

**ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND STATEHOOD IN SOUTH SUDAN**

**BY**

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## **DEDICATION**

This study is dedicated to my late parents that I should have achieved this in their presence. May their precious Souls Rest in Peace

## DECLARATION

I Timothy Tut KULANG hereby declare that this dissertation is my original work. It has never been submitted to any university or other institution of higher learning for the award of a degree, diploma or any other academic qualification.

Signature  \_\_\_\_\_

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
## APPROVAL

This is to satisfy that this doctoral dissertation has been completed under our supervision and ready for submission for examination with our approval.

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A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'Wotsuna Khamalwa', written over a horizontal line.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CVI	Content Validity Index
DV	Dependent Variable
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EM	Elite Manipulation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
IV	Independent Variable
JRP	Justice and Reconciliation Panel
KI	Key Informant
KIU	Kampala International University
NIF	National Islamic Front
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS	Ordinary Least Square
PLCC	Pearson's Linear Correlation Coefficient
PSC	Protracted Social Conflict
RPA	Revitalized Peace Agreement
R-ARCISS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People Liberation Movement
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TJRM	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Mechanism
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
VIF	Variance Inflation Factor

## **ABSTRACT**

The study examined the impact of ethnic conflicts on the statehood in South Sudan. In doing so, the study set out to realize four objectives: to investigate the causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan; to examine the effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan; to evaluate the impacts of ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan, and to determine the strategic remedies to mitigate the ethnic conflict in South Sudan. In addition, the study was guided by two theories namely: Elite Manipulation (EM) Theory and Theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC). The study adopted a cross-sectional survey design and a mixed method approach in data collection, whereby both quantitative (survey questionnaire) and qualitative (key informant interview) approaches were used to elicit data from the study. Quantitative approach, however, was the main source of data, whilst qualitative approach served as a supplementary source of data. The sample size consisted of 399 respondents for quantitative data determined through Slovene's formula and another 15 key informants determined purposively by the researcher. Quantitative data were presented using descriptive statistics (frequency counts and percentages) and inferential statistics, while the hypotheses were tested using correlations and coefficients of determination. Then, qualitative data were analyzed using thematic analysis method, whereby raw data from the field were assigned preliminary codes in order to describe the content, followed by grouping the data based on identified patterns or themes of the codes across the different interviews. On the purpose of the study, which is the impact of ethnic conflicts on the statehood in South Sudan, the study found that ethnic diversity has positive and significant effect on statehood in South Sudan however, the ethnic conflicts make it a real challenge to the statehood. The findings also show evidence of a weak positive linear relationship between ethnic conflicts and statehood in South Sudan. On the first objective, the study found that unfair allocation of political positions, corruption and nepotism within the government system and power struggles among the elites are the main causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan. On the second objective, the study found that ethnic loyalty which is associated with ethnic bias, sentiment and prejudice has a negative impact on the statehood in South Sudan. On the third objective, the quantitative data reveals that ethnic conflicts do not have any significant or direct impact on the statehood in South Sudan. However, the qualitative data differs as it indicates that ethnic conflicts have a direct adverse impact on the statehood in South Sudan. The fourth and final objective reveal that the remedies to mitigate ethnic conflicts in South Sudan are but not limited to: respect for minority rights and interest, fair allocation of state powers and national resources, restructure of the modalities of coexistence through ethnic dialogue. Other remedial measures include respect for ethnic communities' boundary, promotion of friendly cooperation among ethnic groups, restructuring of state administrative organs into units that are fairly represented in terms of ethnic affiliations or introduce quota system for disadvantaged groups and spread across the different regions, full implementation of the 2018 revitalized peace agreement, particularly disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) among others.

## **CHAPTER ONE:**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.0 Introduction**

Chapter One presented the background to the study, the statement of the problem, purpose of the study, the study objectives and research questions, scope, and significance of the study, conceptualization of operational key terms and the organization of the dissertation. This chapter as well will presents theoretical perspective and detail discussion on those concepts. The chapter will explain the topic in detail and how it is relevant to be research at this time. The chapter will also discuss the center of argument for the study.

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

This study is to examine the impact of the ethnic conflicts in South Sudan and how these conflicts become challenges to the smooth running of the state in rendering services to its citizen as well as carrying out tasks required from any sovereign state. The background to the study is structured into four perspectives namely: historical, theoretical, conceptual, and contextual perspectives.

Observably, South Sudanese are yet to embrace national identity; people clinch more to their ethnic identities than the national identity. In fact, there is no one collective definition that unites the heterogeneous people of South Sudan, each and every one prefers to identify him/herself with the ethnic group he/she belongs, and this perhaps presents a challenge to national unity and statehood. Another considerable issue is common language. The country's constitution specified English as the first language and Arabic as the second language,

however, due to high illiteracy level, a huge proportion of the citizens are unable to communicate in these languages. According to UNESCO (2019) report, South Sudan has 27% literacy rate, which implies that 73% of the population are illiterate – unable to read and write. Consequently, a significant portion of the population communicates in their local language and thus, relate only with people of their ethnicity and shared language. It is estimated that the 60 ethnic groups in South Sudan speaks different local languages, making it difficult for people of different ethnical background to relate and identify as one. The implication being that in South Sudan people minimally relate with people from a different ethnic group other than theirs, which seem to present a challenge to the country's statehood. South Sudanese celebrated their independent in unity and all were united but just few days the tribalization of the country started in form of ethnic groupings. This syndrome went on to the level those seeing those who should be national figure become like tribes' representatives and their appointment in public offices make only their constituencies celebrate and congratulating the presenting of appointing their sons. Therefore, the ethnic conflicts become inevitable to protect their ethnic interests with all costs. With this background, the study of conflict resolution become necessary to bring out the issues openly for wider audience.

### **1.1.1 Historical Perspective**

Globally, most countries are ethnically diverse, and this always leads into civil strife when such diversity is well managed. Africa is leading in such diversity and also leading in ethnic oriented conflicts which mostly comes from failure of diversity management. In many countries of traditional stability today, ethnic conflicts are becoming an increasing factor. These ethnic conflicts have become the serious challenge for development which can

explains why ethnicity is seen as the reigning concept in African. In Nigeria as an example, the colonial masters provided urban setting, which constitutes the cradle of contemporary ethnicity. The colonialist while pretending to carry out a mission of uniting the warring ethnic groups, consciously and systematically separated the various Nigerian people thereby creating a suitable atmosphere for conflict.

This study in its center of argument, argues that ethnic problems are only one aspect of political violence in the world in general and in Africa in particular, and this can be considered as a failure of the state to manage and perform some of its fundamental tasks. Statehood in Africa is all about transition from an institutional endowment of ethnic division. Very few African states can satisfactorily deliver all the services adequately and must go through an initial phase of federation of ethnic groups.

South Sudan as of today is the world's youngest state. Therefore, to provide a holistic historical perspective of the country, it is pertinent to review its origin right from the beginning. Accordingly, the country's history was traced from the time it was part of the Republic of Sudan to the present day. The history of the modern Sudan traces its origin to the first quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century when it was conquered by the Viceroy of Egypt, Mohamed Ali in 1821 (Deng, 1995). According to Deng (1995), there was not any political entity known as Sudan prior to this period. The Sudanic kingdoms of Sennar and Darfur controlled much of the North - known today as Republic of Sudan, while the largest tribes in the South are Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Anyuak and others, controlled the part - known today as South Sudan. In the period preceding the Turco-Egyptian conquest of Northern Sudan, the Southerners maintained their own independence by resisting raids and invasions from the Northern kingdoms (Deng, 1995). It was when Mohamed Ali sought gold and slaves in the

Sudan to establish his financial and political autonomy from the Ottoman Empire that the Viceroy decided to establish contact with the South. It is believed that Mohamed Ali's quest for minerals, specifically gold and slaves, which he needed to increase the strength of his army that informed his resolve to conquer the Southern kingdom, which was previously beyond the reach of the Northern kingdom (Abel, 1990). The conquest of the Southern kingdom was however facilitated by warriors from the Northern Kingdom, many of whom not only wanted to be relieved from the harsh labor demands placed on them by the Viceroy, but also saw a possibility to seek opportunities in the South – a kingdom that was previously beyond their reach.

By 1860s, the slave trade was so profitable that the military and commercial networks were expanded throughout the South and both merchants from the North and Turco – Egyptian officials, sometimes working in competition but often working in conjunction with each were keen to exploit the resources in the South. Thus, it can be argued that the first interaction between the Northern and the Southern Sudan happened purely on account of financial motives of foreigners working together with Northerners who wanted to exploit resources for their own benefit (Abel, 1990). After a few decades of cooperation with Turco – Egyptian officials against the Southern Kingdom, in 1881, the Northern Kingdom decided to dislodge the Turco – Egyptian officials and take over sole control of the Southern Kingdom, which led to an internal revolution popularly known as the Mahdist revolution (Abel, 1990). The goal of the Mahdist revolution was to free the North from Egyptian control and for the North to assert full control over the South. The revolution was defeated in 1898 by the Anglo-Egyptian forces and thus both the Southern and Northern Kingdoms remained under the control of the Anglo-Egyptian forces who wanted to control the whole of Sudan to extend

their sphere of influence to acquire vital resources for trade (Mohamed, 1968). Consequently, the British decided to administer Southern Sudan as an integral part of Sudan. The decision was strategic and dictated more by the exigencies of the European scramble for Africa, than by local consideration for improvement of the plight of Southerners who were considered extremely poor and backward by the invading British forces (Lam, 2007).

Emphatically, Britain wanted to occupy the South to maintain its control of the Nile basin, which was crucial to secure the whole of Nile valley to safeguard its colonial interests in Sudan and Egypt (Deng, 1995). Thus, effective control of the Northern Kingdom by the British meant that the Southern kingdom become part of the British colonial empire, primarily because of its strategic location and the fear of the British that other colonial power like France and Germany might extend in the North and conquer the area, which would jeopardize its economic interests (Lam, 2007). In essence, the Southern Kingdom became an integral part of the North, largely as a strategy to satisfy the economic interests of the British and Egyptians (Lam, 2007).

With the brief introduction explaining how the Southern kingdom became part of the Northern Kingdom and eventually an integral part of Sudan, it is pertinent to examine the historical evolution of Sudan and what influenced the political developments that led the South to fight for autonomous status while still part of Sudan and subsequently seek total independence through self-determination.

Although the Northern and Southern Kingdoms were amalgamated by the British under the identity of Sudan, in 1922 the British introduced segregatory colonial policies—“the Closed District Ordinance and Passports and Permits Ordinance” that were meant to control

movement between Northern and Southern Sudan (Edgar, 2000). Although, the British justified this policy on the basis of a need to protect the Southerners from pressures from the North, its enforcement separated the two regions and exacerbated their differences (Edgar, 2000). The British paid more attention to the North economically, which resulted in greater success of the North, while the South mostly survived on its own. According to Deng (1995), the British merely wanted to keep order in the South; they were not interested in establishing a fully functioning political society in the region. With the high economic and social development of the North in comparison to the South, the North was primed to assert dominion over the South when the country finally gained its independence. Observably, the assertion of Northern hegemony over the South began in earnest almost immediately, upon Sudan gaining independence in 1956 (Deng, 1995). The first step by the North was to implement “Arabization” agenda over the South through military occupation of the South. This development further inflamed the tensions between the Northern and the Southern regions and led to the commencement of a long and bloody civil war that lasted between 1958 and 1972. The war ended with the Addis Ababa Agreement, which was signed by representatives of the Northern and Southern Sudan, granting autonomy to the later (LeRiche and Arnold, 2012; Deng, 1995).

Then, in 1983, the then President of Sudan Gaafar Nimeiry, instituted Islamic Sharia law in the whole country and declared Arabic as the national language and essentially ended the Southern autonomy (Atta-Asamoah, Sharamo and Mwanzia, 2011). In addition, the Southern autonomy was also undermined by the changes in the internal boundaries of the South (LeRiche and Arnold 2012). These factors exacerbated the rift between the Islamic north and Christian south. Apparently, a combination of the above-mentioned factors and others such

as differences in language, religion and discriminatory power sharing arrangements resulted in a second civil war between the government forces - National Islamic Front (NIF), and the southern rebels - the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) headed by late John Garang.

The civil war lasted until 2005, when the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement” (CPA) was signed between the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM), a political front for the Southerners and the ruling Sudanese government in Khartoum. The CPA included agreements on power-sharing, sharing of oil wealth and ending the conflicts in Abyei and South Kordofan, and most importantly, it ceded autonomy to Southern Sudan with the possibility to pursue independence after a six-year transition period through a referendum (Le Riche and Arnold 2012). In 2011, after the expiration of the transition period, the referendum was organized, and more-than 98 per-cent of the population voted in favor of secession from Sudan (Atta-Asamoah, Sharamo and Mwanzia, 2011). In light of the outcome of the referendum, South Sudan declared its independence on 9 July 2011, and Sudan was among the first countries to recognize South Sudan as sovereign state. Regrettably, the oil rich country was confronted with internal conflict almost from the onset of her independence.

After gaining independence from Sudan in 2011, South Sudan was faced with the task of building a new state, which include establishing viable government institutions, good security apparatus and to foster ethnic integration within its societies among other pertinent issues. However, instead of addressing the aforementioned issues, the country slipped into a violent civil war that its real causes have been marred with controversy. While the political dispute that triggered the crisis was not clearly based on ethnic identity, it overlapped with preexisting ethnic and political fault lines and sparked armed clashes and targeted ethnic killings in the capital, Juba, and beyond. The Republic of South Sudan is a multi-ethnic

sovereign entity, consisting of 10 states of the former three regions, namely; Greater Upper Nile, Greater Equatoria and Greater Bahr elGazal that comprise a culturally diverse population. While this ethnic diversity speaks to the country's rich national heritage, it has also always been a source of internal ethnic discord in the country (Shulika and Okeke, 2013). Since it gained independence, the country has witnessed localized inter-ethnic conflicts, most notably arising from disputes rooted in grazing land, cattle raiding and access to natural resources and political power (ibid).

The struggle for political power between President Salva Kiir and his former vice, Riek Machar is at the root of the ongoing violent conflict that began in December 2013. The death of John Garang, the leader of SPLM in 2005, paved way for the ascension of Salva Kiir as the leader of SPLM, who then led South Sudan to achieve independence in 2011 (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). After gaining independence, Salva Kiir became the president, while Riek Machar became his vice. As Kiir took over the affairs of the world's newest country, a number of his cabinet members and senior SPLM members, including Machar and the SPLM's secretary-general, Pagan Amum, viewed his leadership as reckless and autocratic (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). The tension among the political class gathered momentum, when the vice-president Riek Machar, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amun, and Madam Rebecca Garang, the widow of the late SPLM leader John Garang, publicly announced their intentions to run for the post of Chair of the SPLM, and by implication President of the country. President Kiir responded, by revoking executive powers of the vice-president in April 2013 (Dessalegn, 2017). Then in July of the same year, he dissolved the government, removing Machar from the position of vice-president of the nation and other cabinet members from their positions (International Crisis Group, 2014). On 16 December 2013, President Kiir

accused his former vice Riek Machar of plotting a coup against his government, which Machar denied. Consequently, President Kiir ordered the arrest of dissident politicians including Pagan Amum. Machar managed to elude arrest and fled Juba to his home in Greater Upper Nile States. Within this period, targeted ethnic killing of civilians took place in Juba, providing an ethnic dimension to the political power struggle between Kiir and Machar. Weeks after the clashes erupted in Juba, heavy fighting between army units loyal to the government and rebel forces loyal to Machar spread to the states of Jonglei, Unity, Central Equatoria and Upper Nile. Thus, the situation escalated from a political rift between President Kiir - a Dinka and Vice President Machar - a Nuer to a full-blown civil war.

In spite of the fact that more than 60 ethnic groups make up South Sudan, the main inter-ethnic rivalries are limited to the major ethnic groups of the Dinka and the Nuer and, to a lesser degree, the Murle. In South Sudan, inter-communal conflicts between the Dinka and the Nuer on the one hand, and the Nuer and the Murle on the other, pre-date Sudan's independence in 1956 (New Sudan Council of Churches, 1999). The divergent views and approaches of the Dinka and Nuer – the two largest ethnic groups that dominated the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) during the second Sudan civil war irrefragably provides a reference point for South Sudan's present-day ethnic disagreements. The SPLM/A struggle against the Khartoum government for the liberation of the then-Southern Sudan region were clouded by two opposing visions. The Dinka advocated for a united Sudan where all Sudanese are liberated and treated as equal citizens whereas the Nuer vision of liberation was a total separation from Sudan (LeRiche and Arnold, 2012). Thus, the divergence of visions within SPLM/A on Southern Sudan's future translated into latent and in some cases active divisions in the ranks of the South Sudan liberation movement (ibid).

From 1991 to 1995, these disagreements led to widespread unrest between the fragmented groups of the Dinka and Nuer populations, as well as attack and counterattacks against villages and communities of these two major ethnic groups of South Sudan (LeRiche and Arnold, 2012). Observably, the ongoing civil war in South Sudan is practically fought along ethnic lines of the Dinka and the Nuer, though in some cases fighters from these ethnic groups have joined forces with the opposition to fight their own ethnic group. The long-drawn ethnic differences not only disrupted social, economic and political relations between the Southern Sudan communities in pre-independence South Sudan but have continued to sow seeds of dissonance between and among local ethnic communities and by extension impacts on the statehood of the country's new sovereign political status.

Therefore, the ethnicity in South Sudan is taken negatively including segregation against people in the public institutions which contributed to the escalating or conflict and targeting on ethnic lines. Though the ethnicity would have meant diversity if taken positively but with the perception which deepened the gap and brought about hatred among the people.

### **1.1.2 Theoretical Perspective**

The study was guided by three theories namely: Elite Manipulation (EM) Theory that were formulated at the end of the nineteenth century and in the first decades of the twentieth century by Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), and Robert Michels (1876–1936). The theory builds on Max Weber's ideas, especially concerning the centrality of political power and charismatic leadership. The other theory which also used in the study is the Theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) was developed by Edward Azar in the early 1970s. It generally refers to long lasting, complex, severe, commonly enduring, and often violent conflicts (Ramsbotham, 2005). It generally refers to long lasting, complex, severe,

commonly enduring, and often violent conflicts. The theory explains prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition, acceptance, fair access to political institutions and positions, and economic participation (Ramsbotham, 2005). The theory suggests that protracted social conflict is almost inevitable in situation where a group's identity is threatened or frustrated or when their access to basic needs is limited. In this case, hostile interactions between communal or ethnic groups that are based in deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural hatreds, which persist over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence, are indications of protracted social conflict (Azar, 1990).

In summary, protracted social conflicts occur when communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs, when there is a feeling of marginalization in power structure on the basis of communal identity, resulting from colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, and the multi-communal nature of the society. Azar identified four variables, as the predominant sources of protracted social conflict: communal content, deprivation of human needs, governance and the state's role, and international linkages (Azar, 1990).

Ethnicity has been the simplistic explanation of the conflict in South Sudan. The elites such as Kiir and Machar has manipulated their political interest and differences and present them in favor of ethnic nationalism, mobilizing their kinsmen into participating in a violent conflict that has taken thousands of lives and render millions of South Sudanese homeless, whilst others are turned to refugees in neighboring countries. Surely, the mass killings of the Nuer people by the Dinka paramilitary groups in Juba in the aftermath of the dispute between President Kiir and his former vice Machar in late 2013 were the pretext to the origin of the outbreak of the war, which at first was only a political dispute. Since then, Kiir and Machar

have successfully mobilized key groups of their respective communities, thus, making ethnicity the easiest and simplest explanation of the conflict and the atrocities committed against civilians by the warring factions. The failure to manage ethnic heterogeneity after independence in South Sudan enabled the political elite to manipulate ethnic fault lines.

The justification for adopting these theories is that they provide valuable explanation of the present situation in South Sudan. Elite Manipulation Theory explains how the political elites manipulate the masses to their personal gain; the theory of Protracted Social Conflict explains the drivers and sustenance factors of conflicts in multi-ethnic societies such as South Sudan. Thus, the two theories were considered appropriate to provide a theoretical foundation to explain the causes, effects and the way forward for South Sudan.

### **1.1.3 Conceptual Perspective**

The section conceptualized the dependent variable (Ethnic Conflicts) and the independent variable (Statehood) and Ethnicity as an intervening variable.

Ethnic Conflicts occurred when considering engaging in conflict to secure control of a resource, land, or political power. This explain why conflict often takes place along ethnic lines, why some ethnic groups are more often in conflict than others (and some never are), and why the same groups are sometimes in conflict and sometimes at peace. This derives a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance between ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and appropriable resources. Ethnic conflicts were the main forms of political

instability in the multiethnic societies during second half of twenty century and beginning of new century.

Ethnicity is a concept that refers to a shared culture and a way of life, which is reflected in language, religion, material culture that includes mode of dressing and attire, cuisine, and cultural products such as music and art (Crossman, 2019). Ethnicity is not based on biological traits, except in peculiar cases where an ethnic group considers certain traits as requirements for membership. In other words, the cultural elements that characterize a particular ethnic group are learned, not inherited. Consequently, the boundaries between ethnic groups to some degree, permits an individual to move between groups. This can happen, for example, when a child from one ethnic group is adopted into another, or when an individual undergoes a religious conversion. It can also happen through the process of acculturation, a situation whereby members of a native group are compelled to assimilate into the culture of a dominating host group (Crossman, 2019).

According to Bomani (2018), ethnicity refers to a group of people who identify with each other based on common ancestral, social, cultural, or national experiences. In other words, ethnicity, like race and gender, are social, political, and economic constructs and by implications fallible. Thus, the constructions of ethnicity aren't always the same or correct. Also, ethnicity refers to an ethnic group that shares similar traits, such as a common language, common heritage, and cultural similarities within the group. Other variables that play a role in ethnicity, though not in all cases, include a geographical connection to a particular place, common foods and diets, and perhaps a common faith (Eilers, 2012). Furthermore, ethnicity refers to classifications based on such elements as race, nationality, language, culture,

religion, tribe, and background. It generally encompasses a large group of people who share these characteristics (Steinbach, 2013).

According to Smith (1986), ethnicity means the ethnic group or groups that people identify with or feel they belong to. It is a measure of cultural affiliation, as opposed to race, ancestry, nationality or citizenship. It can be said to mean an ethnic group made up of people who have similar elements of common culture that include religion, customs, or language; unique community of interests, feelings and actions; a shared sense of common origins or ancestry, and a common geographic origin. Ethnicity is self-perceived, and people can belong to more than one ethnic group.

The study conceptualizes ethnicity to mean the culture of people in a given geographic region, including their language, heritage, religion and customs. To be a member of an ethnic group is to conform to some or all of those practices that distinguishes a particular ethnic group. The positive aspects of ethnicity include shared history, experiences, and cultural elements (music, art, clothing, food) by a group of people. However, contemporary narratives usually present ethnicity in the negative, as points of division – a source of discord, confusion, or worse. While ethnicity may serve to identify people in an attempt to reach them, it also serves to divide a country as well as various subsets, such as political parties and educational systems. Thus, ethnicity is often a major source of social cohesion as well as social conflict.

Statehood deals with the effective functioning of a state, while states are the principal and most fundamental actors in world politics. However, over the last few decades, supranational organizations and non-state actors are growing in importance as a result of globalization, but

even at those states have been the dominant form of political organization for the last two centuries. Due to state's centrality to modern international political framework, statehood is well studied, much sought after, and hotly contested. In international law, the declaratory and constitutive nature of the state is debated both in theory and practice. The major divide centers on the extent to which statehood depends on the intrinsic character of the actor or on its external legitimacy in the eyes of other states (Coggins, 2011).

Shaw, (2003) refers to Statehood as a nonphysical juridical entity that possesses a permanent population, defined territory, one government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other sovereign states (Shaw, 2003: 178). Fiore, (1918) defined Statehood as an association of a considerable number of people living within a definite territory, constituted as a political society and subject to the supreme authority of a sovereign, who has the power, ability and means to maintain the political organization of the association, with the assistance of the law, and to regulate and protect the rights of the members, to conduct relations with other states and to assume responsibility for its acts (Fiore, 1918: 106).

In order to provide a clear conceptualization of statehood, the study considers it pertinent to examine the concept of "state". A state is an institutional configuration that results in the establishment of a sovereign structure of political authority within a territory with a given population and has resources to meet the need of the population. It consists of a cluster of constitutionally regulated agencies that have supreme jurisdiction over a delimited territory and population (Peruzzotti, 2015). A state refers to when a community or society is politically organized under one independent government within a definite territory without external control and recognized as such by other states. Statehood, therefore, means the presence or absence of certain features that are crucial for the institutionalization and adequate workings

of the state. Therefore, the term is used to explain the nature of the state as sovereign entity with full control of its territory, population, and a recognized government.

#### **1.1.4 Contextual Perspective**

The study was carried out in South Sudan or sometimes referred to as the Republic of South Sudan. It examined how ethnic conflicts affect South Sudan's statehood. South Sudan is a country that has 10 states with more than 60 ethnic groups the biggest of them are Dinka, Nuer Shilluk, Zande and others. However, the political and economic activities within the country are dominated by few populous ethnic groups within the South Sudan society. This has resulted in a feeling of marginalization among other ethnic groups, particularly the minority ethnic groups and even among the major ethnic groups, who feel that they are not getting fair share and opportunities in national issues as a result, ethnic conflicts intensified among these groups and is likely to affect the function of the state. This situation has contributed to the exacerbation of political rift among elites from an individual perspective to a tribal narrative and sentiments. Since December 2013, South Sudan has been experiencing civil war, which started as political rift between the President Salva Kiir and his former Vice Riek Machar. The conflict gradually deteriorated into a civil war that is mostly fought along ethnic lines, between the Dinka and Nuer. The recorded consequences of the war are grave, including loss of lives, destruction of infrastructures and gross violations of human rights. Large portion of the population have been displaced as IDP's or refugees and all socio-economic systems have been disrupted (Lyman, 2013). Also, hospitals, schools and roads have been destroyed making life very difficult for people within the country. The study therefore examined the impact of ethnicity on statehood or the functionality of the South Sudan as a sovereign state within the challenges caused by ethnical oriented policies. The

two principals Salva Kiir and Riek Machar used their positions to incite the conflict on many occasions and gathering where their followers took their speech to victimize the opponent. This makes change of conflict dimension from power struggle within SPLM as a part to ethnic conflict between the two ethnic groups.

The IGAD mediation team should look back into the factors that led to the success and failure of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to provide the grounds for a peaceful political order in South Sudan. The CPA was primarily meant to address the conflict between the North and the South. However, the transitional governance arrangements in Southern Sudan, which crumbled as the crisis unfolded in late 2013, were also derived from the provisions of the CPA. The CPA negotiations paid too little attention to frictions between the various South Sudanese factions. As a consequence, the exclusivity of the CPA negotiations which focused only between the regime in Khartoum and the SPLM/A in the South led to a transitional order not robust enough to accommodate and regulate the competing demands of the South Sudanese leadership, nor able to address the distrust between the different factions of the SPLM/A. Nearly 10 years after the signing of the CPA, this has had its cost.

The negotiation in its preceding was very much untarnished by personal power struggles which were difficult to realize, given the military capabilities of those involved on the battlefield. While not a party to the armed conflict, the position of the high-ranking members of the SPLM known as the “former detainees” is of central importance. While there is no doubt that they also have an interest in restoring their own political power, their role in the negotiations could change the dynamics of negotiation. Joining the negotiations as an independent political party, the group would push the talks towards a multi-party process. If,

however, they were co-opted by either of the two sides, the risk that a settlement would primarily feed a power sharing deal between the parties would increase. While the latter provides the opportunity for simple tradeoffs, a multi-party process does this to a lesser extent and requires the parties to accommodate their demands through institutional arrangements.

There were indications that South Sudan government prefers clear fault-lines to complexity. Some other developments in Jonglei Region were indicative that co-opting rivals through local deals might be a strategy of the government. Parallel to the first face-to-face meeting in Addis Ababa, the government negotiated and signed a peace agreement with David Yau Yau's South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) – Cobra Faction in May 2014. The deal calls for the establishment of the Greater Pibor Area and concedes greater autonomy to the region. These developments will lead to a reform of the governance arrangements in Jonglei state and are thus encouraging for a political settlement to the crisis in the state. The signing of the deal however also has the effect of effacing the underlying causes of the insurgency in Jonglei State from the current negotiations in Addis. Revisiting the dynamics in the new area of “Greater Pibor” and including stakeholders such as the SSDM/A – Cobra Faction would have made for a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of South Sudan's underlying governance challenges.

Indeed, local deals may even reduce the chances for a comprehensive peace. This is because by conceding authority in specific regions while making only limited changes to the system of government. Some reports suggest that as a result of the agreement signed with the SSDM/A, the SPLA might be able to use the territory around Pibor as an additional corridor to fight the SPLA-In Opposition (SPLM-IO). Blurring the lines between a negotiated and a

victor's peace, South Sudan government seems to have limited willingness to win peace through political reforms so long as this can be done through tilting the balance of power through paying off and appeasing individual factions.

For the mediators and other international actors, their delicate task is to make sure that not only those who have the greatest capacity to wreak havoc will have a say at the negotiation table. It is pivotal for a successful settlement that third parties are willing and able to take an independent position, and in this vein encourage a discussion about transitional arrangements as independent as possible from the increasingly polarized struggle between rivals.

Although the government's delegation did quickly become a leading vocal critic against the issue of inclusivity, this does not mean that the Opposition's side fared any better. On its part, the negotiating delegation representing the SPLM in Opposition initially chose not to publicly reject the involvement of the other third parties in the peace talks. As it later became abundantly clear, this however did not necessarily mean that the opposition embraced the invitation of the said stakeholders to the negotiating table. On the contrary, the initial stance the opposition took with respect to this matter seemed to have been a calculated move designed to evaluate the environment and respond accordingly. Given the fact that rebellion was predicated on unseating the government from power, the opposition probably wanted to survey positions of other forces in the country in order to figure out the possibility of building alliances. Like the representatives of the government who feel obligated to defend the status quo by all means, the opposition delegates seem to harbor a strange view that they are duty bound to allow others to take part only when that helps them to advance their narrowly defined interests. Using this understanding to project a better public posture, the SPLM-IO

delegation through its statements appeared open to the representatives of civil society organizations joining the talks, and this ostensibly set a disparity between them and the government. Of course, the contrast between the two warring camps was just in style but not substance. The government's team understandably seemed set to defend the status quo that it deemed favorable in terms of its grip on power. The opposition on the other hand saw the inclusion of others as not necessarily a drag on their interests but an opportunity to pressure the government they desperately want to replace. Like the government's negotiating team, which as alluded to earlier, was adamant that the talks be essentially restricted to the warring parties alone, a position that certainly does not seem to factor in the necessity of achieving a durable peace that could enjoy the popular support, the opposition had to publicly confirm the notion that only those with guns are allowed to negotiate.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

South Sudan is a multi-ethnic national with over 60 ethnic groups living together from the colonial period up to the time of old Sudan. Though the country has never been peaceful with civil unrests, rebellions and inter and intra-ethnic clashes and communal conflicts, the groups continue enjoying resources such as water, grazing lands and others. The main rivals were Dinka and Nuer who are known on their competition on leadership and control of resources for a very long time.

However, the situation changed from traditional rivalry to political struggle after the independent on 9 July 2011 through referendum that was agreed in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), South Sudan from the birth has faced with the task of managing its numerous ethnic groups, uniting them to forge ahead as one nation. this anticipated reality

did not materialize, instead the country slipped into a violent conflict that has manifested adverse consequences on the country's functionality as an independent state. Since December 2013, barely two years after gaining independence from the Republic of Sudan, violent conflict erupted in South Sudan. This is clearly shown in the various institutions of the government which is ran and dominated by certain ethnic groups where the boss comes from. This is worse in the government security apparatus which favor some ethnic groups and abuse the human rights of others.

The country ruling elites never put in consideration the level of destruction that might come because of the ethnic conflicts and both 2005 peace agreement between North and South Sudan didn't address issues of reconciliation and trauma healing and the same also in the 2015 and 2018 peace agreements between Salva Kiir government and Dr. Machar rebel group which created a gap in bring the warring communities together and reconcile the warring population. Ethnic division and ethnic conflicts are perceived as very sensitive issues within the South Sudanese society, which can mark or mare its statehood. It is against this background that the study examined the impact of ethnic conflicts on the Statehood of South Sudan. Other factors contributing to the situation and disunity of the South Sudanese is the lack of national language which can bring all together. Some ethnic groups are in position to force their languages to be used even in public places such as government institutions and places of learning which add more fuel to the ethnic conflicts and considered as mean of inciting violence and degrading some communities.

As reported by the New York Times, an estimated 383,000 people have died as a result of the conflict (New York Time, 2018). A similar report published by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine indicates that about half of the casualties resulted from

fighting between ethnic rivals as the conflict spread across the country, and the other half died from disease, hunger and other causes exacerbated by the ongoing conflict (Checchi, Testa, Warsame, Quach, and Burns, 2018).

### **1.3 Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of the study was to assess the impact of Ethnic Conflicts on the statehood in South Sudan. Thus, the study will examine the possible causes and outcomes of the conflicts and the future of South Sudan as a sovereign state.

### **1.4 Research Objectives**

The study in its deliberation and engagement with respondents has to address following specific objectives;

- i. To investigate the causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan
- ii. To examine the effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan
- iii. To evaluate the impacts of ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan
- iv. To identify the strategic remedies to mitigate ethnic conflicts in South Sudan

### **1.5 Research Questions**

- i. What are the causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan?
- ii. What are the effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan?
- iii. What are the effects of ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan?
- iv. What are the strategic remedies to mitigate ethnic conflicts in South Sudan?

### **1.6 Hypotheses**

**H0<sub>1</sub>:** There is no significant effect of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan.

**H1<sub>1</sub>:** There is significant effect of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan.

**H0<sub>2</sub>:** There is no significant effect of ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan.

**H1<sub>2</sub>:** There is significant effect of ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan.

## **1.7 Scope of the study**


The scope of the study was categorized into three: geographical scope, content scope and time scope.

### **1.7.1 Geographical scope**

South Sudan was part of the greater Sudan until July 9, 2011. The formal division in 2011 of into two new states—Sudan (the Republic of the Sudan) and South Sudan (the Republic of South Sudan)—was the result of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to end the civil strife that had endured for generations. Sudan for many years suffered from the failure of both regional and international actors to effectively come to terms with the scope of the complex situation. The study was conducted in the Republic of South Sudan, the world's youngest state as at the time of writing this dissertation. The country gained independence in 2011 from the Republic of Sudan and it is located in the northeastern part of Africa. Its current capital is Juba, though it planned to move the capital to Ramciel, which is considered a more central location before the outbreak of the ongoing civil war. The country is made up of three former regions, namely: Greater Bahr el Ghazal which consist of four states namely; Western Bahr elGazal (Wau), Northern Bahr elGzal (Aweil), Warrap (Kuajok) and Lakes State (Rumbek). Greater Equatoria, consist of three states and these are; Western Equatoria (Yambio), Central Equatoria (Juba) and Eastern Equatoria (Torit) and finally Greater Upper Nile which has three states; Upper Nizle (Malakal), Unity State (Bentiu) and Jonglei State (Bor). These are 10 states that made up the Republic of South Sudan. It is bordered by the

Republic of Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the southwest, and the Central African Republic to the west. It is a heterogeneous landlocked country with a vast swamp region and a population of about 11,071,509 people according to South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (2018).

**Figure 1: Map of South Sudan, showing ethnic group**



Source: “South Sudan and the Case for Maps”, *The American Interest*. Available at: <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/08/28/south-sudan-and-the-case-for-maps/>.

### **1.7.2 Content scope**

The study examined the effects of ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan. Accordingly, the study investigated how ethnical divisions, bias and sentiments contribute to the ongoing ethnic conflicts in the country and also the short- and long-term impact it has on statehood in South Sudan. The ethnic conflicts have added too much suffering to the people of the young nations and created more division among the people of one nation. With this study, it is believed to come out with more detailed and clearer picture of the situation in South Sudan by allowing participation of all South Sudanese to express their views on how these ethnic conflicts affected them and the future of their country.

South Sudan is in fact more than a geographical expression. With its human and ethnic diversity of having more than sixty cultural and linguistic groups, each of which have a stronger sense of citizenship in their tribes than in the nation. The only united factor that bring them together is the long history of their struggle for freedom and collective opposition to the Arabs in the north currently known as Sudan. This accelerated the concept of independent state from the north, which was achieved in 2011 referendum on self-determination. However, South Sudan’s unity remains undefined: At independence, the country has found itself with only a hazy notion of a collective national identity beyond its unified opposition to the north, making its viability as a nation a matter of speculation. Given the history of internal political rivalries along ethnic lines, the state’s inability to immediately provide the highly anticipated peace dividends and fruits of independence, as well as the violence and insecurity that is likely to accompany the mechanics of separation, there have

been predictions of possible disintegration. Ethnic squabbles within South Sudan will increase over the allocation of state resources and services, which could dissipate the vague sense of national unity among the people of the new country.

### **1.7.3 Time scope**

After South Sudan's hard-won independence in 2011, the country slid quickly into violent conflicts and became a theatre of enormous human suffering. It was not clear what went wrong either the way the ruling elites managed the transition to statehood, the development of exclusive weak institutions, or frail social cohesion that have all served to undermine peace and the development of a resilient social contract. The major issues of conflicts have never been addressed, witnessed by the eruption of civil war in 2013. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 2015 provides in theory, the basis for forging a new social contract that holds promise for sustaining peace, building inclusive institutions and nurturing social cohesion, its realization was far and requires political will, strategic leadership, and a national vision,

.The study covered a period of 8 years beginning from 2011 to 2018. The reason why this time period was chosen because South Sudan gained its independence in 2011 and in 2013 a violent conflict broke out in the country. The conflict later deteriorated into a civil war that is fought mainly along ethnic lines. The efforts to end the conflict was concluded with the signature of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS, 2015) which collapse in 2016 after dog fight in State House (J1) in July 2016. The IGAD Plus mediators called the parties to another peace talks and ended with Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCISS, 2018). The study was carried out

covering that period of time and the data were collected in 2018 after the signing of the R-ARCISS.

### **1.8 Significance of the Study**

The researcher will be remembered for doing this study in a very hard time while the ethnic conflicts were intensifying in almost all parts of South Sudan. As such, the significance of any empirical study refers to the benefits from the study and how specific audience will benefit from its findings. In view of that, this study will be significant to the following category:

- i. **Policy Makers:** The study provides valuable information for policy makers at different levels in South Sudan, on ethnic divisions and its implications on violent conflict and the statehood of South Sudan. It presents how the countries diversity can be harnessed and utilized in a positive manner to create national unity and nation building agenda. As well, it provided recommendation on how policies can be used as a tool among others to bridge the existing ethnic gaps and sentiments within South Sudanese societies.
- ii. **Regional and International Actors:** To the international actors such as IGAD, African Union and the United Nations, the study reveals that the ongoing civil war in South Sudan is deeply rooted in ethnic differences. At best the conflict has reignited ethnic dichotomy in the country. As such, resolving the conflict cannot be achieved through signing peace agreements that involves only the elites; instead, the solution should be sort from the grassroots. In this case, the study provided a guideline for international actors on how to re-strategize and adopt a holistic approach towards

resolving the conflict instead of the ineffective “top-down approach” that is visibly used in addressing the conflict.

- iii. **Future Researchers:** The study contributes to the available literature and knowledge on the effects of ethnic conflicts on Statehood. It serves as a reference for future researchers, particularly those investigating issues relating to ethnicity, ethnic conflicts and their effects on statehood either in South Sudan or in any part of the world.
- iv. **The Researcher:** The study benefited the researcher by helping him acquire practical research skills. Besides, the study is a partial requirement for the researcher to be awarded a doctorate degree in Conflict Resolution and Peace building. The researcher as well intends to educate his audiences about the negative effects of ethnic conflicts on the growth and development of South Sudan which he believes if not addressed amicably will make the country failed or collapse or disintegrate as some groups started already calling for autonomous administration and owned their resources.

### **1.9 Definition of operational key terms**

**Armed Conflict:** An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015: 536). According to Dhia (2006), it is a political conflict in which an armed group combat with the armed forces of at least one state or a situation where one or more-armed factions seeking to gain control of all or part of the state fights against the state, and in which at least 1,000 people have been killed by the fighting during the course of the conflict. The study operationalized armed conflict as a state-based conflict,

whereby a discontented group takes up arms against the state, leading to civilian casualties, displacement, and effectively hindering the functionality of the state.

**Conflict management:** The study adopted the definition advanced by Bloomfield and Reilly (1998), which refers to conflict management as the positive and constructive handling of differences and divergences among individuals or a group. In this case, instead of advocating methods for eliminating conflict, conflict management addresses the more realistic question of managing conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive management of differences (Bloomfield and Reilly, 1998: 18). Conflict management therefore involves vital skills that will facilitate handling confrontations tactfully and constructively. The aim is to resolve conflict amicably and not to allow it to deteriorate.

**Conflict:** It is defined as a struggle or contest between people with opposing views ideas, needs, beliefs, values, goals or expectations. It is a position that denotes the incompatibility of subject positions (Diez et al, 2006: 565). In this study, it is considered in as the expression of needs or incompatibilities between two relational entities that deserves to be addressed. In broader terms, it refers to some form of friction, disagreement, or discord arising within a group when the beliefs or actions of one or more members of the group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group. It is an inherent part of human existence that is inevitable in human relationships. Conflict is not always characterized by violence but abhorred if it deteriorates to produce destructive consequences particularly in the form of physical violence. However, if properly managed, it can produce positive outcomes.

**Ethnicity:** is the ethnic group or groups that people identify with or feel they belong to. Ethnicity is a measure of cultural affiliation, as opposed to race, ancestry, nationality, or citizenship. Ethnicity is self-perceived and people can belong to more than one ethnic group

**Ethnic conflict:** This is considered, as is a conflict among communities (ethnicities) due to power relationship that exists between those communities and the state (Sambanis (2001: 261)

**Ethnic group:** This refers to a category of people who identify with each other, usually on the basis of a presumed common genealogy or ancestry or on similarities such as common language, religion, mythology and ritual, history, society, culture or nation, cuisine, dressing style, art or physical appearance. Usually, it is an inherited status based on the society in which one lives. Of important note is that the term ethnic group, ethnicity and ethnic nationalities were used interchangeably in the study.

**Ethnic loyalty:** This refers to a person's preference for his/ her cultural orientation or ethnic group over others ethnic groups within a society. It implies being subjectively loyal and sentimental to one's ethnic identity, narrative and prejudice at any given time and situation. The concept stems from ethnicism, whereby ethno-centric individuals view the world from an ethnically biased perspective - a situation where individuals are more inclined on defining themselves through an ethnic identity without broader consideration or rationality. Thus, ethnic loyalty and ethnicism are considered to mean the same in the study.

**Social Conflict:** The study aligned its conceptualization of social conflict to the definition advanced by Coser (1956), whereby he defined social conflict as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to

conquer, neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. Thus, in a social conflict, the aim is to subjugate the opposition through coercion, violence and force.

**Statehood:** The status of being a recognized independent nation. In this study, the statehood refers to the smooth functioning and viability of the state with no threat of collapse.

### **1.10 Organization of the dissertation**

The study is structured into five principal chapters. Chapter one “introduction” provided the background to the study, which is divided into four perspectives (historical, conceptual, theoretical and contextual perspectives), the statement of the problem, purpose of the study, objectives of the study and research questions, scope, and significance of the study and definition of key operational terms.

Chapter two “Literature Review” provided a comprehensive review of the theories that guided the study, presented the conceptual framework, reviewed empirical literature and identified research gaps in relation to the study. Under theoretical review, three theories were reviewed: Elite Manipulation Theory, Theory of Protracted Social Conflict and the Security Dilemma Theory. The theories were meticulously reviewed in relation to the topic and aligned with the situation in South Sudan. Then, the conceptual framework considered ethnicity as the Dependent variable (DV) and Statehood as the Independent variable (IV). The empirical literature was reviewed based on the study objectives and the variables/ constructs under the conceptual framework. In addition, the chapter identified gaps in the literature that warranted the study.

Chapter three “Methodology” provided a description of the process and method through which the study findings and conclusions were reached. Specifically, it explained and justified the research design, study population, sample size, sampling technique, data collection methods and instruments, data quality control (validity and reliability), data analysis, ethical considerations and limitations to the validity of study findings.

Chapter four “Presentation of Findings” provided the study findings. Accordingly, empirical data from the field, which were collected through the use of questionnaires, were presented in frequency counts, tables and charts, while data collected through face-to-face interview were transcribed into transcripts. Presentation of findings followed a chronological order of the study objectives. Quantitative data was presented first because it was the primary source of data and was supplemented with qualitative data.

Chapter five “Discussion of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations” provided a comprehensive review of the study findings. Then, based on the study findings, conclusions were made for each of the study objectives. Furthermore, feasible and practicable recommendations were proffered, to address specific challenges identified under each study objective from the findings. Finally, the chapter proposed areas for further research.

## **CHAPTER TWO:**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

Chapter Two covered four key areas of the study, which are as follows: theoretical review, conceptual framework, review of empirical literature, in line with the study objectives and variables while the study will identify some of the gaps in the literature at the end of the chapter.

#### **2.1 Theoretical Review**

The chapter was in position to review as many theories as possible which are used in the field of social sciences however, the following two theories were seen much applicable to the situation of the study and adapted for use and guidance. Thus, the study was guided by three theories: Elite Manipulation (EM) Theory, Theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) and the Security Dilemma Theory was left out and only the first two applied in the situational analysis.

##### **2.1.1 Elite Manipulation Theory**

Elite Manipulation (EM) Theory is part of the “classic” elite theories that were formulated at the end of the nineteenth century and in the first decades of the twentieth century by Vilfredo Pareto (1923) and developed later by Gaetano Mosca (1941). The theory builds on Max Weber's ideas, especially concerning the centrality of political power and charismatic leadership. The theory contends that elites use ethnic violence as a purposeful and rational strategy to acquire or maintain political power. In doing this, the elites intentionally instigate

ethnic violence as a way of gaining political support (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Gagnon, 1994).

According to Snyder (2000), one of the key reasons for the increased risk of nationalist conflict during democratization is the systematic use of ethnic divisions for political gain. In societies with strong ethnic identities, ethnic entrepreneurs or elites usually capitalize on already existing ethnic divisions within the society to pursue personal political gain and private interests (Sambanis, 2001). In some cases, the elites construct ethnic identities in order to have large enough voting blocs or “minimum winning coalitions” (Bates, 1983; Munene, 2010; Lynch, 2011).

The theory argues that political power is held by a relatively small and wealthy group of people sharing similar values and interests. The theory holds that ethnic conflicts are elite driven clashes and controversies. It stresses the role of political elites and their ability to incite the masses to violence. The elites usually use the mass media, which they have privileged control to mobilize the people and construct ethnic division and conflict (Brass, 1997). Often times, when the elites are dislodged in power sharing or delegitimized in they propagate ethnic sentiment to secure their grip on power, which easily exhort people to ethnic conflict (Snyder and Ballentine, 1996: 26).

The theory clearly fits into the present situation in South Sudan, particularly the ongoing civil war that is fought along ethnic lines. The ongoing civil war is fought along ethnic lines of the Dinka and the Nuer, however the conflict emanated from a personal discord between the leaders. A personal misunderstanding between President Salva Kiir and his former vice Riek Marchar is at the root of the conflict. These two elites, however managed to manipulate

personal grievances to escalate tribal sentiments and conflict. Thus, the political interest and survival of these two elites is at the core of a civil war that has devastated the entire country, with an attendant impact on the neighboring countries. Thus, the theory offers a multidimensional and substantial analysis of key issues related to ethnic conflicts and ethnicity. As well, it clearly differentiates between the masses and leaders, as in most cases the latter serve to be the drivers of ethnic conflicts, rather the former.

According to Gagnon (2001) violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity. He further argues that rather than ethnic hatred and resentment naturally manifest to compromise peace, elites construct a security dilemma by inciting fear and highlighting external threats. The individual interest of the population then becomes focused on the threat to the community defined in ethnic terms and only then do people begin to divide themselves along ethnic lines. Basically, the elites use this strategy to respond to shifts in the structure of domestic power and to fend off domestic challengers who seek to mobilize people against the status quo.

Gagnon (2004), presented the elites manipulation mechanisms in four basic assumptions. First, the domestic arena is the central concern for decision makers and elites because it contains their power base; elites will therefore focus on maintaining this power. Secondly, persuasion is the most effective and least costly means of influence in domestic politics. Thus, the elites consider persuasion as a favorable mechanism when appealing to the interests of politically relevant actors as members of a group. Thirdly, appeals for support within the domestic arena should be constructed and directed to appeal the values of the target audiences. In this case, ideas such as ethnicity, religion, culture and class therefore play a key

role as instruments of power and influence in particular because of their centrality to legitimacy and authority. Finally, the way in which ideas are framed determines the way political arguments are made and how interests are defined. The concern of the elites is therefore to define the interest of the collective in a way that coincides with their own power interests. In other words, they express their interests in the language of the collective interest.

Although the theory provides a good standpoint to analyze ethnic conflicts, it has equally been criticized in so many fronts. First is that it over-predicts ethnic conflict as a tool of elite dominance and control. On that note, the theory fails to provide explanation as to why political elites are very successful in inciting the people to violence, but at the same time unsuccessful in dissuading them from engaging in same. Second, the theory paints a gloomy representation of the elites. It presents the elites as evil, while trumping the masses as innocent victims (Kakar, 1996). Such postulation undermines the logic of free individual acts, where ordinary people can act irrationally due to intrinsic factors such as traits or extrinsic factors such as frustration. The theory therefore represents the masses as mindless entities who foolishly believe the lies crafted by their leaders in spite of the fact that their own personal experience does not support these ideas.

However, Gagnon (2004) responded to these criticisms by emphasizing that elite manipulation is effective on the masses because it has effect mostly in perceptions about such relations outside of their own lived experiences. In Gagnon's view, the elites propagate a narrative of external threat and create a context in which they attempt to affect processes of identity, as a means to influence the behavior of their population. To do this, elites construct a threat defined in particular ways: 'us' versus 'them.' This constructed threat is not a

reflection of some natural relationship, but rather is the product of fear, an image that is imposed and enforced to benefit the elites.

Therefore, the Elite Manipulation Theory was very much applicable and fits for the use in the situation of the ethnic conflicts in South Sudan where population are divided by the elites to maintain their political power and the followers trust them blindly. The elites in most cases diverted the national resources and used them for their constituencies gains to boost their support.

### **2.1.2 Theory of Protracted Social Conflict**

Edward Azar developed the theory of Protracted Social Conflict in the early 1970s. It generally refers to long lasting, complex, severe, commonly enduring, and often violent conflicts (Ramsbotham, 2005). The theory explains prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition, acceptance, fair access to political institutions and positions, and economic participation (Ramsbotham, 2005). The theory suggests that protracted social conflict is almost inevitable in situation whereby a group's identity within a heterogeneous society is threatened or frustrated or when their access to basic needs is limited or hindered (Kulang and Ogbonna, 2018).

Furthermore, the theory contends that hostile interaction patterns between communal or ethnic groups that are based in deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural hatreds, which persist over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence, are indications of protracted social conflict (Azar, 1990). Thus, protracted social conflicts occur when communities are neglected and systematically deprived of their basic needs, which results in a feeling of marginalization in power structure on the basis of communal identity, caused by

colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, or the multi-communal nature of the society. Azar identified three variables as the key phases that characterize protracted social conflict: genesis, process dynamics and outcomes analysis (Azar, 1990).

**Genesis:** This refers to a set of conditions that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones. Azar identifies four key variables responsible for this transformation process as Communal Content; Human Needs; Government and the States and International Linkages.

- i. *Communal Content:* Azar argues that the most significant of all factors that lead to PSC are societies that are characterized by ethnic diversity. Multi-ethnic societies, whether formed as a result of colonial legacy or whether through historical rivalries often result in the dominance of one group over another due to disarticulation between the state and society as a whole. In this case, a single ethnic group or a coalition of a few ethnic groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society usually dominates state affairs. According to Azar, efforts to reconcile this anomaly and enforce integration or co-operation diverts attention from nation-building process, strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict.
- ii. *Human Needs:* Azar's second variable infers that PSC is also triggered by the extent identity groups are able to access developmental human needs. The most obvious ontological need is individual and communal physical survival and well-being. Individual or communal survival is contingent upon the satisfaction of basic needs. Based on Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs, the basic need includes food, water, clothing, security and safety. In the world of physical scarcity and class division, these

basic needs are seldom met. Whereas one group of individuals may enjoy satisfaction of those needs in abundance, others do not. Consequently, grievances on the part of those whose needs are not met due to deprivation are usually expressed collectively. When such grievances are not redressed by the authority, it cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict. On this note, developmental needs and unmet material needs do not lead to conflict. What is key, however, is the degree to which minority groups can access the market or political institutions or the recognition of communal existence (Azar, 1996: 7-8). Thus, the inability to meet the basic needs of a communal group may become a causal variable to incite violent outburst.

- iii. *Government and the State's Role:* Azar's third variable focuses on the role of the state, particularly its role in ensuring that all communal groups under its jurisdiction are able to meet their basic human needs. Azar contends that a preeminent feature in countries that are experiencing protracted social conflict is that political power tends to be dominated by one identity group that uses state resources to maintain power over the other groups. In turn, to ensure that the group in power remains in control, they dominant group often implore strategies that will impede participation of minority groups. Such crises exacerbate already existing competitive or conflictive situations, diminish the state's ability to meet basic needs, and lead to further developmental crises. Thus, regime type and the level of legitimacy are important linkage variables between needs and protracted social conflict (Azar, 1996: 11).
- iv. *International Linkages:* Azar's fourth variable focuses on how governance at the state level is not basically responsible for communal groups inability to access basic human needs, security or recognition, but the extent to which internal policy is influenced by international linkages. In Azar's view, international linkages take the form of

economic dependency and client relationships. States which are economically dependent on the broader international economic system, in turn see their autonomy weakened as economic development policies are dictated by outside influences. Dependency distorts the domestic political and economic systems through the realignment of subtle coalitions of international capital and thus exacerbates denial of the access to needs of communal groups. On the other hand, Client relationships, refers to a situation whereby a state's security is guaranteed by another state, in return for loyalty. Such an arrangement distracts a government from its key responsibilities. Client loyalty undermines state autonomy and independence as the client state pursue both domestic and foreign policies disjointed, with little consideration of the domestic needs of his people.

**Process dynamics:** This is the second component of PSC and it deals with the variables that are responsible for the activation of conflict. Azar recognizes three key determining factors: Communal Actions and Strategies; State Actions and Strategies and Built in Mechanisms of Conflict.

- i. *Communal Actions and Strategies:* This refers to the potential of various 'triggers' which activate otherwise latent conflict, which then escalate into broader and possibly more violent conflict. Initially, a trigger may not be a need-based issue, rather it could be a trivial event. For example, an insult to an individual with strong communal ties could be interpreted as collective victimization. Collective recognition of individual grievances or incompatible goals may lead to collective protest, whilst collective protest is usually met by some degree of disaffections and repression. As tension increases, the victimized communal groups begin to draw the attention of their

constituents not only to the event itself, but also to a broad range of issues involving communal security, access and security needs.

The spillover of the event into multiple issues, increases the appetite and momentum of affected ethnic groups to organize and mobilize resources. As the level of communal organization and mobilization becomes greater, communal groups attempt to formulate more diverse strategies and tactics, which may involve civil disobedience, guerrilla warfare or secessionist movements (Azar, 1996: 14). The extent to which this escalates is in-part influenced by the ability of communal groups to effectively organize and develop strong leadership as well their capacity to gather support outside of national boundaries, which may in turn result in the conflict taking on a regional dimension.

- ii. *State Actions and Strategies:* According to Azar (1996), in the majority of cases, the usual state response to ethnic grievances is one of coercive repression. or instrumental co-option to avoid outward signs of weakness or defeat. When ethnic grievances in expresses in a form of protest or rebellion, the state usually employs repressive measures through its security apparatus or militant undercovers to communal dissent. Such a hard-line strategy invites equally militant responses from repressed groups. This further justifies coercive repressive options, favouring more intense violent clashes.
- iii. *Built in Mechanisms of Conflict:* This is the last of Azar's process variables relates, which to the effects of long-term conflicts on perceptions of the other and how this, in-turn, can impact on the behaviour of belligerent groups. Azar contends that the perceptions and motivations behind the behaviour of the state and communal actors


are conditioned by experiences, fears and belief system of each communal group. In a situation of limited interactions, there is a perception of 'us' and 'them', where 'us' is good and 'them' is evil and bad, which perpetuates communal antagonism and solidify protracted social conflict (Azar, 1996: 15).

**Outcomes Analysis:** Azar explains that Protracted Social Conflicts are different from other conflict because they produce negative-sum outputs in which there is often no clear endpoint and no clear winner (Azar, 1996). The process of protracted social conflict deforms and retards the effective operation of political institutions. It reinforces and strengthens pessimism throughout the society, demoralizes leaders and immobilizes the search for peaceful solutions. A preeminent feature of societies undergoing protracted social conflict is that they find it difficult to initiate the search for answers to their problems and grievances. Instead, as protracted social conflict becomes part of the culture of the ravaged nation, it builds a sense of paralysis which afflicts the collective consciousness of the population. An environment of hopelessness permeates all strata of society, and a siege mentality develops, which inhibits constructive negotiation to resolve pertinent issues and restore order in the society. In summary, Azar identified four possible consequences of PSC as: Deterioration of physical security; Institutional Deformity; Psychological Ossification and Increased Dependency and Cliency.

The theory is suitable for the study as it explicitly explains the present situation in South Sudan. The variables under the PSC such as, Communal Content; Human Needs; Government and the States and International Linkages to some extent among the causes of conflict in South Sudan. Although, in many cases the conflict is misrepresented to reflect ethnic conflict, the actual causes of the conflict are far from ethnicity. Rather than ethnicity,

the conflict is triggered by frustration resulting from want and the inability of the population to satisfy their basic needs. Anger and frustration that accrue from lack and want among members of the society are expressed in a violent outburst. Also, the structure of the society is another issue propelling conflict in South Sudan. The marginalization of other ethnic groups by the two major ethnic groups, Dinka and Nuer is a factor that fuels apathy for the government by minority ethnic groups in South Sudan, who consider the government to be dominated by members of the above-mentioned ethnic nationalities. Unfortunately, the needs of the minority ethnic groups have been long neglected, while the affairs of the state and control of national resources are solely in the hands of the Dinka's and Nuer's, making members of the minority group to seek solace from members of their ethnic group, and thus creating deeper ethnic divide within the South Sudan Society. Also, the Communal Actions and Strategies variable is clearly situated in the context of the ongoing civil war in South Sudan. A personal disagreement between Present Salva Kiir and his deputy Riek Machar led to the former to remove the later from office. The removal of the vice president was considered a collective insult and attack by members of his ethnic Nuer. Thus, necessitating the deployment of collective action in a way of protest and civil disobedience, which was met with brutal repression from the government, resulting in further escalation of the conflict. Observably, the impact of the conflict has permeated all strata of the South Sudan society, causing fears and hopelessness, creating a siege mentality among the population, thus making it impossible to resolve the situation constructively and restore normalcy in the country. Summarily, the Theory of Protracted Social Conflict provides a clear background and standpoint to explain the present-day South Sudan.

**Figure 2:1: Conceptual Framework**



Source: *Developed by the researcher, 2018*

## **2.2 Conceptual Framework**

In this study, Ethnic Conflicts is considered as the independent variable (IV) and statehood as the dependent variable (DV). The conceptual framework provides a visual understanding of the relationship between the independent variable (Ethnic Conflicts) and the dependent variable (statehood). It identified Ethnic division, hatred & conflict, identity issues, ethnic segregation, ethnic mobilization, social relations, displacement and killing on ethnic lines and destruction of properties under the IV. These factors affect the dependent variable (statehood), which has the following variables: sovereignty; governance and service delivery; law and order, security and protection and accountability. Thus, constructs under the IV such as ethnic division, mobilization and loyalty, which leads to ethnic trust, bias, sentiment and nepotism has a direct effect on statehood in terms of governance, maintaining law and order within the state and has the capacity to weaken state ability to perform its core responsibilities such as, providing basic services, maintaining law and order and protection of lives and property among others. In essence, if ethnicity is well managed, it can be a progressive tool of statehood, on the contrary, it could be a threat to statehood. In this case, the nature of ethnicity in any multi-ethnic society determines the functionality of the state. However, the state through its governance structure and policies can actually influence the mood of ethnicity within its territory. Accordingly, the study considers state structure and policies as the intervening variable between the IV (Ethnic Conflicts) and DV (statehood). The logic is that if state structure and policies are rich enough to accommodate the concerns and interest of its multi-ethnic nationalities, then ethnicity can be a positive tool for wider state governance and vice-versa.

### **2.3 Review of empirical literature**

The literature review focuses on the impact of ethnicity on statehood and therefore, the study conceptualizes two main variables, Ethnic Conflicts and statehood. However, the literature review was presented in accordance with the study objectives.

The term “ethnicity” as used today arose in the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century, replacing the terminology of “races” or “nations” used for the concept in the 19th century. Conventional warfare was formerly conceived as conflicts between nations, and only with the rise of multi-ethnic societies and the shift to asymmetric warfare did the concept of “ethnic conflict” arise as separate from generic “war” (Center for Systemic Peace, 2006). This has been the case especially since the collapse of the multi-ethnic Soviet Union and of the relatively more homogeneous Yugoslavia in the 1990s, both of which were followed by ethnic conflicts that escalated to violence and civil war (Smith, 2001; Wallenstein, 2005).

In recent times, the term ethnicity is being considered as one of the most Important concepts in the social sciences. The theoretical development corresponds to the realization that ethnic phenomena considerably permeate and influence the main social events of our times. According to Howrowitz (1985) ethnic conflict persist on every continent and such violence are a central feature of contemporary social life and have been for centuries in places where heterogeneous population live, or people from different ethnic group come into contact. Thus, ethnic conflict is a world view phenomenon (Howrowitz, 1985: 3). It is defined as any episode of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, and religious or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in status (smith, 2001).

It is important to highlight that there are different forms of manifestations of ethnic conflict and there is a risk of confusing a conflict with related phenomena such as various forms of hostility and competitive behavior, which generally may be defined as ethnic tensions. They usually precede the emergence of overt conflict, and may be said, to constitute a pre-conflict situation (Matsievsky, 2000: 66). The sociological approach to the study of conflict provides a clear narrative of the phenomenon as it perceives ethnic conflict as a process, which has separate stages of development. The common feature in most sociological definitions of an ethnic conflict is a concentration on the notion of a process. This assumption provides a possibility analyze a conflict as a dynamic process with different stages of development.

According to Matsievsky (2000), the period of the origin of conflict involves at least three stages: the emergence of inconsistencies in human relations (latent conflict), rationalization of inconsistencies and their association with certain system of values (perceived conflict), the emergence of disturbances, stresses, tensions, hostile feelings and attitudes in group members' mentality (felt conflict). These initial stages of the conflict process may be conceived as a pre-conflict situation (Matsievsky, 2000: 67). The next stage is overt manifestation of conflict, which essentially differs from the previous stages in behavioral aspects, that is the parties' activity aims to achieve the object of desire. In this situation one party's activity is essentially incompatible with that of the other's, which constitutes a conflict itself. The subsequent stage comes when a desire appears for conflict elimination and normalization of the situation. This is usually caused by some factors that include when there is decisive victory of one side which may try to use its victory to establish a new normal. It also may be determined by lack interest by the parties to continue engaging in violence due to exhaustion in strength. The later scenario can be related to the genocide in Rwanda, where

the parties were exhausted and opted to end the violence. The last stage of the ethnic conflict process covers the period of normalization of situation after the end of the conflict. The goal at this stage is to establish a new relationship and form a social order.

### **2.3.1 Causes of ethnic conflicts**

One of the main reasons why the study of ethnic conflict is important in contemporary times is the necessity to answer a principal question of: What is the nature of ethnic conflict? The question relates to the issue of whether ethnic conflict is simply an irrational action caused by such factors as accumulated frustration or aggression, lack of identity, needs of maintaining group boundaries and cohesiveness, ineffectiveness of social co-ordination and others. If the aforesaid is the reality, then to what extent rationality in ethnic conflict? Related to the problem of the nature of ethnic conflict is the question of the origin of ethnic conflicts. It is considered that there is no universal reason for ethnic conflict emergence; some factors in some situations may provoke ethnic conflict but in another may not. Thus, the study does not pretend to give definitive answer to the above questions, however, it provides more specific typology, manifestation and triggers of ethnic conflict. According to Kim (1989) ethnic conflict is usually caused by: (i) history of subjugation, (ii) ideological / structural inequality, and (iii) minority group strength.

- i. *History of subjugation:* This is a fundamental societal condition crucial to understanding contemporary incidents of ethnic conflict. Kim (1989) asserts that subjugation often takes the form of political, economic, and cultural domination through slavery, colonization, and military conquest. The main intent of ethnic subjugation is to destroy, in whole or in part, not a group, but a group's political

aspirations/capacity to be a political force. It can take the form either of a single campaign to defeat an adversary, such as the defeat of a secessionist bid, or a continuous regime of enforced and, sometimes, legally codified vertical hierarchy orchestrated against a certain ethnicity. In effect, subjugation is always institutionalized in a series of provisions intended to deter a certain ethnic group from gaining any power. Whereas the usual response from the targeted ethnic group is to mobilize politically and intensify their demand for liberty. Such mobilization takes different forms and ideological connotations, depending on the capacity of the ethnic group.

- ii. *Structural inequality*: This deals with unequal access to power and economic reward, which are often considered to be scarce resources. During the colonial period, the mechanism of leadership was largely divide and rule, in this case some ethnic groups were granted special status by the colonist and eventually after decolonization, these groups became the politically dominant group in their new states. As society operates by and large based on the interests of the dominant ethnic group, whose beliefs and values are primarily responsible for the societal ideology, the other (dominated) ethnic groups either enter into political contests to protect citizen rights, ask for autonomy, or mount a secessionist movement (Nash, 1989: 21). In many cases, the dominant societal ideology legitimises discriminatory actions against specific minority groups. Under such an inequitable societal condition, subordinate groups' primarily express their comparative feelings of dissatisfaction, or "relative deprivation" and symbolic claims to social parity over the political, economic, social, and cultural structures through confrontation that often deteriorate to violence (Baker, 1983).

iii. *Minority group strength*: This is crucial factor when considering issues that contribute to the emergence of ethnic conflict. In multi-ethnic societies characterized by societal inequities, minority ethnic groups vary in their ability to mobilise their community opinions and resources into collective actions against such inequities. Accordingly, some researchers have provided explanations on the differential strengths of ethnic groups according to evolutionary stages. For example, Clarke and Obler (1976), asserts that ethnic action involves three-stages of development: (i) the initial stage of the economic adjustment which occurs upon arrival of the group until they become an integral part of the permanent economy; (ii) the second stage of community building, or the development of community leadership and institutional resources used to assert the ethnic group's interests; (iii) the third stage of aggressive self-assertion that develops into the group's conventional use of the existing political system. As marginalized ethnic group progresses from its initial, economic adjustment stage to the later stages of community building and political self-assertion, it will increasingly show its group strength and demands are usually tailored towards cultural identity or ethnicity for the common interest of the group. Neglect for such demands creates an incentive for collective disobedience by the group and consequent rebellion as tensions grow.

From the above, we can deduce that multi-ethnic societies carry various degrees of conflict potential. Ethnic emotions, rooted in historical memories of grievances, are at the core of conflict potential. Ethnicity, as Donald Horowitz argues, “embodies an element of emotional intensity that can be readily aroused when the group’s interests are thought to be at stake” (Horowitz, 1985). Such emotions can be triggered and used contrarily due to major structural

change such as the collapse of communism in Bosnia and decolonization in Rwanda and Sri Lanka. In this case, structural changes ended up upsetting previous political and institutional arrangements. When these institutional mechanisms are no longer in place, countries face a period of political and economic transition “in which the old no longer works while the new will not yet function and the social costs grow” (Brunner, 1996: 92). The usual impact is associated with a context of instability and uncertainty about the political, social, and economic future of the communities or a “collective fears of the future” (Lake and Rothchild, 1996). Such a situation facilitates a manifestation of emotional antagonisms among ethnic groups. Then, political entrepreneurs, in their quest for power, mobilize ethnic constituencies by promoting inter-ethnic animosities using the rhetorical weapons of blame, fear, and hate. This results in an inter-ethnic competition over resources and rights, which is accompanied by a reconstruction of social categories of “inclusion” and “exclusion,” ethnification and ethnic intolerance. Blagojevic (2009), suggested four approaches to the understanding of the causes of ethnic conflict: Primordialist Approach; Institutional Approach; Political Entrepreneurs Approach and Competition over Resources Approach.

**Primordialist Approach:** Primordialism can be traced philosophically to the ideas of German Romanticism, particularly in the works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried Herder. For Herder, the nation was synonymous with language group. In Herder's thinking, language was synonymous with thought, and as each language was learnt in community, then each community must think differently. This also suggests that the community would hold a fixed nature over time. This approach asserts that the main cause of ethnic conflict is the existence of “ancient hatreds” among ethnic and cultural groups. The argument centers on the point that the urge to define and reject the other goes back to our

remotest human ancestors (Blagojevic, 2009: 5). According to this view, “tendencies toward xenophobia and intolerance are more natural to human societies than liberal politics of interest. The primordialist approach helps explain the role of emotions in ethnic conflict and the conflict potential of ethnicity. While ethnic emotions appear to be primordial, they are a socially and politically constructed reality – drawn from the historical memories of past injustices and grievances

As Suny Grigor puts it, “National identities are saturated with emotions that have been created through teaching, repetition, and daily reproduction until they become common sense [...]. These tropes – betrayal, treachery, threats from others, and survival – are embedded in familiar emotions – anxiety, fear, insecurity, and pride” (Suny, 2002). Although the study is not suggesting that ethnic animosities are primordial, but it contends that historical perception forms a greater part of ethnic collective memory. Algis Prazauskas, defined historical memory of an ethnic group as a “set of ideas about the past history of the group, its historical relations with other groups, ethnic images and self-images” (Prazauskas, 1995). Thus, history is employed to buttress ethnic and religious polemics and, more importantly, to reclaim and re-construct ethnic identity, while ethnic communities use historical memories of past grievances as a point of reference – a source of ethnic animosities and a justification for discriminatory actions against other ethnic groups (Akbar, 1995). The Primordialist Approach considers ethnic divisions and tensions are to be natural and somewhat unavoidable.

Although the approach presents a logical argument in respect of ancient ethnic animosity being a driver of ethnic conflict, however the study believes that understanding ethnic hatred as something that is ingrained in ethnic groups and cannot be changed is a simplified view

of a complex problem. Such view neglects the fact that ethnic animosities exist in combination with other factors and that addressing each dimension of the problem is necessary to address the issue. Besides, restraining explanations of ethnic conflict solely to primordial causes also implies a degree of ignorance and prejudice towards the societies experiencing ethnic conflict. In the views of Ahmed Akbar, “ideas and arguments about ethnicity are usually based on the assumption that ethnic identity is a characteristic of primordial and tribal societies [...] Only backward societies cling to the past” (Akbar, 1995: 20). The reality is that when multi-ethnic societies are subjected to a convergence of a particular set of factors and conditions, there is always the potential of ethnic conflict. For example, uncertainties associated with a major structural change can trigger the consciousness of historically rooted ethnic identities - a situation where emotions are employed as vehicles to ethnic violence for political purposes. Instead of clinging to primordial causes, we should consider the view that our realities are socially constructed.

**Institutional Approach:** This deals with the structure of institutions in a multi-ethnic society. Obviously, institutions play an important role in regulating the level of the conflict potential of ethnicity. In doing so, institutions define inter-ethnic relationships by either facilitating or obstructing inter-group cooperation. According to Beverly Crawford, institutions “both constrain behavior and provide incentives for cooperation and compliance in norms, rules, and procedures for allocation, participation, representation, and accountability” (Crawford, 2008: 17). In Crawford's view, whether or not identity politics turns into violent conflict depends on the functioning of state institutions. Thus, in societies where identity politics is practiced, the state can channel it in peaceful political competition as long as the state can make credible commitments to shape and uphold agreements made among culturally defined

political actors. On the contrary, when states fail to properly manage identity politics and uphold culturally defined political agreements, that provides incentive for conflict.

The institutional approach is supported with the argument that the nineteenth century tensions among the three ethnic groups in Switzerland were effectively managed by the current political system (consociational democracy) through institutionalizing ethnic pluralism and giving the three groups equivalent power-sharing (Crawford, 2008: 597). On the contrary, if the state's administrative structures and legal institutions are such that distribute resources based on ethnicity, this encourages political mobilization along ethnic lines (Enloe, 2011). The later seem to be the appreciable status within African continent, situation where resources are allocated along ethnic lines and always for political appeasement. In summary, countries whose political institutions politicize ethnic identity are usually more vulnerable to ethnic conflict than countries whose political institutions are structured to promote social integration of diverse ethnic groups (Crawford, 2008:). Also, the inherited colonial governance structure is another factor perpetrating ethnic conflicts in many states. According to Brunner (2006), colonial political systems used the "divide and rule" strategy to create and/or separate groups along ethnic lines in order to strengthen the power of the colonial system. However, once decolonization took place, the absence of old institutional mechanisms of group control allowed for ethnic emotions to surface and ethnic intolerance to take place. Then, the exploitation of such a situation by political entrepreneurs, leads to inter-ethnic competition and conflict.

Democratic institutions are considered to promote inter-ethnic cooperation and thus mitigate the conflict potential of ethnicity. According to Prazauskas (2001), in a democratic multinational state, stability is generally maintained by means of political bargaining and

compromise between ethnic subgroups. Similarly, Dixon (2004) argues that democratic states are usually better prepared than others with the means for addressing conflict situations at early stage before they escalate to armed violence. However, while conflict may not happen in or among established democracies, the potential of conflict is often high in democratizing states and particularly in states with multi-ethnic identity. Introduction of the majority democracy rule in ethnically divided societies in the context of a major structural change instigates fear of domination and marginalization among the minority groups. In the words of Lijphart (2009: 33), “majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy [...], what such societies need is a democratic regime that emphasizes consensus instead of opposition that includes rather than excludes”. According to Morris (2001: 3), state institutions are the filter through which all other causes of conflict have to pass. She added that institutions fuel grievances through political exclusion or inefficiency.

**Political Entrepreneurs Approach:** This approach contends that the instability and uncertainty that result from a major structural change and the inability of state institutions to regulate and normalize inter-ethnic relations provides a platform for political entrepreneurs to manipulate ethnic emotions in order to mobilize groups for personal political purposes. Politicians and other elites exploit ethnic differences by drawing upon historical memories of grievances and incite hatred in order to strengthen their hold on power. Accordingly, the dynamic that develops between political entrepreneurs and their followers causes an inter-ethnic security dilemma (Blagojevic, 2009: 10). As Stuart Kaufman explains, “belligerent leaders stoke mass hostility; hostile masses support belligerent leaders, and both together threaten other groups, creating a security dilemma which in turn encourages even more mass hostility and leadership belligerence” (Kaufman, 2006: 109).

Political entrepreneurs manipulate fears and uncertainties of ethnic groups they represent and use that to awaken a consciousness of common grievances and a desire to rectify these wrongs among their group members. As a result, they create and sustain ethnic polarization in the society. Furthermore, ethnic polarization allows political entrepreneurs to mobilize grievances against allocation of resources and other benefits that are perceived to be unfavorable to the group (Lake and Rothchild, 2006). In doing this, political entrepreneurs employ rhetoric of fear, blame, and hate as a tool of division, manipulation and control. While manipulation of ethnic emotions leads intolerance and breaches peaceful coexistence.

The political entrepreneur's approach to the causes of ethnic conflict is related to the institutional approach. The political elites who thrive on ethnicity on ethnic division and mobilization can successfully operate only within those institutional arrangements that support such practice or are unable to prevent it. Thus, the success of political entrepreneurs in mobilizing ethnic groups into violent conflict is depends on the capacity of the existing state institutions. In this case, if a state provides a legitimate arena for entrepreneurs to compete and whereby resources available for allocation are abundant, identity politics, like other kinds of political competition, will be legitimized. The failure of the state to address such anomaly provides incentives promoting social and political divisions along ethnic lines are likely to persist to the point where ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs may accumulate resources to influence support.

**Competition over Resources Approach:** This approach suggests that political mobilization of ethnic identities results in ethnic intolerance and competition over resources and rights – which, if unresolved, provides a justification for violent conflict. When resources are scarce, it is easier for political entrepreneurs to capitalize on the conflict potential of ethnicity. When

ethnic groups find themselves in situations characterized by a lack of opportunities, they more likely to be vulnerable to maneuvering by political entrepreneurs.

The assumption here is that under difficult economic conditions, high unemployment and poor prospects for the future, people feel victimized, and the usual behavior is to blame their misfortune on other ethnic groups, which leads to inter-ethnic competition and apathy. When scholars discuss competition over resources, they often refer to the economic competition over resources, however, it is considered here to include not only economic, but also political, social, and cultural “goods” that not only include material security but also encompass individual and group rights.

The reason being those issues such as: property rights, jobs, language rights, and development allocations are scarce and, thus, objects of competition and occasionally struggle between individuals and groups. For example, De Varennes (2003) contends that in almost all conflicts, ethnic groups’ demands focus mainly on securing basic rights for their group such as: more effective political participation, a fairer share and distribution of education, employment opportunities among others. As Williams (2004: 55) puts it, "the likelihood of conflict is higher when disagreement and opposition concern collective goods, e.g. language rights, religious beliefs and symbols, civil and political rights and privileges, regional-ethnic power, or regional-ethnic parity in the economy. The more nearly indivisible the goods and the less the access of the ‘disadvantaged,’ the greater is the resentment and the more likely is ethnic mobilization, followed by overt conflict.

In the literature, there are various notions on what mechanisms may facilitate ethnic competition. These mechanisms have both economic and political dimensions such as:

racially split labor markets; employment segregation; cultural division of labor; substitution of local control with more inclusive domains of control and sovereignty and expansion of state systems (Olzak and Nagel, 2006: 93-112). According to Kposowa and Jenkins (2004), all of these factors increase the likelihood of ethnic competition over resources. The concept of 'internal colonialism' has been used extensively to explain economic and political dichotomies along ethnic lines. According to the internal colony theory, when a group establishes its dominance within the society, it is able to maintain “a cultural division of labor: a system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class lines” (Hechter, 2007: 30).

In the context of a major structural change within an ethnically diverse society, political entrepreneurs attribute their ethnic group's have-nots to the exploitation and denial of access to resources and rights by the other “groups.” Advantaged groups, on the other hand, begin to see the “others” as those who will take away their “haves” should they gain a position of power within the society. Thus, politics of exclusion fuels inter-ethnic competition, with great potentials of conflict. When ethnic groups find themselves victimized and/or threatened by other groups, they become agitated and because their ethnic group is seen as a source of protection from other groups and a possible provider of a safety. This increases ethnic loyalty and adherence to group symbols, and intolerance for out-groups and dissenters.

### **2.3.2 Effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood**

Ethnic loyalty, patriotism or parochialism are caused by various social, economic, political and cultural factors that leads to hatred among ethnic nationalities and often result in ethnic conflict over resources and other sources of wealth and power. Precisely, economic

backwardness, political hegemony and colonial type of behavior of the ruling class results in ethnic patriotism among the people of marginalized ethnic group (De, 2013). While, relative developmental differences, economic isolation or blockage, observation of continuous nepotism creates and sustains an inverse relationship between the income, equality in the distribution of income or economic growth and ethnic conflict, civil war and other forms of instabilities (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Miguel et al, 2004).

Levine and Easterly (1997) contends that about 25% of the difference in the growth experiences of African and Asian economies can be attributed to the greater ethnic diversity in Africa. While it is unclear precisely the way by which ethnicity influences economic performance, the authors present some evidence on a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and underinvestment in schooling, weak financial institutions, poor infrastructure and black-market premia. Again Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) showed that the diversity in United States cities reduces spending on public services and increases rent-seeking activities. So, peaceful coexistence and social-communal harmony is contingent upon the development opportunities and its inclusiveness across the societies. Also, maintenance of peace and absence of conflict and control over the source of conflict like corruption, nepotism, parochial attitude, exclusiveness of opportunities and the likes are essential for the growth of societies.

Discrimination by the members of ruling ethnic group with the objective of personal gain or for the alliance group, coupled with remoteness and isolation of various social groups, lack of attention from the ruling administration and lack of representativeness in administration and difficulty in communicating grievances, non-representation in government and cultural segregation are all factors that can lead to the generation of loyalty and parochialism among

certain ethnic groups (Banerjee and Pande, 2007; Bhaumik, 2007; Mique 2007). Ethnic loyalty does manifest in various forms and in its extreme case it results in violence. It represents regionalism, provincialism, ethnocentric, tribalism, fundamentalism, linguistic, racism, classism, separatism, sectarianism, vernacularism, chauvinism, sectionalism, localism, communalism, chauvinism, and preference for self-caste or culture (De, 2013). However, the rise and intensity of ethnic loyalty depends upon the availability of resources and there is apparently an inverse relationship between availability of resources and intensity of hatred and jealousy (OECD-USAID, 2003). On the other hand, sufficiency of resources leads to conditions of more love and affectionate relationship between the groups or communities. Ethnic loyalty, which manifest in the form of narrow-minded feelings and narrow outlooks about the others are branded into the term parochialism (Dubey et al, 2012). If such a situation manifest (parochialism) and not properly managed properly, it could deteriorate to apathy, threat of violence or actual violent confrontation among ethnic nationalities.

### **2.3.3 The impacts of ethnic conflicts on statehood**

Ethnic conflict, a form of conflict in which the objectives of at least one party are defined in ethnic terms, and the conflict, its antecedents, and possible solutions are perceived along ethnic lines. The conflict is usually not about ethnic differences themselves but over political, economic, social, cultural, or territorial matters (Reuter, 2011). Ethnic conflict has become one of the major threats to international peace and security. Conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, Chechnya, Iraq, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Darfur, as well as in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, are among the best-known and deadliest examples from the late 20th and early 21st centuries (Reuter, 2011).

Ethnic conflict leads to the destabilization of states structure, often accompanied by gross human rights violations, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, economic decline, and eventually state failure. Massive human-rights violations and physical attacks on civilians - such as rape, torture, mass killings, ethnic cleansing, and genocide - lead to tremendous human suffering. Systematic discrimination and exclusion from national and local political decision making, the appropriation of ethnic minorities' traditional homelands, and policies that marginalize ethnic minorities are common practices accompanying ethnic conflict. Eventually, these factors instigate a condition of lawlessness and undermines the security of the state. The inability of a state to secure life and property within its border evidently tilts to a failed state, though such outcome can be avoided if the state takes necessary measures to address the root causes of the conflict.

Even if an ethnic conflict is fought at a low level of intensity, protracted ethnic conflicts have a great impact on the affected society and the state as a whole. The lack of functional or legitimate political institutions, weak economic performance, a nonexistent or polarized structure of civil society, and antagonized elites lead to polarization and separation, leaving the state deeply divided and prone to further ethnic strife (Reuter, 2011). Besides, ethnic conflict results in refugee flows, internal displacement, economic failures, environmental disasters, diffusion and spillover effects, and creates the environment favorable to breed organized crime and terrorism network.

The impact of ethnic conflict on the economies of states ravaged by ethnic incited violence cannot be over empathized. The economies of state affected by ethnic induced civil war and other kinds of political strife have been set back by years, if not decades, due to economic destruction and disorganization wrought by ethnic conflicts (Stavenhagen, 1996). Material

wealth and resources are often destroyed or consumed in the process. Besides, investors are scared away, which negatively impact on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with an attendant impact on economic growth and other development indices. Often times, infrastructures (schools, hospitals and roads) are destroyed, while scarce foreign exchange is diverted from providing infrastructure or productive purposes, to purchase of arms and ‘security’ needs (Stavenhagen, 1996). Consequently, unemployment increases and the labor force abandons the war zones to join the struggle or to find refuge elsewhere, while public services are stretched to the limit.

The nomenclature of contemporary conflicts has significantly changed. Conflicts are no longer between states, instead they are within them. According to Eriksson and Wallensteen (2004: 132), since the post-Cold War period, specifically between 1990 and 2003, 55 of the 59 different major armed conflicts that happened in 48 different locations were internal. Many of these internal conflicts also possess an ethnic dimension (Eriksson and Wallensteen, 2004: 132). From the early 1950s, only few countries had experienced ethnic conflict, but by the early 1990s, 31 countries had been affected by them (Gurr and Harff, 2004: 1). The evolution of ethnic conflicts peaked at the end of the Cold War after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1991 alone, eight new conflicts broke out; more than double the number from any other year since 1955. Furthermore, 20 ethnic conflicts erupted within seven years (1988 – 1994), composing nearly one-third of the total number of conflicts that had arisen since 1955. Although the rate of new ethnic conflicts declined in the late 1990s, ethnic conflict remains the most common type of internal armed conflict in the world (Goldstone et al, 2000: 33-34).

In the continent of Africa, most of the conflicts that happened since decolonization possesses ethnic dimensions. The construction of African societies made the continent prone to ethnic

conflicts. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, more than 200 civil conflicts have broken out since 1945. Roughly one-third of these took place in Africa, most of which were ethnic conflicts (Wimmer et al. 2009). Just like any other violent conflict, ethnic conflicts produce inimical consequences on the state. According to Gates et.al. (2010) ethnic conflicts have different degrees of consequences on the state such as: economic consequences and health and mortality consequences.

**Economic Consequences:** In their study, Collier et al. (2003) concluded that ethnic underdevelopment is both a cause and a consequence of ethnic conflict. The assumption is that, economic underdevelopment increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict, while ethnic conflict exacerbates economic underdevelopment. Furthermore, they held the opinion that like other conflicts, ethnic conflict impacts negatively on states capacity to realize the millennium development goals due to destructiveness of armed conflict. One major area of economic consequence of ethnic conflict is on economic growth. Ethnic conflict has a clear and detrimental effect on GDP per capita growth. The disorganization resulting from it usually leads to loss of manpower, which slows output and thus impact negatively on the economic growth of the state. A long-term decline in economic growth produces economic recession and austerity, with an attendant human suffering. Gobarah, Huth and Russett (2003) argue that civil wars have a long-term effect on civilian suffering.

**Health and Mortality Consequences:** Generally ethnic conflict produces adverse impact on infant mortality rates and life expectancy (Gates et.al., 2010). States that experience ethnic conflicts are usually subjected to infrastructure decay, making it difficult for the citizens to access good healthcare, thus leading to high infant and maternal mortality rate. Though, it can be argued that infant and maternal mortality rate are not a direct outcome of ethnic

conflict, the truth is that it produces outcomes that hampers these development indices. Ghobarah, Huth and Russett (2003: 871) argues that ethnic conflict impact negatively on all the major contributors to health: exposure to disease, medical care, public health interventions, and overall socio-economic conditions One of the most comprehensive and recent study of the effects ethnic conflict on health by Iqbal (2010), concludes that conflict results in a deterioration in public health, mainly because of its effect on both general infrastructure and health infrastructure.

#### **2.3.4 Strategic remedies to mitigate ethnic conflicts**

There are no direct remedies or a ‘one-fit-all’ solution to ethnic conflicts as different conflicts have their peculiarities. However, some scholars have provided possible solutions to ethnic conflicts. Jae-Woo (2005) proposed two variables: democracy and institutional reforms - through power-sharing arrangement as relatively possible solutions to ethnic conflict.

Though there have been controversies about the coexistence of ethnic plurality and democracy the principle of democracy and its institutions have been also regarded as not only desirable, but also a possible mechanism to resolve ethnic conflicts (Muller and Seligson, 2004). This is because the basic rules and mechanisms of democratic politics provide different pathways to “the state affairs” for the public and even minorities (Sisk, 2006). According to (Dryzek, 2006: 486) democracy and democratization is “largely [...] a matter of the progressive recognition and inclusion of different groups in the political life of society”. In democracy, the minorities can organize themselves into interest groups, parties or other forms of affiliation with established parties. Through those organizations, minorities represent themselves in electoral politics, lobby in the process of policy development and implementation, channel and negotiate grievances with the government without deploying

the violent methods. These are functions of ethnic conflict resolutions that democracy offers. Of important note is that not all democracies are capable of generating such functions. Scholars such as Reynolds (2000); Sisk (2006) have argued that majoritarian democracies do not easily coincide with ethnic accommodation.

**Democratization:** The relationship between democracy and ethnic conflicts has created controversial debates. In fact, democracy may have two opposite effects on ethnic strife. According to (Jae-Woo, 2005) 'ethnic outbidding' is a prevalent phenomenon in ethnically divided democratic polities. On the other hand, democracy enables ethnic minorities to express their grievances and needs by constructing a route to institutionalized politics. In this case, democracy seem to help ethnically divided countries in holding together their polities (Jae-Woo, 2005). In the words of Albert Hirschman “one may say that since their voices are heard in the decision-making process the minority groups do not choose the option of exit with violent ways. At least they maintain loyalty to the polity. After all, the rebellion costs more”. That is to say that democracy offers minority/ marginalized group(s) a channel of expressing dissatisfaction rather than the deployment of anarchy. Thus, democracy can enhance peaceful ethnic protests as previous, while at the same it can alleviate violent ethnic rebellion by providing less expensive methods to achieve political goals (Jae-Woo, 2005).

**Institutional reforms:** This starts by emphasizing that the contextualization of institutional reform focusses on power sharing. The basic logic and grand theory of institutional solutions to ethnic conflicts seems rather simple: share political power with other groups and ethnic conflicts will automatically decline. Although the proposal sounds reasonable and apt, yet it is somewhat narrow in terms of expected outcome realization. That being said, the task of institutional design is much complicated and therefore institutions should prevent one or

more groups from being structurally and permanently isolated, excluded, and alienated in the process of power and resource allocation due to their ethnic differences.

Institutions, therefore, should be designed in a way to fulfil two seemingly contradictory tasks: first, recognizing and preserving ethnic group identity, institutions encourage political inclusion by guaranteeing the groups the paths of participation. At least, institutions should be able to provide incentives to ethnic groups for staying within even if a grand coalition is not assured (Lake and Rothchild, 1996). Second, reducing or ignoring the differences between ethnic groups, institutions should promote non-ethnic cleavage particularly in electoral politics. Members of minority groups should be accorded the possibility to participate in decision-making processes not through their ethnic organizations, but through umbrella or 'catch-all organizations' (Jae-Woo, 2005). It is equally important to note that the power-sharing hypothesis works depending on the degree and dimensions of ethnic conflicts that each country confronts. For example, power-sharing mechanism may work in relatively peaceful circumstances. However, if violent methods are mobilized by at least one of the ethnic groups, power-sharing solutions can be unrealistic because power sharing requires a process - needs multiple steps of agreements among multiple parts, relatively long-term experiences and trust between groups.

#### **2.4 Ethnicity, race and nation: contextual differences**

Ethnicity is often equated with terms that although closely related are not conceptual surrogates. The section will explore the relations between ethnicity and such related terms. Brian du Toit, for instance, in his *Ethnicity in Modern Africa*, explores several connotations of ethnicity (Du Toit, 1978: 4). The discussion shall be on the two most salient connotations, that of 'race' and 'nation', which are often conflated with ethnicity. Fenton suggests there is

a commonality between the three terms by describing them as descent and culture communities and claiming that they share a single core with some important differences at the periphery (Fenton, 2003: 13). If there is presumably a single core, then an attempt is made to outline commonalities and differences between the concepts.

The discourse of race remains a potent background for the study of ethnicity today, not least because race has been widely used as a concept capable of classifying people into social groups. Although there are similarities of the usage of race and ethnicity, especially in the North-American vernacular, it is generally accepted that race cannot be a surrogate term for ethnicity. The meaning of race has changed dramatically over time. In the sixteenth century, race in Europe earned a meaning of a group or a tribe of people regarded as of common stock and ancestry (Banton, 2004). At the time, its usage was very similar to ethnicity now, and they were used interchangeably. In the late eighteenth century, it obtained the meaning that sought to classify humans along greater subdivisions of mankind. Cuvier and de Gobineau were among prominent proponents of such human classification into subspecies. By late nineteenth century, race culminated as a key concept in the quasiscience of classifying the divisions of humankind into physically or phenotypically defined racial groups. Even though contemporary usage of race is primarily concerned with biological underpinnings, in the nineteenth century its meaning encompassed wider social horizons and its biological component was only a part of wider reference to terms like nation, culture, or tribe (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996).

Race scientists had four key co-related propositions (Fenton, 2003: 20). Firstly, they argued that it is possible to classify humankind into races as defined biologically by physical and visible appearances. Secondly, such physical classification of humans implied possible

categorization and distinction of unphysical qualities and characteristics according to physical races. Thirdly, racial inheritance, or genetic make-up, meant physical and moral qualities were preserved through racial descent. And finally, as a result of the previous two propositions, they argued that races had hierarchical order with some races superior to others. The above propositions are best exemplified through the scientific racism suggested by its nineteenth century founder himself, Arthur de Gobineau. He proposed division of the world into three races: white Caucasian, black Negroid and yellow Mongoloid. His claim was that every race is endowed with certain physical and unphysical qualities that are scientifically discernible. Thus, he discerned, people of the white race had far superior intelligence, mentality and morality. This was allegedly evidenced in European dominant position in the world, where black people were on the least capable and ‘human’ end, making up most of the slave populace in the world. Such view may have been convincing in the past but is now totally discredited on the grounds of its narrow-mindedness, scientific fallacy and self-fulfilling justification of the status-quo enjoyed by the privileged group in domestic society and in the wider world. It is not surprising that the term race is now largely abandoned in scientific discourse of ethnicity. Hence a broad definition of race is considered as “aggregates whose members are objectively distinguished from others by certain gross hereditary phenotypical features” (Rex and Mason, 1986: 192).

Although recent attempts have been made to use genetic technology to improve racial assessment, such moves are received with criticism by biologists and geneticists who assert that phenotypical variations in human groups notwithstanding, it is scientifically impossible to identify clear-cut races and develop a race-based human classification, and that genetic diversity is great within people of the same race as between races. This means, and many

social scientists would agree, that race can be nothing more than a socially or ideologically constructed ideal type with perceived, though fallacious, biological grounding by which people can be categorized.<sup>105</sup> However, other experts would claim that even though biological evidence is contested, people's subjective belief in or perception of the significance and viability of racial (physical) differences in society cannot be dismissed and therefore should be within academic realm of study. Le Vine (1997), for instance, argues that race no longer serves any useful purpose as a larger referent of group identity, though it remains relevant for political analysis due to its historical role in structuring power relations (Vine, 1997: 46). One example of such power relations was given by Cox, who notes that expansion of European colonialism and consequent increase in demand for labor created capitalist societies with the social structure and belief system that justified subordination of black people and their distinction from white populace (Banton, 2004: 199).

Rex and Mason (1986), made a useful distinction between race and ethnicity based on the unnegotiability of the former: racial identity is "immutable, manifest, and normally unambiguous in multi-racial societies and contexts". Other scholars tend to conflate the two concepts and debunk the distinction by stating that race's reliance on phenotypical difference is just one element in the repertoire of ethnic boundary markers. One such scholar is Van den Berghe who claims that ethnicity is a manifestation of an adaptive nepotism between kin with essentially genetic foundations, therefore race can be seen as "just a special marker of ethnicity, a visible folk test of likely common ancestry (Jenkins, 1999: 92).

Conflating the two concepts has been challenged on the basis of its neglecting the qualitative distinctions. Banton (2004), for example, suggests that race is a categorization of people based on physical characteristics describing the other, while ethnicity is a cultural group

identification denoting us. Accordingly, ethnicity and race differ in their application in the discourse of us vs. them with the former usually referring to self-identification based on cultural distinctions and the latter addressing external classification based on biological traits. In addition, ethnicity is a matter of voluntary subscription and race is an imposed categorization. Thus, the perception of ethnicity among ethnic people is a positive sensation, while race categorization is usually perceived by ascribed people more as a stigma label (Gaziyeve, 2008). Apparently, the conceptualization of race is heavily based on physiological characteristics. According to Kellas (1991: 5) race is distinguishable from ethnicity because races are viewed in predominantly biological terms, with particular emphasis on phenotypical distinctions and presumed genetic distinctions.

The term 'nation' is a close relative to ethnicity. Both are even attributed to the same discipline and are often used interchangeably. However, it is pertinent to understand the similarities and differences between the two. According to Smith (2001: 13), a nation is "a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members". The definition emphasizes objective characteristics of nation such as a territory, language, religion, and common descent. Besides the afore-stated, nations also encompass subjective features like people's awareness of their nationality and loyalty to it.

The term nations apparently have links to the concept of state, and sometimes conflated with nation-states. Although in certain circumstances a nation may mean a nation-state, one needs to bear in mind that there are states made up of more than one nation and there are nations that are not states. The nature of the link between state and nation is explained by two conceptions: the first views nations as self-governing entities, and the second holds that state

populace are, or result to form, a nation. The second conception prompts us to approach nation as an entity in the process of nation building. In many cases, however, nationhood is not only an achieved status but also a subjective state of mind, or imagination (Fenton, 2003: 161).

According to Anderson (1992), this imagination, is not in the sense of falsehood but of psychological creativity. The assumption presents a reinforcing connection relation between objective national attributes and subjective national sense. In a related perspective, Eller (1999: 18), illustrates the relationship by the description of a nation evolving as “the product of the will-to-nationhood that prevails, an often-personal imagination that becomes nation’s imagination”. Evidently, such qualitative relationship is indeed a source of stability and instability as this very imagination can create rival groups claiming competing visions of nationhood with competing evidence to that effect. Thus, the study concludes that commonalities between ethnicity and nation are substantially. As a result, both terms belong to the same family of phenomena, collective cultural identities. Nations and ethnic groups share the attributes of common myths and shared memories. The two types of collectivity are both conditioned by the past or memories of the past and their territorial legacy. Summarily, ethnicity and nation similarly manifest objective and subjective dimensions.

## **2.5 Ethnicity and the post-colonial Africa**

Earlier debates on ethnicity focused on whether or not it should be considered as a primordial factor or a colonial legacy (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent, 2007: 6), but in the contemporary, it is widely accepted that ethnic and other identities are subject to constant transformation (Scarcelli, 2012; Stewart, 2008a). Similarly, instrumentalist and constructivist narratives of ethnicity are now accepted as complementary theories rather than as rivals (Scarcelli, 2012;

Ukiwo, 2005; Young, 2007). The Instrumentalists narrative stresses how ethnicity is used as a tool in struggles over resources and power, whilst constructivists emphasize how ethnicity has evolved and been transformed over time. The African post-colonial state is central in shaping ethnic relations, but reality suggests that it tends to set ethnicity against citizenship.

According to Mahmood Mamdani, African states are bifurcated in that, on one hand, there is the use of 'civic' power, associated with civil society and civil rights and claiming to protect rights, and, on the other, there is the use of 'customary' or 'ethnic power', associated with community and culture and with the mandate to enforce tradition (Mamdani, 1996). He added that under colonialism, the local state functioned based on ethnic power, which also came to define the resistance to it. The anti-colonial struggle was directed primarily at the ethnically defined local state or the native authority that enforced the colonial order. In multi-ethnic and multi-religious settings, this has had the effect of manipulating ethnicity and religion as a political divide (Mamdani 1996: 16 - 25).

Similar to Mamdani's argument, Peter Ekeh (1975), who contends that colonialism differentiated African societies the Western Society by manifesting two publics in African states, instead of one as in the Western hemisphere. The reality of Africa is that the society two, first a 'civic' public, associated with the modern state but fundamentally amoral, as it is not rooted in a private realm. Second, the 'primordial' public that is associated with ethnic sentiments, ties and associations towards which the individual owes duties and obligations in return for identity and security. Ekeh emphasized that the amorality and focus on economic value in the civic public makes the people operating in this sphere to siphon resources in favor of the primordial public. Consequently, the civic public becomes characterized by 'tribalism' and corruption (Ekeh, 1975: 108 - 110). In light of the above argument, state

politics is used for ethnic ends. In the former case, actors are inclined to support the community as a collective, whereas in the latter ethnicity and religion are used as a tool for personal advantage. By using religion and ethnicity, political actors appeal to a sphere of symbols, morality and historical reference that are part of people's everyday life.

Young (2007: 250) identified three dimensions of ethnicity that shape the character it takes in different settings. The first is a list of common attributes among people, for example language or social practices. The second dimension is a shared consciousness of belonging to a group. This shared consciousness draws on historical and cultural resources of the past and present in the attempts to shape the terms of social change (Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004b: 5). The third dimension, ethnicity 'demarcations' deals with boundary - the presence of a visible 'other'. The demarcations that are stressed and the type of resources that are available are accordingly dependent on the setting and the groups in relation to whom boundaries are drawn.

A similar distinction is sometimes made between internal and external aspects of ethnicity. Berman, et.al (2004b: 4) characterize the internal dimension as a 'moral ethnicity', a process that involves defining cultural identity, communal membership and leadership. It can be described as a process of 'ourselvesing', in contrast to 'othering' (Lonsdale, 2004: 76). As this process fosters trust and solidarity, an essential element is the subordination of individual behavior to the group's moral imperatives. Ethnic relations can thus not be defined as egalitarian or harmonious, but rather as conservative authoritarianism (Berman, et.al, 2004b: 4). The external dimension deals the relations with other ethnic groups or the state, which Ekeh (1975); Berman, et. al (2004b: 5) characterized as 'essentially amoral'. These relations are tailored to maximize power and resources for the 'own group', and thus result in 'political

tribalism'. Political competition is accordingly recognized as central to explaining why ethnic diversity sometimes translates into ethnically defined conflict. However, ethnic sentiments cannot be mobilized arbitrarily. Usually state processes interact with constitutive meanings of ethnicity (Kanbur, Rajaram and Varshney 2011: 151), which is an internal aspect of ethnicity.

In shaping ethnic relations, the state is central both as arena and actor. It is an arena within which parties contend or ally to shape policies and regulations. For example, when conflict arise between soldiers loyal to President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar in December 2013 in Juba, the state was at the same time an actor that shapes social and political processes, for example by the way in which state institutions tried to prevent or react to the conflict. Thus, symbols and references that ethnic mobilization draws on are to a large extent determined by the need for demarcation from other groups.

## **2.6 Decentralization of governance and ethnic conflict**

Just like democratization, since the 1990s decentralization has been prevalent phenomenon across sub-Saharan Africa, as in the rest of the world. Together with federalism, it has been promoted as a way to, among other issues, reduce ethnic conflict. The arguments in favor of political decentralization on ethnic conflict are similar to those relating to federalism (Brown, 2008: 389). The assumption is that ethnic conflict is reduced, and political stability is improved through political participation that encourages accountability and strengthen policies can be formulated differently according to the demographic particularities and needs of a state (Treisman, 2007: 238).

The assumption is that the preference of a heterogeneous population is relative and can be better met through decentralization, and that conflicts can be reduced when demands for limited autonomy are satisfied. Though some risk as associated with employing decentralization as a mechanism to manage ethnic conflict as granting autonomy may cement group identities and provide resources and structures for emancipation (Ghai, 2000: 501; Snyder, 2000: 327). Accordingly, escalation of conflicts is expected when power is decentralized to groups whose loyalty to the central government is not guaranteed (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008: 23). Another problem is that regional inequalities in terms of resources and development may increase the potentials of conflicts between regions.

Empirical studies on decentralization and conflict propose that decentralization can actually reduce national competition, but at the same time it encourages local expressions of conflict (Brown 2008: 390) as well as ethnic mobilization (Ukiwo 2005: 19). In Uganda, decentralization has increased struggles over district leadership positions but also triggered local conflicts by altering relations between ethnic groups and between the central government and sub-national regions (Sjogren, 2015). Also, in Indonesia, decentralization has been characterized by heightened local tensions arising from competition over sub-national positions as well as by increased ethno-religious segregation (Diprose, 2008). Nevertheless, the goal of decentralization is to reduce competition around the central state.

In other words, decentralization may help prevent large-scale national conflict that threatens the state itself, but simultaneously intensify local contestation (Gates et.al., 2010). In the debate on decentralization, it is often assumed that ethnic groups are territorially concentrated and that, by implication, their members share interests. Ethnic groups may, however, be more or less territorially concentrated (Coakley, 2003) and, in Nigeria, as in many other

federations, subnational borders divide ethnic groups in order to weaken ethnic identities and instead foster alternative ones associated with the federating units (Faguet, 2014; Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). However, these alternative federating units have not been effective in curtailing ethnic alliance and sentiments, instead people still bond along ethnic lines and demands are pursued along ethnic line and with ethnic narrative.

## **2.7 Gaps in the literature**

There is vast literature on ethnic conflicts that addresses the concept from different standpoints. For example, Wani and Suwirta (2013) focused on ethnicity and conflicts in Nigeria and proposed federalism as a possible solution. Similarly, Rorbaek (2016) examined ethnicity from the context of exclusion, arguing that marginalization is the most crucial element of ethnic conflict. Olu-Adeyemi (2017) analyzed ethnic pluralism as a challenge to political participation and nation building in Nigeria. Gazyev (2008) examined ethno-nationalism and ethnic conflicts, focusing on Central Asia countries. Other studies such as Smith et.al (2006) examined statehood and ethnic relations, with emphasis on the Baltic States. Jayal (2003) examined the impact of ethnic diversity on nation-states, using East European countries as case study.

In South Sudan, several studies have been carried out on ethnicity such as Mutanda (2015), which examined ethnicity and the dynamics of the ongoing civil war in South Sudan. Dessalegn (2017), that analyzed the causes and consequences of ethnic conflict in South Sudan. Lukong and Nwabufo (2013), whose findings concluded that ethnicity is a major impediment to peace in South Sudan

Apparently, the above-mentioned studies carefully examined ethnicity from different viewpoints, but these studies were either carried out in countries other than South Sudan or where South Sudan was the focus, they addressed ethnicity from a narrow perspective such as: its impact on political participation, resource allocation, fueling ethnic conflicts and the likes. Thus, there is a lack of studies with a holistic analysis of the impact of ethnicity on the statehood of the world's youngest country. Consequently, there is content, geographical and knowledge gaps on the impact of ethnicity on the statehood in South Sudan, which this study intends to fill.

This particular study will focus on the factors that can threaten the statehood and the ways of which ethnicity can create conflicts, divisions and hatred which can lead to the collapse of the state. South Sudan is not the only country with more than one ethnic group and the big question that the study is trying to answer is why is it a problem of these ethnic groups to coexist peacefully in South Sudan and what could be the fate of their state (nation) if they continue that way with continuous intra and inter-ethnic conflicts.

## **CHAPTER THREE:**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

Chapter three discusses the general procedures for conducting the research. It explained the research design, research paradigm, study population, sample size and sampling procedure, sources of data, data collection instruments, data quality control (validity and reliability), analysis of empirical data, ethical considerations and limitations of the study.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

According to Burns and Grove (2003), a research design is a blueprint for conducting a study with maximum control over factors that may influence the validity of the end results. The study adopted a cross-sectional survey design is deemed appropriate and useful for the situation and the study subject. By using the above-mentioned design, data was elicited from a representative subset of the study population at a specific point in time and the data gathered from the subset was used to generalize for the entire population.

Furthermore, the study adopted a mixed method approach in data collection; consequently, both quantitative and qualitative approaches were used to elicit data from the respondents. Quantitative approach, however, was the main source of data, whilst qualitative approach served as a supplementary source of data. Accordingly, data collected through the use of questionnaire were presented using descriptive statistics (frequency counts and percentages) and inferential statistics, while the hypotheses were tested using correlations and coefficients of determination.

Qualitative approach involved collecting data through face-to-face interview and observation. Data gathered through interview were analysed using thematic analysis method, whereby raw data from the field were assigned preliminary codes in order to describe the content, followed by grouping the data based on identified patterns or themes of the codes across the different interviews. This was followed by review of themes to ensure that data within themes are coherent, meaningful and relates directly to a specific objective of the study. Though, both qualitative and quantitative paradigms are used to explain the same situation. Qualitative as a tool is used in understanding and describing the data.

### **3.2 Research paradigm**

Research paradigm is an all-encompassing system of interrelated practice and thinking that define the nature of a research enquiry along three dimensions: ontology, epistemology and methodology (Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 1999). It implies a pattern, structure and framework or system of scientific and academic ideas, values and assumptions (Kuhn, 1977). Given that the study adopted a mixed method approach, it considered two research paradigms, namely: Post-positivism and Interpretivism.

Post-positivism emphasizes objectivist approach to the study of social phenomena, though it focuses on research methods that rely on quantitative analysis, surveys, experiments and the likes. Thus, in the study Post-positivism was used within the context of quantitative approach, whereby the responses gathered through the administered questionnaires were examined in-relation to the characteristics of the participants, and the answers they provided, which were quantified using descriptive statistics - frequencies and percentages. Besides, the study

advanced hypotheses that were tested to obtain “objective” truth, therefore providing a logical justification for the adoption of Post-positivism research paradigm for the study.

On the other hand, Interpretivism was adopted within the context of qualitative approach. Interpretivism is recommended for studies whereby the researcher is dealing with data that cannot be adequately measured and numbered. In line with the above, the study involved in-depth investigation of the study objectives and the identified research problem through face-to-face interviews and document analysis, thus providing a justification for the adoption of interpretivism as a complimentary research paradigm for the study. Accordingly, Interpretivism provided the study with a platform to obtain an individual understanding, perspective and narrative of the issue under investigation - the effects of ethnicity on the statehood in South Sudan. Interviews were used to elicit in-depth information from key informants, particularly on issues that were not captured in the questionnaire or those that were not comprehensively or clearly answered due to limited options given in the questionnaire.

Moreover, within the philosophical underpinning of the study, there was a need to check whether the responses of the participants, collected through questionnaire were objective and derived out of what they knew very well. The validity of their answers was verified by including some of the survey respondents as key informants for interview discussions. This provided the researcher with the opportunity to examine the objectivity or subjectivity of the participants, hence the application of the ontological philosophy, which agitates for analysis of the objectivity and subjectivity of an individual’s argument. Therefore, the post-positivist and interpretative philosophy underpinned this study by using questionnaires to gather empirical data to answer the research questions on the effects of ethnicity on the statehood in

South Sudan. To evaluate the validity of the data elicited through the use of survey questionnaire, some of the quantitative respondents were involved in providing qualitative data, after which their answers in both context (quantitative and qualitative) were compared to determine validity of the information that they provided.

### **3.3 Population of the study**

Study population is the aggregate or totality of objects or individuals with similar characteristics that are of interest to the researcher and where inferences are to be made (Amin, 2005). The study investigated a phenomenon that impacts on the entire people of South Sudan, therefore, the study population consisted of the total population of South Sudan, which is 11,071,509 according to South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (2018). However, the target population consisted of the adult population (people above 18 of age) in South Sudan, which is 5,734,057 (ibid).

The study subject which is the ethnic conflicts have been happening in almost all corners of South Sudan and this make state incapable in rendering much needed services to the population being security, health, education. Therefore, the study was used to get views of all those affected by such phenomena and in return, the state functions in their places of concentration.

### **3.4 Sample size**

Sample size is the number of observations taken from a population through which statistical inferences for the whole population are made. The study sample size was categorized into two: quantitative sample and qualitative sample.

**3.4.1 Quantitative sample:** Based on the study target population of 5,734,057, the sample size consisted of 399 respondents, determined through Slovene's formula. The reason for adopting Slovene's formula was because it is reliable when the study population is finite compared to Gordon formula or Yamane Formula that could have been used for quantitative data while simple random sampling was used for qualitative data. The respondents were selected to represent the three regions and not ten states that make up South Sudan for purpose of this study (see table 3.1 below).

Sample size computation using Slovene's formula:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(\alpha)^2}$$

Where; n = the required sample size.

N = the known population size

$\alpha$  = the level of significance, which is fixed at = 0.05

$$n = \frac{5,734,057}{1 + 5,734,057 (0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{5,734,057}{1 + 5,734,057 (0.0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{5,734,057}{14336}$$

$$n = 399$$

Therefore, the sample size was 399 respondents.

**Table 1 : 3. 1. Computation of quantitative sample size**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>	<b>Sampling Technique</b>
Greater Bahr elGazal	1856400	135	Simple Random Sampling
Greater Upper Nile	2179285	152	Simple Random Sampling
Greater Equatoria	1698372	112	Simple Random Sampling
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,734,057</b>	<b>399</b>	

Source: Primary data, 2018

### **3.4.2 Qualitative sample:**

This consists of a section of the study population that was selected for key informant interview. The study selected 15 key informants that include officials of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Political Leaders, Local Community Leaders, Religious Leaders, officials of Intra-Government Agencies - IGAD and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The key informants were purposively selected based on the researcher's perception of their deep knowledge of the issue under investigation. The key informants were limited to 15 because that was the point at which the study attained saturation. After interviewing 15 key informants, the researcher could no longer elicit new perspective from each subsequent interview or observation. For purpose of clarification, saturation occurs when adding new data does not improve the explanations of the themes or the categories or add new information to the study. These key Informants were selected from the three former

regions for purpose of geographical representation. Thus, the study is in line with Creswell (1998), which recommended between 5 and 25 participants for a qualitative sample.

**Table 2: 3. 2. Categorization of qualitative sample**

<b>Regions</b>	<b>Portfolio of Participants</b>	<b>Sample</b>	<b>Sampling Technique</b>
<b>Greater Bahr elGazal</b> with four states (Western Bahr elGazal, Northern Bahr elGazal, Warrap and Lakes State)	Government Official	1	Purposive Sampling
	Traditional Leader	1	Purposive Sampling
	Intra-government Agency official (UNMISS)	1	Purposive Sampling
	CSOs Official	1	Purposive Sampling
	Political Leader	1	Purposive Sampling
<b>Greater Upper Nile</b> with three states (Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei State)	Government Official	1	Purposive Sampling
	Traditional Leader	1	Purposive Sampling
	Intra-government Agency official (UNMISS)	1	Purposive Sampling
	CSOs Official	1	Purposive Sampling
	Political Leader	1	Purposive Sampling
<b>Greater Equatoria</b> with three states (Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria and	Government Official	1	Purposive Sampling
	Traditional Leader	1	Purposive Sampling
	Intra-government Agency official (UNMISS)	1	Purposive Sampling
	CSOs Official	1	Purposive Sampling

Eastern Equatoria State)	Political Leader	1	Purposive Sampling
<b>Total</b>		<b>15</b>	

Source: Primary data, 2018

### 3.5 Sampling technique

Sampling is a technique of selecting individual members or a subset of the population to make statistical inferences from them and estimate characteristics of the whole population. Different sampling methods are widely used by researchers so that they do not need to research the entire population. Or in other words, sampling is the act, method, process or technique involved in the selection of a suitable sample size or a representative subset of a study population, for the purpose of determining parameters or characteristics of the whole population.

Other sampling techniques that can also be used such following.

- **Convenience sampling:** This method is dependent on the ease of access to subjects such as surveying customers at a mall or passers-by on a busy street. It is usually termed as convenience sampling, because of the researcher's ease of carrying it out and getting in touch with the subjects. Researchers have nearly no authority to select the sample elements, and it's purely done based on proximity and not representativeness. This non-probability sampling method is used when there are time and cost limitations in collecting feedback. In situations where there are resource limitations such as the initial stages of research, convenience sampling is used. For example, startups and NGOs usually conduct convenience sampling at a mall to

distribute leaflets of upcoming events or promotion of a cause – they do that by standing at the mall entrance and giving out pamphlets randomly.

- **Judgmental or purposive sampling:** Judgmental or purposive samples are formed by the discretion of the researcher. Researchers purely consider the purpose of the study, along with the understanding of the target audience. For instance, when researchers want to understand the thought process of people interested in studying for their master’s degree. The selection criteria will be: “Are you interested in doing your masters in ...?” and those who respond with a “No” are excluded from the sample.
- **Snowball sampling:** Snowball sampling is a sampling method that researchers apply when the subjects are difficult to trace. For example, it will be extremely challenging to survey shelterless people or illegal immigrants. In such cases, using the snowball theory, researchers can track a few categories to interview and derive results. Researchers also implement this sampling method in situations where the topic is highly sensitive and not openly discussed—for example, surveys to gather information about HIV Aids. Not many victims will readily respond to the questions. Still, researchers can contact people they might know or volunteers associated with the cause to get in touch with the victims and collect information.
- **Quota sampling:** In Quota sampling, the selection of members in this sampling technique happens based on a pre-set standard. In this case, as a sample is formed based on specific attributes, the created sample will have the same qualities found in the total population. It is a rapid method of collecting samples.

The study employed two sampling techniques: Simple Random Sampling and Purposive Sampling.

### **3.5.1 Simple Random sampling**

Simple Random Sampling is one of the best sampling techniques that helps in saving time and resources. It is a reliable method of obtaining information where every single member of a population is chosen randomly, merely by chance. Each individual has the same probability of being chosen to be a part of a sample.

The study utilized simple random sampling to select respondents for quantitative data. Although the sample size for the study was 399 respondents determined through Slovine's formula, the study actually distributed 400 questionnaires. In doing so, the respondents were chosen in a manner that gives all the individuals in the population equal chances of being selected. Thus, individuals of adult age were randomly selected from all the three regions and ten states that make up South Sudan. Out of the 400 questionnaires distributed, a total of 385 were retrieved, 13 were partially filled, while 5 were vaguely filled, hence, the study relied on the 367 completely filled questionnaires for analysis and reaching conclusions on findings.

### **3.5.2 Purposive sampling**

Purposive sample was used to select key informants from whom specialized information were elicited to compliments the data collected through the use of survey questionnaire. The key informants were 15 in number (see table 3.2 above) and comprised of 3 Government Officials; 3 Traditional Leaders; 3 Intra-government Agency officials (UN, IGAD, AU); 3 CSOs Officials and 3 Political Leaders. The key informants were consciously selected by the

researcher to represent individuals with good knowledge of the situation in South Sudan. This position is reinforced by Cooper and Schindler (2005) who stated that purposive sampling is a technique whereby the researcher relies on his/her own judgment in selecting a sample from a study population. As highlighted above, the key informants were chosen precisely because the researcher was convinced that they possessed in-depth knowledge of the subject under investigation, which is the impact of ethnicity on the statehood in South Sudan.

### **3.6 Sources of data**

In order to adequately address the research objectives, the study adopted two major sources of data: primary and secondary sources of data.

#### **3.6.1 Primary source**

Primary data dealt with the new evidence or information elicited from the field during the course of research. It included data gathered from respondents through questionnaires, interviews and observation. In this study, primary source of data reflects the answers elicited from the study participants through the administration of survey questionnaires, as well as face-to-face interview with key informants.

#### **3.6.2 Secondary source**

Secondary data implies data that is already available. It also refers to data that has already been collected and processed by another person other than the researcher. The study utilized such data (secondary data) that was either published or unpublished. Published data was sourced from: (i) books; (ii) peer review journals; (iii) publications of the government of South Sudan and international agencies such as the IMF, World Bank and their subsidiary

organizations; (iv) magazines and newspapers; (v) reports and publications of intra-government agencies such as IGAD, African Union and the United Nations; (vi) public records and statistics, historical documents, and other sources of published information. The sources of unpublished data were also considered and included information on historical events found in personal diaries, letters, unpublished biographies and autobiographies available with scholars, public/ private individuals and organizations.

### **3.7 Data collection instrument**

The study utilized two main data collection instruments: survey questionnaire and interview guide, to elicit data from the study participants.

#### **3.7.1 Survey questionnaire**

The researcher designed a survey questionnaire, which was used to collect data from the respondents. The questionnaire was structured in five-point Likert scale ranging from: 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 3= not sure; 4= agree; 5= strongly agree. As well, the questions were designed to measure the study objectives and variables - causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan, effects of ethnic conflict on statehood in South Sudan, effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan, and remedies to end ethnic conflicts in South Sudan. Furthermore, the questionnaire had five sections A, B, C, D, and E. Section A had four items designed to gather the demographic information of the respondents. Section “B” had twenty-two constructs that focused on the causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan. Section “C” had eleven constructs used to gather information on the level of ethnic loyalty in South Sudan. Section “D” has ten constructs used to collect information on the effects of ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan, and Section “E” had ten constructs that focused on possible solutions to end ethnic conflicts in South Sudan. A total of 400 questionnaires

were distributed, while 385 were retrieved. Out of the 385 questionnaires retrieved, 367 were fully filled, 13 were partially filled and 5 were vaguely filled. Questionnaire was a favorable choice for the study because it provided firsthand and detailed standardized questions, which made the data collected bias free.

### **3.7.2 Interview guide**

In order to generate qualitative data, the researcher interviewed 15 key informants that include: 3 Government Officials; 3 Traditional Leaders; 3 Intra-government Agency officials; 3 CSOs Officials and 3 Political Leaders. An interview guide was designed as a template that guided the researcher during the interviews; however, in the course of the interviews the questions on the interview guide were not followed chronologically. In some cases, questions that are not contained in the interview guide were asked as a follow-up question to an answer given by the interviewees, in other instances, they were used as a prelude to the actual interview. The interview guide contained open ended questions that were consciously developed and structured to elicit valuable data from the respondents on the study objectives, and reasonable enough to answer the research questions and thus it aided in eliciting valuable information that supplemented the quantitative data.

### **3.7.3 Observation**

In this study, observation implies the direct observation of phenomena in their natural setting. It means a study of behaviors that occur naturally in natural contexts. The researcher visited and made observation among the different ethnic groups and communities in South Sudan, to understand how they perceive themselves in relation to their tribal and national identity. Observation helped the researcher to get a clear understanding of the dichotomy that exist between ethnicity and statehood in South Sudan and correlate it with the data gathered

through questionnaires and interviews to infer the extent to which ethnicity impacts on the statehood in South Sudan.

### **3.8 Data Quality Control (Validity and Reliability)**

This deals with the validity and reliability of the instrument used in data collection. Data Quality Control ensures that the instruments used in collection of empirical data are capable to elicit information that is reasonable enough to realize the set-out objectives and answer the research questions.

#### **3.8.1 Validity**

Validity is the ability of a research instrument to produce accurate results and able to measure what it is intended to measure (Mugenga and Mugenda, 2003). Thus, it is the adequacy with which an instrument correlates with the study objectives, variables and research questions. The validity of the instrument used for this study was measured using two levels of analysis: face validity and content validity.

**Face validity:** The initial draft of the questionnaire was first discussed with my colleagues in the PhD programme, after which adjustments were made based on their feedback before submission to my supervisors and one other expert in the College of Humanities and Social Sciences in KIU to evaluate the instrument. The experts assessed the instrument based on the appropriateness of sentence construction and language clarity, length of the questionnaire (in terms of the anticipated time to answer it) and the privacy of the respondents. Based on feedback from the experts, the instrument was revised and resubmitted back to them for another round of validation.

**Content validity:** To further validate the instrument, the content validity was used to test the validity of the questionnaire based on the result of the expert judgment. The experts that were mentioned above examined the correlation between the questions contained in the instrument and the study objectives, its suitability to answer the research questions and correctly test the hypotheses advanced by the study. After the judges have evaluated the instrument, the validity was then determined by calculating the Content Validity Index (CVI). According to Mugenga and Mugenda (2003), if the coefficient of the CVI is 0.70 or above, the instrument is considered to be valid.

**Table:3. 3. Content Validity Index of the Questionnaire**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Total No. of Questions</b>	<b>No. of Valid Questions</b>
Demographic Profile of respondents	4	4
Causes of ethnic conflicts	22	21
Effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood	11	11
Effects of ethnic conflicts on statehood	10	9
Remedies to end ethnic conflicts	10	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>54</b>

Source: Primary data (2018)

$$CVI = \frac{\text{Number of Items declared Valid by the judges}}{\text{Total number of items in the instrument}}$$

$$CVI = \frac{54}{57}$$

$$CVI = 0.94$$

Since the Content Validity Index was  $0.94 > 0.7$  then it means that the instrument (questionnaire) is valid to measure what it was intended to.

### **3.8.2 Reliability**

Reliability dealt with the degree to which the data collection instrument yielded a consistent result after repeated trials. To ensure reliability of the data collection instrument, the researcher conducted a pilot study using the test-re-test method. A total of 10 respondents participated in the test. The respondents were given the questionnaire to answer and after 2 weeks the same respondents were given the questionnaire a second time to answer. Afterwards, their answers in the first and second test were compared, and the result was computed using Cronbach's alpha to determine the internal consistency. Based on the rule of thumb, when the Cronbach's alpha value is more-than 0.90, the result is interpreted as excellent, more-than 0.80, it is interpreted as good, more-than 0.70 it is considered acceptable. Then, when it is more-than 0.60 it is interpreted as questionable, more-than 0.50 it is interpreted as poor, whereas if it is less than 0.50 it is interpreted as unacceptable (Gliem and Gliem, 2003).

Cronbach's Alpha formula is represented below.

$$\alpha = \frac{K}{K-1} \left( \frac{1 - \sum SD_i^2}{SD_t^2} \right)$$

Where  $\alpha$  = Alpha coefficient

$K$  = Number of items in the instrument

$\sum$  = Sum

$SD_i^2$  = Individual item variance

$SD_t^2$  = Variance of total score

**Table 3: 3. 4. Results of the Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Coefficient test for Likert-type Scale Questionnaire**

Variable	Number of Items	CVI	Interpretation
Causes of ethnic conflicts	3	0.843	Good
Effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood	3	0.809	Good
Effects of ethnic conflicts on statehood	2	0.845	Good
Remedies to end ethnic conflicts	2	0.791	Acceptable
<b>Overall</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0.822</b>	<b>Good</b>

Source: Primary data (2018)

### 3.9 Data collection procedures

Data gathering process encompass the various stages involved in the collection of empirical data from the field. Given that the study employed a mixed method approach, data was

collected using concurrent triangulation method, whereby both quantitative and qualitative data were collected simultaneously.

### **3.9.1 Quantitative data**

The direct delivery and retrieval method was employed in the administration of the questionnaire.

**Before the administration of the questionnaires:** An introduction letter was obtained from the Directorate of Higher Degrees and Research of Kampala International University approving the researcher to conduct a field study on ‘Ethnicity and Statehood in South Sudan’. After obtaining an introductory letter, the researcher recruited five research assistants who assisted him in the administration of survey questionnaire. The research assistants were well briefed on the purpose of the exercise and trained on how to select or assist the respondents should they require clarity or other forms of assistance in filling the questionnaire. Besides, the respondents were properly briefed on the purpose of the study and were requested to sign the informed consent form at will, prior to participating in the study.

**During the administration of the questionnaires:** The respondents were kindly requested to endeavor to answer all the questions on the questionnaire to the best of their knowledge and ability. Also, the researcher and research assistants informed the respondents in advance that the questionnaire will be retrieved within five days from the date of distribution, therefore they were encouraged to fill it out within the specified time.

**After the administration of the questionnaires:** The questionnaires retrieved were sorted to make sure that they were properly filled out. Consequently, the ones that were not properly filled were discarded. Below are some criteria used in sorting the questionnaires for analysis:

- i. *Straight-lining:* The researcher looked out for questionnaires which the respondent chose similar option for all or most of the questions in the same section. For example, if a respondent chose option “5” repeatedly for questions 1-22 under Section “A” of the questionnaire, it indicates that the respondent did not read the questionnaire before answering and just decided to tick anything. When determined that this was an intentional act, the questionnaire was removed from the data set.
- ii. *Christmas tree behaviour:* The researcher also looked out for questionnaires, whereby the respondent instead of choosing a particular option repeatedly, intentionally chooses for example option “1, 5, 1” or “5, 3, 5” in a particular section of the questionnaire. In such case, one can observe the ‘zigzag’ pattern of the responses. This method is often used by respondents to quickly fill out a questionnaire without due consideration of the content. Consequently, such questionnaire was removed from the data set.

### **3.9.2 Qualitative data**

The key informants were consciously selected, and appointments were scheduled on a convenient date and time to meet with each of them for interview. Some of the appointments were scheduled via telephone to reduce travel costs. However, the actual interviews were conducted face-to-face between the researcher and the key informants. During the interview, the respondents were properly briefed on the purpose of the study; assured of their privacy, on the premise that information elicited from them will be used solely for academic purpose,

and they were encouraged to answer the questions honestly and to the best of their knowledge and ability. Furthermore, the KI's were informed of their right to discontinue with the interview at any point that they feel uncomfortable to continue.

### **3.10 Data Analysis**

Data analysis is the process of evaluating data using analytical and statistical tools to discover useful information and aid the researcher in reaching conclusions. It is a process of inspecting, cleansing, transforming and modeling data with the goal of discovering useful information, informing conclusions and supporting recommendations. In this study data analyses dealt with the process with which empirical data collected using questionnaire and through interview guide were analyzed to reach conclusions. The essence of data processing and analysis was to verify the value of the information gathered during field research. The process involved assessment of the accuracy and uniformity of data generated in the field.

#### **3.10.1 Quantitative data analysis**

Quantitative data were coded and statistically treated using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). During this process, raw data collected in the field was cleaned prior to analysis through checking for multicollinearity, testing for normality, and linearity. Thereafter, the response rate and demographic characteristics of respondents were presented using tables, frequencies. The specific objectives of this study were achieved using descriptive statistics involving weighted means and standard deviation, and regression analysis, whereas the purpose was achieved using Pearson's Linear Correlation Coefficient.

**Descriptive statistics:** Descriptive statistics (mean scores and standard deviation) were used to answer the research question one (what are the causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan?),

and four (what are the strategic remedies to end ethnic conflicts in South Sudan?). The researcher employed the weights attached to the scale to compute the mean scores for the items as well as for all the items on the questionnaire. For the research questions, real limit of numbers displayed in Table 3.5 were used in analyzing the data and answering the research questions. Any item with a mean of 3.00 – 3.99 and above was considered accepted, otherwise it was considered rejected. The Standard Error (SE) coefficient was used to verify the reliability of descriptive statistics (Ray, 2016). The decision rule is to accept descriptive analysis as better and more reliable if the SE coefficient is close to zero (0).

**Table 4: 3. 5. Mean Range Analysis**

Mean Range	Respondents	Interpretation
4.0 – 5.00	Strongly agree	Totally accepted
3.0 – 3.99	Agree	Accepted
2.5 – 2.99	Not sure	No opinion
1.5 – 2.49	Disagree	Rejected
1.00 – 1.49	Strongly disagree	Totally rejected

Source: Primary data (2018)

**Regression Analysis:** Specifically objective two (to examine the effect of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan) and three (to evaluate the effect of ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan) were achieved by employing ordinary least square (OLS) multiple regression models. This model was considered appropriate where functional relationship between two or more variables is suspected (Sekaran and Bougie, 2014). The model for Multiple Regression is specified in accordance with Lucey (1994) and Osuala (2009) thus:

$$ST = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ET + \beta_2 EC + \mu \dots\dots\dots (3.3)$$

Where:

ST = Statehood in South Sudan

Bo= Constant term

$\beta_1$  &  $\beta_2$  = Parameters of independent variables

$\mu$ = Error term

ET = Ethnic loyalty in South Sudan

EC = Ethnic conflict in South Sudan

The signs of the slope coefficients ( $\beta_1$  to  $\beta_2$ ) were used to evaluate the nature of effect of ethnic loyalty and ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan. If for example the slope coefficients are negative and significant, it would imply that ethnic loyalty and ethnic conflicts have negative influence on statehood in South Sudan. Conversely, positive slope coefficients would imply positive influence of ethnic loyalty and ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan. The *a priori* expectation of the slope coefficients are as follows:

$$\beta_1 \& \beta_2 < 0.$$

The assumption of the error term ( $\mu$ ) is absence of serial correlation. This assumption was examined using Durbin-Watson statistic. The Durbin-Watson test statistic tests the null

hypothesis that the residuals from an ordinary least-squares regression are not auto correlated against the alternative that the residuals are auto correlated process. The Durbin-Watson statistic ranges in value from 0 to 4. A value near 2 indicates non-autocorrelation; a value toward 0 indicates positive autocorrelation; a value toward 4 indicates negative autocorrelation (Moses, 2018). The estimated regression model would therefore be adequate if the Durbin-Watson coefficient approximates 2.

**Pearson’s Linear Correlation Coefficient:** The purpose of this study was to evaluate the relationship between ethnicity and statehood in South Sudan. To achieve this purpose, the Pearson’s linear correlation coefficient (PLCC) was used. The value of the coefficient of correlation ( $r$ ) ranges between +1 and –1. To interpret the relationship between ethnicity and statehood in South Sudan, the researcher adopted the following decision rule on the strength of relationship using the following values correlation  $r$  is closest to:

<b>Value of <math>r</math></b>	<b>Strength of relationship</b>
• Exactly –1.	A perfect negative linear relationship
• –0.70.	A strong negative linear relationship
• –0.50.	A moderate negative relationship
• –0.30.	A weak negative linear relationship
• 0.	No linear relationship
• +0.30.	A weak positive linear relationship
• +0.50.	A moderate positive relationship
• +0.70.	A strong positive linear relationship
• Exactly +1.	A perfect positive linear relationship

**Method of Hypotheses Test and Significance Level:** The hypotheses formulated in section 1.6 were tested using  $p$ -value. The decision rule is to reject the null hypothesis if the  $p$ -value is less than or equal to the significance level (i.e.,  $p\text{-value} \leq \alpha$ , then reject  $H_0$ ). Conversely, the alternative hypothesis would be accepted if the  $p$ -value is greater than the significance level.

All the hypotheses were tested at the five per cent (5%) significance level. Hence, if the  $p$ -value is less than or equal 0.05, we would reject the null hypothesis, and accept otherwise.

### **3.10.2 Qualitative data analysis**

Qualitative analysis was applied on data collected using interview guide. The researcher applied thematic content analysis to identify and explain the major themes derived from the discussions with the key informants, from which conclusions and recommendations were derived. Interviews were edited to improve legibility and meticulously transcribed in a way that captured the views of the respondents in their own words.

### **3.11 Ethical consideration**

First and foremost, the researcher obtained an introductory letter from the Directorate of Higher Degrees and Research of Kampala International University, approving the researcher to carry out this research. The introductory letter was significantly useful to the study as it helped to clear suspicion from the respondents as to the actual reason for the research. In addition, the researcher got permission and clearances from all the relevant offices and ministries in South Sudan before going to the field to collect data (See appendix iv and v). Furthermore, the researcher sorts the consent of the respondents and assured them that their

names or identifications would be made anonymous, except where approval was given by them to have their names published. In fact, the respondents were encouraged to use pseudonym instead of their real names, which apparently boosted their confidence, and as well remove doubt of being traced and victimized based on their answers. Besides, the study properly acknowledged all materials and sources of data used in the study in the list of references.

### **3.12 Limitations of the study**

In the course of carrying out this study, the researcher encountered some constraining factors that may have impacted on the findings.

- i. One of the limitations encountered in the course of this study was that some of the respondents could not speak English, the language used for data collection. Though that was expected given that South Sudan has a high number of people that never attended formal education. To solve this challenge, the researcher orally translated the questionnaires into Arabic and other local languages so as to enable proper understanding.
- ii. Another limitation was some of the respondents were not available as of the time scheduled for interview with them. This apparently presented the challenge of delay in data collection. To mitigate this challenge, the researcher has to book a second appointment and in some cases third appoint before being able to meet and interview some of the respondents.
- iii. Again, it was a real challenge to get good number of female respondents due to the fact that they are either not willing to fill the questionnaires because of their busy schedule or having language difficulties to read and write English. Thus, the

researcher continued with the available and willing respondents, hence the respondents were more of males than females.

## CHAPTER FOUR:

### DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

#### 4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of data collected from the field. Firstly, it presented the results of the data analyses conducted with Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The analyses started with the response rate presented in Section 4.1.1 and followed with evaluation of the demographic characteristics of respondents in section 4.1.2. In section 4.2, the results of linearity assumption were presented. Section 4.3 contains multicollinearity and section 4.4 provides descriptive characteristics of dependent variable (Statehood in South Sudan). Section 4.5 presents the findings of the study on each of the four study objectives. Secondly, the transcript of qualitative data was presented under each study objective to supplement quantitative data.

#### 4.1 Preliminary Analysis

##### 4.1.1 Response Rate

The response rate is the percentage of people who responded to the study, and was calculated using the formula:

$$\frac{\text{Actual number of responses}}{\text{Targeted responses}} \times 100\% = 91.75\%$$

If the response rate is 50% or less, it shows that the data is inadequate for analysis, but if the response rate is 60%, it indicates that the data is good for analysis, while if the rate is 70% and above, then the data is considered very good for analysis. The researcher should use all means to increase the response rate in order to have a representative sample for meaningful

generalization (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). However, due to non-response of 32 respondents, 367 responded to the questionnaires used in data collection, giving a response rate of 91.75 percent. This rate is good enough basing on Richardson and St. Pierre (2005) who argues that response rates of 60 percent or more are regarded acceptable for social science studies. Based on these assertions, this implies that the response rate for this research was adequate for analysis.

#### **4.1.2 Demographic Characteristics**

In this study, there was need for first establishing the nature and characteristics of the sample before embarking on the investigating the variables. The sample characteristics being presented in this section includes sex, age, educational background and working experience. The geographical information was excluded because the responded were contacted and interviewed in the regional capital such Juba, Malakal and Wau which does not represent their original birth places. These demographic data characteristics were sought in order to determine the characteristics of the participants and their potential reliability in providing the relevant data that were being sought in the study. The knowledge of the participants' demographic data also helped the researcher to design the instruments in a way that suited their level of understanding in relation to the study problem. The demographic results in the current study included the following. Table 4.1 gives the distribution of the respondents by sex:


<b>Table 5: 4. 1: Sex of the Respondents</b>					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	262	71.4	71.4	71.4
	Female	105	28.6	28.6	100.0
	Total	367	100.0	100.0	

#### **4.1.2.1 Sex of the Respondents**

According to Table 4.1 above, males dominated the sample by constituting 71.4% of the respondents, while the females accounted for 28.6%. This happened because females in South Sudan are in many ways marginalized, their political participation and economic participation is relatively not strong and not available in public places where most of the respondents were found. The results concurred with the country gender profile report of the republic of South Sudan in March 2017 that women account for 29% of the National Assembly members though the constitution gave them 35% as affirmative action which is never met, this implies that their decision-making power is still low, and the majority of women are engaged in non-essential employment or engaged in unpaid work. The above is a representation of the cultural practices in South Sudan, which disadvantages women in the society and only recognizes them as child-bearer and home makers.

The Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), 2016, also gives a situation of Gender gaps in South Sudan, the organization presented major issues related to gender and women's economic and political participation in South Sudan, across the ethnic groups (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, etc.) and the society of South Sudan was generally reported to be patriarchal.

Hence, the resulting gender gaps are pronounced in all spheres of life within the country, their reported 57% of female-headed households are poor whereas 48% of male-headed households are poor. Women constitute 51.6% of the poor. South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics National Baseline Household Survey (2009) report that was released in January 2012 also emphasizes the root causes of this situation being strict gender norms and customary laws, the gender norms all through South Sudan are being relatively egalitarian, traditional and religious perceptions about women and gender socialization perpetuate an imbalance of power and status and low value attached to women and girls. Figure 4.1 below gives a pictorial illustration of table 4.1.



**Figure 3: 4. 1: A Pie Chart Representing Sex of the Respondents**


**Table 6: 4. 2: Age of the Respondents**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Below 29	42	11.4	11.4	11.4
30 – 39	134	36.5	36.5	48.0
40 – 49	155	42.2	42.2	90.2
50 – above	36	9.8	9.8	100.0
Total	367	100.0	100.0	

#### **4.1.2.2 Respondents by Age**

Table 4.2 illustrates that the highest percentage of respondents, 42.2% were aged between 40 - 49 years. About 36.5% of the respondents were aged between 30 - 39 years, 11.4% were below 29 years of age and the least number of respondents (9.8%) were above 50 years meaning that the age structure of a population of the respondents was normally distributed and by inspection it is observed that the median age is of code 2.5 that divides the coding interval into two numerically equal groups; that is, half the people are younger than this age and half are older. Thus, the South Sudan population pyramid has an expanding type which is a common type of pyramid for developing countries with high birth and death rates, relatively short life expectancy, as well as low level of education (see table 4.3) and poor health care are also describe such kind of population age distribution model. Therefore, the findings still reckoning with the countrymeter.info data that the dependency ratio of population that includes the population under 15 years old and people aged 65 and over therefore the population is in the productive part of population age structure accordingly

consists of population between 15 and 64 years. The findings in table 4.2 are further illustrated in a bar graph as shown in a figure 4.2 below.



**Figure 4: 4. 2: A Bar Graph Representing the Age of Respondents**

#### **4.1.2.3 Respondents by Qualification**


The other striking characteristic that was important to this study was the level of education presented in table 4.3 below showing the distribution of respondents according to qualification.

**Table 7: 4. 3: Qualifications of the Respondents**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Uneducated	5	1.4	1.4	1.4
	Primary	13	3.5	3.5	4.9
	Secondary	150	40.9	40.9	45.8
	Tertiary	199	54.2	54.2	100.0
	Total	367	100.0	100.0	

The researcher's interest here was to establish the educational levels of the respondents who were from civil society groups including cultural and religious institutions, political leaders and local community leaders that constituted a research population in the study. As observed from Table 4.3 above, it is observed that the majority of respondents 199 (54.2%) were Tertiary certificate holders implying they were graduates, and master's holders represented together. Yet 150 (40.9%) were holding an education level of secondary school certificate implying they were either dropouts or they completed secondary school and did not continue with education. 13 (3.5%) and 5 (1.4%) constituted primary certificate holders and those who had not attained any basic education respectively. The low levels of education were indeed observed by the researcher during the group discussions and time for filling questionnaires that there were high levels of incompetence attributed to English-speaking and interpretation of research topical discussion by the respondents. These findings in table 4.3 provided compelling evidence that the country needs an effective way to increase the transition from secondary school education to tertiary levels. Therefore, in the modern perspective of ethnic conflicts emphasizes that it is not always a senseless phenomenon and it is less about social breakdown than the creation of new forms of political and economic relations at local,

national and international levels (Duffield, 2000). Therefore, the education system has a key response for the South Sudanese people in successive periods of conflict. Schools are on the front line of maintaining hope and social fabric, thus, South Sudan's education system should not be neglected because if it collapses young people will lose out on their education, inequalities will increase dramatically, and future development will be put at risk. Access to education besides being a fundamental 'right', it is also an effective tool of promoting global values of humanity and citizenship not only in peacetime but more importantly during civil wars. The graph presented in figure 4.3 below reveals the level of education as shown in the table 4.3 above.



**Figure 5: 4. 3: A pie chart representing the Qualification of Respondents**


**Table 8: 4.4: Age of the Respondents \* Working Experience of the Respondents**  
**Cross tabulation**

Count		Working Experience of the Respondents				Total
		0 - 5 years	6 - 10 years	11 - 16 years	16 and above	
Age of the Respondents	Below 29	35	6	0	1	42
	30 – 39	26	58	41	9	134
	40 – 49	3	71	26	55	155
	50 – above	0	2	3	31	36
Total		64	137	70	96	367

#### 4.1.2.4 Distribution of Respondents by Working Experience

This distribution was intended to answer the question of experience and how it relates to the age of the respondents. As seen in the table 4.4 above, most respondents to the study, 137 had 6 – 10 years’ experience in working sector, yet 96 had in 16 years’ experience and above and 70 were in the category of 11 – 16 years of service in South Sudan. The highest representation was 6 - 10 years, which implied that most respondents at the workstation had attained enough experience to help them execute their duties satisfactorily. Findings don’t tally with those of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2006) recommendations on the aging and employment policies that encourage greater labor market participation at an older age by fostering employability, job mobility and labor demand (see Appendices 1 – 4). Based on its findings, a set of OECD policy guidelines for

encouraging and supporting employment at an older age were prepared and adopted in December 2015 as the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Ageing and Employment Policies, which is not the case without South Sudan where the youth has a greater percentage in the employment sector. This is because those youths who came from diaspora had attained good education compared to those who remained at home and as a result, most of them are the one occupying public and private offices. The bar chart in figure 4.4 below gives an illustration of working experience of the respondents.



**Figure 6: 4. 4: A Bar Graph Showing the Working Experience of the Respondents**

#### **4.2 Tests for Normal Distribution**

One of the assumptions of classical linear regression model is the normality assumption. Johnson and Wichern (1998) and Hair, Black, Bobin, and Anderson (2010) warned that overlooking the key assumption of normal distribution could reduce the statistical power of the analysis. Normal distribution is usually evaluated using either statistical or graphical methods. In this study, both the statistical and graphical methods were adopted to investigate

whether the variables (ethnic loyalty, ethnic conflict, ethnicity and statehood) for regression analysis are normally distributed. The statistical method for normal distribution was done using Kolmogorov-Smirnov, and the graphical method was accomplished using Q-Q normality charts. The decision rule of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov is 'reject the null hypothesis' of no normal distribution if the p-value is less than the significance level, which in this study is 0.05 (5%). The Q-Q normality chart was used as confirmatory analytical tool for normal distribution of the variables. The observed values of single numeric variables are plotted against the expected values. If the sample is from a normal distribution, points will cluster around a straight line. The Q-Q normality chart was plotted ethnicity and statehood variables to determine whether they follow the normal distribution and presented in Figures 4.5 to 4.8. Notice from Table 4.5 that the kolomogrov-smirnov coefficients for the ethnic loyalty, ethnic conflict, ethnicity and statehood variables were significance at the 5% significance level. These can be seen from the p-value (0.000) for all the variables which were less than the significance level (0.05). This result suggests that ethnic loyalty, ethnic conflict, ethnicity and statehood variables are normally distributed.


**Table 9: 4. 4: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Normal Distribution**

**Hypothesis Test Summary**


	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of EthnicLoyalty is normal with mean 4.42 and standard deviation 0.18.	One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.
2	The distribution of EthnicConflict is normal with mean 4.38 and standard deviation 0.32.	One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.
3	The distribution of Ethnicity is normal with mean 4.40 and standard deviation 0.18.	One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.
4	The distribution of Statehood is normal with mean 4.36 and standard deviation 0.20.	One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

The Q-Q normality charts were plotted to examine whether ethnic loyalty, ethnic conflict, ethnicity and statehood variables are from a normal distribution. Observe from Figures 4.5 to 4.8 that the Q-Q normality charts appear normally distributed. This is evident in the charts as points cluster around a straight line in ethnic loyalty, ethnic conflict, ethnicity and statehood variables. These charts therefore provide support for the evidence of normal distribution shown by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov values. Hence, the researcher concluded that the distribution of the variables was normal.



**Figure 7: 4. 5: Q-Q Normal Distribution Chart for Ethnic Loyalty**



**Figure 8: 4. 6: Q-Q Normal Distribution Chart for Ethnic Conflict**




Figure 9: 4. 7: Q-Q Normal Distribution Chart for Ethnicity




Figure 10: 4. 8: Q-Q Normal Distribution Chart for Statehood

### **4.3 Linearity Test**

To achieve some of the objectives of this study, regression analysis was estimated. One of the pre-estimation diagnostics is to ensure that the data meets the linearity assumption. Linearity assumption suggests that the relationship between independent and dependent variables should be linear (Roval, Baker, & Ponton, 2013). Testing for linearity before performing ordinary least square regression model is very important because overlooking it increases the chance of Type I error (overestimation) and Type II error (underestimation) of the relationship between independent variables (ethnic loyalty and ethnic conflict) and the dependent variable (statehood).

Linear relationship between ethnic loyalty, ethnic conflict and statehood in South Sudan was estimated using Pearson's linear correlation coefficient and tested using the p-value. The decision rule is to accept linearity, if there is significant linear relationship between the independent and dependent variable (Pallant, 2010).

**Table 10: 4. 5: Linear relationship between ethnicity and statehood**

**Correlations**

		Ethnic Loyalty	Ethnic Conflict	Statehood
Ethnic Loyalty	Pearson Correlation	1	-.060	.195**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.248	.000
	N	367	367	364
Ethnic Conflict	Pearson Correlation	-.060	1	.075
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.248		.156
	N	367	367	364
Statehood	Pearson Correlation	.195**	.075	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.156	
	N	364	364	364

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

As shown in Table 4.5 above, there is a significant linear relationship ethnic loyalty and statehood in South Sudan. This implies that the linearity assumption has not been violated in this study.

**4.4 Multicollinearity Test**

Multicollinearity occurs when there is high correlation among independent variables of a study’s data (Hair, Black, Bobin, & Anderson, 2010). If data has a problem of

multicollinearity, results of the regression coefficients and other statistical significance can greatly be reduced, leading to falsification of the study findings. It also makes establishing the contribution of coefficient towards variation in dependent variables before running a regression model.

In this study, the coefficients of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance levels were used to test whether the problem of multicollinearity exists or not, and the results are presented in Table 4.6 below. According to Sekaran and Bougle (2014), multicollinearity exists if the Tolerance level is less than 0.5. Conversely, there is absence of multicollinearity if the Tolerance level is greater than 0.5. Similarly, there is absence of multicollinearity if the VIF is less than 3. Notice from Table 4.7 that the Tolerance level is greater than 0.5 in the coefficients of ethnic loyalty and ethnic conflicts. These show that there is no multicollinearity in the independent variables. Similarly, coefficients of the VIF are all less than 3 for ethnic loyalty and ethnic conflicts. The VIF therefore provides support for the absence of multicollinearity indicated by the Tolerance level. Hence, there is no multicollinearity in the independent variables. Thus, the two variables can be estimated in a multiple regression model.

**Table 11: 4. 6: Multicollinearity Test Results**

<b>Collinearity Statistics</b>		
<b>Variables</b>	<b>Tolerance Level</b>	<b>VIF</b>
Ethnic Loyalty	.996	1.004
Ethnic Conflict	.869	1.231

Source: SPSS output (2018)

#### 4.5 Descriptive characteristics of the Statehood in South Sudan

The dependent variable of this study was “Statehood in South Sudan”. Statehood was measured using 10 items in a 5-point rating scale questionnaire. Respondents were requested to rate the extent to which each of the measure relate to statehood of South Sudan. This section presents the summary of the mean rating and standard deviation on Statehood in South Sudan. The summary of the responses is presented in Table 4.8 below.

**Table 12: 4. 7: Descriptive characteristics of the Statehood in South Sudan**

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Mean		Std. Deviation
	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic
South Sudan is a viable State	367	4.2234	.03248	.62217
High chances of state disintegration in the future	367	4.4033	.03582	.68616
South Sudan is already a weak State	367	4.3515	.03338	.63945
South Sudan is collapse or in the process of collapsing	367	4.2943	.02967	.56833
South Sudan is seen as failed state	367	4.5014	.02936	.56237
Issues of poor governance and sovereignty issue	367	4.3951	.03512	.67288
Government bad practices in state institutions	364	4.3297	.02969	.56637
Impunity and unprofessional security organs	367	4.3760	.03298	.63183
Majority of population displaced	367	4.4523	.03418	.65478
poor territorial control	367	4.2643	.03466	.66399
Valid N (listwise)	364	4.3591	0.0327	0.6263

Source: Authors Computation

Table 4.7 above presents results of the mean ratings and standard deviations of responses from the respondents on Statehood in South Sudan. Notice from Table 4.8 that the mean ratings of responses from the respondents for items 1 to 10 are: 4.2 (0.03), 4.4 (0.03), 4.3 (0.03), 4.2 (0.02), 4.5 (0.02), 4.3 (0.03), 4.3 (0.02), 4.3 (0.03), 4.4 (0.03), and 4.2 (0.03); with corresponding standard deviations of 0.62, 0.68, 0.63, 0.58, 0.56, 0.67, 0.56, 0.63, 0.65, and 0.66.

Based on the cut-off point of 4.00, the respondents rated items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 totally accepted. The ratings of the respondents indicate that the respondents totally accepted that South Sudan as viable state, there is high chances of state disintegration in the future, South Sudan is already a weak state, South Sudan is in process of collapsing, and that South Sudan is seen as failed state. The respondents also totally accepted that there is issue of poor governance and sovereignty, government bad practices in state institutions, impunity and unprofessional security organs, majority of population displaced and poor territorial control in South Sudan. Notice also from Table 4.8, that the respondents rated item 5 as the highest, followed by items 8 and 2. These ratings indicate that, on average, the respondents totally accepted that South Sudan is seen as failed state, impunity and unprofessional security organs, and that there are high chances of state disintegration in the future.

The average mean rating of responses of the respondents on statehood in South Sudan is 4.4 with an average standard deviation of 0.62. This indicates that the respondents totally agreed with items of measurement for Statehood.

## 4.6 Objective-based Analyses

### 4.6.1 Causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan (Obj.1)

This section presents the results of the mean ratings and standard deviations of the responses obtained from respondents through the use of questionnaires. This section aims at providing answer to research question one: what the causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan are; The summary of the responses is presented in Table 4.8 below.

**Table 13: 4. 8: Mean Ratings and Standard Deviations on Causes of Ethnic Conflict in South Sudan**

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Mean		Std. Deviation
	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic
An unequal distribution of the money that come from the sale of oil	367	4.1935	.06218	1.19111
Corruption and nepotism within the government system	367	4.3597	.03478	.66637
Poverty as a major cause of the conflict	367	4.1662	.04474	.85708
Unfair allocation of political positions	367	4.4251	.03698	.70844
Power struggles among the elites	367	4.3297	.04112	.78772
Differences in Religion religions and beliefs	367	3.8529	.06364	1.21922
Different tribes that are living in South Sudan are the problem	367	3.8392	.06037	1.15649

Primitivism and ignorance among the ethnic groups	367	4.2098	.04128	.79073
Lack of awareness about the negative consequences of conflicts	367	4.2125	.04151	.79517
Bureaucratic leadership style practiced by the leaders	367	4.2125	.04240	.81217
Lack of competent leaders to deal with the situation	367	4.2752	.04095	.78442
Selfishness and ethnocentric policies	367	4.2507	.03963	.75917
Competition over the Scarce resources	367	4.0981	.04537	.86913
Conflicts caused by the colonial regimes	367	3.8965	.05801	1.11137
Main cause lies on cultural beliefs	367	3.9482	.05134	.98349
Ethnic groupings such as its history, traditions, and customs	367	4.0954	.04786	.91685
Meeting and getting to know people from ethnic groups other than their own	367	3.9619	.04907	.94010
Would be better if different ethnic groups didn't try to mix together	367	3.7766	.05734	1.09853
Having a lot of pride in their ethnic group and its accomplishments	367	4.1826	.04389	.84084

Association with people from other ethnic groups can be suspicious	367	4.0518	.05234	1.00275
Feeling good about their cultural or ethnic background	367	4.2207	.04559	.87329
Having a strong commitment to improve life in their ethnic community	367	4.1172	.04926	.94372
Valid N (listwise)	367			
<b>Average</b>		<b>4.1216</b>	<b>0.0477</b>	<b>0.9140</b>

Source: Author's computation

Table 4.9 above presents results of the mean ratings and standard deviations of responses from the respondents. Notice from Table 4.9 that the mean ratings of responses from the respondents for items 1 to 22 are: 4.1 (0.06), 4.3 (0.03), 4.1 (0.04), 4.4 (0.06), 4.3 (0.06), 3.8 (0.04), 3.8 (0.04), 4.2 (0.04), 4.2 (0.04), 4.2 (0.03), 4.2 (0.04), 4.0 (0.05), 3.8 (0.05), 3.9 (0.04), 4.0 (0.04), 3.7 (0.05), 4.1 (0.04), 4.0 (0.05), 4.0 (0.04), 4.2 (0.04), and 4.1 (0.04); with corresponding standard deviations of 1.19, 0.66, 0.85, 0.70, 1.21, 1.15, 0.79, 0.79, 0.81, 0.78, 0.75, 0.86, 1.11, 0.98, 0.91, 0.94, 1.09, 0.84, 1.00, 0.87, and 0.94.

Based on the cut-off point of 4.00, the respondents rated items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 totally accepted. These indicate that the respondents totally accepted that unequal distribution of the money that come from the sale of oil, corruption and nepotism within the government system, poverty, unfair allocation of political positions and power struggles among the elites are among the causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan. The respondents also totally accepted that primitivism and ignorance among the ethnic groups, lack of awareness about the negative consequences of conflicts, bureaucratic

leadership style practiced by the leaders, lack of competent leaders to deal with the situation, selfishness and ethnocentric policies and competition over the scarce resources is among the causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan. The respondents further totally accepted that ethnic groupings such as its history, traditions, and customs, pride in their ethnic group and its accomplishments, cultural or ethnic background and strong commitment to improve life in their ethnic community are among the causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan. Observe however, that the respondents rated item 4 as the highest cause of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan, followed by items 2 and 5. These ratings suggest that the highest causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan are unfair allocation of political positions, corruption and nepotism within the government system and power struggles among the elites.

Based on the cut-off point of 3.00 - 3.99, the respondents rated items 6, 7, 14, 15, and 17 acceptable. These indicate that the respondents accepted that differences in religion and belief, differences in tribe, conflicts caused by the colonial regimes and absence of viable ethnic interaction groups other than their own are the causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan. Although, all the respondents rated the items as acceptable, item 17 is the least cause of ethnic conflict in South Sudan. Thus, absence of viable ethnic interaction groups other than their own is the least causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan.

The cluster or average mean rating of responses of the respondents on the causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan is 4.12 with an average standard deviation of 0.91. This implies that the causes outlined above are among the major causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan. The standard errors for all the 22 mean ratings are within the conventional significance levels in humanities and social sciences. More so, the standard error for the cluster of average mean

is 0.04, which is less than the 5% significance level. This indicates that the descriptive analysis is very reliable for policy-making purposes.

As stated in Chapter three, the study utilized a mixed method approach in data collection, thus qualitative data were elicited from key informants to compliment quantitative data, below are the extracts of the interviews.

***Item 1: What are the causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan?***

*In my opinion, there are different causes of conflicts in South Sudan. If I may say there are issues of poverty. Many South Sudanese are poor despite the fact that the country is rich, so this poverty has translated to frustration and anger and part of the reason why people are conflicting with each other. Another reason is that our politicians are greedy and using their personal interest to deceive poor citizens into conflict with each other. What I mean is that when our politicians have misunderstanding among each other, they quickly run to their people and misinform them that the misunderstanding is simply because of their ethnic identity and often times their tribe's men buy into this deceit and eventually the conflict escalates. Besides the points I mentioned, there is a big issue of marginalization in this country. As you may know, a few ethnic groups have taken the rest of the country hostage, which has resulted in conflicts, as other ethnic groups believe that they are shortchanged in the affairs of things in this country (KI<sup>1</sup>, Juba, 02 August 2018).*

*The cause of conflicts in this country (referring to South Sudan) is marginalization, and the issue of marginalization has been around for a long time. In fact, before independence, the people of South Sudan while still part of Sudan fought its first and second civil wars due to marginalization from the people of Northern Sudan that is now Republic of Sudan. After independence, the problem of marginalization continued and as you may observe the affairs of this country is run by a few ethnic groups. Now the problem is not necessarily that a few ethnic groups are running the affairs of the country, but these ethnic groups do not consider the needs and interest of the other ethnic groups in this country. I am not saying that every member of the ruling ethnic group is comfortable with how the affairs of the country are being handled; in fact, this country is divided between the rich and the poor. The rich create conflicts due to selfish interest and the poor fight against each other to the benefit of the rich. Since independence, we have the same set of people that is ruling the country and these people are the*

*same fueling conflicts and causing the problems in the country (KI<sup>2</sup>, Jonglei, 18 August 2018).*

*I think there are several causes of conflict in this country. One of them is poverty, our people are very poor and when a person is very poor is easy to manipulate and take advantage of the person for personal gain and that is what our elites do. A similar factor is the high level of illiteracy in this country. Just like poverty, illiteracy makes people susceptible to manipulation. Then, I will add that ethnic division is also a factor that is causing conflicts in this country (KI<sup>3</sup>, Warrap, 26 August 2018).*

***Item 2: Though there may be more-than one cause, in your opinion what is the number one factor causing ethnic conflict in South Sudan?***

*I will say that the number one cause of conflict in South Sudan is ethnic division. This ethnic division is complimented by ethnic bias (KI<sup>1</sup>, Juba, 02 August 2018).*

*A straightforward answer from me will be that the number one cause of conflict in this country (referring to South Sudan) is the systemic marginalization orchestrated by one or two ethnic groups within the country against the others (KI<sup>2</sup>, Jonglei, 18 August 2018).*

*Conflicts in South Sudan are caused by a combination of factors that are interrelated. You can't say that it is caused by factor "A" without relating it to factor "B". In that case, I would say that it is caused by a combination of poverty, illiteracy and ethnic division (KI<sup>3</sup>, Warrap, 26 August 2018).*

***Item 3: Do you think that the factor(s) causing conflict in South Sudan are internal or external factors?***

*Well, this will depend on individual understanding. To me the causes are internal. The President Salva Kiir and his former Vice Riek Machar are fighting each other, so I don't see an external party fighting with them. With that I will say that the causes are internal (KI<sup>1</sup>, Juba, 02 August 2018).*

*The factors causing conflicts in our country (referring to South Sudan) are simple internal. If you address the long-standing ethnic marginalization in this country, I will assure you that internal conflicts will significantly if not totally eliminated (KI<sup>2</sup>, Jonglei, 18 August 2018).*

*The conflicts are caused by both internal and external factors. The internal factors are factors are the issues that I mentioned earlier, poverty ..., while the external factors can be traced from the continued influence of Sudan on South Sudan, which*

may not be far from their interest in South Sudan's natural resources (KF<sup>3</sup>, Warrap, 26 August 2018).

#### 4.6.2 Effect of Ethnic Loyalty on Statehood in South Sudan (Obj.2)

Section 4.6.2 presents the results of the regression model estimated to examine the effect of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan.

**Table 14: 4. 9: Results of effect of ethnic Loyalty on statehood in South Sudan**

##### Variables Entered/Removed<sup>a</sup>

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	EthnicLoyalty <sup>b</sup>	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: Statehood

b. All requested variables entered.

##### Model Summary<sup>b</sup>

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.195 <sup>a</sup>	.038	.035	.19914	2.092

a. Predictors: (Constant), EthnicLoyalty

b. Dependent Variable: Statehood

##### ANOVA<sup>a</sup>

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
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1	Regression	.567	1	.567	14.304	.000 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	14.356	362	.040		
	Total	14.924	363			

a. Dependent Variable: Statehood

b. Predictors: (Constant), Ethnic Loyalty

#### Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.371	.261		12.903	.000
	Ethnic Loyalty	.223	.059	.195	3.782	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Statehood

Notice from Table 4.9 that ethnic loyalty has significant positive effect on statehood in South Sudan at the 5% percent significance level. This is clear from the slope (B) coefficient (0.22), and the *p*-value (0.00) which is less than the study significance level (0.05). This result provides evidence showing that ethnic loyalty has positive effect on statehood in South Sudan.

The results of the regression model further suggest that ethnic loyalty is positively related to statehood in South Sudan. This can be seen value of the coefficient of determination (0.19). Since correlation varies between -1 to +1, coefficient of determination value of 0.19 hence indicate evidence of a weak positive relationship between ethnic loyalty and statehood in South Sudan. The value of  $R^2$  (0.038) indicates that 4% of the total variation in statehood is explained by ethnic loyalty. The  $F$ -statistics indicate that the coefficients of ethnic loyalty, including constant, are not zero. This is evident in the  $p$ -value (0.00) of  $f$ -statistics is less than the critical value (0.05). Standard error of estimate represents the imprecision of the regression equation in fitting the data. The closer the coefficient of standard error of estimates to zero, the better and more reliable the analysis. From Table 4.10, coefficient of standard error of estimates is close to zero (0.05). This suggests that the regression equation is properly fitted the data. More so, the Durbin-Watson coefficient (2.06) indicates that there is absence of serial correlation in the residual of the regression estimate. This is because the Durbin-Watson value is approximately 2.

#### **4.6.2.1 Testing Null Hypothesis One ( $H_{01}$ ): “there is no significant effect of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan”.**

This hypothesis was tested using  $p$ -value based on the decision rule outlined in Section 3.9.4. The results presented in Table 4.9 are contrary to the stated null hypothesis ( $H_{01}$ ). Since the computed  $p$ -value (0.00) of the ethnic loyalty coefficient is less than the significance level (0.05), there is significant effect of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis of no significant effect of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan. Consequently,  $H_{01}$  is rejected and  $H_{I1}$  is upheld.

#### **4.6.2.2 Quantitative data transcription for effect of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan**

***Item 1: Why is it that ethnic identity seems to be more appreciable to the people of South Sudan, than their national identity?***

*I don't believe that the citizen of this country appreciates their ethnic identity more than the national identity. Though that narrative may represent the present reality, but I can assure you that it is temporary. The people of South Sudan love their country, only that when the government fails to provide for its citizens, they will rely on their source of sustenance, which in this case is their ethnic group. So if the government does the rights things, obviously people will relate more with their national identity than ethnic identity (KI<sup>1</sup>, Juba, 02 August 2018).*

*This is the work of the elites. They segregate people along ethnic lines to gain relevance and to advance their personal interest. The truth is that our elites have been successful in manipulating the people to believe that their survival depends on their ethnic affiliation (KI<sup>2</sup>, Jonglei, 18 August 2018).*

*Again, I will answer you that the cause of that is the same poverty and illiteracy that I have talked about. Even though some people may say that it is the handwork of the political elites, the truth is that they were able to achieve that because the people are poor and uneducated. These two factors in my opinion are responsible for many anomalies going on in this country (KI<sup>3</sup>, Warrap, 26 August 2018).*

***Item 2: Do you think that ethnic loyalty and bias has any effect on the statehood in South Sudan?***

*It has an obvious effect. The ongoing civil war is partly caused by ethnic loyalty; therefore, it has a negative effect on the statehood of this country. The war has killed many people and others have run away from the country to seek refuge elsewhere (KI<sup>1</sup>, Juba, 02 August 2018).*

*All over the world, ethnic loyalty presents a challenge to statehood. Whenever people rely on their ethnic affiliation instead of their national identity, it is usually a problem. In this country, ethnic loyalty has disintegrated the country to the extent that every single issue is perceived with ethnic bias. The implication is that the country is divided along ethnic line, making it difficult for the government to function effectively. Even the civil war is fought along ethnic lines of the Dinka and Nuer. With that you will agree that ethnic loyal is a big problem to this country and should be addressed if we intend to move forward as a nation (KI<sup>3</sup>, Warrap, 26 August 2018).*

### 4.6.3 Impact of Ethnic Conflicts on Statehood in South Sudan (Obj.3)

Section 4.6.3 contains the results of the simple regression model conducted to examine the effect of ethnic conflict on statehood in South Sudan. The results of the analysis are displayed in Table 4.10 below.

**Table 15: 4. 10: Results of impact of ethnic conflict on statehood in South Sudan**

#### Variables Entered/Removed<sup>a</sup>

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	EthnicConflict <sup>b</sup>	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: Statehood

b. All requested variables entered.

#### Model Summary<sup>b</sup>

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.075 <sup>a</sup>	.006	.003	.20248	1.997

a. Predictors: (Constant), Ethnic Conflict

b. Dependent Variable: Statehood

ANOVA<sup>a</sup>

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.083	1	.083	2.024	.156 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	14.841	362	.041		
	Total	14.924	363			

a. Dependent Variable: Statehood

b. Predictors: (Constant), Ethnic Conflict

Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	4.154	.144		28.887	.000
	Ethnic Conflict	.047	.033	.075	1.423	.156

a. Dependent Variable: Statehood

Notice also from Table 4.11 above that ethnic conflict has positive but non-significant effect on statehood in South Sudan at the 5% percent significance level. This is can be seen from the slope (B) coefficient (0.047), and the *p*-value (0.15) which is more than the study

significance level (0.05). This result shows that ethnic conflict has no significant effect on statehood in South Sudan.

The results of the regression model further suggest that ethnic conflict is poorly related to statehood in South Sudan. This can be seen value of the coefficient of determination (0.075). Since correlation varies between -1 to +1, coefficient of determination value of 0.075 hence indicate evidence of a very weak non-significant positive relationship between ethnic conflict and statehood in South Sudan. The value of  $R^2$  (0.006) indicates that 0.6% of the total variation in statehood is explained by ethnic conflicts. The  $F$ -statistics indicate that the coefficients of ethnic conflict, including constant, are zero. This is evident in the  $p$ -value (0.15) of  $f$ -statistics being more than the critical value (0.05). Standard error of estimate represents the imprecision of the regression equation in fitting the data. The closer the coefficient of standard error of estimates to zero, the better and more reliable the analysis. From Table 4.10, coefficient of standard error of estimates is close to zero (0.03) and it is within the range of conventional confidence interval in humanities and social sciences. This suggests that the regression equation is properly fitted the data. More so, the Durbin-Watson coefficient (1.99) suggests that there is absence of serial correlation in the residual of the regression estimate, since the Durbin-Watson value is approximately 2.

#### **4.6.3.1 Testing Null Hypothesis Two ( $H_{02}$ ): “there is no significant effect of ethnic conflict on statehood in South Sudan”.**

The hypothesis two was also tested using  $p$ -value based on the decision rule outlined in Section 3.9.4. The results presented in Table 4.10 concur with the stated null hypothesis ( $H_{02}$ ). Since the computed  $p$ -value (0.15) of the ethnic conflict coefficient is greater than the significance level (0.05), there is no significant effect of ethnic conflict on statehood in South

Sudan. Hence, we accept the null hypothesis of no significant effect of ethnic conflict on statehood in South Sudan. Consequently, Ho<sub>2</sub> is accepted and H1<sub>2</sub> is rejected.

#### **4.6.3.2 Quantitative data transcription on the effect of ethnic conflict on statehood in South Sudan**

***Item 1: Do you think that ethnic conflict has or may have any effect on the statehood in South Sudan?***

*Obviously, they do. You can only talk of statehood when the government of a state is able to govern its territory and maintain law and order. Besides, the main responsibility of every government is to protect the lives and property of its citizens, which as you may have observed is no longer feasible in this country (referring to South Sudan). Ethnicity is part and parcel of the civil war and therefore, no one can exonerate it from the consequences arising from the war, such as breakdown of law and order, mass killing of innocent people and destruction of property. Today, South Sudan is a lawless country and dangerously progressing to a failed state due to the civil war that is partly engineered by ethnic division, hence ethnicity poses a great challenge to this country. In my view, to get this country working again, the government should find a way to bridge ethnic divisions, so that people will consider themselves as south Sudanese and not as Dinka, Nuer or other tribes as the case may be (KI<sup>5</sup>, Western Bahr el Ghazal, 08 September 2018).*

*Conflict is normal and ethnic conflict is unavoidable as long as there are several ethnic groups within a state. I feel that the problem is not ethnicity, but the greed among ethnic leaders. What we see today as ethnic conflict are mere disagreement among our leaders, who then cashed-in on tribal identify to ferment violence by deceiving their tribal kinsmen to fight in other to advance their political ambitions. If I may ask, there ethnic conflicts in many other parts of African, why is it that we are having civil war? The answer is simple and it is because of greed by our leaders. If we can find a way to eliminate greed among our leaders, then we will immediately eliminate the so called ethnic conflicts (KI<sup>2</sup>, Jonglei, 18 August 2018).*

***Item 2: Since your answer is affirmative, explain how the ongoing conflict and other ethnic conflicts within South Sudan will affect its Statehood?***

*As I said earlier, the conflict has resulted in lawlessness in the country. Also, it has caused the death of many innocent people, while many others have lost their property and means of livelihood. Apart from Syria, we have the highest number*

*of refugees scattered all over the continent, is that not a negative impact on the statehood of the country? Does lawlessness not have an impact on statehood? What we are experiencing in this country is not conflict, we are having a civil war and a state cannot function properly when it is undergoing a civil war. As you can see the government is no longer capable of performing its main function of protecting lives and property, which means that our statehood is in question (KF<sup>5</sup>, Western Bahr el Ghazal, 08 September 2018).*

#### 4.6.4 Strategic Remedies to mitigate Ethnic Conflicts in South Sudan (Obj.4)

This section displays the results of the mean ratings and standard deviations of the responses obtained from respondents on the strategic remedies to end of ethnic conflict in South Sudan. The summary of the responses is presented in Table 4.11 below.

**Table 16: 4. 11: Mean Ratings and Standard Deviations of Responses on Strategic Remedies to end Ethnic Conflict in South Sudan**

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Mean		Std. Deviation
	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic
Respect for ethnic nationalities' rights and consideration of their long-term interests in the South Sudan state	367	4.6076	.03057	.58557
Political stability and accepted form of governance by all South Sudanese	367	4.3079	.03299	.63204
Respect ethnic communities' boundary	367	4.4005	.03040	.58234
Fair allocation of national resources	367	4.4850	.03512	.67279
Carrying out friendly cooperation	367	4.4142	.03419	.65505
Enhancing communities dialogue can be good tool to resolve the local conflicts	367	4.3924	.03531	.67650

Redivision of South Sudan into new administration units on new basis	367	4.1008	.04641	.88902
Full implementation of the 2015 peace agreement	367	4.3134	.03670	.70316
Elimination of the culture of impunity	367	4.3106	.04052	.77634
Control of Information technology as a mechanism for the spread of conflict to all parts of South Sudan	367	4.2480	.05093	.97571
Valid N (listwise)	367			
<b>Average</b>		<b>4.3580</b>	<b>0.0373</b>	<b>0.7148</b>

Source: Author's computation

Notice from Table 4.12 that the mean ratings of responses from the respondents for items 1 to 10 are: 4.6 (0.03), 4.3 (0.03), 4.4 (0.03), 4.4 (0.03), 4.4 (0.03), 4.4 (0.03), 4.1 (0.04), 4.3 (0.03), 4.3 (0.04), and 4.2 (0.05); with corresponding standard deviations of 0.58, 0.63, 0.58, 0.67, 0.65, 0.67, 0.88, 0.70, 0.77, and 0.97.

Based on the cut-off point of 4.00, the respondents rated items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 totally accepted. These suggest that the respondents totally acceptable that respect each other's sovereignty and take the overall situation and their long-term interests into consideration, political stability and accepted form of governance by all South Sudanese, respect for ethnic communities' boundary, fair allocation of national resources, and carrying out friendly cooperation, are among the possible solutions to ethnic conflict in South Sudan. The respondents also totally accepted that dialogue among the ethnic communities, redivision of South Sudan into new administration units on new basis, full implementation of the 2018 revitalized peace agreement, elimination of the culture of impunity and control of information

technology as a mechanism for the spread of conflict to all parts of South Sudan as possible solutions to end ethnic conflict in South Sudan. Notice also from Table 4.11, that the respondents rated item 1 as the highest cause of possible remedial measure to end ethnic conflicts in South Sudan, followed by items 4 and 6. These ratings suggest that the most likely possible solution to end ethnic conflict in South Sudan are respect for ethnic nationalities' rights and consideration of their long-term interests in the South Sudan state affairs, fair allocation of national resources and enhancing communities dialogue can be good tool to resolve the local conflicts which will result into resolution of the national conflict. However, the respondents rated item 7 the least possible solution to end ethnic conflict in South Sudan. Thus, redivision of South Sudan into new administration units on new basis is the least possible solution to end ethnic conflict in South Sudan.

The cluster or average mean rating of responses of the respondents on the possible solution to end ethnic conflict in South Sudan is 4.35 with an average standard deviation of 0.71. This indicates that the possible solutions end ethnic conflicts in South Sudan are among those presented in Table 4.11. The standard errors for all the 10 mean ratings are within the conventional significance levels in humanities and social sciences. More so, the standard error for the cluster of average mean is 0.03, which is also less than the 5% significance level. This indicates that the descriptive analysis is reliable for policy-making purposes.

#### **4.6.4.1 Quantitative data transcription on Strategic Remedies to end Ethnic Conflict in South Sudan.**

***Item 1: In your opinion, what can be the possible solution to ethnic conflicts in South Sudan?***

*Every newly independent state face challenges and in the case of South Sudan, ethnicity is among the challenges that the government should deal with. To*

*address ethnic conflicts in this country, the government should first build strong institutions like police, judiciary and legislature. As far as these institutions are weak, corrupt or inexistent, there will always be lawlessness and impunity in this country (KF<sup>2</sup>, Jonglei, 18 August 2018).*

*I don't think that there is a direct solution, but the government can address ethnic division by introducing even or fair representation of different ethnic tribes as a policy to address marginalization. Also, the government should adopt decentralization as a mechanism to reach the people at the grassroots. What I mean is that the government should copy from some of our neighboring countries and establish state, regional, district and even community tiers of government. This will help the government to reach the people in the most rural communities and therefore boost the sense of belongingness among the citizens (KF<sup>5</sup>, Western Bahr el Ghazal, 08 September 2018).*

*The possible remedy is for the government and other international organizations to address the high level of poverty and illiteracy in the country. We should get more people educated, particularly women. I believe that education is the key to close unhealthy ethnic divisions and reoccurring ethnic conflicts in this country (KF<sup>6</sup>, Upper Nile, 17 September 2018).*

**Item 2: What are the best possible ways to resolve the ongoing conflict in South Sudan?**

*The best possible solution is to get representatives from all the tribes in South Sudan and put them in one room to discuss and agree on how this country will function as one. Why I am saying this is because the conflict is internal, therefore the solution will also be internal. The people should agree on peace in their own (KF<sup>3</sup>, Warrap, 26 August 2018)*

*My opinion maybe a little bit controversial, but my solution will be to ban the present crop of politicians in this country from holding political positions. I know that may look impossible because they are in control of power, but external bodies, such as the East African community or African Union can take such decision, given that each of these leaders have committed atrocities against ordinary citizens, which is enough reason to ban them from holding public office or face rejection and excommunication from the East African community or African Union terms (KF<sup>5</sup>, Western Bahr el Ghazal, 08 September 2018).*

#### 4.6.5 Effect of Ethnic Conflicts on Statehood in South Sudan

Section 4.6.5 was aimed at achieving the purpose of this study. The constructs of ethnicity, ethnic loyalty and ethnic conflict were summed and divided into two to obtain the variable for ethnicity, which was regressed on statehood. The results are presented in Table 4.12 below

**Table 17: 4. 12: Regression Results of Effect of Ethnic Conflicts on Statehood in South Sudan**

##### Variables Entered/Removed<sup>a</sup>

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Ethnic Conflicts <sup>b</sup>	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: Statehood

b. All requested variables entered.

##### Model Summary<sup>b</sup>

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.163 <sup>a</sup>	.027	.024	.20032	2.028

a. Predictors: (Constant), Ethnic Conflicts

b. Dependent Variable: Statehood

ANOVA<sup>a</sup>

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.397	1	.397	9.904	.002 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	14.526	362	.040		
	Total	14.924	363			

a. Dependent Variable: Statehood

b. Predictors: (Constant), Ethnicity

Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.549	.257		13.788	.000
	Ethnicity	.184	.058	.163	3.147	.002

a. Dependent Variable: Ethnic Conflicts

Observe from Table 4.12 that ethnicity has significant positive effect on statehood in South Sudan at the 5% percent significance level. This is clear from the slope (B) coefficient (0.18), and the *p*-value (0.00) which is less than the study significance level (0.05). This result

indicates that ethnicity has significant positive effect on statehood in South Sudan. There is therefore significant positive effect of ethnicity on statehood in South Sudan. However, the ethnic conflicts which came as a result of ethnic mismanagement has caused division among the people and the result was violent engagement which consequently affects state running and become negative effect on statehood.

The results of the regression model also show that ethnicity is positively related to statehood in South Sudan. This is glaring from the coefficient of determination (0.16). Since correlation varies between -1 to +1, coefficient of determination value of 0.16 hence indicate evidence of a weak positive relationship between ethnicity and statehood in South Sudan. The value of  $R^2$  (0.027) indicates that 3% of the total variation in statehood is explained by ethnicity. The *F*-statistics indicate that the coefficients of ethnicity, including constant, are not zero. This is evident in the p-value (0.00) of f-statistics is less than the critical value (0.05). Standard error of estimate represents the imprecision of the regression equation in fitting the data. The closer the coefficient of standard error of estimates to zero, the better and more reliable the analysis. From Table 4.12, coefficient of standard error of estimates is close to zero (0.05). This suggests that the regression equation is properly fitted the data. More so, the Durbin-Watson coefficient (2.02) indicates that there is absence of serial correlation in the residual of the regression estimate. This is because the Durbin-Watson value is approximately 2.

#### **4.6.8 Relationship between Ethnic Conflicts and Statehood in South Sudan**

This section reports the results of the Pearson's linear correlation coefficient (PLCC) conducted to determine the relationship between ethnic conflicts and statehood in South

Sudan. The section aimed at establishing the significance of the relationship between ethnic conflicts and statehood.

**Table 18: 4. 13: Correlation Results of the Relationship between Ethnic Conflicts and Statehood in South Sudan**

**Correlations**

		<b>Statehood</b>	<b>Ethnic Conflicts</b>
Statehood	Pearson Correlation	1	.163**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.002
	N	364	364
Ethnic Conflicts	Pearson Correlation	.163**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	
	N	364	367

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Observe from Table 4.13 that a weak positive linear relationship exists between ethnic conflicts and statehood in South Sudan. This is evident in the correlation coefficient of 0.163. From the results displayed in Table 4.13, the *p*-value (0.00) of the PLCC is less than the significance level (0.05). Hence, there is significant positive relationship between ethnic conflicts and statehood in South Sudan.

## **CHAPTER FIVE:**

### **DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.0 Introduction**

This chapter provided discussions of the study findings. In doing so, the findings were presented in a chronological format, following the study objectives, while the discussions were aligned with empirical literature. The chapter then drew conclusions from the discussions, after which it offered recommendations. Finally, it suggested areas for further research.

#### **5.1 Summary of key findings**

The purpose of the study was to assess how Ethnic Conflicts affects the statehood in South Sudan. To accomplish this purpose, the study investigated the causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan; examined the effect of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan; evaluated the impact of ethnic conflict on statehood in South Sudan; and determined the strategic remedies to mitigate mitigate these conflicts in South Sudan. On the purpose of the study – the impact of Ethnic Conflicts on the statehood in South Sudan, findings as reported on Table 4.12 revealed that ethnic conflicts has negative and significant effect on statehood in South Sudan. The findings also show evidence of a weak positive linear relationship between ethnic conflicts and statehood in South Sudan. This is evident in the correlation coefficient of 0.16 with p-value of 0.00. Thus, the study findings indicate that ethnic conflicts on its own is not a challenge to statehood, instead it is a factor that can be harnessed to consolidate the statehood in South Sudan.

Obviously, ethnic conflicts inclination is inherent in the South Sudanese political system and the development of ethnicity as social stratification in the country is traceable to the colonial era. The colonial agenda isolated the public and masses from the benefits and convenience of the system and as a result the people were left with no other choice than to seek comfort, security and material as well as socio-psychological support and sense of belonging from their various ethnic groups. This spate of ethnic arrangement led to the formation of ethnic driven political elites and militia groups to promote, represents and protect their primordial interest.

Furthermore, competition for scarce resources has been the more common bases of ethnic consciousness and tensions in South Sudan. Ethnic competition is glaring in areas such as land, boundary, natural resources, and political power and control. In the political sphere and in relation to political development, especially in areas like elections, formation of government, and support for candidates, the impact of Ethnic Conflicts cannot be overemphasized. The usual mechanism employed by political elites seeking mass support is to appeal to ethnic/communal cries and sentiments rather than universalistic appeal and ideology. This explains the process of political participation in the country, which is usually along ethnic ideology, which often misrepresents ethnicity as the major challenge to the statehood in the country.

These findings agreed with what Elite Manipulation theories termed as blind support to the elites and make people ready to obey their instructions. These findings furthermore are in line with Johnson (2008: 145) whereby the author states that ethnicity is not always a problem to statehood and nation building, rather the politicization of the distinctive characteristics of an ethnic group is a feature of an ethnic conflict, which may have an attendant impact on

statehood. Whereas ethnic conflict is described as a confrontation that occurs along ethnic lines or groups that comprises at least one group expressing its goals and dissatisfaction exclusively with ethnic terms.

### 5.2 Discussion of findings

Discussion of the study findings were presented according to the study objectives, which are: to investigate the causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan; to examine the effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan; to evaluate the impact of ethnic conflict on statehood in South Sudan and lastly, to determine the strategic remedies to end ethnic conflict in South Sudan.

#### 5.2.1 Causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan

• OBJECTIVE ONE:

The respondents identified the following as the causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan:

• CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN

- ❖ Unequal distribution income from the sale of oil.
- ❖ Corruption and nepotism within the government system.
- ❖ Poverty
- ❖ Unfair allocation of political positions.
- ❖ Power struggles among the political elites.

The first objective of this study was to investigate the causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan. In this respect, the study findings reported in Table 4.8 indicate that the major causes of ethnic conflict in South Sudan are unfair allocation of political positions, corruption and

nepotism within the government system and power struggles among the elites. Other factors such as unequal distribution of revenue from oil resources, poverty, illiteracy and lack of clear awareness of the negative consequences of violent conflict, government bureaucracy, lack of visionary leaders, selfishness and ethnocentric policies and competition over limited resources featured among the causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan. This statement is in disagreement with the concept that ethnicity is one of the main causes of the conflict in South Sudan.

The study findings are in agreement with Nafziger et al (2006), which outlined the case that the causes of civil conflicts come from social, cultural and political factors, where wide economic gap between the citizens and the elites results to frustration on the citizens who experience the consequences of poverty and thus make them to resort to armed rebellion as a solution to their problems. The study findings are also similar to the work of Irobi (2005), who opined that economic factors are the major causes of conflicts in Africa. He argued that competition for scarce resources is a common feature that is inherent in almost all ethnic conflicts in Africa. The nexus between poverty and conflict is widely considered from two standpoints. First, poverty makes countries to be more prone to civil war. Second, armed conflict weakens governance and economic performance, thus increasing the risk of conflict relapse and continued rights violation (Goodhand, 2001). Bardhan (1997), for example, argued how economic factors directly linked to inter-ethnic economic competition often become the source of ethnic conflict in underdeveloped countries. Fearon and Laitin (2003), identified macro-level factors that made countries more likely to experience armed conflict. They argue that countries with low per capita income and large populations correlate with

civil war, whereas ethnic and religious diversity does not make countries more prone to conflict.

Other scholars such as Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) examined the processes and mechanisms that precipitate and shape violence on the ground. The study concluded that at the state level, poverty can lower resilience to conflict by weakening government institutions, stripping capacity for public goods provision, and limiting the projection of power and authority, whether soft or coercive. Besides, poverty can serve as an impediment to insurgency at the individual and community levels by decreasing the opportunity cost of mobilizing for violence. However, high rates of unemployment and inequality, coupled with high levels of illiteracy and hopelessness, are considered to provide motives for violent confrontation and therefore makes recruitment of fighters undemanding (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008: 48).

The above-mentioned individual correlates of poverty often follow systematic patterns that lead to “horizontal inequalities”, which occurs when members of ethnic, religious, or other identity groups have unequal access to public goods, opportunities and resources (Ostby, 2008; Stewart, 2009). In sociology, it is considered as a form of forced inequality between different culturally formed groups and subcultures living in the same society, while in economics, it is seen when people of similar origin, intelligence, do not have equal success and instead experience parity in status, income and wealth due to overt discrimination, exclusivity of public goods, and unfair access to resources that increases the risk of violent conflict.

Furthermore, the study findings also share similarity with Langer, Mustapha and Stewart (2009) who in their study on ethnicity and conflicts in Nigeria, reported that since the decolonization era in Africa, different ethnic groups have been in competition over representation in government and state institutions. Often, this led to feelings of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, race or religion among the groups that were inadequately represented, which in turn provoked tensions and conflicts, culminating into civil wars.

Other studies such as Prasad (2008: 957) and Angstrom (2000) suggest that modernization and development are the major sources of ethnic conflict. Prasad (2008) reported that modernization and development cause multiple ethnic identities to be created by aspiring elites in the struggle for power, wealth and security and consequently, violent ethnic conflicts arises between ethnic groups as modernization tends to progress unequally. Furthermore, Angstrom (2000) documented that because modernization and development provide the elites with the incentives to manipulate ethnicity to gain power and wealth, ethnic conflicts are likely to occur between ethnic groups as a result. These results, however, do not concur with Ihonvbere (1996), who argues that the main source of conflict in Africa is that the continent is characterized by militarization of its societies, which gives conflicts a credible means of addressing divergences.

In South Sudan context, the findings are partially related to De Waal, (2014), who reported that since the country's independence, the government has largely squandered its economic potential and political goodwill, becoming a kleptocracy where political power is leveraged to secure wealth. Apparently, South Sudan's leadership has been dominated by rotating set of elites who move seamlessly between positions in government and the frontlines of the

rebellion, as political situations change. Most of these individuals had played leading roles in the country 's economic and political decisions in the post-independence government and after being pushed out of government, many joined a political opposition bloc that soon developed into an armed opposition. As a result, political appointments in South Sudan are mainly a means of political settlement, and rarely based on merit, thus encouraging recklessness and impunity among government officials.

It was also observed from the findings that corruption is a serious problem in South Sudan. Although corruption on its own cannot lead to conflict, but its attendant impact on service delivery can culminate to a violent reaction from the citizens. In a study by the National Democratic Institute in 2007, which explored South Sudanese citizens' views and perception of corruption, found that South Sudanese people understood corruption to mean both tribalism/nepotism and the misuse of public funds. The findings further revealed that citizens were very concerned about corruption in their government; embezzlement of public funds was perceived to be pervasive, along with tribalism that promotes public employment for members of a particular ethnic tribe, were viewed as extremely detrimental and a main form of abuse of public office. Thus, among the South Sudanese people, corruption is considered as a hindrance to service delivery, development and a propellant of horizontal inequalities. Obviously, corruption affects the provision of services such as healthcare, and education of which the latter (itineracy) is a factor that contributes to ethnic divisions, wide economic gaps among different ethnic nationalities and invariably results in conflict among the people of South Sudan. The findings also coincide with those of (Madut, 2015) who noted that independence of South Sudan did not affect anticipated change in citizens' welfare nor strengthen political will to eradicate discrimination, marginalization and injustice.

Another cause of ethnic conflict in South Sudan is the manipulation of ethnic identity by the leaders. It is observed that ethnic division is considered by the elites as a political tool that is intended to propel their political dominance and control, while keeping others away from the center of power. As a result, instead of addressing socio-economic development in the country, the elites propagate ideologies that fuel ethno-tribal sentiments for personal gain, while hindering the country's socio-economic and political development. Such ill-conceived mentality among the elites has resulted in them pitching different ethnicities against each other for personal aggrandizement.

#### **5.2.1.1 Understanding the Causes of the Conflict in South Sudan**

The Conflict in South Sudan has a complex dimension that requires proper analysis and because of that complexity, the researcher has decided to use the conflict tree after identifying the variables. The best tool that seems fits to analyze the causes and the effects of the ethnicity in the South Sudan conflicts is the Conflict Tree. The conflict tree is a visual tool used in analyzing conflicts by connecting the causes with the effects and identifying the real problem. The tool is helpful and gives practical presentation to better understand the prioritized conflict dynamics. It also helps in understanding how and why conflict originates and the sequence of contributing causes. The conflict tree as a tool was used in many conflict analyses worldwide and among them; the tool was used to analyze the Kenya post-election conflict (Roberts, 2009).

The tool is employed here to study the root causes of the conflicts and the effects as outlined in the figure below and the links between the causes and effects to the state function. The major cause but not limited to are the corruption, unfair allocation of political positions, nepotism, power struggles among others. These causes have clearly affected the state

function and the results are in term of ethnic bias, sentiments, prejudice and many more. To some extent, the mediators did not paid attention to the difference between cause and consequence of violence. After six years of continuous mediation and reaching agreements at different times with some peace agreements and ceasefire agreements signed but rarely respected. It is now increasingly difficult to imagine because neither government nor oppositions are not to be committed to what they signed rather to the power sharing and their protection not interest of the South Sudanese. The question that everybody wants to ask is if the solution to political tensions and ethnic conflicts does not lie in a power-sharing agreement between government and oppositions, what would a solution look like?

Bringing genuine peace requires finding ways to avoid binary narratives, including in interpretations of local conflicts as being trickle-down versions of a fight within the political and military elites. This means that the government, the opposition, and the international community need to acknowledge that the entire country is affected by the war, and that there are many more parties involved than only the government on the one hand and the—already divided—oppositions on the other. Without addressing such grievances in the peace agreement contributes to its failure, the spread of violence, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. The elites have proven that peace is not what they strive for—so attention needs to be paid to those people who crave for a peaceful and a more just South Sudan.

The Statehood in South Sudan has been in question since the outbreak of the war in 2013. The state has faced some challenges in all main sectors; security, the economy, and access to basic services. With the trend of events of the recent past, and no decisive action to reverse the trends, the situation will certainly continue to deteriorate if amicable solution to the


ongoing conflict is not found and the state collapse is eminent. To support such assumption, first, the lack of political will to implement the key provisions in the 2018 Revitalized peace agreement which can shift the crisis from military to genuine and inclusive political and non-violent politics. Secondly, there are numbers of armed groups emerging of which many of them are not signatories to the peace agreement and are not committed to the ceasefire. This proliferation of armed group points to a surge in the scale of hostilities, which in turn fuels the alarming displacement of citizens

There was a debate whether South Sudan's birth was premature, this is not correct because South Sudan was more than ripe for the birth of statehood. The overwhelming majority vote for independence is the most precise and authoritative indication that the people have chosen their destiny of independence, but the point was about what next after the birth of this country. South Sudanese were not given an opportunity to establish a social contract and decide on a national vision for the country, the confusion over "what next" grew. That situation evolved into a dispute in the ruling party, the SPLM [Sudan People's Liberation Movement], over which direction to lead the country. Inter-community dialogues were needed to agree on the important issues of power sharing among citizens of different regions and communities—and not only those with guns. There are other issues, such as system of governance and resource sharing.

As such, the below analysis presented the situation of the South Sudan conflict and how the Statehood is affected. (Fig. 2:2). The analysis focused only on the possible root causes of the ethnic conflicts and its effects without going further to the actors, however, the researcher added a new element to the tree, which he described as fallen fruits or values. These fruits or values have fallen not because they are ripe enough or ready for consumption but because

they can't continue hanging up while the situation affected them to extend of loosing the strength. Therefore, their falls attributed to many factors among them the strong wind that came as result of conflict tense, unfavorable environment and the hatred. These fruits or values can be good for use if the conflict did not reached that level as described by the effects. These represented some of the values, which are not in existent because of the conflict in the country. The absent of such values has brought about negative impact to the situation. Therefore, without embracing such values, the statehood will be in question and there is likelihood of its collapse. These values include community dialogue, respect of minority's rights, national identity and loyalty. The study as well discussed the possible strategically remedies that can help in ending such conflicts as per the objectives of the study (Obj.3).

**Figure 11: 5:1 South Sudan Conflict Tree**



By Researcher, 2018

### 5.2.2 The effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan.

#### • OBJECTIVE TWO:

The respondents identified the following as the some of the effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan:

#### • EFFECTS OF ETHNIC LOYALTY ON STATEHOOD IN SOUTH SUDAN

- ❖ Ethnic bias
- ❖ Sentiment
- ❖ Prejudice
- ❖ Mistrust
- ❖ Ethnic division
- ❖ Identity issue
- ❖ Segregation
- ❖ Ethnic mobilization

The second objective of this study was to examine the effect of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan. The study findings reported in Table 4.9 indicate that ethnic loyalty has negative and significant effect on statehood in South Sudan. This is evident in the ethnic loyalty coefficient of 0.22 with the corresponding p-value of 0.00. This implies that ethnic loyalty, which is associated with ethnic bias, sentiment and prejudice has an unfavorable impact on the statehood in South Sudan. This finding can actually be related to the way South Sudanese prioritize their ethnic identity over national identity. Being loyal to one's ethnic group should not be seen as a problem, but it becomes a concern when such loyalty become above the national loyalty and being used to against others as a means to achieve self-interests. The challenge in this particular case is that the elites have leveraged on ethnic loyalty to their personal gratification at the detriment of statehood.

This finding agrees with the results of Horowitz (2000) who documented, different cases where ethnic loyalty and diversity relates to nationalism. Horowitz reported that tensions

arising from ethnic diversity was the principal trigger of genocide in Rwanda, violent riots in the Democratic Republic of Congo, civilian mass killings in Burundi, army killings in Uganda, long civil war between North Arabs and Africans in the Southern Sudan and repeated hostilities in Chad that have occurred during the last two decades of the 20th century. Obviously, when ethnic and State interests cannot be reconciled, there is always an attendant impact on the statehood and this rings true of the present situation in South Sudan, where tribal affiliation seem to take center stage in national issues and considerations. In South Sudan, strong ethnic sentiments orchestrated by the elites through agitation and propaganda, as well as ethnic struggles over land and identity have resulted in violent disputes. In other places such as Rwanda and Burundi, same has led to 'ethnic cleansing' and civil war. Apparently, the impact these conflicts have on the lives of many thousands of individuals and families and the structure of the state usually present a challenge to statehood.

It may not be wrong to state that ethnic loyalty undermines the concept of 'web of relationship' proposed by John-Paul Lederach. According to Lederach, building 'web of relationship' is the only feasible way to live in harmony within diversities (Lederach, 2005). Lederach's argument is that people should be connected just like the 'cobweb' - a situation where each and every member of the society interconnects and whereby members are affected by the success and failure of others. In this case, an appreciation by the group members that the failure of a member will impact on all members of the group becomes a consideration and motivation for empathy among members. Ethnic loyalty however is an antithesis to the above-mentioned presumptions of Lederach, as it creates dissension, threatens peaceful coexistence and by implication presents a challenge to statehood.

Ethnic loyalty in South Sudan creates division and disunity among different ethnic groups, making it difficult for the country to forge ahead as a unified front for national interest. This specific finding is in line with Van der Stoel (2001), which argues that in multi-ethnic societies the main problem is always associated with accommodating nationhood within statehood. This is to say that the marginalization of some ethnic groups by others is a recipe for violence and a threat to statehood. This could be related to South Sudan in that two main ethnic groups: the Dinka and Nuer have consistently dominated the political and economic landscape of the country, fueling a sense of neglect and marginalization by other ethnic groups, which threatens national unity and the statehood in South Sudan.

### 5.2.3 The impacts of ethnic conflict on statehood in South Sudan

#### • OBJECTIVE THREE:

This objective was analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively and the following came out as the impact on statehood in South Sudan:

#### • IMPACT OF ETHNIC CONFLICT ON STATEHOOD IN SOUTH SUDAN

- ❖ The quantitative data reveals that ethnic conflict does not have any significant or direct impact on the statehood in South Sudan.
- ❖ However, the qualitative data differs as it indicates that ethnic conflict has a direct adverse impact on the statehood in South Sudan.

The third objective of this study was to evaluate the impact of ethnic conflict on statehood in South Sudan. Before presenting the study findings on this objective, it is important to highlight on the nature of the ongoing conflict. South Sudan gained independence in 2011,

after fulfilling the declarative requirements of a state in international law. However, the tools needed to build a sovereign state were lacking and thus, the country descended rapidly into a bloody civil war. The conflict has been described with different connotations such as: resources conflict, ethnic conflict and power tussle among the elites as the actual nomenclature of the conflict. Although there are variations in analysis and interpretation of the actual nature of the conflict, the reality is that the conflict possesses elements of each and every of the identified nature of the conflict. Whatever the case may be, the reality is that the ongoing conflict is being fought along ethnic lines. For clarity sake, an ethnic conflict is a conflict between two or more contending ethnic groups. While the source of the conflict may be political, social, economic or religious, the individuals in such a conflict expressly fight for their ethnic group's position within the society. Obviously, the conflict in South Sudan is not caused by ethnic diversity, however the fighting is organized along ethnic lines - mainly between the Dinka and Nuer.

Having provided the above overview, the findings from the study reported in Table 4.10 shows that ethnic conflict does not have any significant impact on the statehood in South Sudan. This is revealed in the ethnic conflict coefficient of 0.04 with the corresponding p-value of 0.15. The finding indicates that although ethnic conflict may have negative impact on the population in terms of peaceful coexistence and solidarity, it does not have a direct impact on the statehood in South Sudan. This finding is in line with David and Rothchild (1996), which states that the main goal of ethnic conflicts is control of the state and exemption from control by others. That is to say that the target or end goal of an ethnic conflict is to gain control of the state and not necessarily to impede the functionality of the state.

Considering the above, ethnic conflict therefore has no significant direct impact on the statehood in South Sudan, as its main focus is on acquirement of power and control of state apparatus by the different conflicting groups. But at the same time, the findings show that ethnic conflict has impact on other factors that may affect the dynamics of relationship between the state and the citizens. For example, the study findings reveal that human rights violation is a major feature of the ongoing conflict. Table 4.10 indicates that rights violation has a mean score of 4.46, which denotes gross violation of the citizen's fundamental rights. According to Thoms and Ron (2007) gross human rights violations refer to the systemic infringement of international human rights law by states or state institutions either intentionally or by act of negligence. In this case, killing, torture, forced displacement, genocide and slavery constitute gross violations of human rights, where the violation of human rights is regarded as one of the direct triggers of conflicts and wars within a state. According to the New York Times, the conflict in South Sudan has caused about 383,000 deaths and another 4,000,000 million has been displaced internally or across the border as refugees in neighboring countries (Williams, 2018). Also, the conflict has incapacitated the government from providing basic services to the citizens, which complicates their living condition and serves as an incubator for violence.

Although the quantitative data indicates that ethnic conflict has no significant effect on Statehood in South Sudan, the qualitative data differs. The qualitative data shows that ethnic conflict has a direct adverse impact on the statehood in South Sudan. It contends that ethnic conflict hampers the maintenance of law and order, which threatens the statehood in the country. Besides, ethnic conflict has caused the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent people; many others have lost their property and means of livelihood, while others have been

forcefully displaced as refugees in neighboring countries. In essence, ethnic conflicts have incapacitated the state's ability to perform its main function of protecting lives and property. Thus, qualitative data suggests that ethnic conflict has a negative impact on the statehood in South Sudan.

#### 5.2.4 The strategic remedies to mitigate ethnic conflicts in South Sudan

##### • OBJECTIVE FOUR:

the respondents identified the following are the Strategic Remedies to mitigate Ethnic Conflicts in South Sudan:

##### • STRATEGIC REMEDIES TO MITIGATE ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN SOUTH SUDAN

- ❖ Respect for each other's sovereignty
- ❖ Political stability and an accepted form of governance by all South Sudanese.
- ❖ Respect for ethnic communities' boundary.
- ❖ Fair allocation of national resources.
- ❖ Re-division of South Sudan into new administration units
- ❖ Full implementation of the 2018 revitalized peace agreement
- ❖ Elimination of the culture of impunity and control of information technology

The fourth objective of the study was to determine the strategic remedies to mitigate ethnic conflicts in South Sudan. The study findings reported in Table 4.11 shows that the major solutions to mitigate ethnic conflict in South Sudan are respect for ethnic nationalities' which implies respect for minority rights and consideration of their long-term interests in the South Sudan state affairs; fair allocation of state powers and national resources, a restructure of the modalities of coexistence through ethnic dialogue. Other remedial measures to end ethnic conflict in South Sudan, include respect for ethnic communities' boundary, promotion of friendly cooperation among ethnic groups, restructuring of state administrative organs into units that are fairly represented in terms of ethnic affiliations and spread across the different

regions, full implementation of the 2018 revitalized peace agreement - particularly, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), elimination of the culture of impunity among the elites and control of information technology as a mechanism for the spread of propaganda and other conflict propelling narratives.

As reported in table 4.11, respect for the nationhood of each ethnic group among the several ethnicities in South Sudan and taking their long-term interests into consideration has a greater capability towards a permanent solution to ethnic conflict in the country. Furthermore, the findings indicate that fair allocation of resources among the regions and territories of South Sudan is another factor that can breach violence. Thus, it calls for inclusive governance, which is considered as a significant milestone in realizing democracy and peace dividends in South Sudan. This finding correlates with Radon and Logan (2014), which uphold that in South Sudan, the exercise of inclusivity has been marred with contradictions between constitutional provision and existing practices. The situation in South Sudan is one that political parties are found to be the focal point for rewarding the warlord's dubbed as freedom fighters at the expense of participatory civilian structures, exercise of centralized nomination system, the nerves of ethnic factionalism over nationalism, all of which breed disaffection and tensions among the population (Radon and Logan, 2014: 37).

According to De Waal (2014), South Sudan is characterized by militarization of public service, perception of ethnic favoritism in public employment and appointments, marginalization of regions outside urban centers and unequal share of national resources. Apparently, these factors comprise practices that violate the foundations of inclusive governance and propel the country to the margins of conflict. Respect for ethnic and community boundaries was also identified amongst the higher mean scorers. This finding

implies that the mismatch between ethnic nationalities interest is the main factor contributing to instability, ethnic conflicts and civil war due to nationalities that resist absorption or ethnic groups that seek to dominate the others.

#### **5.4 Conclusions**

Ethnic diversity is a natural feature that characterizes Africa in general and also present in other nations across the globe. Perceptibly, ethnic diversity presents a challenge to peaceful coexistence, but countries that embrace diversity and accept its virtues thrive. Ethnic division has challenged post-cold war Africa more-than any other continent, of which South Sudan is not an exception. Whenever internal ethnic divisions and conflicts prevail among communities and uncertainty triumphs, the core of durable peace and stability is effectively compromised. Such state of affairs, which provokes social, political and economic grievances, usually lead to entrenched insecurity, as manifested in the ongoing conflicts within and between the various South Sudanese communities over issues related to resources, power-sharing, land and boundaries. The prevailing ethnic disharmony, the sporadic but deeply disruptive ethnic manipulated conflicts with its attendant human casualties, shows that tackling ethnic sentiments and loyalty should be accorded the highest priority in order to enhance national cohesion and put South Sudan on the path of stability, durable peace and prosperity.

The study from the quantitative data analysis concludes that Ethnic Conflicts do not pose any direct challenge to statehood in South Sudan; rather ethnic loyalty presents some challenges. When people are more concerned with the welfare and ideology of their ethnic affiliation against the interest of other ethnic nationalities in a multi-ethnic society, the consequent denial of access to resources and other forms of marginalization endured by the other ethnic

groups often result in violent engagement and eventually lead to Protracted Social Conflict. Thus, the study disagrees with the assumption that multi-ethnicity is a source of violent conflict. Although, it is a fact that when inter-ethnic division, sentiment and hatred is whipped up, they may lead to violent confrontation, but that does not mean that violent conflict is inevitable in multi-ethnic settings. In fact, the study concludes that inter-ethnic conflicts can be avoided. Respect for human rights, a democratic and representative political system based on the rule of law, effective legislation to protect minority rights, and mechanisms to allow for minority participation can increase the chances of a peaceful multi-cultural coexistence. So too is responsible leadership from members of the majority and minority communities.

As part of the conflict resolution and peace-building approach, the government of South Sudan and its stakeholders should engage ethnic groups and communities in comprehensive interactive dialogues and develop a blueprint for peaceful coexistence among different ethnic nationalities, while emphasis should be given to land reform. On the issue of land reform, whether it will involve land redistribution, redefinition or the maintenance of property rights, there should be a consideration of the poignant attachment to land by different ethnicities in South Sudan. Besides, policies should be promulgated to promote sustainable land use and the development of resources.

These noble goals are realizable if the people of South Sudan can embrace their diversity to consolidate national unity. In doing so, the government should enlist the influence and power of ethnic leaders to mobilize their supporters to accept and collaborate in a sustained inter-ethnic cooperation. In fact, ethnic diversity is an asset that should be capitalized upon to help South Sudan overcome its current and future challenges. The government should ensure that the dividends of a sovereign South Sudan trickles down to the entire population, which will

in turn, cultivate a sense of belongingness and perpetuate collaboration among the state and the populace. That is to say that the sense of belonging to a nation that cares for its citizens should not be limited to ethnic leaders alone, but should permeate the different layers of the society, whereby every citizen can access and benefit from national resources. In addition, there should be a sense of obligation by the ruling parties and elites to cooperate with the traditional leaders, while reciprocation is expected from the later, so as to encourage self-perpetuating cycle of mutual trust that would strengthen internal cohesion.

## 5.5 Recommendations

In view of the study objectives, the following recommendations are provided for both national actors and international actors to address the issues of ethnic conflicts:

### 5.5.1 Causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan

- ✓ *Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Mechanism (TJRM) with support of the International Partners*
- ✓ *Full democratization of the polity (Affirmative action packages for disadvantaged (minority) groups in form of quota systems)*
- ✓ *Decentralization and restructuring of the governance process.*

In the first object of the study, the issues identified includes unfair allocation of political positions, corruption and nepotism within the government system and power struggles among the elites as the major causes of conflict. Other factors include unequal distribution of revenue from oil resources, poverty, and illiteracy among others. First

and foremost, it is important to emphasize that ethnic conflicts in South Sudan are real, but they can be managed through national efforts that privilege reconciliation and power sharing. As in most post-colonial African states, ethnic conflicts often reflect elite insecurities rather than widespread animosities among communities. The other lesson that is significant from across Africa is that ethnic mobilization camouflages class and individualistic interests that

are detached from the broad objectives of nation-building and development. The study therefore recommends the following:

Firstly, the government of South Sudan should establish a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Mechanism (TJRM) with the goal of enhancing justice, forgiveness, healing and reintegration of the offenders and the offended. This is very important considering the magnitude of atrocities committed against the population since the beginning of the ongoing civil war. The recommended panel will constitute of South Sudan citizens of different social-economic status. Thus, the TJRM is expected to adopt the model of the Gacaca Court in Rwanda, where the judges and facilitators of justice and reconciliation comprised of ordinary and everyday Rwandese, even those without formal legal education. The Justice and Reconciliation Panel (JRP) will address the atrocities committed against the citizens of South Sudan since the beginning of the civil war with a focus on providing an environment for acceptance of guilt, punishment, forgiveness, healing and reconciliation. Thus, the panel will emphasize restorative, rather than retributive justice.

Secondly, there should be a full democratization of the polity. The recommendation here is that democracy should be practiced in South Sudan in a way that every citizen will have the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process either directly or remotely via representatives. Thus, democratic process should be open, transparent, fair and practiced within firmly and generally accepted rules of the game. Room should be made for a normative dimension that consists of the acceptance of majority rule, protection of individual and minority rights and the safeguard of the interests of disadvantaged groups. Obviously, democracy permits the majority to determine the direction of events in terms of electoral outcomes and accepts the rationality of the people in making decisions that affect them; it

however allows the majority to choose their leaders and decide when to change such leaders while the minority are accorded a say in terms of how the values of the society are authoritatively allocated.

In light of the above, the study recommends that the government of South Sudan should create affirmative action packages for disadvantaged (minority) groups, which will emphasize the “management of diversity”. Accordingly, the structure of governance should be constitutionally reviewed to make way for a government of national unity through power sharing mechanisms that appreciates proportionality rather than “survival of the fittest”. Fair ethnic representation in state affairs is therefore the key to dowsing discontent and grievances. The study believes that a genuine South Sudan that will be appreciated by its citizens would likely emerge through human equality; popular sovereignty; majority rule and the principle of government by popular consideration and consent – an all-inclusive government.

Thirdly, there is need for decentralization and restructuring of the governance process in South Sudan. The dynamics of the ongoing civil war shows that there is need to decentralize governance and restructure the governance system. In doing so, the starting point is to limit the powers and responsibilities of the federal government through regional decentralization. In this case, the three existing regions should be formally constituted as regional governments to which a substantial quantum of the powers and resources currently held by the federal government (including the police and sundry agencies of government) would be conceded to. The regional governments will then develop their own constitution, albeit deriving existence from the national constitution, but will be accorded powers to decide how and through what structures to deliver governance at the local level.

It is believed that when governance is decentralized in this manner and the three regions are turned into governance structures superintending the States and Local Governments, a dispersion of the centers of governance will occur thus, removing the attraction for acute competition over the imperial central government, and by implication make the country much more unified and stable. With regional governments in place, conflicts will be likely curtailed at regional levels with less possibility to attain the status of a national crisis in terms of spreading to engulf the entire nation. The logic here is that as long as the pockets of instability do not occur simultaneously within the regions, they will constitute little or no overall threat to national peace and stability.

#### **5.5.2 The effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan**

*Convene a 'Sovereign National Conference of Ethnic Nationalities' (the goal of the conference will be to produce a blueprint or working template that will address issues relating to land ownership and boundaries, resources utilization, access to power and education)*

Objective two which examine the effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan, the study is recommending that the government of South Sudan should convene a 'Sovereign National Conference of Ethnic Nationalities', where all the ethnic groups will be fairly represented and with a mandate to develop a blueprint on how best the country can move forward peacefully. The idea here is that a National Conference will provide a forum where all ethnic groups and nationalities can express their grievances and offer ideas on how to recompose South Sudan. This forum will provide the opportunity for different ethnic groups to seat together and reach a consensus on how the nation should be structured, how rights will be protected and how a truly democratic South Sudan can be achieved. This national conference will encourage the various ethnic nationalities to state categorically those things that will make them shift allegiance, loyalty

and patriotism from the level of their ethnic nationalities to that of the nation at large. Among other task of the national conference will be to produce a blueprint or working template that will address issues relating to land ownership and boundaries, resources utilization, access to power and education.

The pertinent questions to ask will be: who will sponsor the suggested conference? What will the composition look like? On the first question, the government of South Sudan should take the responsibility of sponsoring the conference. Then on the second question, it is estimated that South Sudan has more-than 60 distinct ethnic groups including two major ethnicities; Dinka and Nuer. Therefore, it is recommended that the Sovereign National Conference starts with a regional conference, whereby each ethnic group will send representatives to an initial conference at the respective regions. It is believed that the regional conferences would address and harmonized some of the positions or grievances of the respective ethnic groups, subsequently, each ethnic group will be represented by fewer representatives at the national conference to present the positions of their respective ethnic nationality. The study also acknowledge that it may be slow and demanding to change ethnic loyalty built over a long period of time. But the logic of this recommendation is that ethnic identities are not fixed but can change a great deal over time through a slow process of political, social and economic transformation that incorporates the interest of the diverse ethnic groups.

### 5.5.3 The impacts of ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan

- ✓ *Formulation of a unifying national agenda/ "Federal Character" Measure (effective participation of national minorities in leadership and public life).*
- ✓ *Reformation of the electoral system to capture minority representation through introduction of quota system.*

Objective three which evaluate the impact of ethnic conflicts here recognized the heterogeneous nature of South Sudan society, the study recommends that the leaders of South Sudan and other elites should look beyond ethnic differences and formulate unifying national agenda that will address and consign ethnic sentiments to second place in

terms of priority. One of the major challenges faced by South Sudan is that it is over-shadowed by three (3) main ethnic groups (Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk), therefore, to get the country functioning properly, they government should eradicate this biased representation of the country and instead drive a new national narrative that will conscientize the people of South Sudan on the need for a holistic consideration of the country's ethnic diversity, whereby the different ethnic groups will be incorporated and represented in national issues and power sharing arrangements. On this note, the general principle is that effective participation of national minorities in leadership and public life is an essential component of a peaceful and democratic society. This can be done through adopting a policy of "federal character", whereby a constitutional review will consider fair representation of all ethnic groups in South Sudan in all spheres of governance and state representation. In this case, recruitment into the different arms of government and government institutions should consider the wider ethnic representation. Then, the electoral system should also be reformed to facilitate minority representation and influence. That is to say that federal elections should be structured in a way to capture representatives from all ethnic nationalities in the country.

#### 5.5.4 The strategic remedies to mitigate ethnic conflicts in South Sudan

- ✓ *Establishment of conflict mitigation or an intervention mechanism to be reinforced by the regional entities with support from international community*
- ✓ *Introduction of Youth National Services Program aimed at empowering the youths (national youth skill acquisition program and startup funds for youths).*
- ✓ *Prioritizing education and offering reward package to parents*
- ✓ *Conduct national dialogue with participation of all ethnic groups, political parties and Civil Society organizations.*

The major factors propelling ethnic loyalty in South Sudan are poverty and illiteracy. Most ethnic groups in South Sudan are marginalized, limiting their access to needs and means of livelihood. Consequently, there is a need for the government to develop economic intervention mechanisms that will encompass business training and startup funds for youths. In this case, it is recommended that the government should initiate a mass ‘national youth skill acquisition program’, where the government will facilitate training of youths on skill acquisition and thereafter provide business start capital for the trainees. It is believed that engaging the youths in

gainful businesses and other economic activities will definitely reduce their attraction to violence, as their economic status improves.

Another factor that sustains ethnic loyalty is illiteracy; therefore, the study recommends that the government of South Sudan should make education a priority. The country occupies an unenviable position on world education ranking and therefore the government should pursue a mass education policy that will address the educational needs of both the young and older generations. It is important to note that the government merely pursuing a mass free education program will not be a solution, instead education should be made attractive to the population particularly to parents. One way of doing this is to provide free education that will include

free educational materials for pupils. Then, the government through the district/ local council should establish a reward package for parents whose child(ren) are registered in school. For example, parents can be rewarded with a goat or cow if their child(ren) did not miss school for the whole term or academic year. That alone will be enough encouragement for parents to ensure that their children attend school regularly. Also, there could be provision for stipend for parents to cover the income their children would have brought home if they chose to go to work or hunt instead of going to school. The logic here is that a significant improvement in the literacy level, particularly among the youths of South Sudan, will liberate them from the shackles and grip of manipulation by the elites, which apparently fuels ethnic sentiment and loyalty.

Finally, it is important to note that although the above recommendations are limited to internal actions and capacity, it does not mean that inputs from regional and international actors cannot help South Sudan to move forward, instead the consideration here is that foreigners cannot determine the pace and shape of urgent measures to work on a constitutional review, demilitarize politics, land ownership and boundary demarcation, resources management, forgiveness and healing. The argument is that South Sudan's present challenge can only be resolved through a national dialogue and consensus agreement that emanates from the people, and which takes into consideration the interest and concerns of the different ethnic nationalities in the country.

## **5.6 Contribution to the Knowledge**

The study contributed to the knowledge in the following ways.

- The study presents how the countries diversity can be harnessed and utilized in a positive manner to create national unity and nation building agenda
- The study reveals that the ongoing civil war is deeply rooted in ethnic differences. As such, resolving the conflict cannot be achieved through signing peace agreements that involves only the elites; instead, the solution should be sorted from the grassroots.
- The study provided a guideline for regional and international actors on how to re-strategize and adopt a holistic approach towards resolving the conflicts in South Sudan instead of the ineffective “top-down approach” that is currently used in most of the peace talks and benefits only leaders by agreeing on the power sharing formula and neglect the bigger population and this failed in addressing the conflicts.
- Study further reveals that some few ethnic groups claim obligation of being left by the colonizing powers are the permanent rulers and are always right.
- It serves as a reference for future researchers, particularly those interesting in issues of ethnicity and governance in South Sudan or in other African countries.

## **5.7 Recommended areas for further studies**

To compliment the knowledge brought out in this research, the study recommends the following areas for further research:

- i. A comprehensive assessment of the role and strategies of IGAD countries in South Sudan in both war and peace times and their intervention in the peace process
- ii. The Resources ownership and/or allocation/management and its impact in state viability in South Sudan
- iii. The Challenges of transitions in South Sudan and the state building agenda

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**APPENDIX I: MAP OF SOUTH SUDAN SHOWING THE THREE REGIONS**



Key:



Greater Bahr el Ghazal Region



Greater Equatoria Region



Greater Upper Nile Region

## APPENDIX II: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE.

Dear Respondent,

I am **TIMOTHY T KULANG**, a PhD Candidate of Kampala International University, pursuing a doctorate degree in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building. As per of my study requirements, I am conducting a research on the topic, “*Ethnicity and the statehood in South Sudan*”. I am kindly requesting that you spare some time out of your busy schedule to fill out this questionnaire. I will be very grateful if the questions are answered with utmost sincerity. I also wish to assure you that all information provided shall be treated with maximum confidentiality and used solely for academic purpose.

### SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENT

You are requested to kindly provide demographic information about yourself in the questions below. Please answer all questions and indicate your response by ticking (√) in the appropriate box as requested.

S/N	VARIABLE	(√)	For Official Use
<b>1.</b>	<b>Gender</b>		
<b>a)</b>	Male		1
<b>b)</b>	Female		2
<b>2.</b>	<b>Level of Education</b>		
<b>a)</b>	Uneducated		1
<b>b)</b>	Primary		2
<b>c)</b>	Secondary		3
<b>d)</b>	Tertiary		4
<b>3.</b>	<b>Age in Years</b>		
<b>a)</b>	18-29		1
<b>b)</b>	30-39		2

c)	40-49		3
d)	50- above		4
<b>4.</b>	<b>Years of Work Experience</b>		
a)	0-5 yrs		1
b)	6-10 yrs		2
c)	11-15 yrs		3
d)	16 and above		4

### INSTRUCTION

For sections B, C and D, kindly indicate (tick) your level of agreement or disagreement with the questions following the rating scale below.

Response Mode	Rating Scale
Strongly Agree	5
Agree	4
Not sure	3
Disagree	2
Strongly disagree	1

### SECTION B: QUESTIONS ON CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN SOUTH SUDAN

B	Causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan	5	4	3	2	1
1	An unequal distribution of the money that come from the sale of oil					
2	Corruption and nepotism within the government system					
3	Poverty as a major cause of the conflict					

4	Unfair allocation of political positions (question of power)					
5	Power struggles among the elites					
6	Differences in religion and belief					
7	Different tribes that are living in South Sudan are the problem					
8	Primitivism and ignorance among the ethnic groups					
9	Lack of awareness about the negative consequences of conflicts					
10	Bureaucratic leadership style practiced by the leaders					
11	Lack of competent leaders to deal with the situation					
12	Selfishness and ethnocentric policies					
13	Competition over the scare resources					
14	Conflicts caused by the colonial regimes					
15	Main cause lies on cultural beliefs					
16	Ethnic groupings such as its history, traditions, and customs.					
17	Absence of viable ethnic interaction groups other than their own					
18	Would be better if different ethnic groups didn't try to mix together.					
19	Having alot of pride in their ethnic group and its accomplishments.					
20	Association with people from other ethnic groups can be suspicious.					
21	Feeling good about their cultural or ethnic background.					
22	Having a strong commitment to improve life in their ethnic community.					

**SECTION C: QUESTIONS TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTS ETHNIC LOYALTY ON THE STATEHOOD IN SOUTH SUDAN**

<b>D</b>	<b>Effect Ethnic Loyalty on Statehood in South</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
1	High level of ethnic mobilization in South Sudan					
2	More loyalty to the ethnic affiliation than to the state					
3	Ethnic nepotism					
4	Ethnic segregation among the people					
5	Mistrust among the ethnic groups					
6	Ethnic favour in service delivery					
7	Ethnic politicization of resources					
8	Ethnic marginalization in the state					
9	Widespread ethnic injustices					
10	Hate speeches fuelled the ethnic hatred in South Sudan					
11	Ethnic identification is above national identification					

**SECTION D: QUESTIONS TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTS OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS ON STATEHOOD IN SOUTH SUDAN.**

<b>E</b>	<b>Effects of Ethnic Conflicts on the Statehood in South Sudan</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
1	South Sudan as viable state					
2	High chances of state disintegration in the future					
3	South Sudan is already a weak state					
4	South Sudan is collapse or in process of collapsing					
5	South Sudan is seen as failed state					
6	Issues of poor governance and sovereignty issue					
7	Government bad practices in state institutions					
8	Impunity and unprofessional security organs					

9	Majority of population displaced					
10	Poor territorial control					

**SECTION E: QUESTIONS TO DETERMINE THE STRATEGIC REMEDIES TO END ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN**

<b>F</b>	<b>Remedies to Ethnic Conflicts in South Sudan</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
1	Respect for ethnic nationalities' rights and consideration of their long-term interests in the South Sudan state					
2	Political stability and accepted form of governance by all South Sudanese					
3	Respect for ethnic-communities' boundary					
4	Fair allocation of national resources					
5	Carrying out friendly cooperation					
6	Enhancing communities dialogue can be good tool to resolve the local conflicts which will result into resolution of the national conflict					
7	Re-division of South Sudan into new administration units on new basis					
8	Full implementation of the 2015 peace agreement in South Sudan					
9	Elimination of the culture of impunity					
10	Control of information technology as a mechanism for the spread of conflict to all parts of South Sudan					

### **APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW GUIDE**

Dear Respondent,

My name is Timothy, T. KULANG a student of Kampala International University, Uganda. I am a doctoral candidate in Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies and my research focuses on the effect of ethnicity on the statehood in South Sudan. I appreciate that you were kind enough to spare some time out of your tight schedule to grant this interview. I wish to emphasize that any information you provided will be treated with maximum confidentiality and will solely be used for academic purpose. Also, be informed that you reserve the right to terminate the interview at any point that you feel uncomfortable or choose to discontinue for other reasons.

#### **Causes of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan**

What are the causes of ethnicity conflict in South Sudan?

Though there may be more-than one cause, in your opinion what is the number one factor causing ethnicity conflict in South Sudan?

Do you think that the factor(s) causing conflict in South Sudan are internal factors or external ones?

#### **Effects of ethnic loyalty on statehood in South Sudan**

Why is it that ethnic identify seem to be more appreciable to the people of South Sudan, than their national identity?

Do you think that ethnic loyalty and bias has any effect on the statehood in South Sudan?

#### **Effects of ethnic conflicts on statehood in South Sudan**

Do you think that ethnic conflicts have or may have any effect on the statehood in South Sudan?

If your answer is yes, explain how the ongoing conflict and other ethnic conflicts within South Sudan will affect its Statehood?

#### **Remedies to end ethnic conflict in South Sudan**

In your opinion, what can be the possible solution(s) to ethnic conflicts in South Sudan?

What are the best possible ways to resolve the ongoing conflict in South Sudan?

## APENDIX IV: TRANSMITAL LETTER FROM KIU



**KAMPALA  
INTERNATIONAL  
UNIVERSITY**

Ggaba Road, Kansanga \* PO BOX 20000 Kampala, Uganda  
Tel: 0772365060 Fax: +256 (0) 41 501974 E-mail:  
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*Directorate of Higher Degrees and Research  
Office of the Director*

Our ref. 1153-06467-03103

Friday 4<sup>th</sup> May, 2018

Dear Sir/Madam,

**RE: INTRODUCTION LETTER FOR TIMOTHY TUT KULANG  
REG. NO. 1153-06467-03103**

The above mentioned candidate is a student of Kampala International University pursuing a PhD in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building.

He is currently conducting a research for his dissertation titled, "*Ethnicity and Statehood in South Sudan*".

Your organization has been identified as a valuable source of information pertaining to the research subject of interest. The purpose of this letter therefore is to request you to kindly cooperate and avail the researcher with the pertinent information he may need. It is our ardent belief that the findings from this research will benefit KIU and your organization.

Any information shared with the researcher will be used for academic purposes only and shall be kept with utmost confidentiality.


I appreciate any assistance rendered to the researcher

Yours Sincerely,

Dr. Claire M. Mugasa

**Director**

C.c. DVC, Academic Affairs  
Principal CHSS



*"Exploring the Heights"*