fear of engaging at all with designated groups (Marchal, R. 2017). The impact of the humanitarian sector's failure to engage with non-state actors on humanitarian access has been widely noted and discussed, and is of increasing relevance. The concern about the negative impact of counter-terrorism measures on humanitarian action is a pressing one because areas in which non-state armed groups designated as terrorist are often those where humanitarian needs are greatest (Parrin, A. 2016).

There are however points of convergence between counter-terrorism and humanitarian objectives (Piombo, J., & Englebert, P. 2022). At the most basic level, both seek to protect civilians from harm. International Humanitarian law (IHL) is underpinned by the principle of distinction, according to which the parties to an armed conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives (Brankamp, H., & Glück, Z., 2022). IHL also prohibits, as war crimes, most of the acts that would be considered terrorist if committed in peacetime (deliberate and direct attacks against civilians and civilian objects, hostage taking and others). It likewise prohibits as a war crime acts or threats of violence that are specifically intended to spread terror among the civilian population (Muibu, D. 2022). Beyond this, the principles of neutrality and impartiality require humanitarian assistance and protection to simply relieve the suffering of those in need, not to support the efforts of any party to an armed conflict (Piombo, J., & Englebert, P. 2022). They are, therefore, incompatible with funding or assisting any belligerent group, including those that may be designated terrorist.

The obligation and commitment of humanitarian actors to adhere to humanitarian principles can be seen, for example, in the development of the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief in the early 1990s (Biegon, R., & Watts, T. F. 2022). Efforts to prevent the diversion of aid and other support intended to benefit the civilian population by armed groups, which have been high on the humanitarian agenda since at least that period, are compatible with effective counter-terrorism efforts undertaken by national authorities to prevent groups designated as terrorist benefitting from humanitarian operations (Biegon, R., & Watts, T. F. 2022). The counter-terrorism framework, for its part, explicitly accommodates humanitarian objectives in several areas (Menkhaus, K. (2019). Counter-terrorism law and sanctions can include humanitarian exceptions or provide for licences to be granted to humanitarian actors to deal with designated entities.

In January 2013 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) committed to the continued use of humanitarian derogations in Council-imposed sanction regimes applicable to all Member States. It also emphasized that Member States must respect their obligations under international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law, in any measures designed to combat terrorism (Muibu, D. (2022)). The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006 highlights the relationship between humanitarian considerations in the widest sense and counter-terrorism objectives through its recognition of human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (Menkhaus, K. (2019)). Some international donors specifically refer to international law, core humanitarian principles and sector standards in their overarching counter-terrorism strategies or in funding agreements with humanitarian actors.

#### **2.4.3. The prepare and protect strategy of counter terrorism and national security**

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has imposed sanctions on certain individuals and entities in response to terrorism as a threat to international peace and security through targeted sanctions regimes (Marchal, R. 2017). In 1999, one year after the bombing of the US embassies in East Africa, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1267, the third in a series of resolutions calling upon the Taliban to cease sheltering terrorists. Resolution 1267 differed from the earlier resolutions in two respects: it mentioned Osama bin Laden by name for the first time (demanding that he be handed over to a relevant state for prosecution) and imposed sanctions on the Taliban for failure to comply with the earlier resolutions (Ibrahim, M. 2020).

UN Member States were ordered to deny permission to Taliban controlled flights to take off or land in their territory, as well as to freeze funds and financial resources belonging to the Taliban (named individuals or entities) and to ensure neither these nor any other resources were made available to the Taliban by “their nationals or by any persons within their territory” (Marchal, R. 2017). Paragraph 4(b) of the resolution provided a mechanism to create humanitarian exceptions, allowing the committee created to oversee the sanctions regime to authorize the transfer of resources otherwise prohibited to listed individuals “on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need” (Marchal, R. 2017). The terms of this exception were later widened considerably to include, inter alia, resources determined by Member States to be “necessary for basic expenses, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges.

In 2000, Resolution 1333 extended the regime to Osama bin Laden himself, and any individuals and entities associated with him. Soon after the terrorist attacks of September 2001 Resolution 1390 transformed the 1267 regime into a global list of Al Qaeda and Taliban members, without temporal or geographic limitations (Elliot, A., & Holzer, G. S., 2019). In 2011, the Taliban and Al Qaeda sanctions regimes were split. 21 Separate Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctions committees, established by the UNSC, maintain lists of designated individuals and entities and monitor Member States' compliance with the sanctions regimes. These sanctions regimes and associated lists are referred to in this report with reference to UNSCR 1267, for simplicity, although the current Taliban regime is more accurately linked to UNSCR 1988 (Ibrahim, M. 2020). That's The Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctions regimes are the only targeted UN counter-terrorist regimes, and the only terrorist lists at UN level (Ibrahim, M. 2020).

In other situations, such as Somalia, however, groups or individuals designated on national counter-terrorism lists are subject to UN sanctions imposed on other grounds (Marchal, R. 2017). In 2008, UNSC Resolution 1844 imposed sanctions on individuals and entities, who threatened the peace in Somalia, violated the arms embargo originally imposed in 1992/24 or obstructed humanitarian assistance. In April 2010, the Committee monitoring the arms embargo and related sanctions issued a list of individuals and entities concerned, which included Al-Shabaab.<sup>25</sup> By this date, a number of Member States including the US (February 2008), Australia (August 2009), Canada and the UK (both March 2010) had already designated Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization and imposed their own related sanctions (Ibrahim, M. (2010).

Alongside the international legal framework provided by multilateral treaties and resolutions of the UNSC, international policy initiatives also influence the development of counter-terrorism measures at national level Elliot, A., & Holzer, G. S. (2019). These include the G8's Counter-terrorism Action Group (CTAG), which was established to support the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and more widely the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 26 the Global Counterterrorism Forum, launched in 2011 with 29 Member States plus the EU and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

FATF is particularly influential and relevant for this research. An informal group originally established in 1989 by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to combat money-laundering, FATF's mandate was expanded to address terrorist

financing in the wake of the September 2001 attacks. FATF has issued nine Special Recommendations against terrorist financing to its members (currently 34 states and two regional associations) (Menkhaus, K. (2019). Former Special Recommendation VIII, now Recommendation 8, is specifically concerned with ensuring that nonprofit organizations cannot be misused to finance terrorism. The interpretative note to the Recommendation contains a detailed list of measures Member States should undertake in order to achieve compliance.

Other recommendations, such as those on criminalizing the financing of terrorism and imposing greater scrutiny on money transfers, are also of relevance to humanitarian operations. Member States are rated on their compliance with FATF recommendations through a regular process of detailed peer review (Hoehne, M. V., 2019). While FATF recommendations are not legally binding, they can have far-reaching practical effects. It has been argued that the FATF focus on non-profit organizations as particularly vulnerable to exploitation for terrorist purposes is not justified by empirical evidence and has encouraged over-regulation of the sector (Menkhaus, K. (2019).

## **2.5 Research gaps**

From the literature review above, it can be seen that several studies have been conducted in the past on the causes and effects of terrorism in the Horn of Africa, and in most cases Somalia. Also, other studies have been carried out in security related spheres in Somalia especially regarding to the best ways how security challenges in Somalia can be resolved amicably. However, for any study on the impact of Somalia Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia are rare, hence, the study is an attempt to examine the effect of the variables of Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia. The study has also been attempted in several modern economies in the first world but it has not been attempted in the context of Mogadishu City, a fragile city of Somalia. Therefore, the study suggests examining the effect of Somalia Counterterrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia.

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 3.0. Introduction

This chapter presents the methodological procedures used in the study. Specifically, the chapter described the research design, study population, sample size and sampling technique, data collection methods and tools, measurement of variables, Validity and Reliability, data analysis, ethical considerations and limitations of the study.

#### 3.1. Research design

A research design is a plan of carrying out a study while controlling the factors that may have interference in the study findings validity (Creswell, 2017). In other words, a research design outlines how, where, and when data was collected and analyzed.

A descriptive and correlations research design was adopted to investigate the parameters of the study. A correlation design was selected to get the required data since a case study is a complete study, in itself, can provide focused and valuable insights to phenomena that may otherwise be vaguely known or understood (Singh, 2007). The descriptive design was deemed appropriate because the main interest is to establish the relationship between the study variables, where a detailed explanation was required on the aspects of the study, and the study has not been well researched before. Kothari (2011) attests that a descriptive study finds out what, where, and how of a phenomenon. It allows for the generalization of collected data when the sample population is large.

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), descriptive survey is used to obtain information concerning the current status of the phenomena to describe what exists with respect to variables in a situation, by asking individuals about their perceptions, attitudes, behaviour or values. Coopers and Schindler (2010) noted that descriptive studies are more formalized and typically structured with investigative questions. This method allows for easier and more direct collection of specific data required by the researcher when describing opinions and views on the Somalia counter terrorism and national security. The adoption of descriptive research enabled the researcher to

conduct a snapshot survey and apply quantitative techniques to determine the relationship between the research variables.

### 3.3. Research approaches

In this case, both qualitative and quantitative methods were used. In this study, both methods were utilized for instance qualitative opinions that were got and confirmed by statistical data. The study used in-depth interviews, observations (qualitative) as well as survey and statistical records like tables (Amin, 2005). Qualitative approach enabled the researcher capture the respondents' attitudes, behaviours and experiences regarding the phenomenon under study. Quantitative approach, using tools such as questionnaires and interview guides, enabled the researcher gather large scale data, in a relatively shorter time frame (Creswell, 2017). The study further employed a triangulation of both these approaches in order to efficiently put to use the collected data. These research approaches were appropriate for this study as they assisted in establishing the relationship between the study variables.

### 3.3. Research population

A population is a set of all elements, groups and items with common attributes and characteristics (Yin, 2013). The study involved political leadership, clan leaders, civil society organizations CSOs, and community members. The respondents provided information about the study topic and acted as key informants during data collection. Therefore, the target population of this research is 29,057 consisting of all the leadership of Mogadishu and Somalia as a whole as illustrated in Table 3.1 below.

**Table 3.1: Population size**

| Category           | Category                 | Study Population |
|--------------------|--------------------------|------------------|
|                    | Religious Leaders        | 10               |
|                    | Chief Security officials | 07               |
|                    | AMISOM officials         | 17               |
|                    | Military Detaches        | 10               |
|                    | Political leaders        | 20               |
|                    | Citizens                 | 29,000           |
| <b>Grand total</b> |                          | <b>29,057</b>    |

*Source: (Human Resource Report, 2022).*

### **3.4. Sampling techniques**

Sampling technique is a method of drawing samples from a population, usually in such a manner that the sample facilitates determination of some hypothesis concerning the population (Kothari, 2014; Mohojan, 2018). It is believed that if sample is chosen carefully, using the correct procedure, it is then possible to generalize the results to the whole of the research population (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). The researcher used both probability and non-probability sampling techniques so as to be exhaustive in the research findings. The study employed a combination of both stratified and purposive sampling techniques in selecting the sample.

According to Amin (2005), there are broadly two sampling approaches namely the probability and the non-probability sampling techniques. The probability sampling approach involved selecting a sample in such a way that all the elements in the population had some chances of being selected while in non- probability, the elements in the population never had a well-defined chance of being selected. The sampling techniques that were used are as mentioned below:

#### **3.4.1. Simple Random Sampling**

Simple Random Sampling was used as a probability technique to obtain a good representative sample from the study population, where the respondents were picked at random from the population, to ensure proportionate representation of the different sub- groups, because it gives each respondent an equal chance of being selected (Privitera, 2017). It ensures a high degree of representation of the whole population and has no bias, gives all respondents a chance to be selected and it allows in-depth analysis (Verhoef, 2018).

#### **3.4.2. Purposive Sampling**

Simple random sampling was used to select the participants from the different departments. The respondents were picked at random from the population; this is used because it gives each respondent an equal chance of being selected (Cooper & Schindler, 2011). The technique emphasizes that the population be divided into a number of strata. This technique was used to give more respondents in the population a chance to be part of the sample (Britten, 2009). It is a probability sampling technique where each sampling unit in the population has an equal probability of being selected in the sample size and is representative of the characteristics in the population



(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). It ensures a high degree of representation of the whole population and has no bias, gives all respondents a chance to be selected and it allows in-depth analysis and this procedure is also less costly and time saving (Englander, 2012). To arrive at the sample, the researcher used proportional method where the accessible population is divided by the total accessible population of the study, multiplied by the total sample of the study.

### **3.4.3. Convenience Sampling**

Convenience sampling involved in getting participants wherever they could be found and typically wherever it was convenient. Convenience sampling method was applied by engaging respondents that were picked from the streets of Mogadishu.

### **3.5. Sample Size and Selection Strategy**

A sample is a proportion of a population selected for observation and analysis and used to make an inference to the population from which it was obtained (Bryman. 2008). In this study, the sample size was calculated using Scott Smith, (2013):  $(Z \text{ value})^2 \times \text{standard deviation} (1 - \text{standard deviation}) / \text{Marginal error})^2 = n$ , to determine an adjusted sample of 205 were used for the whole population of 29,057.

The assumptions are that the sample of the bigger populations is insufficient for a valid conclusion, thus the need to adjust for a more definitive level of response. The adjusted sample was viable in the context of funds available for the research study; systematic bias is controlled in a better way. According to the formula the sample size is divided by the total sample size multiplied by the adjusted sample, as explained by Table 3.2 below.

**Table 3.1; Sample size and sampling procedure**

| <b>Staff under Departments</b> | <b>Study Population</b> | <b>Sample Size</b> | <b>Adjusted Sample Size</b> | <b>Sampling Method</b> |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| Religious Leaders              | 5                       | 5                  | 2                           | Purposive Sampling     |
| CSO officials                  | 05                      | 5                  | 2                           | Simple Random Sampling |
| AMISOM officials               | 07                      | 7                  | 3                           | Purposive Sampling     |
| Military Detaches              | 10                      | 10                 | 5                           | Purposive Sampling     |
| Political leaders              | 20                      | 19                 | 9                           | Simple Random Sampling |
| UN officials                   | 10                      | 10                 | 5                           | Simple Random Sampling |
| Citizens                       | 29,000                  | 377                | 179                         | Convenient Sampling    |
| <b>Grand total</b>             | <b>29,057</b>           |                    | <b>205</b>                  |                        |

*Source: Human Resource Report, (2018) & Krejcie and Morgan (1970) table*

This study's unit of inquiry was Mogadishu City, while the unit of analysis focused on how Somalia counter terrorism affect national security. The unit of inquiry constituted of all the population of Mogadishu.

### **3.6. Sources of Data**

Data sources included both primary and secondary sources (Amin, 2010). The researcher used both primary and secondary data sources.

#### **3.6.1. Primary Data**

The primary sources of data were used to collect first-hand information from the field using collection tools such as questionnaires and interviews guides from the respondents. Primary data was collected with the aid of a semi-structured questionnaire and this was analyzed using both descriptive and inferential statistics like Mean, Standard Deviation (SD). Pearson's correlation,

and Pearson's product moment correlation ( $r^2$ ) statistic were used to establish the significance of the correlation between the variables. The use of multiple linear regressions is based on the fact that only a single dependent variable was tested in relation to three independent variables. The use of self-administered questionnaires afforded privacy of response and therefore recorded a high response rate. Mugenda and Mugenda (2012) state that primary data refers to information that is gathered from the field. Primary data enhances reliability since it is conducted by the investigator conducting the research.

### **3.6.2. Secondary Data**

Secondary data was collected by use of desk search techniques from published reports and other relevant documents. It also included the Ministry of Defense and Security's publications and Annual Reports. Cooper and Schindler (2010) define secondary data as a source of data that can be evaluated to study past trends based on reports, public records, and other publications. Information obtained from these sources helped to complement the information obtained from primary sources (Amin, 2005).

### **3.7. Data Collection Methods**

Data collection is the process of gathering and measuring information on variables of interest in an established, systematic fashion that enables one to answer stated research questions, test hypotheses and evaluate outcomes (Bryman, 2012). The data collection methods used in this study were the questionnaire survey and interviews to collect the primary, and secondary data.

#### **3.7.1. Survey**

Survey was used to collect data from the population that was randomly selected. The choice of the survey method was on the fact that respondents can read and write, and this enabled responding to the study questions without influence in the presence of the respondent. Patton (2015) affirms that survey method covers big area over a short period of time. The employees, especially the junior staff used, were given questionnaires which had closed ended and open ended questions for collecting of data in a wide range from a wide number of individuals (Sekaran & Bougie, 2011). It also allowed respondents to respond boldly and frankly to questions. The Survey method also enabled the collection of vast amounts of data in a short time and in a less expensive manner (Kankiriho, 2014).

### **3.7.2. Interview**

The study employed the interview method. This is a purposeful discussion between the researcher and the respondent (Gall, Gall & Borg, 2007). This approach was guided by the consideration that interview method of gathering information that can be used to solicit the opinions and suggestions of the respondents. It is also used as a means of probing of some interesting and unexpected behavior (Mohojan, 2018). Interviews, in this study were used to obtain more in depth information on the study topic which may not be possible to obtain with the use of closed -ended questionnaires. Face-to-face interviews have the strength that you can ask follow-up questions and use non-verbal communication to your advantage, which in turn provides the richest data when it is conducted face-to-face, as the interviewer and participant can react to each other's nonverbal cues to develop a rapport (Saunders et al., 2015). In-depth information was used to obtained, from purposive participants, since they are more experienced in their field of work. For confidentiality reasons, participants were asked whether the name of the company can be disclosed in this dissertation.

### **3.8. Data Collection Instruments**

A data collection instrument refers to the device used to collect data (Bryman, 2012). The subject's characteristics, the topic of the research, the problem statement, objectives, and expected data determine the instrument that were adopted in data collection (Kothari, 2011). This research utilized questionnaire and interview guide as explained here below:

#### **3.8.1. Questionnaire**

A questionnaire is a well thought-out tool designed to elicit information that can be obtained through written responses from the study subjects (Katamba & Nsubuga, 2014). Closed questionnaire were used to obtain information from respondents (see appendix I). The self-administered questionnaire is an efficient data collection tool which has advantages of high completion responses within a short period. Use of questionnaires allows some respondents adequate time to reflect on the responses to circumvent rushed feedback (Cox, 2012). However, some researcher-administered questionnaires were employed by the researcher and/or the research assistance given the time and/or language barrier issues. This helped enhance the validity (accuracy) of the responses (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2012). The researcher used a 6-Likert scale questionnaire to ensure collection of data from many respondents within a short time and

respondents are free to give relevant information because they are assured of their anonymity (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). The researcher used the questionnaire to examine the relationship between the study variables.

### **3.8.2. Interview Guide**

A semi structured interview guide was designed and administered to collect data from the purposive participants. Face-to-face interviews were used on the staff based on a pre-determined interview guide to capture in-depth qualitative data. This consisted of structured questions administered purposively on participants because they are deemed to be more knowledgeable about the variables under study. According to Kankiriho (2014) interviews have the advantage of generating more information through probing. In addition, interviews also allow for clarification and capturing facial expressions of the interviewees. In addition, they give an opportunity to the researcher to revisit some of the issues that had been an over-sight in other instruments and yet they were deemed vital for the study (Schuler & Jackson, 2017).

## **3.9. Quality Control of Data Tools**

For quality control purposes, the study measured the validity and reliability of the tools and findings.

### **3.9.1. Reliability**

Accordingly, Amin (2005) echoes the fact that reliability can be used to measure the extent to which the instruments used can produce consistent results when repeatedly administered on the same group of individuals under the same conditions. Pre-testing helped the researcher in determining the consistency in understanding the instruments by the respondents as well as finding out the time it would take the respondents to fill out the questionnaire. According to Sekaran (2006) some professionals, as a rule of thumb, require a reliability of 0.70 or higher (obtained on a substantial sample) before they use an instrument.

The researcher pre-tested the instruments to be used in order to establish reliability and this needed the instruments to be tested under a pilot study, which had a sample of about 10 respondents. The researcher used the Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient to test all the items from both independent

variable and dependent variable dimensions in the instrument. According to Amin (2005), reliability refers to consistency of a measuring instrument that is the extent to which a measuring instrument contains variable error. In this study, Cronbach's Alpha was used to test reliability of the instrument whereby the value of coefficient Alpha can range from zero (no internal consistency) to one (complete internal consistency) and (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

### **3.9.2. Validity**

Validity refers to the appropriateness of the instrument (Amin, 2005). It takes into consideration how well the questions measure the matters chosen to be studied. In order to get valid results, the meters for measuring must be in order. To establish validity, the questionnaire was given to two experts who happen to be the researcher's supervisors from the university as well as another expert from the participants. Using experts as help and pre-testing are ways of ensuring that the questions are formed correctly and that they measure what they are wanted to be measuring (Cope, 2014). This was done to evaluate the relevance of each question in providing answers to the study. After which a Content Validity Index (C.V.I) was computed using the formula:  $CVI = K/N$

$$C.V.I = \frac{\text{Total No. of questions declared valid/relevant}}{\text{Total No. of questions in the questionnaire}}$$

### **3.10. Data processing and analysis**

Data analysis is the process of converting raw data into meaningful information from which meaningful inferences can be drawn (Gall et al., 2007). The collected data was edited, coded, organized and entered into the computer for analysis. After data entry, all errors were eliminated and frequency analysis was done such that descriptive analysis was computed. Descriptive statistics, such as means, standard deviations and frequency distribution were used to analyze the data. Data presentation was done by the use of percentages and frequency tables. Inferential statistics were used in drawing conclusions. Data in part 'A' of the questionnaire was analyzed using frequency distributions and percentages to determine the profile of respondents. Data in part 'B' was analyzed using mean scores and standard deviations to determine the relationship between variables. Inferential statistics such as Pearson's product moment correlation ( $r^2$ ) statistic were used to establish the significance of the correlation between the study variables.

The use of multiple linear regressions was based on the fact that only a single dependent variable was tested in relation to three independent variables. Multiple regression analysis was used to determine the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable.

Presentation of results for both the descriptive and inferential statistics was through tables. Quantitative data was presented using mean and standard deviations with the aid of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version. 23.

For the qualitative data, a mixture of thematic content analysis and narrative analysis was adopted. It was organized into themes and sub-themes according to the objectives of the study to reinforce the findings obtained through quantitative data. This was through getting familiar with the data through reading and re-reading after previewing the recordings with the written interviews per selected interviewees, this was followed by Coding (labeling) the whole text, then themes with broader patterns of similar connotation was identified, reviewing themes to make sure they fit the data, then designating these subjects to provide for a comprehensible description that comprises quotations from the respondents. There were also comparisons in stories which led to creating stories out of those told by the respondents depending on the consistence of these stories.

### **3.12. Ethical Considerations**

In order to observe good ethical practices all the necessary permission was acquired from the relevant sources. The interviewed participants were requested to sign a sign-off sheet to prove that they have fully accepted to take part in the study with their consent. In the sign-off sheet, the researcher provided his contacts for participants to request for any further information that they needed regarding the study. Lenience was ensured to observe ethical principles to ensure that bias was eliminated to maximize meaning of information provided. Respect for all intellectual property, where all primary sources was properly documented, referenced and Authors acknowledged. The research Assistant recognized the rights of individuals to privacy, personal data protection and freedom of movement, while the “Do no harm” principle was followed during research. Additionally, any risks were clearly communicated to subjects involved. Finally, all the data collected was destroyed after capturing and analysis.

### **3.13. Limitations of the Study.**

The researcher encountered the following limitations in the course of gathering data for the study:

- i. Lack of enough written records reduced the accessibility to vital information that was required for our research. This was, however, dealt with by reaching out to corned high people to access some information.
- ii. Limited outcomes in a quantitative research. This study used quantitative approach which involved structured questionnaire with close ended questions. This led to limited outcomes outlined in the research proposal, since some respondents had limited options of responses. However, this was mitigated by adopting the mixed approach, where qualitative approach, using interviews were used to back up questionnaires.
- iii. There were unstable work schedules due to Covid-19, which forced may people who work to adopt to the new trends of working from home on some particular days. However, the researcher ensure that appropriate appointments were scheduled before time.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF STUDY FINDINGS

#### 4.0. Introduction

This chapter deals with presentation analysis and interpretation. The data collected from the field was processed and analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The approaches used in analysis provided more clarification on explanations on both quantitative and qualitative data. The information was summarized to show the responses of the respondents. All these findings were interpreted and presented, through thorough re-examination of the research objectives. The researcher provided the results and discussion of the study findings about examining the impact of Somalia Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu Somalia as the case study. The specific objectives involved (i) to examine the impact of the pursue strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City. (ii) To ascertain the impact of the prevent strategy of counter terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; (iii) To ascertain the impact of the prepare and protect strategy of Counter Terrorism on national security in Somalia.

The chapter also presents the response rate, background information on the respondents, descriptive analysis and verification of research hypotheses as well as the research questions

The analysis begins with presentation of the response rate, presentation of personal characteristics of the study participants and lastly the presentation of finding according to the study objectives. It also presents the response rate, demographic characteristics of the respondents (bio data), mean, standard deviation, correlation, analysis of variance and regression analysis based on the study topic.

#### 4.1. Response rate

**Table 4.1: Response rate**

| <b>Sex</b> | <b>Questionnaires</b> | <b>Frequency</b> | <b>Percentage</b> |
|------------|-----------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Valid      | Respondent            | 166              | 81                |
|            | Not responded         | 39               | 19                |
|            | <b>Total</b>          | <b>205</b>       | <b>100.0</b>      |

*Source: Primary data, 2023*

Results in Table 4.1 above indicate that, out of the 205 respondents to whom the questionnaires were issued, 166 returned the questionnaires, representing 81 percent response rate while 39 of the questionnaires were invalid, and the 81% response was valid and acceptable.

#### 4.2 Demographic characteristics of the respondents

Information about background characteristics of respondents is presented in this section. These characteristics include gender, Age, level of education and length of time of respondents had spent in Mogadishu, Somalia.

##### 4.2.1 Gender/Sex of Respondents

**Table 4.2: Gender/Sex of the Respondents**

| <b>Sex</b>   | <b>Frequency</b> | <b>Percentage</b> | <b>Cumulative</b> |
|--------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Male         | 138              | 67.3              | 67.3              |
| Female       | 67               | 32.7              | <b>100</b>        |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>205</b>       | <b>100</b>        |                   |

*Source: Primary data computed by the researcher, (2023)*

Results in Table 4.2 above show that 138(67.3) were males while 67(32.7%) were females respectively. Thus, the involvement of both male and female respondents' enhanced representativeness and reliability of the survey data collected.

#### 4.2.2. The age of the respondents

**Table 4.3: The age of the respondents**

| Age          | Frequency  | Percentage | Cumulative |
|--------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 30- 34 years | 52         | 25.6       | 25.6       |
| 18-29 years  | 39         | 18.8       | 44.4       |
| 35- 39 years | 33         | 16.4       | 60.8       |
| 40-44 years  | 26         | 12.9       | 73.7       |
| 45- 49 years | 20         | 9.9        | 83.6       |
| 50-54 years  | 16         | 7.7        | 91.3       |
| 55-69 years  | 11         | 5.5        | 96.8       |
| 70+ years    | 8          | 3.2        | <b>100</b> |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>205</b> | <b>100</b> |            |

**Source:** Primary data computed by the researcher, (2023)

Results in Table 4.3 above show that 25.6 percent of the respondents that participated in the study belonged in the age group of 30–34 years, 18.8 percent, belonged in the age group of 18–29 years, 16.4 percent belonged in the age group of 35–49 years, 12.9 percent of the participants belonged in the age group of 40–45 years, 9.9 percent of the participants belonged in the age group of 45–49 years, 7.7 percent of the participants belonged in the age group of 50–54 years and 5.5 percent of the participants belonged in the age group of 55–69 years, while the remaining 3.2 percent

belonged to the age group of 70+ years. The results therefore indicate that the majority of respondents were of mature and of experienced age which made the researcher to consider their views as valid and authentic in relation to the study. These findings argues that majority age of above 18 years adds value to the responses given that mature people are more and take time to think about a particular aspect of life given their wide exposure and experience.

#### 4.2.3. Respondents' level of education

**Table 4.4: Respondents' level of education**

| Level of Education | Frequency  | Percentage   | Cumulative |
|--------------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| Bachelor's Degree  | 87         | 42.3         | 42.3       |
| Diploma            | 51         | 25.1         | 25.1       |
| Certificate        | 40         | 19.4         | 86.8       |
| Master's Degree    | 24         | 11.7         | 98.5       |
| Secondary          | 03         | 1.5          | <b>100</b> |
| <b>Total</b>       | <b>205</b> | <b>100.0</b> |            |

*Source: Primary data computed by the researcher, (2023).*

Results in Table 4.4 above indicate that 42.3 percent of the respondents were Bachelors holders, 25.1 percent of the respondents were diploma holders, 19.4 percent were holding certificates in different courses, 11.7 percent were Masters 'holders while the minority 1.5 percent were Secondary holders in various fields. These findings indicate that most of the respondents were adequately educated since most of them were degree holders. This therefore implies that the study involved people with acceptable level of literacy who were in better position to understand and interpret the contents in questionnaire. This argues that it is important in social investigation research to involve people who have attained an acceptable level of literacy and numeracy in order to be in position to understand and interpret the content in questionnaire.

#### 4.2.4. The category of the respondents

Table 4.7 below presents the category of the respondents.

**Table 4.7: Category of the respondents**

| <b>Category</b>  | <b>Frequency</b> | <b>Percentage</b> |
|--|------------------|-------------------|
| Officials from Ministry of Internal Affairs and defence                | 20               | 9.76              |
| Officials from AMISOM  | 10               | 4.8               |
| Defense Military Attachés  | 20               | 9.7               |
| Somalia Police Force (Crime Intelligence, Interpol, Counter Terrorism) | 25               | 12.1              |
| Political leaders  | 25               | 12.1              |
| Clan leaders   | 20               | 9.7               |
| Religious leaders  | 15               | 7.3               |
| UN officials / envoys to Somalia                                       | 25               | 12.1              |
| Local Citizens of Somalia  | 45               | 21.9              |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>205</b>       | <b>100.0</b>      |

*Source: Primary data computed by the researcher, 2023*

Results in Table 4.7 above indicate that 21.9 percent were operational staff, 18.2 percent were belonging to the procurement/ administration category, 14.5 percent were accountants and 1.5 percent were supervisors while the minority 1.3 percent were in the top management category.

### 4.3. Descriptive statistics for the study variables

These outputs below provide descriptive statistics for all of the independent variables and the dependent variable. Variables are listed down the left column of the outputs and the requested descriptive statistics are listed across the top row. The descriptive statistics included in the output are, the Mean (or average) for each item and the Std. deviation (the standard deviation). A mean value close to 1 represents definitely disagreed, mean value close to 2 means mostly disagree, mean close to 3 indicates a state of somewhat disagree about the question asked, for a mean close to 4 means mostly agree, and those close to 5 means definitely agree. For riskiness, a mean value close to 1 indicates very improbable, mean value close to 2 indicates improbable, mean value close to 3 indicates neither improbable nor probable, mean value close to 4 indicates probable and mean value close to 5 indicates very probable. The results are summarized in Table below.

#### 4.3.1. Findings on the impact of pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia;

**Table 4.1: The pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts on national security**

| The pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts on national security  | RESPONSES (%) |       |      |      |      |       |      |       |
|--|---------------|-------|------|------|------|-------|------|-------|
|  | SA %          | A %   | UC % | D %  | SD % | TOTAL | MEAN | STD   |
| The pursue strategy has created and promoted more attention to helping Somalia with the twin task of reconciliation and state building.  | 52.68         | 28.76 | 5.47 | 8.21 | 6.81 | 100   | 3.27 | 1.808 |
| Building up Somalia counter-terrorist network, headed by faction leaders and former military or police officers, and by cooperating with the security services in Somaliland and neighboring Punt land | 53.42         | 26.02 | 2.73 | 9.58 | 8.21 | 100   | 3.21 | 1.792 |

|   |       |       |      |       |       |     |             |             |
|---|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-----|-------------|-------------|
| Counter- terrorism efforts are producing growing unease within the broader public   | 24.65 | 19.17 | 0    | 28.76 | 15.06 | 100 | 2.82        | 1.679       |
| Unidentified surveillance flights , the abduction of innocent people for weeks at a time on suspicion of terrorist links, and cooperation with unpopular faction leaders all add to public cynicism and resentment                                      | 34.24 | 46.57 | 5.47 | 10.95 | 2.73  | 100 | 2.18        | 1.476       |
| Eager to earn the support of western governments as an allies in the war on terrorism, the TFG leadership has attributed the attacks to islamist extremists but some of the evidence appears to implicate supporters of the interim president, instead. | 39.72 | 34.24 | 9.58 | 10.95 | 5.47  | 100 | 2.87        | 1.694       |
| The threat of jihadi terrorism from Somalia can be addressed through the restoration of stable, legitimate and functional government.   | 47.94 | 41.09 | 5.47 | 4.10  | 1.36  | 100 | 4.08        | 0.58        |
| Somalia’s friends are required to do more to assist in bringing Somali society together again and rebuilding the state.   | 24.65 | 19.17 | 0    | 28.76 | 15.06 | 100 | 3.91        | 0.63        |
| <b>Average</b>  |       |       |      |       |       |     | <b>3.87</b> | <b>1.69</b> |

**Source: Primary data 2023**

The following mean ranges were used to arrive at the mean of the individual indicators and interpretation:

| <b>Mean Range</b> | <b>Response Mode</b> | <b>Interpretation</b> |
|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 3.26-4.00         | strongly agree       | Very High             |
| 2.51-3.25         | Agree                | High                  |
| 1.76-2.50         | Disagree             | Low                   |
| 1.00-1.75         | Strongly disagree    | Very Low              |

From table, the study findings, 4.7, with respect to the effect of pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia, was rated good and this was indicated by the average mean of 3.87 standard Deviation 1.69, hence implying that pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts like; reconciliation and state building, building up Somalia counter- terrorist network, etc, directly affects national security in Somalia. This implies that the pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts investigates and disrupt terrorist attacks; and stopping people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. This is because, terrorism disrupts livelihoods, increases violence and fear, affects the production in all sectors of the economy, destroys infrastructure and has resulted in bloodshed. In all cases of terrorist attacks, it has disrupted normal life, stalled production in the economy and international effort to provide peace and security through peruse strategy, the impact is being minimized.

From the study findings, specifically on the issue that the pursue strategy has created and promoted more attention to helping Somalia with the twin task of reconciliation and state building, majority of the respondents, representing (50.68%) of the total respondents, strongly agreed, while (28.76%) disagreed, (5.47%) were not sure, (8.21%) disagreed and finally, the rest of the respondents representing (6.81%) strongly disagreed. The result was rated very high with a mean value of (mean=3.27) and a STD of 1.808. Thus, this implied that the purse strategy has helped to tackle the causes of radicalization and responded to the ideological challenge of terrorism.

However, study results further show that, on the statement that building up Somalia counter-terrorist network headed by factional leaders and former military or police officers, and by cooperating with the security services in Somaliland and neighboring Punt land, majority of the respondents, representing (53.42%) strongly agreed, (26.02%) disagreed, (2.73%) were not sure, (9.58%) disagreed while the rest of the respondents strongly disagreed with (8.21%) response.



These responses were summarized to a mean value of (mean=3.21) which was rated high with a STD of 1.792.

Further, on the fact that, counter- terrorism efforts are producing growing unease within the broader public, the study findings in the table above shows that, (24.65%) of respondents strongly agreed, (19.17%) agreed, (28.76%) were not sure, (15.06%) disagreed while only 12.36 of respondents strongly disagreed. These results were rated as high with an average mean of 2.82. Thus, indicating that through the pursue strategy, the government security agencies do safeguard and support those most at risk of radicalization, through early intervention, identifying them and offering support and to enable those who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate.

While, on the fact that unidentified surveillance flights, the abduction of innocent people for weeks at a time on suspicion of terrorist links, and cooperation with unpopular faction leaders all add to public cynicism and resentment; (34.24%) of respondents agreed, (46.57%) strongly agreed, while (5.47%) Disagreed, (10.95%) of respondents were Not Sure and only (2.73%) of respondents strongly disagreed, and these results were rated low with a mean value of only 2.18.

Further, the study results in the table above indicates that, on the fact that eager to earn the support of western government as an ally in the war on terrorism, the TFG leadership has attributed the attacks to islamist extremists but some of the evidence appears to implicate supporters of the interim president instead, with (39.72%) of the total respondents strongly agreeing, (34.24%) agreed, (9.58%) not sure, (10.95%) disagreed, while only (5.47%) strongly disagreed. These results were rated as high with a mean value of 2.87.

While, majority of the respondents agreed to the statement that, the threat of jihadi terrorism from Somalia can be addressed through the restoration of stable, legitimate and functional government (M=4.35 & SD= 0.40). The respondents also agreed that Somalia's friends are required to do more to assist in bringing Somali society together again and rebuilding the state (M=4.21 & SD= 0.47). Thus, this shows that all the respondents were aware of the contribution of the pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts affects national security.

*“.....The purse strategy on counter terrorism is good since it includes efforts to strengthen law enforcement and judicial capabilities, expand aviation and border security, deepen global information sharing, counter terrorist financing, improve crisis response, and counter violent extremism. Thus, the strategy helps to stop vulnerable people from being drawn into extremism.....”*  
*interviewee I*

*While enforcing the purse strategy, the core capabilities are essential for the execution of each of the five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. This means that as the purse strategy centers on security Intelligence, it plays a vital role in preventing terrorist attacks from occurring and in assisting law enforcement officers in apprehending persons suspected of committing terrorist acts whether before or after an actual attack has occurred.....”* Interviewee II

The findings are in disagreement with Civins, (2009) who asserted that, despite these successes, counter-terrorism efforts are producing growing unease within the broader public. Few Somalis believe there are terrorists in their country, and many regard the American-led war on terrorism as an assault on Islam. Unidentified surveillance flights, the abduction of innocent people for weeks at a time on suspicion of terrorist links, and cooperation with unpopular faction leaders all add to public cynicism and resentment. Without public support, even the most sophisticated counter-terrorism effort is doomed to failure. However, Mulugeta, (2009) asserts that militants have responded by assassinating at least a dozen Somalis working for Mogadishu's Western-backed counter-terrorism networks. Meanwhile, an Ethiopian intelligence network hunts Islamist militants and insurgents among Somalia's small, fearful community of Oromo migrants and refugees.

While, Kaldor (2012) argues that the threat of jihadi terrorism in and from Somalia is real. But attempts by the new Somali leadership and its regional allies to exploit this threat for short-term political gain risk plunging the country into even greater crisis. Several key leaders in the deeply divided transitional government are notorious for smearing adversaries and critics with allegations of terrorist linkages conduct that threatens to deepen the schisms within the government. More alarmingly, the faction of the TFG aligned with the interim president has tried to use the threat of terrorism to justify deployment of a regional intervention force to Somalia a widely unpopular and

deeply divisive proposition that would not only irrevocably split the government and trigger renewed conflict, but would also dramatically strengthen the jihadis.

**Establishing the relationship between pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia.**

*Correlation and Regression of pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts and national security in Mogadishu, Somalia.*

This section presents the correlation between pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia. The correlation analysis results are details in the table 4.8 below.

*Table 24: Correlation between pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia.*

| Correlations      |                     |                 |                   |
|-------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
|                   |                     | Pursue Strategy | National Security |
| Pursue Strategy   | Pearson Correlation | 1               | .757              |
|                   | Sig. (2-tailed)     |                 | .001              |
|                   | N                   | 205             | 205               |
| National Security | Pearson Correlation | .757            | 1                 |
|                   | Sig. (2-tailed)     | .001            |                   |
|                   | N                   | 205             | 205               |

**\*\*.** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Source: Primary data computed by the researcher, (2023).*

From the above table, it is indicated a strong and significant correlation coefficient of Pearson. 0.757. This means that there is a strong relationship between pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts and national security in Mogadishu, Somalia. This implies that pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts by 76% and other factors contribute only 24%. Therefore the government of Somalia through the national intelligence security agency (NISA) in particular need to understand that undertaking effective measures through the pursue strategy which calls a positive impact to combating terrorism in Mogadishu and this has

**Table 25: Model Summary of Pursue Strategy of counter terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia.**

| Model Summary                                     |                    |          |                   |                            |
|---|--------------------|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| Model   | R                  | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
| 1   | 0.813 <sup>a</sup> | 0.7713   | 0.8742            | 0.32091                    |
| <b>a. Predictors: (Constant), Pursue Strategy</b> |                    |          |                   |                            |

*Source: Primary data computed by the researcher, (2023).*

From the above table, it is indicated that the model summary of R<sup>2</sup> of 0.771 existed between Pursue Strategy and counter terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia, suggesting that Pursue Strategy predicted 77.1% of the variance in counter terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia whereas other factors at 22.9%. The R<sup>2</sup> of 0.7713, suggests that Pursue Strategy is a significant predictor of the counter terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia by 77.1%.

**Table 26: Regression Coefficient between Pursue Strategy of counter terrorism efforts and national security in Mogadishu, Somalia.**

| Coefficients                                    |                 |                             |            |                           |       |       |
|---|-----------------|-----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------|-------|
| Model   |                 | Unstandardized Coefficients |            | Standardized Coefficients | T     | Sig.  |
|   |                 | B                           | Std. Error | Beta                      |       |       |
| 1   | (Constant)      | 87.320                      | 1.3456     |                           | 16.54 | 0.000 |
|   | Pursue Strategy | 0.6145                      | 0.0205     | 0.603                     | 14.19 | 0.000 |
| <b>a. Dependent Variable: national security</b> |                 |                             |            |                           |       |       |

*Source: Primary data computed by the researcher, 2023.*

From the above table, it is indicated that the Regression Coefficient T of 14.19 and Beta of 0.603 and the significance of 0.000 suggests that Pursue Strategy is a significant predictor of counter terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu, Somalia, suggesting that Pursue Strategy predicted by 77.1%.

### 4.3.2 Descriptive analysis of the impact of prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City

The responses were graded on a 5 Linkert scale with representing SD-Strongly, D-Disagree, N-Neither Agree nor Disagree, A- Agree, SA- Strongly Agree.

Mean: In the study shows the average of response

Standard Deviation: In the study shows how spread the responses are to or from the mean value.

Specific objective number one of the study was to examine the impact of prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City. To achieve this, several questions were asked in this regard. The responses are in respect of these questions are as shown below:

**Table 4.2: showing responses on the impact of prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City**

| The prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City  | RESPONSES (%) |       |      |       |      |       |      |       |
|--|---------------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
|  | SA %          | A %   | UC % | D %   | SD % | TOTAL | MEAN | STD   |
| The government have imposed sanctions on certain individual and entities in response to terrorism as a threat to international peace and security through targeted sanctions regimes | 60            | 20    | 0    | 5     | 15   | 100   | 3.35 | 1.830 |
| UN member states were ordered to deny permission to Taliban controlled flights off or land in their territory.   | 40            | 30    | 15   | 10    | 05   | 100   | 3.05 | 1.746 |
| UN member state also froze funds and financial resource belonging to the Taliban and to ensure   | 42.46         | 27.39 | 6.84 | 13.69 | 9.58 | 100   | 2.78 | 1.667 |

|  |    |    |    |    |    |     |             |              |
|--|----|----|----|----|----|-----|-------------|--------------|
| neither these nor any other resources were made available to the Taliban by their nationals or by any persons within their territory.  |    |    |    |    |    |     |             |              |
| UN resolution of the prepare and protect strategy par 4(b) of the resolution provided a mechanism to create humanitarian exceptions, allowing the committee created to oversee the sanctions regime to authorize the transfer of resources otherwise prohibited to listed individuals “ on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need. | 15 | 25 | 10 | 25 | 25 | 100 | 2.46        | 1.568        |
| In Somalia, groups or individuals designated on national counter-terrorism lists are subject to UN sanctions on other grounds.   | 25 | 30 | 0  | 10 | 35 | 100 | 3.27        | 1.288        |
| <b>Average</b>   |    |    |    |    |    |     | <b>2.98</b> | <b>1.620</b> |

**Source:** Primary Data 2023

The following mean ranges were used to arrive at the mean of the individual indicators and interpretation:

| <b>Mean range</b> | <b>Response mode</b> | <b>Interpretation</b> |
|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 3.26-4.00         | Strongly agree       | Very High             |
| 2.51-3.25         | Agree                | High                  |
| 1.76-2.50         | Disagree             | Low                   |
| 1.00-1.75         | Strongly disagree    | Very Low              |

Study results in table 4.6 indicated that the effect of prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu City Somalia were rated high and this was indicated by the overall mean of 2.98, Std. Deviation of 1.620. And on the fact that the government have imposed sanctions on certain individual and entities in response to terrorism as a threat to international peace and security through targeted sanctions regimes; majority of the study respondents representing (60%) of the total strongly agreed, while (20%) agreed, (0%) were uncertain, (05%) disagreed and lastly (15%) strong disagreed. This was indicated by the average mean of 3.35, Std. Deviation of 1.830, implying that prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts directly influences the national security levels in Mogadishu Somalia.

Still, on the statement that the government have imposed sanctions on certain individual and entities in response to terrorism as a threat to international peace and security through targeted sanctions regimes, majority of the respondents representing (40%) strongly agreed, followed by (30%) who agreed, (15%) of respondents were not sure(uncertain), While, (10%) disagreed and (05%) strongly disagreed. The overall result was indicated by the average mean of 3.05, Std. Deviation of 1.74 this further shows the local authorities in collaboration with the security agencies do help to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, and a wide range of government departments, and community organizations to deliver the Prevent Strategy.

As well, results in table 4.6 indicate that, UN member states were ordered to deny permission to Taliban controlled flights off or land in their territory; 42.46%) of respondents agreed, (27.39%) strongly agreed, 05(6.84%) were not sure, while (13.69%) Disagreed, and 07(9.58%) of respondents strongly disagreed. The overall result was rated as high with an average mean of 2.78, and a Std. Deviation of 1.667.

Though, the study results also indicate that majority study respondents representing 25% of the total strongly disagreed to this notion, followed by still 25% who also disagreed, and 10% who were uncertain about the statements that UN member state also froze funds and financial resource belonging to the Taliban and to ensure neither these nor any other resources were made available to the Taliban by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, and that UN resolution of the prepare and protect strategy par 4(b) of the resolution provided a mechanism to create humanitarian exceptions, allowing the committee created to oversee the sanctions regime to authorize the transfer of resources otherwise prohibited to listed individuals “ on a case-by-case

basis on the grounds of humanitarian need. While, 25% also agreed and lastly, only 15% strong agreed. These results were rated poor with (mean value =2.46), Std. Deviation of 1.568. This implied that the prevent strategy is about safeguarding people and communities from the threat of terrorism.

And lastly, the Study results in the table above shows that, on the statements that, in Somalia, groups or individuals designated on national counter- terrorism lists are subject to UN sanctions on other grounds; majority study respondents representing 35% of the total strongly disagreed to this notion, with 10% who disagreed. Though, still 25% strongly agreed, while 30% agreed. The overall results were rated as good with an average mean of 3.27, and a Std. Deviation of 1.288, hence implying that a strongly good intended Prevent strategy is part of Contest, the Government's counter-terrorism strategy. It aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism and violent extremism.

*“.....Prevent is all about keeping people and communities safe from the threat of terrorism. It is one of the four strands of the government's “CONTEST” counter-terrorism strategy; the other strands are Pursue, Protect and Prepare.....”*

*“.....Terrorism is designed to change minds by destroying bodies; it is a form of costly signaling. Terrorists employ five primary strategies of costly signaling: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding.....”*The strategy prevents terrorism through encouraging everyone to be extra vigilant in places with large numbers of people, for example metro and train stations, festivals and concert venues, and shopping centres, Check the location of the emergency exits in every building you enter, and not leaving any belongings unattended.

The findings concurs with the study findings of Miyandazi, (2012), counter-terrorism law and measures have developed substantially over the last decade, humanitarian actors including United Nations (UN) agencies and international and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have begun to feel, or fear, their impact on their work. A number of studies and reports have indicated potential incompatibility between neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action and counter-terrorism objectives. Key problem areas have been identified and some legal analysis



has been carried out. The framework for humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict is provided by international humanitarian law (IHL), a body of rules that aims, among other things, to protect the life, health and dignity of civilians. Humanitarian action is provided for as a means to that end. IHL obliges the parties to an armed conflict to undertake relief actions themselves or allow impartial and humanitarian organizations to do so.

While, Mary Kaldor (2012) explains that a number of well-established principles are also relevant to humanitarian action. 3 Key among them is the principle of humanity, the aim of which is to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Closely related to the principle of humanity is that of impartiality, requiring that no discrimination be made on the basis of nationality, race, religion or other similar criteria and that assistance and protection be given only in proportion to need. Additionally there are principles of neutrality between the parties to an armed conflict and independence from political agendas, both of which enable the other core principles to be translated into action on the ground. The legal framework and these humanitarian principles require humanitarian actors to treat state and non-state parties to an armed conflict on an equal basis and to respond to all victims in proportion to their needs, without consideration of political or other factors. This approach can clash with that of counter-terrorism which designates certain armed actors as terrorist, and therefore criminal, and may impose liability for engaging with them even for humanitarian purposes.

### **The relationship between prevent strategy of counterterrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; a study of Mogadishu city**

Correlation and Regression of prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts and national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City

This section presents the correlation between prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts and national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City. The correlation analysis results are details in the table 37 below.

**Table 37: Correlation between prevent strategy of counterterrorism efforts and national security in Somalia; a study of Mogadishu City**

| Correlations      |                     |                  |                   |
|-------------------|---------------------|------------------|-------------------|
|                   |                     | Prevent Strategy | National Security |
| Prevent Strategy  | Pearson Correlation | 1                | 0.684**           |
|                   | Sig. (2-tailed)     |                  | .002              |
|                   | N                   | 205              | 205               |
| National Security | Pearson Correlation | 0.684**          | 1                 |
|                   | Sig. (2-tailed)     | .002             |                   |
|                   | N                   | 205              | 205               |

**\*\*.** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Source: Primary data computed by the researcher, 2023.*

From the above table, it is indicated a strong and significant correlation coefficient of Pearson, 0.655. This means that there is a strong relationship between prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts and national security in Mogadishu City of Somalia. This implies that prevent strategy affect Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu City of Somalia by 68.4% and other factors contribute only 31.6%. Therefore the government of Somalia in particular need to understand that undertaking effective prevent strategy measures of Counter Terrorism can cause a positive impact on national security in Mogadishu Somalia.

**Table 38: Model summary of prevent strategy of counterterrorism efforts and national security in Somalia; a study of Mogadishu City**

| Model Summary                                      |                     |          |                   |                            |
|--|---------------------|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| Model  | R                   | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
| 1  | 0.7801 <sup>a</sup> | 0.6630   | 0.6117            | .20135                     |
| <b>a. Predictors: (Constant), Prevent Strategy</b> |                     |          |                   |                            |

*Source: Primary data computed by the researcher, 2023.*

From the above table 4.12, it is indicated that the model summary of  $R^2$  of 0.663 existed between prevent strategy and national security in Mogadishu City in Somalia predicted 66.3% of the variance in national security in Mogadishu City in Somalia whereas other factors 33.7%.

**Table 39: Regression coefficient between prevent strategy of counterterrorism efforts and national security in Somalia; a study of Mogadishu City**

| <b>Coefficients</b>                             |                  |                |            |              |       |       |
|---|------------------|----------------|------------|--------------|-------|-------|
| <b>Model</b>                                    |                  | Unstandardized |            | Standardized | T     | Sig.  |
|   |                  | Coefficients   |            | Coefficients |       |       |
|   |                  | B              | Std. Error | Beta         |       |       |
| <b>1</b>  | (Constant)       | 19.410         | 1.0313     |              | 14.17 | 0.000 |
|   | Prevent Strategy | 0.6362         | 0.1311     | 0.505        | 12.05 | 0.000 |
| <b>a. Dependent Variable: National Security</b> |                  |                |            |              |       |       |

From the above table 4.13, it is indicated that the Regression coefficient of T of 12.05 and Beta of .505 that existed between prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts and national security in Mogadishu City in Somalia should a significant relationship between the two variable, and the significance of 0.000 suggests that prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism was a strong predictor of national security in Mogadishu City in Somalia.

### **4.3.3 Descriptive analysis of the impact of prepares and protects strategy of Counterterrorism on national security in Somalia.**

The responses were graded on a 5 Linkert scale with representing SD-Strongly, D-Disagree, N- Neither Agree nor Disagree, A- Agree, SA- Strongly Agree.

Mean: In the study shows the average of response

Standard Deviation: In the study shows how spread the responses are to or from the mean value.

Though, objective number three of the study was to examine the impact of prepares and protects strategy of Counter Terrorism on national security in Somalia. The responses in this area are presented, analyzed and discussed below:

**Table 4.3: Showing Response on the impact of prepares and protect strategy of counterterrorism on national security in Somalia.**

| The Prepare and protect strategy of counter terrorism on national security   | RESPONSES (%) |       |       |      |      |       |             |              |
|--|---------------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|-------------|--------------|
|  | SA %          | A %   | UC %  | D %  | SD % | TOTAL | MEAN        | STD          |
| Various resolutions have been put in place to cease sheltering terrorists in the country.  | 54.79         | 30.13 | 4.10  | 6.84 | 4.10 | 100   | 3.37        | 1.808        |
| Counter terrorism laws have substantially been developed to curb its spread.   | 45.20         | 32.87 | 12.32 | 6.84 | 2.73 | 100   | 3.28        | 1.792        |
| There is a frame work for humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict is provided by international humanitarian law to protect life, health and dignity. | 47.94         | 41.09 | 5.47  | 4.10 | 1.36 | 100   | 2.92        | 1.679        |
| There are international orders issued to deny permission to terrorists attached flights by all UN member states.   | 33.42         | 26    | 5.47  | 4.10 | 1.36 | 100   | 2.18        | 1.476        |
| There are international sanctions to freeze and denial of resources to so called terrorist groups across the globe   | 50.79         | 28.76 | 5.47  | 8.21 | 6.81 | 100   | 3.11        | 1.761        |
| Courts of laws are in place to try and prosecute whoever is suspected to involve in terrorism activities.  | 47.94         | 41.09 | 5.47  | 4.10 | 1.36 | 100   | 2.92        | 1.679        |
| <b>Average</b>   |               |       |       |      |      |       | <b>2.92</b> | <b>1.703</b> |

**Source: Primary Data 2023**

The following mean ranges were used to interpret the means:

| <b>Mean Range</b> | <b>Response Mode</b> | <b>Interpretation</b> |
|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 3.26-4.00         | Strongly Agree       | Very Good             |
| 2.51-3.25         | Agree                | Good                  |
| 1.76-2.50         | Disagree             | Poor                  |
| 1.00-1.75         | Strongly disagree    | Very poor             |

From study results in table 4.8 with respect to the impact of prepare and protect strategy of Counter Terrorism on national security in Somalia. Study results in table 4.8 indicated that, majority respondents strongly agreed on the impact of prepares and protect strategy of Counter Terrorism on national security in Somalia. This was indicated by the average mean value and STD value of; (Mean Value: 2.92 and STD value: 1.703).

Though, from the study findings indicate that various resolutions have been put in place to cease sheltering terrorists in the country as (54.79%) strongly agreed, (30.13%) agreed, (4.10%) were not sure, (6.84%) disagreed, and only (4.10%) strongly disagreed. These results were rated as very good with a mean value of 30.13, and a Std. Deviation of 6.84. While, on the statement that counter terrorism laws have substantially been developed to curb its spread, (45.20%) of the total study respondents strongly agreed, (32.87%) agreed, (12.32%) were not sure, (6.84%) disagreed, and only (2.73%) strongly disagreed. This was rated as good with a mean value 32.87, and a Std. Deviation of 6.84

Also on the statement that there is a frame work for humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict is provided by international humanitarian law to protect life, health and dignity. The majority respondents representing (47.94%) strongly agreed with the statement, (41.09%) agreed, (5.47%) of respondents were not sure, (4.10%) disagreed, while only (1.36%) strongly disagreed and these were the minority. This was further ranked as good with a (mean value=41.09), and a Std. Deviation of 4.10.

*Protect strategy aims at strengthening our protection against terrorist attacks. Prepare - when an attack occurs, to mitigate its impact. That's the purpose of Protect is to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against its interests overseas and so reduce their vulnerability. Hence, the core capabilities*

are essential for the execution of each of the five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery

Study results further indicate that there are international orders issued to deny permission to terrorists attached flights by all UN member states, and this was shown basing on the majority respondents representing (33.42%) who strongly agreed with the statement, (26%) agreed, 5.47% of respondents were not sure, 4.10% disagreed, while only 1.36% strongly disagreed and these were the minority. This was rated as poor with (mean value=26.0 Std. Deviation of 4.10.

*“.....Violent extremism is an affront to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It undermines peace and security, human rights and sustainable development. No country or region is immune from its impacts.....”*. Thus, it is not enough to counter it, we must prevent it. Because no one is born a violent extremist, but they are made and fueled. Disarming the process of radicalization must begin with dialogue and respect to human rights and the rule of law.

*Firewalls are another essential tool in defending networks against security threats. A firewall can help prevent unauthorized access to a network by blocking incoming traffic from untrusted sources.*

Lastly study results further indicated that there are international sanctions to freeze and denial of resources to so called terrorist groups across the globe, and that Courts of laws are in place to try and prosecute whoever is suspected to involve in terrorism activities; (50.79%) of respondents strongly agreed, (28.76%) agreed, (5.47%) not sure, (8.21%) of respondents strongly disagreed and (6.81%) strongly disagreed. This was rated good (mean=28.76) Std. Deviation of 8.21. The findings implied that the urging support for regional organizations and sustainable financing to counter terrorism in Africa, the deputy secretary-general stressed that the spread of terrorism is a concern for the entire international community and requires a preventive approach that includes respect for human rights and international law, as the Security Council held a high-level debate on counter-terrorism in Africa today.

The findings are in line with the UNSC has imposed sanctions on certain individuals and entities in response to terrorism as a threat to international peace and security through targeted sanctions regimes. In 1999, one year after the bombing of the US embassies in East Africa, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1267, the third in a series of resolutions calling upon the Taliban to cease sheltering terrorists. Resolution 1267 differed from the earlier resolutions in two respects: it mentioned Osama bin Laden by name for the first time (demanding that he be handed over to a relevant state for prosecution) and imposed sanctions on the Taliban for failure to comply with the earlier resolutions.

According to Musse, (2018), UN Member States were ordered to deny permission to Taliban controlled flights to take off or land in their territory, as well as to freeze funds and financial resources belonging to the Taliban (named individuals or entities) and to ensure neither these nor any other resources were made available to the Taliban by “their nationals or by any persons within their territory”. Paragraph 4(b) of the resolution provided a mechanism to create humanitarian exceptions, allowing the committee created to oversee the sanctions regime to authorize the transfer of resources otherwise prohibited to listed individuals “on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need”. The terms of this exception were later widened considerably to include, inter alia, resources determined by Member States to be “necessary for basic expenses, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges.

**4.3.3.1 The relationship between prepares and protects strategy of counterterrorism on national security in Mogadishu city of Somalia.**

*Correlation and Regression of prepares and protects strategy of counter terrorism on national security in Somalia.*

This section presents the correlation between prepares and protects strategy of counter terrorism and national security in Somalia. The correlation analysis results are details in the table 49 below.

**Table 49: Correlation between prepares and protects strategy of counterterrorism and national security in Somalia.**

| Correlations                   |                     |                                |                   |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|
|                                |                     | Prepares and protects strategy | National Security |
| Prepares and protects strategy | Pearson Correlation | 1                              | .594**            |
|                                | Sig. (2-tailed)     |                                | .000              |
|                                | N                   | 205                            | 205               |
| National Security              | Pearson Correlation | .594**                         | 1                 |
|                                | Sig. (2-tailed)     | .000                           |                   |
|                                | N                   | 205                            | 205               |

**\*\*.** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Source: Primary data computed by the researcher, (2023).*

From the above table, it is indicated a strong and significant correlation coefficient of Pearson is 0.594. This means that there is a strong relationship between prepares and protects strategy of counter terrorism and national security in Somalia. This implies that prepares and protects strategy of counter terrorism affects national security in Somalia. Therefore the government of Somalia need to understand that undertaking effective Prepares and protects strategy mechanisms can cause a positive impact on the National Security in Mogadishu city of Somalia.



**Table 50: Model Summary of prepares and protects strategy of counterterrorism and national security in Somalia.**

| Model Summary  |                     |          |                   |                            |
|--|---------------------|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| Model  | R                   | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
| 1  | 0.6741 <sup>a</sup> | 0.5844   | 0.5014            | 0.1719                     |
| <b>a. Predictors: (Constant), Prepares and protects strategy</b> |                     |          |                   |                            |

*Source: Primary data computed by the researcher, (2023).*

From the above table, it is indicated that the model summary of R<sup>2</sup> of 0.5844 existed between Prepares and protects strategy, suggesting that Prepares and protects strategy predicted 58.4% of the variance of Prepares and protects strategy and national security in Somalia whereas other factors 41.6%.

**Table 51: Regression coefficient between Prepares and protects strategy and national security in Somalia**

| Coefficients <sup>a</sup>                                  |                                |                             |            |                           |       |       |
|--|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------|-------|
| Model  |                                | Unstandardized Coefficients |            | Standardized Coefficients | T     | Sig.  |
|  |                                | B                           | Std. Error | Beta                      |       |       |
| 1  | (Constant)                     | 12.28                       | 0.351      |                           | 10.22 | 0.000 |
|  | Prepares and protects strategy | 0.453                       | 0.849      | 0.396                     | 8.10  | 0.000 |
| <b>a. Dependent Variable: National security in Somalia</b> |                                |                             |            |                           |       |       |

*Source: Primary data computed by the researcher, 2023.*

From the above table, it is indicated that the Regression coefficient of T of 8.10, Beta of .396 that existed between Prepares and protects strategy and national security in Somalia, should a relationship between the two variables. The T of 8.10, Beta of .396 and the significance of 0.000 suggests that Prepares and protects strategy was a strong predictor of national security in Somalia.

#### 4.3.3.2 Establishing the relationship between variables

##### The relationship between the Somalia counterterrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu Somalia.

This section presents the correlation between Somalia Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu Somalia. The correlation analysis results are details in the table 40 below;

*Table 52 Correlations between Somalia Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Mogadishu Somalia.*

| Correlations                 |                     |                 |                  |                              |                   |
|------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|
|                              |                     | Pursue strategy | Prevent strategy | Prepare and protect strategy | National Security |
| Pursue strategy              | Pearson Correlation | 1               | .958**           | .948**                       | .978**            |
|                              | Sig. (2-tailed)     |                 | .000             | .000                         | .000              |
|                              | N                   | 205             | 205              | 205                          | 205               |
| Prevent strategy             | Pearson Correlation | .958**          | 1                | .918**                       | .985**            |
|                              | Sig. (2-tailed)     | .000            |                  | .000                         | .000              |
|                              | N                   | 205             | 205              | 205                          | 205               |
| Prepare and protect strategy | Pearson Correlation | .948**          | .918**           | 1                            | .946**            |
|                              | Sig. (2-tailed)     | .000            | .000             |                              | .000              |
|                              | N                   | 205             | 205              | 205                          | 205               |
| National Security            | Pearson Correlation | .978**          | .985**           | .946**                       | 1                 |
|                              | Sig. (2-tailed)     | .000            | .000             | .000                         |                   |
|                              | N                   | 205             | 205              | 205                          | 205               |

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is positive at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*

**Pursue strategy of counterterrorism efforts and national security**

Results in Table above showed a positive and significant relationship between pursue strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts and national security ( $r = .978$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implies that a positive change or increase in Pursue strategy methods of Counter Terrorism will consequently lead to improved national security.

***Pursue strategy, Prevent strategy and National Security***

Results in Table indicated a moderately positive and significant relationship between Pursue strategy, and Prevent strategy ( $r = .948$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ) and a strong positive and significant relationship between Prevent strategy and National Security ( $r = .946$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implies that improved Prevent strategy will have an impact on the National Security of Somalia and if there is effective Prevent strategy, then this will ultimately lead to improved National Security.

***Prepare and protect strategy and National Security***

Results in Table showed a strong positive and significant relationship between Prepare and protect strategy and National Security ( $r = .985$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implies that a positive and significant change in Prepare and protect strategy mechanisms will lead to an improved National Security.

**Table 53; Model Summary of the study variables**

| <b>Model Summary</b>  |                   |          |                   |                            |
|---|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| Model   | R                 | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
| 1   | .993 <sup>a</sup> | .987     | .986              | .28773                     |
| a. Predictors: (Constant), Prepare and protect strategy and National Security |                   |          |                   |                            |

Table shows the regression model summary results show that 98.7% of national security is explained by Prepare and protect strategy, Prevent strategy and National Security. The results therefore show that Prepare and protect strategy, Prevent strategy and Prepare and protect strategy highly contribute to National Security in Mogadishu Somalia.

From the above table, it is indicated that the model summary of R<sup>2</sup> of .987 existed between Pursue strategy, Prevent strategy, Prepare and protect strategy and National Security suggesting that Pursue strategy, Prevent strategy, Prepare and protect strategy predicted 98.7% of the variance in national security in Mogadishu Somalia whereas other factors 33.7%.

The R<sup>2</sup> of .987, T of (6.234, 14.680 and 3.504) and Beta of (.306, .578 and .125) respectively, and the significance of 0.000 suggests that Pursue strategy was the strongest predictor of national security in Mogadishu Somalia by 66.3% than the other variables.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.0. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on the findings of this study and suggested areas that need further research following the study objectives.

#### 5.1. Summary of findings

##### **Objective one:**

The study shows that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of pursue strategy of Counter Terrorism on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City ( $r = .610$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implied that pursue strategy of counter-terrorism, it will result into a corresponding good and improved National Security in Somalia. This is because pursue strategy of Counter Terrorism typically results into the accomplishment of the National Security.

Further, it shows that pursue strategy of counter-terrorism creates clear modes of communication amongst the security organs in Somalia and opens door to achieving national security goals. The significance level is at (0.005), which means that the correlation is statistically significant because it is equal to the P-Value of (0.05). This meant that nevertheless, the pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts like; reconciliation and state building, Building up Somalia counter- terrorist network etc. directly affects national security in Somalia. This implies that the pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts investigates and disrupt terrorist attacks; and stopping people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. This is because, terrorism disrupts livelihoods, increases violence and fear, affects production in all sectors of economy, destroys infrastructure and has resulted in bloodshed. In all cases of terrorist attacks, it has disrupted normal life, stalled production in the economy and international effort to provide peace and security through peruse strategy, the impact is being minimized.

### **Objective Two:**

The study shows that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City ( $r = .597$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implied that effective prevent strategy mechanisms of Counter Terrorism will lead to improved national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City. This is because implementation of the prevent strategy is about safeguarding people and communities from the threat of terrorism.

The study further found that the local authorities in collaboration with the security agencies do help to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, and a wide range of government departments, and community organizations to deliver the Prevent Strategy. Hence, implying that a strongly good intended Prevent strategy is part of CONTEST, the Government's counter-terrorism strategy. It aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism and violent extremism.

### **Objective Three:**

The study shows that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of Prepare and protect strategy of Counter Terrorism and national security in Mogadishu City, Somalia ( $r = .582$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implied that improved Prepare and protect strategy of Counter Terrorism or a positive change in the Prepare and protect strategy mechanisms of Counter Terrorism will have a relatively positive impact on national security in Mogadishu City, Somalia. This is because the Prepare and protect strategy mechanisms of Counter Terrorism greatly affects the positivity within the security organs of the country.

The study results indicated that Protect strategy aims at strengthening our protection against terrorist attacks. Prepare - when an attack occurs, to mitigate its impact. The respondents rated this objective as satisfactory (Overall mean= 4.15 & SD= 0.52), implying that majority number of the respondents strongly agreed. Hence, the purpose of Protect is to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against its interests overseas and so reduce their vulnerability. Hence, the core capabilities are essential for the execution of each of the five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.

## 5.2. Conclusions

### **Objective one:**

The study concludes that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of pursue strategy of Counter Terrorism on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City ( $r = .610$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implied that pursue strategy of Counter Terrorism, it will result into a corresponding good and improved National Security in Somalia. This is because pursue strategy of Counter Terrorism typically results into the accomplishment of the National Security. Further, it concluded that pursue strategy of Counter Terrorism creates clear modes of communication amongst the security organs in Somalia and opens door to achieving national security goals. The significance level is at (0.005), which means that the correlation is statistically significant because it is equal to the P-Value of (0.05). This meant that nevertheless, the pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts like; reconciliation and state building, Building up Somalia counter- terrorist network etc. directly affects national security in Somalia.

### **Objective Two:**

The study concludes that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City ( $r = .597$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implied that effective prevent strategy mechanisms of Counter Terrorism will lead to improved national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City. This is because implementation of the prevent strategy is about safeguarding people and communities from the threat of terrorism.

### **Objective Three:**

The study concludes that there was a positive and moderately significant impact of Prepare and protect strategy of Counter Terrorism and national security in Mogadishu City, Somalia ( $r = .582$ ,  $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ ). This implied that improved Prepare and protect strategy of Counter Terrorism or a positive change in the Prepare and protect strategy mechanisms of Counter Terrorism will have a relatively positive impact on national security in Mogadishu City, Somalia. This is because the Prepare and protect strategy mechanisms of Counter Terrorism greatly affects the positivity within the security organs of the country.

### 5.3 Recommendations

Inclusive citizen participation in public affairs is not a new concept. Many countries have wide-ranging initiatives that promote citizen involvement in governing and decision-making processes.

- Empowered citizens: Citizens who have the skills, knowledge and attitudes to participate, including the ability to organize themselves.
- Effectively implemented laws, regulations and policies that enable participation and social accountability.
- Commitment to genuine inclusive participation by the government (political leadership and civil service) and citizens: willingness to incorporate citizens' needs and suggestions in policy.
- The identification, understanding and involvement of all relevant stakeholders, particularly marginalized and vulnerable groups.
- A well-planned process with clear objectives and sufficient allocation of resources (financial and human). The plan and its limitations should be understood by all stakeholders.
- A transparent government: the publication of understandable and useable information.
- Trust between government and citizens.



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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE

#### Dear respondent

My name is MOHAMED SHUEIB MUSSE, 2021-0403234; a masters student of international relations and diplomacy at Kampala international university. Currently, I am carrying out a study on **SOMALIA COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES AND NATIONAL SECURITY**. I am very glad that you are my respondent for this study.

The purpose of this questionnaire was to obtain your opinion / views to be included among others in the study. This research is one of the requirements leading to the award of a master's degree in international relations and diplomacy at Kampala international university. It is hence an academic research and will not be used for any other purpose other than academic.

Your co-operation and answers to these heartily and honestly will be significant to this study to gather the data needed. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

#### PART 1: RESPONDENTS BIO DATA

##### Gender

1. male
2. female

##### Education level

1. Primary
2. Secondary
3. University



4. Other tertiary

Age of respondents

1. 20-35 years

2. 36-51 years

3. 51 and above years

Direction 1: please write your rating on the space before each option which corresponds to your best choice in terms of level of motivation, Kindly use the scoring system below:

| <b><u>Score</u></b> | <b><u>response mode</u></b> | <b><u>description</u></b>         | <b><u>interpretation</u></b> |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 5                   | Strongly agree              | you agree with no doubt at all    | very satisfactory            |
| 4                   | Agree                       | you agree with some doubt         | satisfactory                 |
| 3                   | Neutral                     | you are not sure about any        | none                         |
| 2                   | Disagree                    | you disagree with some doubt      | fair                         |
| 1                   | Strongly disagree           | you disagree with no doubt at all | poor                         |

**PART 2: QUESTIONS ON IV: SECTION 1**

| No. | <b>The pursue strategy of counter terrorism efforts on national security</b>  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|-----|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1   | The pursue strategy has created and promoted more attention to helping Somalia with the twin task of reconciliation and state building.   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 2   | Building up Somalia counter- terrorist network headed by faction leaders and former military or police officers, and by cooperating with the security services in Somaliland and neighboring punt land  |   |   |   |   |   |
| 3   | Counter- terrorism efforts are producing growing unease within the broader public   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 4   | Unidentified surveillance flights , the abduction of innocent people for weeks at a time on suspicion of terrorist links, and cooperation with unpopular faction leaders all add to public cynicism and resentment                                  |   |   |   |   |   |
| 5   | Eager to earn the support of western government as an ally in the war on terrorism, the TFG leadership has attributed the attacks to islamist extremists but some of the evidence appears to implicate supporters of the interim president instead. |   |   |   |   |   |
| 6   | The threat of jihadi terrorism from Somalia can be addressed through the restoration of stable, legitimate and functional government.   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 7   | Somalia’s friends are required to do more to assist in bringing Somali society together again and rebuilding the state.   |   |   |   |   |   |

**PART 2: QUESTIONS ON IV: SECTION 2**

**The impact of the prevent strategy of Counter Terrorism efforts on national security in Somalia; a case study of Mogadishu City.**

**PART 2: QUESTIONS ON IV: SECTION 3**

| No. | <b>The Prepare and protect strategy of counter terrorism on national security</b>  | <b>1</b> | <b>2</b> | <b>3</b> | <b>4</b> | <b>5</b> |
|-----|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1   | The government have imposed sanctions on certain individual and entities in response to terrorism as a threat to international peace and security through targeted sanctions regimes   |          |          |          |          |          |
| 2   | UN member states were ordered to deny permission to Taliban controlled flights off or land in their territory.   |          |          |          |          |          |
| 3   | UN member state also froze funds and financial resource belonging to the Taliban and to ensure neither these nor any other resources were made available to the Taliban by their nationals or by any persons within their territory.   |          |          |          |          |          |
| 4   | UN resolution of the prepare and protect strategy par 4(b) of the resolution provided a mechanism to create humanitarian exceptions, allowing the committee created to oversee the sanctions regime to authorize the transfer of resources otherwise prohibited to listed individuals “ on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need. |          |          |          |          |          |
| 5   | In Somalia, groups or individuals designated on national counter- terrorism lists are subject to UN sanctions on other grounds.  |          |          |          |          |          |
| 6   | The government has imposed sanctions on certain individuals and entities in response to terrorism as a threat to international peace and security through targeted sanctions regimes.  |          |          |          |          |          |

### SECTION III

| No. | National security  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|-----|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1   | There are currently little and or no terror attacks in Somalia   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 2   | The intelligence agencies have managed to strongly counteract terrorism activities   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 3   | Currently, there is little insurgency activities across Somalia  |   |   |   |   |   |
| 4   | Insurgency often is brought about failed intelligence coordination   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 5   | The intelligence agencies have effectively prevented human trafficking in most parts of Somalia                                  |   |   |   |   |   |
| 6   | With improved intelligence liaison, insecurity and other violet conflicts such as human trafficking are minimized in communities |   |   |   |   |   |
| 7   | There is proper rule of law and improved security in most parts of Somalia   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 8   | Due to presence of peace and security, there is improve social economic development across Somalia.                              |   |   |   |   |   |

**THE END**