

**BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION IN NORTH
EASTERN NIGERIA**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL
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UGANDA**

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis report is my work and that to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published by another person nor materials which have been accepted for the award of any other degree of the university, except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.

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Date

APPROVAL

This is to certify that this thesis has been submitted to the Directorate of Higher Degree and Research of Kampala International University with my approval as the candidate's thesis supervisor.

Dr. Chidiebere C. Ogbonna

Date

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis report to my wife and children. They have been very inspiring and instrumental to me.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACHPR	African Charter on Human and People's Rights
AU	African Union
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
OAU	Organization of African Union
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations

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ABSTRACT

The insurgency caused by Boko Haram's insurgency is among the primary challenges faced by Nigeria. The group's activities in the North have resulted in thousands of casualties, the displacement of more than one million people, the destruction of hundreds of schools, mosques, churches and government establishments and have ravaged the economy of the region. This study analyzed Boko Haram insurgency and Human Rights violation in North Eastern Nigeria. Accordingly, the study was guided by the following objectives: to evaluate human rights abuses resulting from Boko Haram activities in North Eastern Nigeria; to assess the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on education in North Eastern Nigeria; and to examine Federal government's efforts in combating Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria. The study adopted a case study research design. The sample size was 25 participants who included camp leaders, security agents, local leaders and human rights experts. The research instrument was key informant interviews. The study found out that human rights abuses by Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria, specifically, in the States of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa included: deprivation of right to life, right to education and right to healthcare. Furthermore, the study revealed that Boko-haram broke the education system of northeastern Nigeria by burning down schools, destroying school property and facilities, killing and abducting both the students and the teachers, and using schools and school property to store their ammunition and kill abductees. In addition, the study revealed that the federal government of Nigeria had made concerted efforts to combat Boko-haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria by: use of military offensives, negotiations, alliances with the neighboring countries and western countries such as United States of America (USA) and United Kingdom (UK). The study concluded that Boko-haram insurgency has greatly impacted on the right to life, education, and healthcare. The study made the following recommendations: The government should ensure that right to life is protected first above every other thing. That is, the police and the military should ensure that civilians and their properties are protected from Boko-haram insurgency. In addition, the Federal and States Ministries of Education should ensure that students deprived of educational facilities as a result of the conflict are promptly given access to accessible temporary alternative schools; and the military must ensure that it conducts its operations more professionally in order to minimize collateral casualties and damage to livelihoods.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter covered the background to the study, the statement of the problem, the objectives of the study, the research questions, research hypothesis, significance of the study, scope of the study, and definition of operational key terms.

1.1 Background of the Study

This section captures the historical perspective, theoretical perspective, conceptual perspective and contextual perspective.

1.1.1 Historical Perspective

The emergence of insurgency became more prominent in the 1980s and 1990s when Islamic militancy in pursuit of religious and political goals increased; many militants drawing inspiration from Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution (Jonathan, 2015). In the 1990s, well-known violent acts that targeted civilians were the World Trade Center bombing by Islamic terrorists on February 27, 1993, the Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo on March 20, 1995, and the bombing of Oklahoma City's Murrah Federal Building by Timothy McVeigh on April 19, 1995 (Hoffman, 1998). In the Middle East, 659 people died in Lebanon between 1982 and 1986 in 36 suicide attacks directed against American, French and Israeli forces, by 41 individuals with predominantly leftist political beliefs who were adherents of both the Christian and Muslim religions (Chaliand, 2007).

In Africa, the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency is an ongoing guerrilla campaign waged by the Lord's Resistance Army(LRA) insurgent group since 1987 (Mckinley, 1996). Currently, there is low-level LRA activity in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. The movement is led by Joseph Kony, who proclaims himself the “spokesperson” of God and a spirit medium. It aims to overthrow Yowero Museveni’s Ugandan government and establish a theocratic state based on the Ten Commandments and Acholi tradition (Ruddy & Koen, 1999). The LRA is accused by International Criminal Court of widespread Human Rights violations, including mutilation, torture, slavery, rape, abduction of civilians, the use of child soldiers and a number of massacres (International Criminal Court, 2005). By 2004, the LRA had

abducted more than 20,000 children, while 1.5 million civilians had been displaced and an estimated 100, 000 civilians killed (BBC News, 2004).

In Nigeria, the most dangerous group to cause high level of insurgency is believed to be Boko Haram. Some Scholars traced the origin of the sect to 1995 with Lawan Abubakar as its founder. This school of thought contend that it was when Abubakar left for further studies in Saudi Arabia that the sect then known as Sahaba that Muhammed Yusuf who was also regarded as the leader, took over the affairs of the sect (Ogege et al, 2013). Other school of thought has traced the emergence of Boko-haram to Shehu Sanni, a civil right activist in Northern Nigeria. Apart from the above, numerous expositions on the origin and founder of Boko Haram abound (Uzodike, et al, 2012). A popular opinion about the origin of the current Boko Haram in Nigeria is that it has been founded in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, North-Eastern Nigeria by Ustaz Mallam Muhammed Yusuf. The group later moved to Kanamma in Yobe State in 2004 where it set up a camp called “Afghanistan.” From this camp, it launched attacks on civil society, security agencies and other attributes of western education (Owalade, 2014). Obviously, from the aforementioned origins of Boko Haram, one thing that is clear is the fact that the group was founded by the late Mallam Muhammed Yusuf.

Unarguably, it was under the leadership of the slain Mallam Muhammed Yusuf that Boko Haram became radicalized and gained national and international recognition and collaboration especially with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Abimbola et al, 2012). It should be gainsaid that since 2009, Boko Haram has constituted a serious security challenge in the Northern part of Nigeria and has continued to assume a staggering dimension till date. In 2009, following a spate of attacks against government institutions in the States of Bauchi and Borno, security forces killed Muhammed Yusuf. The death of Muhammed Yusuf led to the ascension Abubakar Shekau as the new leader of Boko Haram. It was during his leadership that Boko Haram launched attacks against objects protected under international law, such as places of worship and schools.

In 2012, tensions within Boko Haram resulted in gradual split of the group between Salafist conservative faction led by Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, and the more dominant, violent faction led by Abubakar Shekau. By 2015, part of the group split into al-Qaeda affiliated Ansaru, and Shekau's faction became ISIL's West Africa branch. In 2013, over 1,000 people died as a result of

the conflict. Furthermore, low levels of education and literacy in Nigeria's North East have been exacerbated by the Boko Haram insurgency. The group has targeted teachers and schools, with more than 910 schools destroyed between 2009 and 2015, and 1,500 forced to close. According to Odinkalu (2014), the closing down of schools have far reaching consequences, including ending the education of many students and the opportunity to get to high education.

1.1.2 Theoretical Perspective

This study was guided by cognitive dissonance theory, which was propagated by Festinger (1957), and affirms that if a person holds two cognitions that are inconsistent with one another, he/she will experience the pressure of an aversive motivational state called cognitive dissonance. According to Nkwede, et al., (2015) this psychological theory defines the propensity of terrorist behavior. Naturally, people seek stability when it comes to their perceptions and desires (cognitive dissonance) and thus they constantly pretend to address their dissonance by breaching this gap either through actions or altering perceptions (Bem, 1967). Therefore, dissonance is not a reaction that arises only due to a lack of basic needs such as safety, satisfying hunger or self-preservation, rather it represents the pervasive human tendency to rationalize (Griffin, 2006).

1.1.3 Conceptual Perspective

Boko Haram is a branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. It has been active in Nigeria since 2009. The name of the group means "Western" or "non-Islamic" education is a sin. The group is active in the north of Nigeria, and wants to impose Islamic law as the only law in Nigeria (BBC News, 2011). It also wants to outlaw education that is not based on Islam in the country. The group sees itself as similar to the Taliban, which are active in Afghanistan. Locally, the group is known as the "Taliban". The official name of the group is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which in Arabic means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" (Chothia, 2011). The group was formed in Maiduguri in 2002. They follow Sunni Islam. Local residents of the area soon called the group Boko Haram. Loosely translated from the local Hausa language, this means Western education is forbidden. Residents gave it the name because of its strong opposition to Western education, which it sees as corrupting Muslims. The term "Boko Haram" comes from the Hausa word 'boko' meaning "Animist, western or otherwise non-Islamic education" and the Arabic word 'haram' figuratively meaning "sin" (literally, "forbidden") (Newman, 2013). Boko Haram opposes not only

Western education, but Western culture and modern science as well. The group also forbids the wearing of shirts and pants and the act of voting in elections. In its view, the Nigerian state is run by non-believers (BBC News, 2011). This study will operationalize the causes of the emergence of Boko Haram as ethnic and religious hatred, economic grievances and lack of political rights and incompetent government.

Insurgency is defined by (Kennedy, 1962) as another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It requires in those situations where we must counter it...a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training. According to the United States Department of Defense (DOD) (2004), insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. O'Neill (2005) defined insurgency as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics. On the other hand, Moore (2007) defined insurgency as a protracted violent conflict in which one or more groups seek to overthrow or fundamentally change the political or social order in a state or region through the use of sustained violence, subversion, social disruption, and political action. According to Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (2007), insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict...an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.

Human Rights is defined by Cassese (1990) as those that are generally “based on an expansive desire to unify the world by drawing up a list of guidelines for all governments...an attempt by the contemporary world to introduce a measure of reason into its history”. On the other hand, Human Rights defined by Brendalyn (1995) as those individual entitlements that every human being possesses by virtue of being human. Human Rights are moral principles or norms that

describe certain standards of human behaviour, and are regularly protected as natural and legal right in municipal and international law (Nkicel, 2010). According to the United Nations (Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948), Human Rights are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human Rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more. Everyone is entitled to these rights, without discrimination.

Human Rights violations occur when actions by state (or non-state) actors abuse, ignore, or deny basic Human Rights (including civil, political, cultural, social, and economic rights). Furthermore, violations of Human Rights can occur when any state or non-state actor breaches any part of the UDHR treaty or other international Human Rights or humanitarian law (Joseph, 2017). In regard to Human Rights violations of United Nations laws, Article 39 of the United Nations Charter designates the UN Security Council (or an appointed authority) as the only tribunal that may determine UN Human Rights violations. Human Rights abuses are monitored by United Nations committees, national institutions and governments and by many independent non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International, International Federation of Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, et cetera. In this study, human rights violations will be operationalized as killing of civilians, abductions, torture and degrading treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, violence against children, attacks against civilian and protected objects, and destruction of property.

1.1.4 Contextual Perspective

The Boko Haram insurgency began in 2009, when the jihadist rebel group Boko Haram started an armed rebellion against the government of Nigeria (BBC News. 24 December 2015). In 2012, tensions within Boko Haram resulted in gradual split of the group between Salafist conservative faction led by Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, and the more dominant, violent faction led by Abubakar Shekau. By 2015, part of the group split into al-Qaeda affiliated Ansaru, and Shekau's faction became Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL's) West Africa branch.

In 2013, over 1,000 people died as a result of the conflict. The violence escalated dramatically in 2014, with 10,849 deaths. (Channel 4 News. 8 May 2014). In 2014, the insurgency spread to

neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger thus becoming a major regional conflict. In 2015, a coalition offensive forced Boko Haram to retreat into the Sambisa Forest. The insurgency took place within the context of long-standing issues of religious violence between Nigeria's Muslim and Christian communities. Boko Haram has been called the world's deadliest terrorist group, in terms of the number of people it has killed (BBC News. 24 December 2015).

Intensified violence and atrocities by Boko Haram, Nigeria's home-grown militant insurgent group, dominated the country's Human Rights landscape in 2014. The group indiscriminately killed civilians, abducted women and girls, forcefully conscripted young men and boys, and destroyed villages, towns, and schools. In April 2014, Boko Haram's abduction of nearly 300 schoolgirls in the town of Chibok focused unprecedented global attention on the group. According to an official of education ministry, 85 schools were closed down in Borno state, affecting about 120,000 students after a frequent attack by Islamic militants in areas which has the country's most illiteracy rate, and more than 200 school girls were kidnapped on the night of April, 2014 (The Guardian 2014). From the beginning of 2012, about 70 teachers and more than 1000 school children have been killed while some were wounded; 50 schools were burnt and more than 60 others have been forced to close. Many children were forced out of school across in Yobe, Kaduna, Adamawa and Borno states. Many teachers were forced to migrate to other locations for safety (The Guardian 2014)

1.2 Problem Statement

The insurgency caused by Boko Haram is among the primary challenges faced by Nigeria. The group's activities in the North have resulted in thousands of casualties, the displacement of more than one million people, the destruction of hundreds of schools, mosques, churches and government establishments and have ravaged the economy of the region (Ogbonna & Jiménez, 2017). The despicable actions of the sect even undermine the existence of the country as a single sovereign political territory. In fact, the group's appalling operations made it the deadliest terrorist organization worldwide in 2015. The dynamics, sophistication and boldness of the sect's actions have raised fundamental questions about national security and governance (Ogbonna & Jiménez, 2017). In March 2015 the faction, through its leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and further declared that territories

under its control belong to the Islamic State and will be governed under orthodox Islamic Sharia law.

Amnesty International (2017) reported that Boko Haram had killed at least 5,500 civilians, completely destroyed 1000 schools in the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, killed 450 teachers from the above mentioned states and 1,000,000 children are out of school from the same states between 2014 and March 2016. According to the UN (2015) this violence has forced more than 1.5 million people to flee their homes, resulting in heavy social and economic dislocation in the entire north-east. Furthermore, OHCHR also received information that, in Madagali (State of Adamawa) in November 2014, Boko Haram assembled some 1,000 male villagers at the local school and shot them (OHCHR, 2015). Despite the evidence of Boko Haram Human Rights violations, and reports by international bodies pinpointing the same, there is little done to bring to an end this kind of menace. It is against this background that the study seeks to examine the impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Human Rights violations in North Eastern Nigeria.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to examine how the activities of Boko Haram violate the human rights in North Eastern Nigeria.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

- i. To document human rights abuses resulting from Boko Haram activities in North Eastern Nigeria.
- ii. To assess the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on education in North Eastern Nigeria
- iii. To examine the Nigeria Federal government's efforts at combating Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria.

1.5 Research Question

- i. What are the human rights abuses resulting from Boko Haram activities in North Eastern Nigeria?
- ii. What is the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on education in North Eastern Nigeria?
- iii. What is the effort of the Nigeria Federal government in combating Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria?

1.6 Scope of the Study

1.6.1 Geographical Scope

This study was conducted in Northeastern geopolitical zone of Nigeria, consisting of the following states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. However, for study purposes, the study conducted specifically in the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. The three states are preferred because they are the most affected in terms of human rights violations by Boko Haram insurgency.

1.6.2 Content

The study focused on how the activities of Boko Haram violate the human rights of the people in Northeastern Nigeria in terms of right to life, education and health. Furthermore, the study focused on Boko Haram Insurgency in terms of insecurity, ethnic and religious hatred, unemployment, poverty and grievances, government negligence, and illiteracy.

1.6.3 Time Scope

This study looked at a period of 8 years, from 2009 to 2017. This is the period when Boko-haram rose to recognition by killing civilians, attacking government objects, abducting school girls and burning villages and schools. It should be argued that since 2009, Boko Haram has created a severe security challenge in the Northern part of Nigeria and has continued to assume a confounding dimension till to-date.

1.7 Significance of the Study

It is hoped that the findings of this study will provide the government with information that will help it to initiate a prompt, independent, impartial, and effective investigation into the gross Human Rights violations by both the Nigerian military and Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria.

Similarly, the findings of this study will help the Government to provide an effective remedy to victims of Human Rights violations and their families, including compensation and reparations, as well as humanitarian relief to all affected communities.

Furthermore, the findings of this study will provide an insight to the military that will help them to safeguard and fully respect the laws of war. In other words it will help them to ensure that

detainees are brought before a court within a reasonable time, given the opportunity to contest the legality of their detention and allowed access to their lawyers and families.

The results of this study will be helpful to the citizens in that it will provide them with information of how they can get redress and help from NGOs and government agencies due to human rights violations committed against them by Boko-haram insurgency.

Last but not least, it is hoped that the findings of this study will be resourceful to future researchers as a reference source in a related study.

1.8 Operational Definitions of Key Terms

Insurgency: refers to an armed group of Islamists in northeastern Nigeria who operate on the propaganda that western education is ‘sin’ and should be stopped and that all Nigerians should become Muslims and be governed under strict sharia law.

Ethnic and Religious Hatred: refers to feelings and acts of prejudice and hostility towards an ethnic group or religious group in various degrees.

Unemployment: refers to the state of not being gainfully employed whether someone has the skills or not.

Poverty: refers to the inability to access and afford basic needs such as food, housing, clothing and health facilities.

Grievances: refers to unfulfilled and unattended-to complaints arising from unequal share of Nigeria’s resources including employment, political representation, education, wealth and social inclusion by the northeastern geopolitical region of Nigeria.

Illiteracy: refers to the lack of attainment of a formal education by the children and adults in northeastern Nigeria.

Right to Education: According to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right to education includes the right to free, compulsory primary education for all, an obligation to develop secondary education accessible to all, on particular by the progressive

introduction of free secondary education, as well as an obligation to develop equitable access to higher education, ideally by the progressive introduction of free higher education.

Human Rights Violations: refers to when action by the state or non-state (Boko-haram) actors abuse, ignore, or deny basic human rights (including civil, political, cultural, social and economic rights).

CHAPTER TWO


LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction



This chapter presented the conceptual framework of the study, theoretical review, and a review of literatures related to the study variables and objectives.

2.1 Conceptual Framework

Independent Variable



Dependent Variable



Source: Researcher Made (2018)

The independent variable of this study was Boko haram insurgency and was measured using insecurity, ethnic and religious hatred, unemployment, poverty and grievances, government negligence, and illiteracy. On the other hand, human rights violations were the dependent variable measured using right to life, right to education and right to healthcare. The effect of the

independent variable on the dependent variable is that due to Boko-haram insurgency, it has resulted into insecurity and mass killing of people, which consequently affected human right to life. Secondly, most of the youth have been able to join Boko-haram insurgency due to unemployment, poverty and grievances hence their involvement with the Boko-haram has led to destruction of school properties, killing and abduction of teachers and students, thus depriving thousands of children the right to education. Thirdly, ethnic and religious rift among most of the people in Northeastern region of Nigeria has forced Boko-haram to operate on the principle of ethnic and religious ‘cleansing’ thus depriving many of their rights to life through killing and torture. In addition, government negligence of the capacity of Boko-haram insurgency to cause detrimental effect made the same book-haram activities to lead to looting of drugs, burning of health facilities, killing patients and abducting health workers hence making majority of the northeastern part of Nigeria to have no access to healthcare services. Furthermore, the high level of illiteracy forced many youth to join Boko-haram insurgency since they could not get gainful employment hence leading to mass killing of people and destruction of government objects.

2.2 Theoretical Perspective

This study was anchored on cognitive dissonance theory, which was propagated by Festinger (1957), and affirms that if a person holds two cognitions that are inconsistent with one another, he/she will experience the pressure of an aversive motivational state called cognitive dissonance. According to Nkwede; Abah and Nwankwo (2015) this psychological theory defines the propensity of terrorist behavior. Naturally, people seek stability when it comes to their perceptions and desires (cognitive dissonance) and thus they constantly pretend to address their dissonance by breaching this gap either through actions or altering perceptions (Bem, 1967). Therefore, dissonance is not a reaction that arises only due to a lack of basic needs such as safety, satisfying hunger or self-preservation, rather it represents the pervasive human tendency to rationalize (Griffin, 2006).

Consequently, people are motivated to resolve their dissonance by: changing their beliefs, changing their actions and behavior and changing their perception of action (Festinger, 1957). Littlejohn and Foss (2005) contend that a cognitive system is “a complex, interacting set of beliefs, attitudes, and values that affect and are affected by behavior.” In any case, cognitive dissonance is the inevitable outcome of dissatisfaction or it could be said to be the middle ground

between preferred value and actual value states. The impending danger of such a situation is that it has the tendency to instigate hatred, anxiety, fear and the utmost desire to eliminate and/or curb the source (Alao; Atere & Alao 2012).

Obviously, Boko Haram's insurgence is deeply rooted in the perceived discrepancy between the preferred life conditions and the actual ones together with the tough life experience of most youths in northeastern Nigeria. The preferred experience in this case includes maintaining the sanctity of orthodox Islam and experiencing a prosperous and vibrant economic environment anchored to youth empowerment models and schemes (Nkwede et al., 2015). Meanwhile, the actual experience is a secular state and a hostile and unpredictable economic environment that has little or no recourse to youth empowerment and emancipation programs. Thus, the situation favors dissonance and the disappearance of the dissonance gives way to terrorism and barbarism.

It is worth noting that, although I chose to focus on the cognitive dissonance theory for my theoretical framework, its premise is not an all-encompassing explanation for terrorism or violent behaviors; instead, it is among the lenses through which I can explain this wholly-threatening phenomenon. Within this theory postulation, I contend that becoming a terrorist supposes a peace-meal process. My point is that the decision to become a terrorist is never a spontaneous one; rather, it involves an assimilation process that happens step by step within a time span. Maikovich (2005) holds that it is within the assimilation process that the influence of cognitive dissonance is undermined or reduced in the individual(s) attraction to terrorism.

2.3 Review of Related Literature

2.3.1 Boko Haram Insurgency

According to Murtada (2013), the real name of Boko Haram was Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lid da'awati Wal-Jihad, (congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad). The word Boko Haram means western education is forbidden. The group emerged in early 2000s as small Sunni Islamic group advocating a strict interpretation and implementation of Islamic law in Nigeria. Initially, the sect's leadership did not call for violence; its followers engaged in periodic clashes with security during its formative years (Blanchard, 2014).

The philosophy of Boko Haram is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam, which frowns upon Western civilization, including the Nigerian democracy, constitution, and the civil service.

Mohammed Yusuf claims that the Nigerian society has deviated from the principles of true Sharia law and adheres to an evil civilization in the form of Western education (Walker, 2012). This explains why the sect is dubbed “Boko Haram” by the general public, a name which literally means “Western Education is a Sin” (Onuoha, 2012 p2). In its broadest connotation however, it refers to Western civilization as a whole.

Given Boko Haram’s philosophy, its mission entails the strict propagation of the Islamic Sharia law as the bonafide legislative law in Nigeria. In fulfillment of this mission, the sect has encountered numerous foes (perceived, fabricated, and imagined). This is indeed true of virtually every instance of terrorism: “enemies have to be invented if they do not already exist” (Juergensmeyer 2004, p171). Simply put, one cannot have a war without an enemy. In the case of Boko Haram, its array of enemies is quite remarkable. First on the list is the Nigerian democratic government, which the sect claims is West-centered and therefore runs against the grain of Islam. The sect claims that since everyone is fully convinced that the Nigerian democracy and constitution is neither from God nor from his Prophet, the practices of democracy and the reliance on the Nigerian constitution is, ipso facto, a form of paganism and should be banned (Kenny, 2012).

The sect has also included in its black book, schools, cinemas, music, and sports, prostitution, pornographic films, beer consumption, and many related practices that seem incongruous in Islamic societies (Vanguard, 14 August 2009). Furthermore, Christians and many Muslims who do not share in the ideology of the sect are also included in the enemy list. In addition to killing Muslims, Christians, civilians, and security forces in northern Nigeria, the sect has also accused the southern states of facilitating the spread of Western civilization in the country (Vanguard, 14 August 2009). As a result, southern Nigeria and the West have become for Boko Haram the ‘axis of evil’; to use former U.S. President George W. Bush’s terminology for reputed terrorist countries.

Within the ranks of the Muslims, Boko Haram insists that any Muslim who cooperates with the Nigerian government and Christians in opposing or providing any useful information that will lead to the arrest of its members will be killed, despite their mosque attendance (Kenny, 2012). So far, Boko Haram has attacked some Islamic clerics. It is reported that Boko Haram assassinated Sheikh Ibrahim Ahmed just after he finished his usual Maghreb prayers at Gomari

Mosque in Maiduguri, Borno state. Before he was killed, Sheikh Ibrahim Ahmed was known for his polemics against the sect. According to Solomon (2012), the intent for Sheikh Ibrahim's assassination was to send a clear message to the other Imams in the country that the only credible interpretation of the Quran is a true Islamic one based on the strict observance of the Sharia law. Also, on July 13, 2012, a Boko Haram suicide bomber detonated his bomb just meters from where the state's deputy governor and the Shehu of Borno – both Muslims – habitually undertook their Friday prayer. Although the duo escaped the attack, about 10 other Muslims lost their lives (Idris, 2012).

Boko Haram further impugned the Muslim political elites of Northern Nigeria for their cooperation with the Christian political leaders of southern Nigeria within the national structure of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Tanchum, 2012a). Further, Christian evangelism and academic research sponsored by the international community other than from Islamic countries are also perceived by Boko Haram to be part of the agenda of Western imperialism, and hence, despised (Danjibo, 2009). Added to the foregoing foes of Boko Haram is a vague, generic enemy, a sort of inchoate force of evil, represented by the Nigerian police, the news media, and virtually anyone the sect thought might be opposed to its brand of Islamic ideology. The sect has also attacked a variety of key northern politicians and village chiefs. On a few occasions, Boko Haram has attacked prisons and mosques. The sect has also attacked civilians whom they deem to be engaged in un-Islamic activities like drinking beer or partying (Forest, 2012).

From 2002-2009, Boko Haram has engaged in low profile showdowns with the Nigerian police force in its headquarters in Borno state, and also in the villages of Geidam and Kanama in Nigeria's north-eastern Yobe state in late 2003. During this initial period, Boko Haram attacked police stations, killing about 30 people and stealing some ammunition for further rounds of destabilization. It was estimated at the time that Boko Haram comprised only about 60 members and all but seven were arrested and detained in prison where they received agonizing treatment from the Nigerian police (Cook, 2011a). The surviving membership and leaders of the sect, including their leader, Abubakar Shekau, fled to Niger and Chad respectively to regroup and possibly mobilize for support from Chadians, Nigeriens and other Sahelian countries. This form of mobilization probably set the stage for "Al-Qaeda's augmentation of Boko Haram's capabilities as it reinvented itself in exile" (Tanchum, 2012b).

By mid-2004, Boko Haram had fully recovered and acquired sufficient arsenals and the technical virtuosity to attack a few police stations in Maiduguri. In the attack, the sect killed some policemen and stole ammunitions. It was reported that 27 Boko Haram members were killed in the clash, while many others disappeared. Still in this initial stage of its violent uprising, Boko Haram attacked a convoy of 60 policemen at Kala-Balge on the banks of Lake Chad on October 10, 2004, and allegedly executed twelve of them (Cook, 2011b).

Boko Haram became a full-fledged insurgency on July 25, 2009 following an all-night onslaught waged by the sect on Dutsen-Tanshi police station in Bauchi state (Bamidele, 2012). Prior to the attack on the police station, Boko Haram members were reprimanded on their way to a funeral by a security outfit in Borno state known as ‘Operation Flush’ for not adhering to the law that demands every motorcyclist to wear a crash-helmet. The circumstances as to why the group confronted the police remains unclear, but a member of the group was reported to have fired on the police, injuring several officers. In the process, one of the sect’s members was shot dead, allegedly by the police (Walker, 2012). The resulting clash led to the deaths of about 800 people including the Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf. Mohammed Yusuf was reported to have been executed, presumably, while still in police custody (Tanchum, 2012a). The death of Yusuf ushered in another phase of security forces ruthlessness in Nigerian history, and set the sect on a revenge mission against the Nigerian state and its security outfits.

After the July 2009 standoff between Boko Haram and the Nigerian security forces, sect members were reported to have fled to neighbouring countries like Niger to regroup, recruit and, possibly, have more training and even acquire more sophisticated weaponry for future attacks. It is alleged that while in Niger, the sect was supported by Droukdel, the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), to rebuild the organization and augment its capabilities and, in so doing, alter its operational outlook to be in accordance with Al-Qaeda (Tanchum, 2012b). After fortifying itself in Niger, Boko Haram resurfaced more fiercely on July 7, 2010, by storming a prison in Bauchi state and releasing over 700 prisoners, 100 of whom were its members. For the rest of 2010, the sect attacked many police and state officials in Borno and Bauchi states, and extended its reign of terror to anyone – particularly Islamic clerics and traditional rulers – perceived to be in cahoots with the secular Nigerian government.

On October 21, 2010 Boko Haram placed posters at key road intersections in some states in Nigeria, cautioning the general public to refrain from siding with the Nigerian security forces in apprehending its members. Each poster bore the hallmarks of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and warned that “any Muslim that goes against the establishment of Sharia law in Nigeria will be attacked and killed accordingly” (United States Department of State, 2010).

While most Nigerians and other international observers initially dismissed the sect as a gang of ill-advised illiterates whose mission was totally unachievable in a diverse country like Nigeria, Boko Haram has gained a reputation that should leave no one in doubt of its strategic intent: which is to substitute the prevailing secular state in Nigeria with a Sharia law-based government. It is the absolute commitment of Boko Haram to the achievement of this strategic intent “that has motivated it to take major strategic steps such as the establishment of external linkages with ideologically-driven Islamic terrorist groups in Mali, Somalia, and the Islamic Maghreb” (Eyamozung, 2012). The potential links of Boko Haram to other like-minded groups across the world was validated in an Al Jazeera interview with Abdelmalek Droukdel, the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). During the interview, Droukdel claimed that his “group would provide Boko Haram with the training and logistics needed to expand its reach and defend Muslims in Nigeria by stopping the advance of a minority of crusaders” (cited in Pham, 2012, p3).

The activities of the sect escalated when on 14th April, 2014 the sect kidnapped 250 female students from Government Girl’s Secondary school Chibok in Borno State (Zenn, 2014). Also, Boko Haram and Ansaru were designated as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United State Security Department in November 2013. Ansaru was the Boko Haram faction that earlier in 2013 kidnapped and executed seven foreigners who were working with international construction companies. Subsequently, the United Nations Committee on Al Qaeda sanction blacklisted the group on 22nd May, 2014 as one of the world terrorist organizations. The United Nation listing entry describes Boko Haram as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda and also one of the organizations of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Reuters, 2014).

Ikezue and Ezeah (2015) in their study investigated the factors responsible for Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The paper attempted to unravel why insurgency became pervasive in the northeastern region of the country and solutions were proffered on how to stop it. The study

adopted the mixed method which involved the quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. Respondents for the quantitative method were selected using the snowball sampling technique. The questionnaire and key informant interviews were the instruments used for data collection. Several findings were made in the paper. It was discovered, among others, that religious, political, ethnic and economic factors coupled with corruption and influences from established terrorist organizations were the major factors responsible for the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The paper also found that insurgency could be eradicated through the use of military actions, re-orientating the insurgents and job creation. The study recommended robust intelligence gathering and multi-agency collaboration, among others, in the fight against the insurgency in Nigeria.

2.3.1.1 Ethnic and Religious Hatred

The perception of religious hatred and discrimination towards Muslims can be clearly seen in Yusuf's lecture in 2009, when he stated that "the government of Nigeria has not been built to do justice...It has been built to attack Islam and kill Muslims" and accused Nigerian government of plotting anti-Muslim violence towards Muslim communities. Similar message can be traced in Yusuf's successor's speeches, when Abubakar Shekau, current Boko Haram leader, pointed out to Yusuf's death as unjust and added that "They're fighting us for no reason, because we've said we'll practice our religion, we will support our religion and stand on what God has said." (Thurston 2016, p17). Despite the fact that Collier (1991) warns against the excessive use of grievance motives as they serve as useful narratives for the groups, either in the sense of legitimization or public support, such statements can prove useful in the possible addressing of the feelings of hatred as they help to name and identify them. Collier also adds that they can persuade even the leaders themselves to accept this kind of propaganda in their mind-set.

The role of history and feelings of grief and unfair treatment are very prevalent throughout Nigeria and in Boko Haram statements. Colonialism ranks as one of the periods which are presented highly negatively, as the colonial powers were perceived to exploit Nigeria, its people and artificially regroup different ethnic and religious groups into national identities they did not identify with. Boko Haram has used the notion of colonialism in one of the sermons by stating that "Europeans divided the countries" and "left them in poverty or created ethnic problems",

while adopting the rotation system of governance between different groups and tribes, which caused their political instability (Pierri & Zenn 2016, p77).

Besides purely religious grievances, Pierri and Zenn (2016) connect the notion of Islam and ethnic discrimination stemming from the historical backgrounds, which Collier perceives as one of the key factors. They attribute the grievances to the precolonial ruler Al-Kanemi, who conquered current Boko Haram territory- Borno- and subjugated ethnic group of Kanuri Muslims, which count for over 80% of Boko Haram members. Aside from prohibiting Kanuri language in religious instructions he also prohibited Islamic education and indirectly discriminated the core practitioners of Islam by assigning them the special status. This period is often mentioned in Boko Haram sermons and speeches and one of its signature characteristics- the prohibited education according to Islamic principles can be seen as the sign of relative deprivation leading to current strive of Boko Haram for its full implementation and at the same time hatred towards its Western form.

2.3.1.2 Grievances

Nigeria is deeply divided country not only in the religious and ethnic sense, but in economical as well. Despite the fact that it has per capita income higher than \$2700 and rich oil fields and natural resources located mostly in Niger delta, the majority of the population is living below the level of poverty, with northern regions with predominantly Muslim population being poorer than Christian south (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016). Harnischfeger considers the poverty, high unemployment rates and overall socio-economic situation of the region as the reason for youth joining Boko Haram's rebellion and quotes the US Department Officer, who said that instead of religion being the root of violence, it is "the underlying political and social economic problems in the north" causing instability (Mohammed 2014, p35). The point of economic grievances can be supported by the economic crisis in 1980s caused by declining profits due to structural adjustment programmes which have proved to be harmful till these days and not tackling poverty of the majority (Mohammed, 2014).

Yet if we have a closer look at Boko Haram rhetoric, the question of poverty is mostly connected to the governmental corruption and mismanagement and therefore serving as the sign of its illegitimacy, than as an actual structural factor Boko Haram attempts to address. Also the

membership of Boko Haram show that while some of the poor are joining its ranks in hope for economic and social justice, its composition also greatly varies- from university professors, political elites of the past, collar workers or migrants from neighboring countries (Agbiboa 2013, p160). However, facts on this greatly vary as others perceive Boko Haram to be composed mostly of “poor, uneducated, unemployed and illegals” who are often crossing borders in search for better future. For example Osumah (2013) suggests that Boko Haram is mostly an organization seeking social justice through the establishment of new, uncorrupted and Islamic government, which also fits to the Boko Haram beginnings, charity work and running school for poor.

According to Liolio (2013), the successful recruitment of the people into the group depend on the nature of the economic and poverty level in the area. Mostly insurgent gain members by claiming their struggle is for the people and that they would provide basic necessity for the general population if supported. The insurgent may succeed if such society embedded by poverty, illiteracy, ineptitude, corruption, discrimination to modernization and globalization, which create artificial poverty to many underdeveloped countries, such countries would become recruitment target of the terrorists. Liolio further stated that, it is significant to know that the root causes of the insurgency often relate to a long cloudy set of problems culminating into uncontrolled grievances and exploding violence. Such problems are socioeconomic and political, that is why insurgencies are more rampant in underdeveloped countries or countries engulfed by corrupt regime, ethnicity, social prejudices religion and disparities in the distribution of resources or even lack of it.

Also, Olojo (2013) contends that one significant factor that has stimulated the drive towards violent extremism, recruitment and support for Boko Haram are economic deprivation. Several scholars believed that poverty and longstanding economic disparities in the northeast part of the country made the youth join the sect. Similarly, Adesoji (2010) stresses that, In Nigeria the marginalization and imbalance distribution or implementation of the resources made some radicalized scholars to preach against the government and democratic setting, which later gave birth to the present Boko Haram insurgency.

In addition, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2007) said “despite Nigeria’s plentiful resources and oil wealth, poverty is widespread to the extent that the country

is ranked one of the 20 poorest countries in the world”. Indeed over 70 percent of the population is classified as poor, with 35 percent living in absolute poverty (Andenrele, 2014). According to Plouch (Blanchard 2014, p10): Understanding Boko Haram’s appeal among some citizen in Nigeria’s far north requires an examination of underlying development challenges facing northern Nigeria, where high rates of poverty and unemployment are exacerbated by extreme population growth and low level of literacy. These factors combined with weak governance, rampant corruption and inadequate public service delivery, has contributed to the widespread disaffection that some suggest may facilitate Boko Haram recruitment.

A country with legacies of economic stagnation, a higher level of unemployment and uneven economic development such country is a fertile ground on which terrorist seed can flourish (Umar, 2013). Moreover, individuals and group grievances such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalization can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister group to get support and recruit for terrorist violence. This explains how economically deprived youth can easily be recruited by the extremist group, due to the economic hardship in the region (Umar, 2013).

The increasing rate of unemployed youth in the region, which were economically deprived, mostly was the recruiting target of Boko Haram. Some scholars pointed out that the connection between poverty, illiteracy and terrorism is indirect and complicated. The huge number of young people living on the margins of Nigeria society intensified these linkages (Olojo, 2013). In 2013 the federal government released some detainees of Boko Haram mostly wives and children of the sect members, some children confessed of providing kegs of fuel to Boko Haram to set school and other buildings ablaze in Maiduguri for the sum of 5000 naira (Olojo, 2013). These show how the people in the area were living in absolute poverty due to the failure of the government to provide education and economic opportunity in the area for more than a decade. These socio-economic problems contributed to the escalation of Boko Haram violence in north-eastern Nigeria.

Grievances in regards to the insufficient political participation and governmental failures seem to dominate Boko Haram discourse, together with its anti-Western rhetoric. Boko Haram criticizes high levels of corruption and “Western orientation” officials causing the economic crisis in

Nigeria on a long-term-basis. The first clashes occurred during Yusuf's leadership, when he attacked local Muslim community- ulema- as a reaction to their close relationship with governor Sheriff known for his predatory and corrupt governmental policies (Mohammed, 2014). Such claims are supported by international NGOs such as Transparency International, which ranks Nigeria as 136th out of 168 in corruption measurement tools and confirms that over 90% of population thinks that the governmental security forces are corrupted, while 45% assumes the same about the military. All is accompanied by the proofs of highly ranked officials embezzling funds appointed to the regional development (Transparency International, 2014).

Boko Haram generally refers to current power-holders as *yan boko*- modern elites which were educated and trained in secular way, and which are therefore responsible for ills of Nigerian government and unjust due to their relations with West (Onuoha, 2014). The roots of violence and mistrust in government can be also found back in 2009 in the violent clash between police and Boko Haram members in an argument over newly introduced Bike Helmet Law, which Boko Haram disobeyed during funeral procession of some of their members and in following dispute 17 of them were killed by the police forces. The same situation happened with extrajudicial killing of Yusuf in 2009, which both lead to the radicalization of the group, their growing insurgency and critique of Nigerian government and its incompetence (The Atlantic, 2014). The relative deprivation theory in this case can be understood as the feeling of not enough religious rights and the voice in political matters, as well as disproportional discrimination in usually common situations such as mentioned Bike Helmet Law incident, which was seen by majority of Boko Haram members as unequally targeting their group and through anger and frustration increasing their radicalization.

2.3.1.3 Poverty and Unemployment

In northern Nigeria, there is the common perception that violent extremism is entrenched in the socioeconomic problems of the country. For example, Ayegba (2015) argued that poverty and unemployment are the driving forces behind the insurgency in Nigeria. Further in the study, Ayegba claimed that the high rate of youth unemployment has resulted in poverty and insecurity in the country. Asuelime (2015) that socioeconomic indices such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, economic underdevelopment, low education, inter alia, underlie the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram terrorism. These assertions suggest that the pervasive poverty and

unemployment in northern Nigeria create the condition for especially young people to be manipulated and recruited by Boko Haram. Although, some studies have found no link between poverty and terrorism, however, the vicious cycle of poverty and unemployment make it easy for people to become prey for Boko Haram recruitment.

A study by Botha and Abdile (2014) confirmed that, due to adverse economic conditions and unemployment in Somalia, some people viewed al-Shabaab as a potential employer. A recent public opinion study on Boko Haram by Botha et al., (2017) revealed that some of the respondents interviewed perceive that people are motivated to join Boko Haram because they are unemployed and see Boko Haram as a job.

Most writers on the Boko Haram conflict have argued that central to the emergence of the Sect is the pervasive poverty of the Nigerian masses especially in the core Northern Nigerian States. Onokerhoraye (2016) posits that two issues have been consistent in attempts to define poverty: who are the poor and at what level is poverty defined? This suggests that poverty is an economic phenomenon measured either in terms of the minimum flow of real income per capita, or as a bundle of basic needs which may be qualified.

Scholars who identify poverty as the root cause of insurgency in Nigeria often observe that the actualization of a free, peaceful and developed society is impossible where majority of the citizens live below the poverty line. This is because poverty reduces people's capacity to enjoy their civil, political and socio-economic rights. Olusegun (2016) argued that poverty is very real in Nigeria...over the years the quality of life of the Nigerian citizen has progressively plummeted.

2.3.1.4 Illiteracy

Much of the instability and violence in Nigeria's North east region and in several other parts of the country are a result of illiteracy and unemployment. Clearly, the inability of the state to effectively deliver the basic necessities of life for its people has been as the underlining cause of violent conflicts and insurgency in Nigeria (Kwaja, 2009). It is now obvious that unemployment, ignorance and marginalization "exacerbate corruption, resource agitation struggles, cut-throat political competition and restiveness (Otoghile & Akov, 2011:87).

These challenges are accelerating to exponential levels, even threatening the unity and the existence of the Nigeria State itself, that is, the Boko Haram insurgency. Despite efforts by government and well-meaning organizations to invest in education, the situation has remained bleak. This scenario is said to be especially worse in Northern Nigeria, where lack of early exposure as well as restrictive and discriminatory cultural/religious practices have reduced the educational opportunities available to the people (Dukawa, 2016).

Boko Haram which literally means “western education is a sin” certainly creates the basis for grave concern. This is in view of its avowed hatred for western education which is crucial for industrial transformation and development. Nigeria cannot afford to be left behind because education is identified as a tool for meaningful progress. These critical elements often mislead the youths into believing that the western-styled state system is responsible for their plight. Armed with this misleading sentiment, their ‘next course of action is usually to unleash mayhem on state institutions (Cook, 2011).

2.3.2 Human Rights Violation

Human rights are those universally recognized values and freedoms, and the legal guarantees that safeguard individuals and groups against the actions and inactions of the State, agents of the State or other individuals that interfere with their natural entitlements and human dignity. As universally recognized values, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms are usually included as essential provisions of international law, especially human rights law and international humanitarian law, and these are reflected in major international human rights treaties notably, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations (UN), 1949). As essential component of international law, human rights provisions are usually reflected in treaty obligations of States. Accordingly, the security of the individual is universally regarded a basic human right, and the protection of the individual against human rights violation is accepted as a fundamental obligation of every State. Consequently, human rights law obliges States to take certain actions to respect, safeguard and guarantee human rights of citizens.

Human rights law and international humanitarian law require States to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering insurgency (UN, 2013). Any counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism strategy adopted by States must therefore comply with the

provisions of international human rights law and humanitarian law. In this regard, counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism strategy is any measure adopted by States to prevent, pre-empt, counter and respond to insurgency and terrorism. Though counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency differs in certain aspect, they generally include any step taken to disrupt, dismantle and ultimately, defeat insurgents and terrorist organizations (Rineheart, 2010). It is the right and duty of every State to take effective counter-insurgency measures to ensure public security. By their nature however, most counter-insurgency operations are characterized by violence and violation of the human rights of the civilian population. Hence, as part of global efforts to mitigate incidents of human rights abuses associated with counter-insurgency operations, the international community has taken certain measures to ensure that any strategy adopted by states to counter insurgency and terrorism complies with their treaty obligation under international law (UN, 2006; Melzer, 2009).

There are several legal Instrument of the AU regarding human rights, notably and more widely known is the 1999 Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2002 Protocol to the Convention, and the 2004 Plan of Action (Goredema, 2004). While the AU has urged its member States to not only ratify but also implement those regional and other international regimes of counterterrorism, the call includes other legal instruments that exist to check the gap to which the rights of the people stands to be challenged and violated. These human rights instruments includes but not limited to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; the African Charter on Human and People's Rights 1981; the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984; and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 2002.

Under the AU, there have been efforts made by States in the adoption of resolutions related to counterterrorism cooperation and coordination among States, terrorism cannot be countered in isolation but with the structural and resource coordination among States. Likewise in the East Africa region, steps to counter terror acts was first experienced in 2003 when the East Africa CT Initiative (EACTI), regional framework for cooperation among member States is observed in the formation of the East Africa Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (EAPCCO), and more also

national framework for regional cooperation among Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is provided for in their various counterterrorism Acts (William, 2004).

Human rights law and International humanitarian law oblige States to be accountable for human rights violations committed by their security forces while combating insurgency and terrorism. In this regard, a global counter-terrorism strategy was adopted by the United Nations' General Assembly in Resolution 60/288 of 2006, in which certain steps were taken to ensure that all counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency measures complies with international humanitarian law. The global counter-terrorism strategy considers human rights protection and effective counter-terrorism measures as “complementary and mutually reinforcing objectives which must be pursued together as part of States' duty to protect individuals within their jurisdiction” (UN, 2008, p.19). Hence, in his report to the 66th Session of the General Assembly on ‘Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights’, the UN Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights in the fight against terrorism, Ben Emmerson, stated that; “ it is essential that the protection of human rights of victims of terrorism is seen as a genuine legal duty resting primarily on States, and that it is not misused as a pretext for violating the human rights of those suspected of terrorism, for taking emergency measures which provides for excessive and disproportionate executive powers, or for other essentially political objectives” (UN, 2011).

Moreover, as part of measures to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms while combating terrorism and insurgency, States are obliged by international humanitarian and human rights laws to strictly adhere to the “principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution” (UN, 2013, p.62), particularly in counter-insurgency operations against irregular armed groups that blend with civilian population. Thus, the protection of victims' right is an integral part of the war against terror, and by extension human rights law and international humanitarian law oblige States as part of their treaty obligation, to protect human rights while countering terrorism and insurgency.

2.3.3 Right to Life

The right to life is the essential right that a human being has the right not to be killed by another human being. The concept of a right to life is central to debates on the issues of abortion, capital punishment, euthanasia, self defence and war. According to many human rights activists,

the death penalty violates this right. According to Article 6.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”. However, even with the right to life in place, Boko-hara, has been ignoring such rights. The following sections elaborate the impact of Boko-haram activities on the right to life.

2.3.3.1 Killing of Civilians

Government sources in the States concerned have estimated that some 20,000 civilians, including an undetermined number of women and children, have been killed by Boko Haram since 2009. International Criminal Court, (2013), para. 218. The actual number of fatalities, however, is likely to be much higher. Civilians have been shot, beheaded, amputated, stoned, drowned, burned and bombed. Boko Haram has used stones, machetes, knives, sophisticated and high-calibre weapons, improvised explosive devices, landmines, guns mounted on pickup trucks, military helicopters, armoured vehicles and motorcycles to perpetrate killings. Men and boys who refused to adopt the beliefs professed by Boko Haram were specifically targeted in killings, as were law enforcement officials, teachers, health-care workers and members of civilian self-defense groups (OHCHR, 2015).

In Nigeria, Boko Haram intentionally killed and maimed civilians in attacks throughout the State of Borno and in parts of the States of Adamawa and Yobe. Many witnesses reported that Boko Haram shot civilians that tried to escape during attacks in AskiraUba, Baga, Bama, Damasak, Gombi, Gwoza, Kwajafa, Madagali, Maiduguri, Michika and Mubi. The killings were often preceded by death threats or an invitation from Boko Haram “inviting” men and boys to join them in “the work of Allah”. Those who refused to join were killed, and their bodies often left to rot in the streets, in wells or river beds (OHCHR, 2015).

In 2014, OHCHR received a video footage of a massacre of civilians after Boko Haram captured Bama. It depicted several men with their arms bound, driven in a truck to a bridge where they were shot, one after the other, in the back of the head and thrown into a river. It also showed civilians held in a room and shot; Boko Haram fighters then trampled on bodies to check that the victims were dead. The footage is consistent with information documented by OHCHR on the attack in Bama. OHCHR also received information that, in Madagali (State of Adamawa) in

November 2014, Boko Haram assembled some 1,000 male villagers at the local school and shot them. Witnesses interviewed in the States of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe recalled numerous cases of men and boys being shot, hanged, hacked to death, stoned and, in some cases, their bodies piled up in the street, and their relatives forced to identify them (OHCHR, 2015).

In the Niger, there were reports of killings, in Bosso and Diffa, particularly in February 2015, and on Karamga Island in Lake Chad, in April 2015. (The Niger declared a state of emergency in the region of Diffa on 13 May 2014). A witness revealed of how her husband and 14 members of her family had been executed by Boko Haram during the attack on Karamga. Other witnesses to the attack have since spoken of countless casualties and of dead bodies buried in eight mass graves, each containing around 12 bodies. Refugee witnesses from Damasak, Nigeria, recalled that in November 2014, fleeing men and boys were captured by Boko Haram, assembled under a tree and shot for refusing to join the group (OHCHR, 2015).

In Cameroon, government figures indicate that 360 civilians were killed by Boko Haram between April 2013 and July 2014. According to information gathered by OHCHR in interviews, more than 770 civilians were allegedly massacred by Boko Haram in Logone and Chari, Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga, the three most affected divisions in the far north region of Cameroon (OHCHR, 2015).

In Chad, in February 2015, Boko Haram was allegedly responsible for shooting and massacring more than 24 people on the islands of Lake Chad, including in the localities of Kaiga-Kingiria, Kangelom and Ngouboua. A number of women and girls who were forced to marry Boko Haram fighters were killed when the group was forced to retreat by the joint forces, reportedly so that they would not remarry “infidels” or provide information to regional forces (OHCHR, 2015). The increasing recourse of Boko Haram to suicide bomb attacks on soft targets, such as markets, has led to more deaths in the first half of 2015 than in the latter half of 2014. Between May and July 2015, these attacks resulted in more than 800 deaths in Nigeria alone. On 11 July, in N’Djamena, Chad, a man disguised as a woman detonated a bomb in a market place, killing 15 civilians. OHCHR (2015) In July 2015, in Maroua, Cameroon, in two separate incidents, girls were used for the first time to detonate bombs, one in a market and another in a residential area, killing some 20 people.

Over the years, Boko Haram has recruited and used boys and girls for active hostilities. Some boys have been forced to attack their own families to demonstrate their loyalty to Boko Haram, while girls were forced to marry, clean, cook and carry equipment and weapons. Reports also indicate that some boys and girls were increasingly used as human shields and to detonate bombs, a pattern that has intensified since 2014. In May 2015, for example, a 12-year-old girl was used to detonate a bomb at a bus station in Damaturu, State of Yobe, killing seven people. Similar incidents were reported in Cameroon and the Niger. During attacks by Boko Haram, abducted boys were used to identify those who refused to join the group, as well as unmarried women and girls (OHCHR, 2015).

In Nigeria, children aged between 6 and 15 years who had been abducted described having been surrounded by “many guns, and armoured vehicles”, and how Boko Haram members had beaten them with cables for not praying or for saying their prayers late. In April 2015, in Yola, State of Adamawa, OHCHR spoke with four children, aged between 12 and 14 years, who had formerly been abducted by Boko Haram and reunited with their families after escaping. They were deeply traumatized, having experienced sexual violence and exploitation. OHCHR documented many cases of separated children in Nigeria and Cameroon who had lost contact with their families when they were abducted or fled attacks, and who did not know whether their parents were still alive. As at August 2015, 40 per cent of unaccompanied children in Dalori camp, State of Borno, were orphans (OHCHR, 2015).

Boko Haram has always targeted civilian objects protected under international law, including schools, mosques, churches, prisons, hospitals and markets, and has contaminated water installations. In Nigeria, in most villages recaptured by military forces, all social infrastructure had reportedly been destroyed. The education authorities reported that 338 schools had been damaged or destroyed between 2012 and 2014 in the States of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. In some areas, Boko Haram destroyed bridges linking villages, such as in Kubroshosh, State of Borno. On 6 April 2015, in Kwajafa village, State of Borno, Boko Haram set fire to a local mosque, leading to an unknown number of casualties. In June 2015, it used improvised explosive devices and suicide bomb attacks against a church, in Postikum, State of Yobe. On 7 July, two separate bomb attacks on a restaurant and a mosque in Jos, State of Plateau, killed 44 civilians. (OHCHR, 2015).

In Cameroon, witnesses revealed that Boko Haram had destroyed many schools, including in Amchidé and Ashigashia, leaving some 35,000 pupils out of school for the entire academic year 2014/15 without access to education. Attacks on health centres had also limited the enjoyment of the right to health. According to information received from the authorities during a joint mission by the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States, in September 2013, in Cameroon, 21 health districts, including 47 health centres that hosted internally displaced persons before they fled further attacks by Boko Haram, were completely shut down in Fotokol, Guzdal, and Koza following attacks (OHCHR, 2015).

Victims consistently reported that Boko Haram systematically destroyed, appropriated and looted homes during attacks. These practices were widespread and part of the group's fighting tactics to gain control over territory and to prevent escapees from returning. Entire villages, such as Lassa, in State of Borno, Nigeria, were burned down during attacks in December 2014. The extent of such destruction was recounted by numerous witnesses who had escaped and returned after attacks. Many described how Boko Haram fighters had appropriated and resided in their homes and stole their possessions and food. For example, in Mabas, Maxi, and Tourou (Cameroon), Lamana and Ngoumao (Niger) and Baga (Nigeria), thousands were left homeless and fled overnight following Boko Haram attacks. According to information gathered by IOM, 40 per cent of registered internally displaced persons in north-east Nigeria declared that their houses had been totally burned down or destroyed by Boko Haram, 26 per cent had their houses burned or damaged, while 21 per cent were unaware of what had happened to their homes. (IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Round IV Report, June 2015).

2.3.3.2 Abductions

Boys have always been abducted by Boko Haram for indoctrination in its ideology and for recruitment into its fighting force, while women and girls have been abducted for sexual exploitation, forced marriages, labour and religious conversions to Islam. In Nigeria, the abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, State of Borno, on 14 April 2014, is well-known. Fifty-seven have since managed to escape. The manner in which they were abducted, the duration of their captivity and the conditions under which they were held have often remained diverse (OHCHR, 2015).

In April 2015, the Nigerian army rescued 293 abducted women and children from the Boko Haram stronghold in Sambisa forest. Many of the women and girls were reportedly pregnant. The army reported having rescued more than 600 women and children since the counter-insurgency. The number of those who managed to escape is unknown. Reports also confirmed that, as at June 2015, 307 rescued women and children had been enrolled in a “de-radicalization” programme run by the Government of Nigeria to prevent recruitment by Boko Haram and to demobilize its members (OHCHR, 2015).

Abductions have also been documented in Cameroon and the Niger. In the Niger, more than 200 women and children were abducted during the attacks against Bosso and Diffa on 6 February 2015, Karamga on 15 February, and Lamana and Ngoumao on 15 June. Witnesses revealed that Boko Haram fighters claimed that they were abducting women because they were married to “unbelievers” and would be remarried to true Muslims. Government sources in Cameroon reported that at least 250 people had been abducted by Boko Haram in the far north region since December 2013 and more than 600 women and girls had been abducted by the group in the same period (OHCHR, 2015).

2.3.3.3 Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment

Civilians living in areas and villages controlled by Boko Haram and abductees have been subjected to various forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. According to interviewees, women and children were subject to repeated beatings when they were unable or unwilling to walk to different Boko Haram strongholds, unable to recite the Koran or refused to adopt the group’s beliefs. Boko Haram ill-treated those in captivity through deprivation of food and water. Most of the victims interviewed by OHCHR in Nigeria, including a 14-year-old girl from Gwoza, recalled that they had been deprived of food and water for up to two to three days. Some women reportedly starved themselves in order to give food to children. Abductees rescued by the Nigerian army from Sambisa forest revealed that six boys suspected of stealing motorbikes and selling them had had their hands cut off in the Boko Haram camp in Buniyadi, while one male abductee accused of “fornication” had been buried up to his neck and stoned to death (OHCHR, 2015).

2.3.3.4 Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Since 2009, Boko Haram has subjected women and girls to widespread and severe forms of abuse, including sexual slavery, sexual violence, forced marriages, forced pregnancies and forced conversions. The group justifies such practices by its conception of the role of women and girls in society. In one video message in which the group claimed responsibility for the abduction of the Chibok girls, Shekau declared that “God instructed me to sell them, they are his property and I will carry out his instructions”. In another message, he spoke of abducted girls as “spoils of war” (OHCHR, 2015).

Furthermore, discussions with psychosocial counselors in north-east Nigeria confirmed widespread sexual violence against women and girls held by Boko Haram. One counselor reported that a girl who managed to escape narrated how Boko Haram fighters would sexually abuse her, telling her “you are the kind of girl we like”. Another interviewee revealed that she had witnessed the rape of girls as young as 15 years of age (OHCHR, 2015).

Similarly, OHCHR documented cases of rape following forced marriages to Boko Haram members during an attack on Bama, State of Borno, in September 2014. Some 150 women at Dalori camp, which opened in April 2015 and hosts internally displaced persons from Bama, had given birth after they escaped from captivity. Information received was that a Nigerian refugee woman in the Niger was abducted in Damasak, State of Borno, on 28 November 2014, and raped by 40 men. A 14-year-old girl also revealed that she had been raped when Boko Haram attacked Damasak, in November 2014, and that, after killing the men and boys, they took the women and children to a house, and selected some 40 girls to marry their fighters. She was forcefully married and raped three times before escaping, during a “wedding”, with three other girls (OHCHR, 2015).

In the wake of events, numerous women and girls have been reported to give birth or have miscarriages in extremely difficult conditions. For instance, during a Boko Haram attack on Gwoza, Nigeria, in September 2014, an interviewee reported that she had given birth in the bush while fleeing. According to information received during numerous interviews conducted by OHCHR in Nigeria, several women died during childbirth or were forced to abandon their newborn babies as they escaped attacks in Baga, Gwoza and Michika. Women previously held in captivity gave accounts of similar experiences. One woman rescued from Sambisa forest

revealed that she had witnessed births by 10 women while being held captive in different Boko Haram strongholds. Other women reported that while they had been trekking through Sambisa forest, their babies had died and been taken away by Boko Haram (OHCHR, 2015).

Owing to stigma, cultural and religious norms and deeply entrenched gender stereotypes, most victims have been reluctant to speak about sexual violence they have endured. Many are unwilling to return to their communities, fearing that they will bring dishonour to their families and be rejected by their communities. According to interviewees, women and girls who were abducted by Boko Haram generally faced worse stigmatization than men and boys. Pregnant women and women who gave birth while in captivity, or shortly after rescue, are particularly stigmatized, together with their children (OHCHR, 2015).

2.4 Right to Education

Fafunwa (2012) describes education as the aggregate of all processes through which a child develops abilities, attitudes and other forms of behaviour which are of a positive value to society. Education enables individuals to acquire appropriate knowledge, values and skills for personal development and also contributes meaningfully to the development of society. Education was declared a basic human right for every individual in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and this has been reaffirmed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (CRC), the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) (ACRWC) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003) (African Women's Protocol), amongst other international and regional human rights instruments.

Drawing on articles 13 and 14 of the ICESCR, which make a comprehensive provision for the right to education, article 28 of the CRC recognizes the right of the child to education. With a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, states are required to make primary education compulsory and available free to all; to encourage the development of different forms of secondary education; to offer financial assistance in case of need, as well as to take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of

drop-out rates. Article 29 of the CRC details the aims of the education of the child, which is directed at preparing the child for a responsible life in a free society, amongst other things.

In the African context, article 11 of the ACRWC contains provisions similar to those of article 28(1) of the CRC, though it does not require a progressive realization of the right. Considering the precarious position of the girl child in accessing education, the African Women's Protocol requires State Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination in the provision of access to education, and to promote the enrolment and retention of girls in school.

The right to education guaranteed under the ICESCR, CRC, ACRWC and other international instruments is not suspended in situations of armed conflicts, as states have the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right whether or not an emergency situation exists. Concerned about the consequences of brutal armed conflicts for education, Munoz (2008) noted in his report that "security in schools", which includes an uninterrupted education in conditions conducive to knowledge acquisition and character development, forms part of the right to education.

Under international humanitarian law, during armed conflict, whether international or non-international, children benefit from the general protection provided for civilians who are not taking part in hostilities. The Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) (GCIV 1949) and the Additional Protocols of 1977 (AP123 and AP224) lay down rules according special protection to children. Article 77 of AP1 requires that children be protected from indecent assault, and parties to conflict must provide them with the care they require.

Article 38 of the CRC requires states to respect the rules of international humanitarian law in armed conflicts, which are relevant to the child, and to take all feasible measures to ensure the protection and care of children who are affected by armed conflict. Article 22 of the ACRWC contains a similar provision and requires that children must be protected from abuse and from participating in hostilities.

With regard to education, the GCIV 1949 in article 24 (1) requires parties to conflict to ensure that children under fifteen who are orphaned or separated from their families as a result of war have access to education. In the case of occupied territories, article 50 requires the occupying power with the co-operation of the national and local authorities to facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children. With regard to internees, article

94 provides that children and young people must be allowed to attend schools either within the place of internment or outside. In addition, the AP1 provides in article 78(2) that an evacuation must take account of the need for continuity in a child's education.

In situations of displacement, children leave the place where they have access to school and go to a place where they have no access to education. Hence, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998) in principle 23 requires the concerned authorities to ensure that internally displaced children receive free and compulsory education which should respect their cultural identity, language and religion. Special efforts must also be taken to ensure girls' participation. Also, the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) requires State parties to provide internally displaced persons, including children, with adequate humanitarian assistance such as food, water, shelter, medical care, sanitation, education and other necessary social services, and in appropriate cases to extend such assistance to host communities.

However, with all the above stipulated rights to education, Boko-haram insurgency managed to violate every single one of them as has been discussed in the following sections.

2.4.1 The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Education in Northeastern Nigeria

According to Graca (2015), attacking schools during armed conflict is a grave violation of children's rights. Such attacks are mounted against students, teachers and other education personnel. They include the killing, abduction, kidnapping, illegal detention, torturing, sexual abuse of and forced recruitment of school children and teachers, and result in the violent denial of children's right to access to education. Such attacks also involve damaging educational buildings and other facilities, occupying school buildings for military purposes, initiating violent attacks on educational activities such as attacks on convoys carrying examination papers, and prevention of the repair, rehabilitation or reconstruction of schools already attacked (O'Mally, 2011).

Under international humanitarian law, schools are protected civilian objects and therefore benefit from the humanitarian principles of distinction and proportionality. The targeted attacks at schools during conflict and the general state of insecurity could force them to close down. This

has the effect of depriving millions of children of their right to education and therefore the ability to realize their potentials. Condemning such grave violations of children's rights, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Resolutions 1998 (2011), 2143 (2014) and 2225 (2015) urges parties involved in armed conflict to refrain from actions that impede children's access to education (Resolution 1998, 2011).

Jones and Naylor (2014) have noted several ways in which armed conflict can affect education. These include, among others, school closure due to targeted attacks; collateral damage and the military use of school buildings; death and injury to teachers and students; the fear of sending children to school and teachers' fear of attending school due to their being threatened with targeted attacks; general insecurity reducing the freedom of movement; the forced recruitment of teachers and students by armed forces (state and non-state); forced population displacement interrupting education; and the public health impacts of conflict, which reduce the possibility of access and learning. These disruptions have the effect of preventing access to education and diminishing the quality of the learning experience. Even where educational opportunities exist, parents worried about the safety of their children may be reluctant to send them to school. In 2014, conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo kept over 31 000 children out of school in response to the attacks that had taken place on 22 schools, of which 12 were thereafter used for military purposes (O'Mally, 2011).

Also, O'Mally (2011) has noted the longer term impacts of armed conflict on education as a result of the occurrence of persistent attacks over a number of years and the use of force to prevent recovery from such attacks. Such long-term effects include the reduced enrolment and permanent drop-out of students and the withdrawal of educational personnel leading to a shortage of teachers; and the general impact of armed conflict on the government's resources reduces the government's capacity to manage or deliver education. As a result, conflict-affected areas have some of the world's worst indicators for education, as millions of children are deprived of their only chance of the schooling that could transform their lives. Armed conflict also poses a problem for states in the implementation of the EFA and MDGs with regard to universal primary education (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO, 2010)

The exposure of children to traumatic events such as the loss of loved ones, displacement, a lack of food, and the interruption of school associated with armed conflict has detrimental consequences for their mental health and psychological well-being (Barenbaum, Ruchkin, & Schwab-Stone, 2014). Children are affected by Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD) such as irritability, insomnia, sleeping disorders, fear, aggression, confusion and an inability to concentrate, which greatly affects their ability to have a loving relationship with their family and friends and to perform well in school.

In a study conducted on 796 children living in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, an area affected by armed conflict, they were found to have behavioural and psychological problems such as depression and fears, to have a tendency to be disobedient and to engage in fighting, and to suffer from sleep disturbances, nightmares and low self-esteem (Baker, 1990). It was discovered that children in Sri Lanka who suffered traumatising experiences during the prevalent armed conflict suffered from PTSD, and both their memory tests and their school grades demonstrated a significant impairment of their cognitive development. It has also been shown that children of school age in Rwanda exposed to the 1994 genocide experience had a drop in educational achievement.

Given that the environment has an influence on development, on learning and other aspects of behaviour, a society characterized by any form of violence will not be conducive for social interaction in the form of teaching and learning (Joda & Abdulrasheed, 2015). Violence can affect students' performance in school as insecurity constitutes a negative reinforcement due to the obvious fact that teaching and learning cannot successfully occur in an environment of fear. Also, war not only destroys lives and schools, but it also diverts resources from education to the military. While spending on defence provides security which sustains a stable business environment, it consumes resources that could be put to more productive use.

According to Oladunjoye and Omemu (2013), attendance at school is dependent on the readiness of the child, encouragement from parents, the provision of school materials, the distance to school and, very importantly, the security of the child. The present state of insecurity in the North Eastern region of Nigeria has been traumatic for children as they are forced to flee from their homes in fear, to witness killings, or to live as displaced persons or refugees. UNICEF

reports that as a result of the incessant attacks on schools, school children and teachers, over one million children have been forced out of school, while their teachers have also been forced to stay away from school (Atsua and Abdullahi, 2015). Some schools have been forced to shut down and the deserted school buildings have been converted into shelters for internally displaced persons. The children who were supposed to populate the schools have either sought refuge along with their families in neighboring countries or have been internally displaced, as over 1.4 million children have been forced to flee the northeastern region (UNICEF, 2015).

The attacks by the insurgents have led to the deaths of many children. In July 2013 the insurgents invaded a government-owned boarding school in Mamudo village in Yobe state, killed 42 students and teachers and burnt down the school (Agbibo, 2013). On 25 February 2014 the insurgents invaded Federal Government College, Buni Yadi, Yobe State and gruesomely murdered about 59 students and burnt several buildings in the school. In November 2014 a suicide bomber entered a secondary school by disguising himself as a member of the school and killed about 47 school pupils and injured many others during their morning assembly (Anon, 2014). Also in April 2014 over 200 Chibok girls were abducted from their school dormitory and to date they have not been found except for some that are reported to have escaped. The Chibok girls' abduction represented the largest single incident of abduction attributable to the Boko Haram. The incident attracted international condemnation and led to the famous "#BringBackOurGirls" campaign, which extended even to the White House and continues to this date (Oke & Labeodan, 2015).

The north-eastern part of Nigeria, which is being ravaged by Boko Haram, has ordinarily recorded a low literacy level, as it has the highest proportion of out-of-school Children (OOSC). The Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey 2013 (NDHS) showed that the north east had the lowest rate of school attendance in Nigeria, as against the south-eastern region, which had the highest. Yobe State in particular had the worst rate among all the states in Nigeria in terms of school attendance for both male and female children in primary and secondary school, with just 12 per cent attendance, compared to 75 per cent in Imo State in the south east.

A recent study conducted in some schools in Damaturu, the capital city of Yobe State, revealed that the insecurity in the region has caused a further reduction in school attendance (Abdullahi &

Terhemba, 2014). Borno State has had the most devastating experience since the Boko Haram insurgency, with a huge negative impact on basic education. Despite the ordinarily low primary and secondary school attendance level in the state (35 and 28 per cent respectively), a recent study revealed that the insurgency has affected basic education, as school attendance has been drastically reduced owing to attacks on schools which have left many children hurt and the abduction of over 200 Chibok girls, and also because many children and teachers have narrowly escaped death during the attacks on their communities (Abdulrasheed, Onuselogu, & Obioma, 2015).

The study carried out by Oladunjoye and Omemu (2013) shows that school attendance has been affected mostly in rural areas as they are usually neglected, unlike school attendance urban areas, where the schools enjoy a measure of protection afforded by the security forces. The constant attacks by the sect undermine the effort of government to improve education in the northern region, and no right-thinking parents would want to send their wards to school for fear that they would become victims of the attacks. Some parents prefer to send their children to neighboring states that are peaceful, but the masses in the north east, who are counted among the poorest, cannot afford that luxury. In situations such as this, the children may never return to school or complete their education even when the insurgency is over, thus diminishing their contribution to their society (O'Mally, 2011).

2.5 Right to Healthcare

The human right to health means that everyone has the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, which includes access to all medical services, sanitation, adequate food, decent housing, healthy working conditions, and a clean environment. The human right to health guarantees a system of health protection for all. Everyone has the right to the health care they need, and to living conditions that enable us to be healthy, such as adequate food, housing, and a healthy environment. Health care must be provided as a public good for all, financed publicly and equitably. The human right to health care means that hospitals, clinics, medicines, and doctors' services must be accessible, available, acceptable, and of good quality for everyone, on an equitable basis, where and when needed.

Article 25 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 states that "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services." The Universal Declaration makes additional accommodations for security in case of physical debilitation or disability, and makes special mention of care given to those in motherhood or childhood.

The United Nations further defines the right to health in Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which states: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for:

- The reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child;
- The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;
- The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases;
- The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.

Nigeria has been involved in a 9 year conflict with the group Boko Haram, responsible for many attacks, the most widely reported being the kidnap of 276 school girls in April, 2014. Boko Haram currently controls an area the size of Belgium across three states in northeast Nigeria: Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. Health indices, such as maternal and child mortality are worst in the northeast region compared with elsewhere in Nigeria (Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey, 2017). The substantial gains Nigeria has made to control polio might be lost if these issues of health care are not urgently addressed in northeast Nigeria. In 2013, 53 cases of polio were recorded in Nigeria, more than half of which were in Borno and Yobe. In 2014, only one case was detected in Borno and Yobe. This change suggests that cases of polio might be going undetected because of the insurgency (Etsano et al., 2014).

The Nigerian Government estimates the number of internally displaced people in northeast Nigeria (as of January, 2015) to be 981 416.3 At least 153 000 refugees have fled to Niger, Cameroon, and Chad (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2015). These internally

displaced people live in (official and unofficial) camps, often with illnesses, physical and psychological trauma, and minimal access to health care and basic essentials, such as food, clothing, shelter, clean water, and sanitary conditions. A report by Welye (2016) suggests that diarrhoea is the main ailment, and so far, two clinical cholera outbreaks have occurred—these were never confirmed because health workers had no access to laboratory tests. Apart from a few official camps (housing about 150 000 people) with potable water supplies, internally displaced people must access water from streams.

According to Isokpan and Durojaye (2016), even before the insurgency, North-East Nigeria had some of the worst health and socioeconomic indices in the country. This is against the backdrop of a weak health system marked by inadequate health facilities and a dearth of skilled health workers. There's also little donor support compared with other regions of Nigeria. The insurgency has compounded these problems and also disrupted what health services there were. Insurgents have destroyed about 788 health facilities in the region. In Borno 48 health workers have been killed and over 250 injured. The state has lost up to 40% of its facilities and only a third of those left in Borno state remain functional. Attrition rates of health workers have also played a role. Over the past two years Borno state has lost 35% of its doctors to other states (Isokpan & Durojaye, 2016).

The Boko Haram insurgency is an urgent wake-up call for policymakers in Nigeria and global health agencies to provide humanitarian aid. In the short term, health workers and health supplies, including vaccines, need to be deployed to both official and unofficial camps. In the long term, efforts should be focused on how to reintegrate returning refugees, and on building capacity for early preparedness for future humanitarian emergencies in Nigeria. The public health implications of the insurgency are dire, and the world cannot afford to sit by and watch. The Nigerian authorities have so far been unable to contain the insurgency. Nigeria and its neighbours, whose health-care systems are being stretched by the influx of refugees every day need support for their health systems to respond to the unique challenge posed by the conflict.

2.6 Federal Government's Efforts in Combating Boko Haram Insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria

2.6.1 Joint Task Force (JTF) Approach to Addressing Boko Haram

Given the intensity of Boko Haram terrorism and its widespread devastations in northern Nigeria, the Nigerian government under President Goodluck Jonathan set up a Joint Task Force (JTF), comprising the army, police, navy, and the state security service, to rein in the excesses of the sect's activities. But in their bid to counter the menace, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch issued out empirical reports that described how the JTF have abused the human rights of many innocent Nigerians who find themselves trapped, as it were, in the middle of a vicious cycle (Amnesty International, 2012). The reports paint a grim picture of spiraling violence, where terrorist attacks instigated by Boko Haram are countered by the security forces with abuses that only add venom to the problem which, as the reports claim, could also bolster the support of Boko Haram by pushing more and more youths toward the organization (CNN, November 2 2012). The human rights violations reportedly carried out by the Nigerian security forces are fuelled by the fact that the Nigerian state and its security institutions, is ill-prepared and ill-equipped to safeguard human rights standards.

The Nigerian government, besides creating a credible and reliable security force, must also bear in mind that military operations alone cannot address the issues created by state fragility. Indeed, such military operations without intermittent and sustained political efforts to rectify the conditions of state failure in Nigeria might prove abortive in the fight against Boko Haram. Thus, measures that are not strictly military should be experimented with, to see if peace could be restored and whether the devastated economic life of the largest percentage of northern Nigeria could also be resuscitated (Onwubiko, 2012).

The foregoing corroborates Shafir et al (2007) claim that terrorism can only be temporarily suppressed by military campaigns, but ultimately diminished only when there is some viable political response to the grievances of the vanguards of terror. At best, if the military is to be involved in curbing Boko Haram, then the Nigerian government should adopt the civil-military coalition along the lines suggested by Rebecca Schiff, who proposes a 'Concordance Theory' of civil-military relations. Schiff argues that violence and excessive military force in intervention could be reduced if the army partner with the citizens and political authorities (Schiff, 1995).

Such a collaborative engagement of the military, political leadership, and the Nigerian citizenry could improve the image of soldiers in the country and help the security forces and the Nigerian government overturn a reputation for brutality, corruption, and arbitrariness (Dayil, 2009). Needless to say that it will also help in many ways to improve, expand and consolidate the Nigerian democratic space that has so far been stifled by tyrannical regimes (Ukeje, 2005).

2.6.2 The Declaration of a State of Emergency

On December 31, 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in some local government areas of Yobe, Plateau, and Borno states following repeated cases of bombings in these states. Under the Nigerian Constitution, a state of emergency Permits the president to confer additional powers to ‘duly authorized persons’ or make any order necessary or expedient for the purpose of maintaining public order, public safety, and securing peace in the emergency area and to derogate from particular sections of Nigeria’s Constitution Among the provisions granted by the constitution are the detention of suspects for justifiable reasons; the taking of possession or control of any property in the emergency area; the entry and search of any premises; and the payment of compensation and remuneration to people affected by the order (Amnesty International, 2012).

Just a month after the state of emergency was declared in the flashpoints of Boko Haram; the sect extended its reign of terror to Kano state, and struck with unprecedented vigour and intensity. In coordinated attacks that targeted security forces and civilians, Boko Haram killed about 200 people and sent shockwaves to other cities in the state and beyond. Clearly, it seems that the declaration of a state of emergency in these flashpoints of Boko Haram attacks did nothing by way of ameliorating the violence. If anything, the state of emergency curtailed the freedom and privileges of the people living in those areas and gave the military the leeway to use excessive force at will. In fact, there are allegations that while the soldiers were sent to keep peace, some of them went into the volatile areas and aggravated the already tensed situation. The soldiers were reported to have destroyed houses, raped women, broken into shops and confiscated jewellery (Abbah et al, 2012).

In places like Maiduguri, Kano and Kaduna where Boko Haram has struck with awful savagery, the people have become more scared of the police and the army than they are of the sect, simply

because of the nuisance that the security outfits constitute in those areas (Walker, 2012: 12). Thus, in spite of, or even because of the declaration of the state of emergency in the flashpoints of Boko Haram terrorism, the frequency of the sect's attacks and the brutality of the military and police are increasing exponentially with carnage spreading to Kaduna, Maiduguri, Kano, and Bauchi states. While declaring a state of emergency might be a short-term strategy in curtailing Boko Haram, it seems highly improbable that it will actually extinguish the menace in the longer term.

2.6.3 Political Dialogue and Amnesty

A number of pundits, politicians, and members of the international community have proposed that if any success is to be made in resolving the Boko Haram bottleneck, the Nigerian government must open a dialogue with the sect. Taking a cue from this proposal, the Nigerian government attempted a modus vivendi with the sect in 2011. The negotiation was made possible with the inclusion of a middleman, Ibrahim Datti Ahmed, President of the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria. However, the dialogue was unsuccessful as the middle man – Ibrahim Datti Ahmed – pulled out, stating that he was shocked at the rate with which news of the talks went viral in the Nigerian newspapers, and that he was embarrassed by the development which has created doubt in his mind about the sincerity of the Nigerian government as the negotiation was supposed to be kept confidential in order to achieve the desired result (Walker, 2012: 11). This failed move to dialogue with Boko Haram was not the first of its kind. The democracy activist Shehu Sani attempted in September 2011 to broker peace talks between the former President Olusegun Obasanjo and Mohammed Yusuf's brother-in-law, Babakura Fugu. Soon after the meeting, gunmen stormed into Fugu's house and assassinated him (Walker, 2012: 11). It is difficult then to see how any meaningful negotiation could be carried out with Boko Haram, since it has variously slain its own members who have attempted to open negotiations with the government or grant interviews to the press (Baba-Ahmed, 2012).

With the failure to successfully hold dialogue with Boko Haram, it has also been proposed that the sect be granted amnesty by way of palliating the grievances of its members. This suggestion was premised on the fact that the amnesty program of late President Umaru Musa Yar'adua has yielded some level of success with the young militants in the Niger Delta, many of whom got vocational training at home and abroad (Zorro 2011). However, the Boko Haram terrorism and

the Niger Delta militancy cannot be juxtaposed. The Niger Delta militants are restive youths from the region that resorted to the use of violence to call attention to the deteriorating conditions of their environment - caused by corruption, oil mismanagement and spillage, and bad work ethic. The youths of the region became violent only when all peaceful means and agitations failed to bring the Nigerian government to intervene in their plight. Thus, in the case of the Niger Delta inhabitants, there is a deep-rooted history of neglect, alienation, exclusion, exploitation, and degradation of their land. Whereas, Boko Haram's Islamist agenda of implementing Sharia law in Nigeria and the violent means it has employed to make known its intent are all breaches of Nigeria's constitution and indicative of the fact that the sect is highly contemptuous of constituted authorities (Dada & Ejue, 2012).

Having assessed the foregoing policy attempts used by the Nigerian state to extinguish Boko Haram terrorism, the overwhelming public view still remains that the government has failed in tackling the mayhem because it lacks a proper blueprint for action. In the wake of these concerns, Aghedo and Osumah (2012) carried out an empirical survey, the results of which suggest that respondents in Nigeria strongly believe that proper security operations, employment generation, poverty alleviation, and restrictions on importations and/or use of illegal arms, rather than dialogue, amnesty, or excessive military intervention, are long-term measures of eliminating Boko Haram terrorism.

2.6.4 Promoting a Culture of Religious Tolerance

Based on Paige's informative data that found 47 societies around the world capable of demonstrating the capacities for non-violent peacefulness (Paige, 2002), the Nigerian government must, as a matter of extreme urgency, begin to recognize and celebrate the peaceful nature of its diverse religious groups. The story of Christians and Muslims coming together to protect each other during national protests or sectarian crises should be encouraged and publicized. The following examples are noteworthy: In the metropolitan city of Kano, Muslim clerics attended Sunday Church services as a show of faith and tolerance. The leader of the delegation, Bashir Ishaq Bashir, stated that they came to the Church to deliver a message of hope, peace, and solidarity.... Also in Minna and in Lagos, Christians joined hands to protect Muslims as they prayed during the nationwide oil subsidy removal strike on January 1, 2012. Christians and Muslims have also been united in protesting against bad governance and

corruption. In the wake of recent security challenges, Christians have shielded Muslims from any potential attack during the weekly Friday Jumat prayers in major mosques. Similarly, Muslims have provided the same protection for their Christian brethren around major Churches during Sunday services. These hands of fraternity, solidarity and fellowship should be continued and sustained on a regular basis until divisive agents of violence and lawlessness are dealt with (Ensign, 2012).

As these examples illustrate, there are some covenantal goods in both Islam and Christianity that could be the foundation for a non-killing society in which mutually productive alternatives are available for diverse individuals in Nigeria. The recognition and championing of the goods in both Islam and Christianity can motivate people with diverse interests to co-exist in multiple, overlapping jurisdictions of varying geographical scopes and can go a long way in building a non-killing community, where religion can play a role as a force for harmony, truth and equal justice. Also relevant in this regard is an effort to consolidate the interfaith comradeship in the country by engaging more religious leaders to interact with potential and identified members of radical Islamic sects such as Boko Haram.

Indeed, the agency of the clergy will be crucial in shedding light not only on peacebuilding and mediation, but also on violent movements and terrorists organizations like Boko Haram (Sandal, 2011). Since religion is a powerful tool for legitimacy and an important source of identity for many Nigerians, religious actors in Nigeria must become heralds, advocates, and institution builders in addition to their role of providing spiritual leadership. As the case of Northern Ireland and that of Apartheid South Africa have shown (Sandal, 2011), faith leaders have a well-established and pervasive influence in their communities, which they must not abuse but must use to bring about constructive changes in their societies based on a respected set of religious values, and reconciling conflicting parties and mobilizing support for peaceful processes. Already, some faith leaders in Nigeria like Cardinal John Onaiyekan, Bishop Mathew Hassan Kukah, Sultan Mohammed Sa'adu Abubakar III, among others, have all shown exemplary leadership in their communities, through their preaching, writings, and participation in national reconciliation processes, which could go a long way in impacting on conflict transformation in Nigeria. Thus, the role that faith leaders play in bringing their theological knowledge to bear on

national policies and the politics of conflict in Nigeria will be crucial in the overall effort to address the Boko Haram crisis in the country.

To bolster the effort of faith leaders in Nigeria, civil society organizations, such as the Interfaith Mediation Centre that operates in Kaduna, can also be established in other volatile cities in the country. Interestingly, the Interfaith Mediation Centre in Kaduna state was founded by James Wuye, a Pentecostal pastor, and Muhammad Ashafa, an Imam – both indigenes – who led conflicting community groups, but who have reconciled and joined forces to bring about peace in the state. The Centre aims to re-establish relationships damaged by violence, minimize the likelihood of the recurrence of religious violence, and organize projects that will involve both Christians and Muslims, such as cultural events and peace workshops (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2010).

Furthermore, the Centre addresses issues of sectarian violence by preventing the occurrence of violent conflicts and contributing to raising the level of trust and tolerance among Christians and Muslims in Nigeria (Wuye, 2005). With trust, tolerance, and the absence of violence, reconciliation can begin through the development over time of collaborative relationships and cohesive peace constituencies in both communities (Wuye, 2005).

To further the strides made by the Interfaith Centre, non-killing civil societies and spiritual councils should be established at every level of government in Nigeria (Paige, 2004). The groups should comprise lawyers, educated clerics, community and youth leaders, who will represent every faith and ethnic group in their particular region. Their responsibilities will be to affirm and endorse the respect of human rights and dignity of all persons as well as organize peacemaking, and post-conflict reconstruction programs. The presence of lawyers in the group will be pivotal in prosecuting those found guilty of abusing the fundamental right to life of all citizens in the jurisdiction and beyond. The clerics and spiritual leaders should be charged with the responsibility of advising the youths and general populace in accordance with the doctrines of their religious books. Indeed, special attention is to be accorded to the youth who are, in most cases, fiercely passionate about their faith and easily used on that basis by politicians and religious demagogues to fuel instability and perpetrate acts of violence. It seems then that any program of change or theory of non-violence and conflict transformation without due regards to

the role or place of the youths, clerics, community leaders, etc. as instruments of change in their societies, is unlikely to yield the desired results.

2.6.5 Addressing Poverty and Unemployment in the North

The impoverishment of the north, especially in the base of Boko Haram – Borno state – should be uppermost in the minds and policies of northern leadership, because excruciating poverty and youth unemployment have helped the sect to build a cult-like anti-government following that is bent on killing anyone and destroying anything in the name of God (Obayiuwana, 2011). To set in place any meaningful development plan in northern Nigeria, the populace must be educated and gainfully employed. The Nigerian government should by all means see the need for a new thinking on resolving conflicts and restoring peace without recourse to their usual heavy handedness. This new thinking on conflict transformation should be framed in the non-killing framework and should entail the creation of job opportunities for the now-teeming number of unemployed youths.

According to Obayiuwana (2011), when jobs are provided for these restive youths, conditions that predispose them to robbery, armed violence, and suicide bombings will be massively reduced. Hence, the Nigerian government, especially the northern Governors, will have to reverse the economic and social degradation that has created a killing society in the region. What the government can do is to resuscitate the agricultural sector and the textile industries in the north, which have lain dormant for many years. If the Kaduna and Kano state governments resuscitate their once flourishing textile factories, unemployment could be massively reduced and the creation of more employment opportunities could see many restive youths resisting any killing tendency and focusing on transforming their lives. Besides, an economic revolution that the refurbishment of the textile factories might bring out could make the northern environment attractive to domestic and foreign investment once more.

Equally relevant in this regard is to set up viable civil society institutions that will promote democracy and challenge the corrupt and hostile authorities in the north who often manipulate the restive youths in the region to kill their political opponents and stir disturbances during elections and other political rallies and social events in the country (Zorro 2011). This was clearly manifested when youths launched protests against President Goodluck Jonathan's

election victory in May 2011 by setting fire to properties belonging to the Vice-President Namadi Sambo in Kaduna state (Zorro 2011). If the populace in northern Nigeria is to be prevented from rising up in anger and attacking the state, then the leaders in the country will have to heed to the crying need of virtually all Nigerians by providing adequate educational and health facilities, decent housing, clean water supply, and steady electricity for the people (Duodu, 2012). The gloomy reality is that Boko Haram is likely to intensify its wave of unrest and terror, and it seems clear that without the prospect of economic improvement for millions of poor and unemployed people in northern Nigeria, mostly youths, the security situation will deteriorate further.

2.6.6 Strengthening Security Capacity

The extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf in the July 2009 violent confrontations between his sect and the police has provided his followers with a valuable recruitment tool and reason to kill both police and civilians who had nothing to do with the killing of the sect's leader (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2010). To compensate for the extrajudicial murder of the Boko Haram leader along with some of its members, late President Yar'adua set up a Commission of Inquiry to look into the matter. The reports of such commissions are hardly, if ever, published (Albert, 2001). Successive governments in Nigeria had always adopted the 'Commission of Inquiry approach' any time a violent situation erupts without any proper follow-up. According to Albert (2001), the refusal to publish these reports gives room for rumour-mongers to boast of possessing insider knowledge of the contents of the reports. In most cases, the warring party that thinks itself disadvantaged by the report would therefore regroup to wage another attack, considering that its grievances cannot be addressed through any official government intervention. It would not be surprising if the same sentiment is also shared by Boko Haram since it clearly expresses little confidence in the legitimacy of the Nigerian state and its ability to redress the grievances of its members.

Furthermore, the security apparatuses in Nigeria are simply ill-equipped and far too corrupt and reckless to handle serious cases of violence or insecurity in the country, and as such, they have lost the confidence of the general population whom they so often punish, beat, and harass at checkpoints. Given this, the Nigerian government will have to make a conscious effort to give first class and robust counterterrorism training to its security forces in accordance with the

following counterterrorism strategy of Kofi Annan: Our strategy against terrorism must be comprehensive and should be based on five pillars: it must aim at dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it; it must deny terrorists access to funds and materials; it must deter states from sponsoring terrorism; it must develop state capacity to defeat terrorism; and it must defend human rights (Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom, 2005).

Among other things, the fulfilment of Annan's strategy will entail providing non-lethal equipment, and helping the Nigerian security forces to be more precise and courteous in their use of force and to accept the role of custodians of human rights (Obayiuwana 2011). To intensify its efforts, the Nigerian government as a signatory of several international human rights treaties is obligated to open speedy trials on the detained members and suspects of Boko Haram, and if possible, prosecute the perpetrators of the extrajudicial murder of Mohammed Yusuf and other Boko Haram members in the July 2009 uprising (Human Rights Watch, 2012). To effectively counter Boko Haram and security abuses in Nigeria, the Nigerian government will certainly require "a judicial branch that holds corrupt governments and military officials responsible for their actions, an accountable and effective police force, and a political process that is inclusive of all groups, regardless of ethnicity, religion, education, gender, or economic status" (Young 2002, p260).

Bearing in mind that the Nigerian Security Forces have lost credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of many citizens, it will be important for the government to garner the people's trust and confidence in the security forces because without this close alliance between the security forces and the citizenry, information about perpetrators of violence will be hard to come by. Based on this, the security forces in Nigeria should work closely with community and religious leaders to collect information on activities around their jurisdiction. Of course, the gains of such an approach may not come immediately but, if vigorously pursued, community policing can create the enabling atmosphere whereby the security forces in the country can be more responsive, more professional, more effective, and more service-oriented. Thus, rather than anti-terror police, or increasing military budgets, it is this kind of quiet revolution in approach that is capable of delivering the optimal result of preventing future generations of Nigerians from taking up arms and killing innocent civilians and attacking the state in the name of God (Forest, 2012). By and large, adhering to these prudent approaches – which rely less on the imagery of war – would

mark a departure from certain major aspects of what have been done so far in the so-called global ‘War on Terror’ (Roberts, 2006), and can go a long way to not only quell the Boko Haram terrorism but to also make the West African sub-region more secure and stable.

2.6.7 Weak Border Control and Regional Policing

Arguably, the proliferation of ammunition and other weapons of mass destruction in Nigeria have contributed to perpetuating a killing society in the country. Boko Haram has used Nigeria’s porous borders and the limited capacities of neighboring countries to its advantage. There are allegations that the sect received ammunitions and explosives from Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel region. Thus, greater cooperation and intelligence-sharing between states in the region need to be encouraged and facilitated by regional and international agencies (Pham, 2012). At the sub-regional level, it is imperative for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to establish its own sub-region-led police force in order to checkmate the activities of criminals and terrorists across the sub-regional borders. But security itself cannot be sustained or promoted without a corresponding counterbalancing strategy of promoting legitimate politics, peace-building, institutional building, sub-regional courts, and democratization processes as catalysts for sustainable development in the sub-region. If and when all these are done in the right manner, then it is unlikely that Boko Haram in Nigeria and other extremist Islamist groups in Mali will carve out niches for themselves across the sub-region. Additionally, Nigeria should collaborate with others at the global level to combat regional and global trafficking networks that could be exploited to help finance and sustain terrorist groups in the country (Forest, 2012).

2.6.8 Underscoring the Secularity of the Nigerian State

To effectively fight the Boko Haram menace, the secularity of the Nigerian state must be underscored. Boko Haram insists on the unitary view of the Nigerian society with no distinction between state and religion, and is also demanding the Islamization of the country, or at least the application of the Sharia law in the northern region (Adesoji, 2010). According to Boko Haram, secularism amounts to a cultural affront to a significant portion of the Islamic societies and reduces them to the status of second-class citizens. However, some structural problems embedded in the campaign for the implementation of the Sharia law in Nigeria abound. For instance, Cook (2011) argues that the introduction of Sharia Penal Codes may in some areas be in conflict with the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, which prohibits the adoption of state religion in

the country. Hence, the call for the Islamization of the northern states by Boko Haram is diversionary and unconstitutional, with grave implications for the nation-building project and the secularity of the Nigerian state (Dada and Ejue, 2012: 237). It is thus arguable by supporters of Nigeria, as now constituted, that improvements in extremists' understanding of the meaning of citizenship and the importance of personal liberty are crucial to achieving peace and consensus on divisive issues in a deeply polarized country like Nigeria (Sanusi, 2007).

Similarly, Ibelema (2012) calls on all Muslims to use moral and religious suasion to help Boko Haram members see the light and to be made to understand that they are a discredit to Islam. Equally important is for the Nigerian government to revisit the idea of organizing a Sovereign National Conference (SNC). Stakeholders in Nigeria have agitated since the 1980s for the use of SNC as an avenue for resolving or (at least) discussing the divisive issues that have stalled harmonious relationship among the different religious and ethnic groups in Nigeria. Although the military regime of Babangida did not allow the conference to hold in the 1980s, it is important for the present crop of Nigerian leaders to revisit the potential significance and benefit of organizing a SNC. But for this to happen, there ought to be a strong political will and readiness of the people to put aside their ethnic and religious divisions and "freely debate, negotiate, and design the nature of their society and their common future" (Rashid, 2004: 388).

2.6.9 Creating Alternative Schools for the Almajiris

In countries like Nigeria where some states lack modern educational structures, the best policy for the Nigerian government may be to help develop alternative modern structures of education, and provide the opportunities for some kids, like the Almajiris who roam the streets, to also benefit from modern education. In Pakistan, for instance, many children end up at extremist schools not of their own accord but simply due to the inability of their parents to afford the necessary finances needed to enroll them in the alternative modern schools (Stern, 2003). In many instances, children who attend public schools may have to buy books and uniforms, or pay for housing and board (Stern, 2003). Government assistance in developing modern schools, especially in northeast Nigeria, that can successfully educate youth to participate constructively in modern society and so keep away from civil disturbances, can be a useful effort, whatever its long-term impact on countering Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.

2.6.10 Strengthening Governance

Ultimately, the long-term difficulty of managing the Boko Haram reign of terror in Nigeria is to improve governance capacity. Nigerians can begin to reap the dividends of democracy and live in a peaceful and sustainable environment if their leaders shun corruption and utilize the country's resources for their benefit. Good leadership characterized by the virtues of honesty, trust, transparency, and integrity, are basic ingredients needed to eliminate the Boko Haram terrorism. The process of providing good governance in Nigeria should focus on the following imperatives, as clearly spelled-out by Ojo (2006: 8): The reasons for being a Nigerian should be uniformly developed and accepted by all throughout the country. This must be articulated and sustained through consistent government programs and institutions. It must be grounded in the constitution and directed toward building people's trust in government. This populist approach to governance should be seen by all to be in the interest of all Nigerians in order to build trust through actions and policies in the interest of every Nigerian.

The economic policy of the government must be reflected in an attainable economic reform, which should prioritize food production. This reform should be based on the principle of investing in people as its foundation. It should also be linked to a social policy that depoliticizes ethnicity and religious affairs. In addition, the government must seek constitutional and legal mechanisms for addressing the ethnic and religious crisis in the country. The government must also provide good road network, constant electricity, fresh water, and affordable healthcare for people, especially those in the deprived regions of the country. All the above attributes of good governance can be achieved through the support of a viable, responsible and depoliticized civil service, and committed and well-informed civil society (Ojo, 2006).

Surely, good governance in Nigeria requires the provision of economic, social, political, and security goods by the Nigerian leaders to its vast citizenry who have been enduring festering injustice and neglect due to bad governance (Ikelegbe, 2005). Providing these legitimate political and social goods to the citizens will be a crucial step in the right direction towards addressing instability and creating an atmosphere of cooperation and trust between the government and the citizens.

2.7 Gaps in Literature

Several studies have been conducted similar to the current research study, among which include: Bamidele (2012) on causes of the rise of Boko-haram; OHCHR (2015) on Boko-haram human rights abuses; and O'Mally (2011), Oladunjoye and Omemu (2013), Jones and Naylor (2014), Abdullahi & Terhempa (2014), Oladunjoye and Omemu (Graca (2015), on the impact of Boko-haram attacks on education. The above studies did not look at Boko-haram in combination of the context of the causes of the rise of Boko-haram insurgency, human rights abuses, and its general impact on education. This study was intended to close such a contextual gap.

CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter dealt with the practical procedures which were used in carrying out the current study. The chapter includes the research design that was adopted, population of the study, sample size, sampling procedure, data collection instruments, data analysis and field data collection procedures. The chapter also underlines the framework within which data was collected, analyzed and presented.

3.1 Research Design

The study adopted case study design. A case study is an in depth study of a particular situation rather than a sweeping statistical survey. It is a method used to narrow down a very broad field of research into one easily researchable topic. This design was adopted because it describes in details the experience of a person, family, group, community, or institution over a phenomenon. The case study design was of particular interest to the researcher because of the need to clearly understand how the activities of Boko Haram violate the human rights of people in North-eastern Nigeria. Furthermore, the study utilized qualitative research approaches, where interviews were the main sources of data collection. The reason for adopting this approach was that it provided the researcher with the opportunity to carry an in-depth study, through fieldwork, to gain insight into the experiences, feelings and opinion of respondents on how the activities of Boko Haram violates human rights in North-eastern Nigeria.

3.2 Study Population

The study population implies the total population under survey, from which the researcher scientifically draws his/her sample size. The study population is 23,558,674, which the population of Northeastern Nigeria according to the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2011). The target population included 55 participants from among the (camp leaders, security agents, local leaders, and human rights experts).

3.3 Sample Size

The study employed qualitative approach in data collection. Thus, the researcher chose the respondents (key informants) purposively. Accordingly, a total of 25 Key Informants was chosen by the researcher as represented in Table 3.1. The respondents were chosen because they possess good knowledge of the issue under investigation. Glaser and Strauss (1967) emphasized that the main issue in a qualitative sample is to attain saturation. Saturation therefore, means a point where the researcher gains no new knowledge from additional interviews. However, some scholars have proffered recommendation on appropriate sample size for qualitative study. For ethnography, Morse (1994) suggested approximately 30 – 50 participants. For grounded theory, Morse (1994) suggested 30 – 50 interviews, while Creswell (1998) suggested only 20 – 30. For phenomenological studies, Creswell (1998) recommends 5 – 25 and Morse (1994) suggested at least six. Thus, the study sample size is in line with Creswell(1998) which recommendation.

Table 3.1: Qualitative Sample Size

Respondents	Target population	Sample size	Sampling technique
Camp leaders	24	11	Purposive sampling
Security agents	12	4	Purposive sampling
Local leaders	11	7	Purposive sampling
Human rights experts	8	3	Purposive sampling
Total	55	25	

Source: OHCHR (2015)

3.4 Sampling Procedure

According to Saunders et al. (2012) purposive sampling allows selection of a sample without bias to ensure inclusion of those respondents who are most suitable to provide useful information to a particular study. Furthermore, it is most suitable for non-statistical findings, which are not generalizable to the entire population and it targets only very knowledgeable of the subject matter. Thus, this study adopted purposive sampling technique in choosing the respondents because of their exposure and expert knowledge about Boko Haram insurgency.

3.5 Data Sources

Primary data deals with data collected afresh and for the first time, which has not been processed. In this study Primary data were gathered through key informant interview.

3.5.1 Primary Data

Primary data deals with new evidence or information gathered in the field during the course of research. It is data collected afresh and for the first time, which has not been processed (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). Primary data were gathered through interviews with key informant.

3.5.2 Secondary Data

Secondary data is documented evidence or information by other researchers. It also refers to the data which has already been collected and analyzed by someone else. This study employed such data (secondary data) that was either published or unpublished. In this study, secondary data consist of policy documents from government departments, organizational records and data that were originally collected for other research purposes. It includes information gathered, processed and interpreted by other researchers and recorded in books, peer reviewed journals, news publication, monographs, working papers, dissertations and related publications.

3.7 Data Collection Instruments

3.7.1 Interview Guide

A face-to-face interview method was applied to gather qualitative data from key informants. The interviews were standardized using an interview guide which was designed with open ended questions. Drawing from Creswell (2014), interviews and more specifically the open ended questions in this study allowed probing to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the problem of Boko Haram insurgency and Human Rights Violations. In view of Bryman and Bell (2011), qualitative data collection provides more room for interviewees to express their thoughts and interviewers to probe on the issues under investigation, which is vital to enhance validity of the findings.

The interview questions allowed the respondents to answer questions from a broader view but within the aspects under investigation. As recommended by Churchill and Brown (2004), further

elaboration of the answers was sought as a matter of probing to gain in-depth understanding. In total, Twenty five interviews were conducted and each interview took 45 minutes.

3.8 Data Collection Procedure

An introductory letter was obtained from the College of Humanities and Social Sciences of Kampala International University after the approval of the validity of the research instruments. Before collecting data, the researcher obtained the permission from the State authorities to allow him carry out the study.

The researcher briefed the key interview informants (KIIs) about his intentions to carry out a research in their area. The researcher verbally asked for the consent of the informants before participating in the study. The researcher requested informants to respond to all the questions and thereafter planned for data analysis.

3.9 Data Analysis

Qualitative data was manually done by identification and transcription of recorded data into the qualitative findings. There after analysis was conducted to identify categories and themes that emerged from the data. The themes on each of the variables was coded, and conceptually organized, analyzed, evaluated and aligned to the research objectives from which interpretations was drawn. The analysis of data was done concurrently with data collection and the findings were used for further processing and analysis (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

3.10 Ethical Considerations

Research ethics involve requirements on daily work, the protection of dignity of the subjects and the conduct of research in a manner that does not harm the subjects.

Respect for Privacy and Informed consent

Fouka and Marianna (2011) believe that an invasion of privacy happens when private information such as beliefs, attitudes, opinions and records, is shared with others, without one's knowledge or consent. In a bid to respect privacy, the author observes that all aims, instruments and methodology must be discussed with the prospective subject and the research workers prior to the investigation. Similarly, Borbasi et al., (2005) observes that researchers should make sure

that the human subjects in the research fully understand the study. In addition, they must ascertain that the respondents have understood their right to withdraw at any time. More important, consent should be obtained freely, with full awareness of implications. In view of this, the principle of the respect for privacy as well as informed consent was observed in this study by seeking for verbal informed consent.

Respondents were made aware of the rationale, objective, methodology, their expected contribution, and any potential benefits versus the harm/risks of participating in the study and how they can seek more information about the study. Upon this, they were able to appreciate the study and therefore gave their consent to participate in the study. In addition, any request not to provide information on some issues was considered. Even after their consent to participate in the study, respondents were allowed an option to quit the interview at any moment they felt they needed to do so.

Confidentiality and anonymity

The issue of confidentiality and anonymity is closely connected with the rights of beneficence, respect for the dignity and fidelity. Anonymity is protected when the subject's identity cannot be linked with personal responses (Fouka & Marianna, 2011). If the researcher is not able to promise anonymity, he or she has to address confidentiality, which is the management of private information by the researcher in order to protect the subject's identity (Müller, 1994).

In the context of this study, data was collected from human subjects and the data collection tools showed no identity of persons by names but rather a unique number identifying each respondent was used. This ensured that information provided cannot be identified with specific individuals. At the stage of reporting findings, the individuals were not revealed but rather general trends arising from analysis of data from individuals were reported. Where verbatim was used, no identity of names or persons were revealed.

3.12 Limitations of the Study

This study was limited by unresponsive respondents and those who withdrew after the study process had kick-started. The researcher however, mitigated this by involving more participants from among the camp leaders and local leaders.

The researcher had no control over honesty of the respondents and personal biases. However, the researcher mitigated this by persuading the respondents to be as honest as possible since the results of the study would be provided to them if requested.

Furthermore, the qualitative survey where only 25 participants were involved in the study might have limited the generalization of the findings of this study. Future studies in a similar area that involves both qualitative and quantitative approaches could provide for the generalization of the findings of the study given the large population coverage. However, the current study used well informed personnel from different backgrounds including security agents, camp leaders, human rights experts and local leaders who have first-hand information regarding the topic under study.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the data collected from the field, analysis and interpretation of the data. It follows the major themes and objectives of the study. After a description of each of the finding, an interpretation is given in the context of the study objectives.

4.1 Boko Haram Human Rights Abuses in North Eastern Nigeria

Boko Haram retained control over a small portion of Nigerian territory after numerous offensives to dislodge the group by security forces from Nigeria and Cameroon. The extremist group, however, continues its violent campaign in the northeast, particularly in Borno and some parts Yobe and Adamawa states. The group uses suicide bombers in markets, universities and displacement camps; ambushes highway convoys; and raids and loots villages.

The first objective of this study was to evaluate Boko Haram Human Rights abuses in North Eastern Nigeria. This section captures information about the human rights violations perpetrated by Boko-haram group. Valuable information regarding the same was sourced from key informant interviews who included: camp leaders, security agencies, local leaders, and human rights organizations.

Item I: Human Rights abuses committed by Boko Haram insurgency

The researcher asked the KIIs the following question: **What kind of Human Rights abuses are committed by Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria?** Their responses were summarized as below:

Boko Haram has been ambushing and killing innocent people. For instance last year in July (2017), they ambushed an oil exploration team from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and killed at least 69 people in Magumeri (Human rights expert).

What I can say is that Boko-haram has been on the offensive for most of their 9 year operations. They have done gruesome mass killings of men and boys whom they (Boko

Haram) grouped together and gunned down or hacked to death with sadistic cruelty, before the female inhabitants of villages are abducted (Camp leader).

When Boko-haram captures you, my dear, you just have to pray to your God that all shall be well. Because when they capture you, you will end up staying in their custody for months or even years, and for the women, it becomes worse. In most cases, women and girls have been sexually enslaved, raped and forced into so-called "marriages". Many survivors of these horrific experiences are now pregnant by their rapists (Camp leaders).

In September 2017, Boko Haram militants kidnapped about 40 young adults, women and children and killed 18 in the town of Banki, 130 km southeast of Borno State, on the border of Nigeria and Cameroon (Security agent).

The terror groups are responsible for the deaths of over 20,000 people, with almost 2 million still forced to live away from their homes in the north east of the country (Human rights expert).

Over the past year, Boko-haram has staged pitiless attacks on towns and villages in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and some parts of Cameroon, Niger and Chad. In these areas, they have also generated terrible suffering. People have been burned to death in their own homes, beheaded, enslaved, raped, tortured, and forcibly recruited (Local leader).

In Yobe, Boko Haram fighters killed civilians, burned villages and, abducted women and children. Another Boko Haram raid in Borno two weeks ago – in which at least 38 civilians were killed in their villages are bloody reminders that Boko Haram retains its capacity to cause significant harm (Security agent).

Boko Haram fighters have often looted and burned down houses, shops and schools; destroyed hospitals and health centres and smashed water points and water systems (Human rights expert).

Boko Haram mostly uses women and girls as suicide bombers, forcing them to detonate bombs in urban centers. Recently more than 83 children were used as suicide bombers

since January: 55 girls and 27 boys, one was a baby strapped to a girl. The group abducted 67 women and children in 2017 (Security agent).

The above responses signify that Boko Haram attacks in northeast Nigeria indicate a pattern of vicious and indiscriminate attacks stretching back months, and even years. They include massacres; the burning down of entire villages; attacks on protected sites such as places of worship and schools, and the slaughter of people taking refuge in such sites; torture; cruel and degrading treatment following sentences in so-called "courts"; abduction on a massive scale, including of children; forced displacement; child recruitment; and extremely severe and widespread violations of the rights of women and girls, including sexual slavery, sexual violence, forced so-called "marriages", and forced pregnancy in violation of human rights and international humanitarian law principles.

Item II: Why there are too many cases of human rights abuses by Boko-haram

Furthermore, the researcher asked the KIIs the following question: **Why do you think there are too many cases of human rights abuses by Boko Haram group?** Their responses were summarized as below.

Because they are on rampage, killing, looting and destroying people and their property wherever they go. Sometimes they attack a community, set some buildings ablaze and quickly withdraw from that community (Local leader).

Because the Nigerian army seems to be incapable of putting this vice to rest once and for all. Nigeria's military regularly trumpets its apparent successes against Boko Haram but often denies reports of army casualties in attacks (Camp leader).

The Boko-haram team is organized militarily and they are founded by Al-Qaeda hence making their activities to keep progressing day after day. Suicide attacks are the most common method of attack in the Nigerian city of Maiduguri, which continues to be the epicentre of the insurgency (Human rights expert).

The high level of poverty and unemployment among the youth has caused most of them to join Boko-haram camps hence promoting and strengthening their activities of human rights abuses in different parts of the north (Local leader).

Item III: The most affect states in Northeastern Nigeria due to Boko-haram insurgency

Furthermore, the researcher asked KIIs this question: **Which states in Northeastern Nigeria are human rights abuses by Boko Haram so rampant and why?.** Their responses were summarized as below:

The responses were synonymous. Yobe, Adamawa and Borno states were cited as the most hit states in Northeastern Nigeria by Boko-haram insurgency. However, Borno was noted as the epicenter because there is a forest where they hide in and it is where they care their activities since it is where the insurgency started and it is where the their leader M. Yusuf was killed in 2010 thus escalating the offensive actions of the group.

Human Rights Watch (2017) report also confirms that the toll of the conflict on civilians continued as the extremist group increasingly resorted to the use of women and children as suicide bombers. Over 180 civilians have been killed in suicide bomb attacks since late 2016, mostly in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital. In August, female suicide bombers killed 13 people and injured 20 others in an attack near a security checkpoint in Borno. Three suicide bombers also killed 27 people and wounded 83 in coordinated attacks at a market and an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Maiduguri in August. Bomb attacks in September killed at least 25 IDPs in two camps at Banki and Ngala, all located in Borno State.

The above reports therefore shows that Borno state still holds the biggest number of assaults caused by Boko-haram insurgency.

4.2 The Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency on Education in North Eastern Nigeria

The second objective of this study was to assess the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on education in North Eastern Nigeria. The researcher asked the KIIs several questions regarding Boko-haram's insurgency and its impact on education sector.

Item I: The effect of Boko-haram insurgency on education

Specifically, the researcher asked this question: **How has Boko Haram insurgency affected education in North Eastern Nigeria?**The responses of the KIIs were summarized as below:

Boko Haram's attacks on education, and the government security forces' misuse of school for military purposes, has had a devastating effect on the right to education in the northeast. It has dramatically affected hundreds of thousands of school children at all levels of education, and thousands of teachers and education administrators (Human rights expert).

The government has failed to adequately protect schools, in the face of Boko Haram's attacks. In 2014, the group abducted 276 schoolgirls from Government Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State. Some of the girls initially escaped, but none were rescued. Another attack on Zanna Mobarti Primary School in Damasak, also in Borno state, in November 2014, led to the abduction of an estimated 300 young students. None of the children have so far been returned to their parents (Camp leader).

Beyond the loss of lives and damages to property, Boko Haram's terrorism, which has lasted 9 years now, has severely affected education in northeast Nigeria, especially that of the girl-child (Local leader).

In Borno, one of the most affected states, schools at all levels have been closed in 22 out of 27 local government areas for at least two years, and public secondary schools in the state capital, Maiduguri, only reopened in February 2016 after internally displaced people, or IDPs, who occupied most of the schools, were relocated elsewhere (Security agent).

In Yobe state, primary and junior secondary schools have virtually disappeared in two local government areas since 2013 when public senior secondary schools were relocated from Gujba and Gulani to Damaturu, the state capital (Human rights expert).

As a result of displacements caused by Boko Haram attacks on schools and other targets, many children have limited schooling in displacement camps or in private homes and

communities where they are hosted by friends, families, and others across northern Nigeria. In such camps, schools consist of children grouped according to their age in large rooms or underneath trees for three to four hours of lessons per day, in most cases three times a week. School materials such as paper and pencils are provided in United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) supplied bags, but there are no textbooks for the children, or other teaching aids for teachers (Camp leader).

In 2012, schools in Damagun, Damaturu and Potiskum, Yobe state, bore the brunt of Boko Haram attacks. Yobe Children's Academy was the first private school to be attacked in Damaturu and later insurgents burned 32 classrooms and nine offices in the primary and secondary sections (Security agent).

A key component of Boko Haram's ideology is hostility toward secular education, and it has gained notoriety for its repeated attacks on schools and universities, as well as teachers, administrators, and students, wreaking havoc on an already fragile education system. Boko Haram has killed an estimated 2,295 teachers, and over 19,000 teachers have been displaced by the conflict. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimates that more than 1,400 schools have been destroyed, damaged, or looted primarily in the northeast, and more than 600,000 children have lost access to education.

According to World Bank (2016) report, Boko Haram has been burning and looting schools since 2009. By January 2015, 254 schools had been burned, as well as 276 partially destroyed in Boko Haram attacks in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states, according to the National Emergency Management Agency (2015). In March 2016, Borno state authorities reported that 512 primary schools, 38 secondary schools and 2 tertiary institutions in the state had been destroyed in the six-year long conflict.

The above responses signify that the overall result is that an entire generation of children in the northeast is being robbed of their right to education, an essential ingredient for their future and for the development of the northeast region, which for years has lagged behind than that of other parts of the country. Without urgent action to address the lack of access to education occasioned by the Boko Haram attacks, the lives of these children could become locked in unending cycles of underachievement and poverty.

Item II: The most affected gender among the school children due to Boko-haram insurgency

Furthermore, the researcher asked the KIIs this question: **comparing the girls and the boys, which gender's education seems to be most affected by Boko Haram insurgency and why?** Their responses were summarized as below:

In terms of gender, both the boys and the girls are affected but the most affected are the girls because Boko-haram abducted about 276 female students from a college in Chibok in Borno state(Human rights expert).

In order to understand why girls' education has been affected by the humanitarian crisis in the northeast, one must understand that Boko Haram translates literally to 'Western Education is forbidden.' Deliberate targeting of schools and abduction of female students are at the heart of Boko Haram's operations. The aim of these attacks is to discourage parents from sending their girls to school (Human rights expert). According to the Kudirat initiative for democracy, over 900 schools in the northeast have been either burnt or closed down by the insurgents.

In February of this year (2018), Boko Haram kidnapped 94 girls from the Government Science and Technical secondary school, Dapchi town, Yobe state, northeast Nigeria. When the girls were eventually returned after negotiations with the Nigerian government, the parents were warned by Boko haram not to enroll them in school again (Security agent).

A report by Human Right Watch indicated one hundred and four of the Dapchi girls were released two weeks later after negotiations with the government. Five of the remaining girls reportedly died in captivity and one girl, Leah Sharibu, continues to be held hostage allegedly for refusing to deny her Christian faith. About 100 of the Chibok schoolgirls remain unaccounted for.

Boko Haram's insurgency has reduced girls' attendance in schools and increased the number of internally displaced persons as both students and teachers flee for safety. Boko Haram also exploits the situation by deceiving school girls, many of whom are separated

from family members and suffering emotional trauma, into carrying out suicide attacks
(Human rights expert).

A 2014 Human Rights Watch report documented the abduction of at least 500 women and girls by Boko Haram between 2009 and 2014. Hundreds of students, including 219 teenage school girls from Chibok and young primary school pupils from Damasak have been forcefully taken away from school for “marriage” to insurgents, forced to convert to Islam, and to carry out forced labor in Boko Haram camps. Other girls are constantly harassed to stop school and to wear long hijab veils.

Item III: The most affected level of education most affected by Boko-haram insurgency

The researcher also wanted to know the level of education most affected by Boko-haram insurgency in northeastern Nigeria. The researcher asked the KIIs this question: **Which level of education seems to be highly affected by Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria in terms of primary level, secondary level, and higher learning level? Why do you think the level you have chosen is highly affected by Boko Haram insurgency?** Their responses were summarized as below:

Boko-haram insurgency is affecting the entire community of northeastern Nigeria and therefore given the fact that they burn any school, all level of education are affected and people lack educational services because of destruction of school buildings, scholastic materials and other academic facilities (Human rights expert).

In fact all the levels of education are affected, but the highly affected are the primary and secondary schools. This is because 99% of the primary schools have been burnt down and destroyed. However, the secondary schools are also not functioning in most of the areas affected by the insurgency (Local leader).

Accordingly, the resolution passed by the Federal House of Representatives on June 2015 noted that Boko Haram insurgents had destroyed 95 percent of schools in Borno state outside Maiduguri. Most public schools in Maiduguri only reopened in February 2016 having been closed since March 2014. Displaced people housed at the schools were moved so that those schools could reopen.

Furthermore, according to Yobe state education authorities, up to 60 percent of schools in Damaturu, the state capital, were destroyed by Boko Haram, some of which had been rebuilt by the state government. Since 2013 when attacks on schools peaked, all schools had been closed in Gujba and Gulani local government areas of the state. Public secondary schools in the area were relocated to Damaturu after the 2013 attacks on Federal Government College Buni Yadi and the State College of Agriculture.

4.3 Federal Government's Efforts in Combating Boko Haram Insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria

The third objective of this study was to examine Federal government's efforts in combating Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria. The researcher picked interest to find out how much the government of Nigeria had done to combat Boko-haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria.

Item I: Government efforts to combat Boko-haram insurgency

Specifically, the researcher asked this question: **What has the government done to combat Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria?** The responses of the KIIs were summarized as below:

The government of Nigeria is trying her best to see that most of the hiding zones of insurgents are been cleared and many towns and villages are being restored (Security agent).

The government of Nigeria has been negotiating with Boko Haram for some time about possible ceasefire and ultimately a permanent end to the conflict (Security agent).

The government of Nigeria joined a new partnership with the UK to expand its provision of equipment and training for the Nigerian military and to help them protect themselves from the threat of improvised explosive devices used by terrorists. This partnership is intended to militarily equip soldiers through training in order to save soldiers' lives and better equip them to combat Boko Haram's insurgency-style tactics (Human Right Expert).

The Nigerian Army has recently initiated a new military operation in the northeast region of the country and around Lake Chad to eradicate the remaining Boko Haram militants. The operation which lasted for four months involved the deployment of additional six army brigades and other military assets in Borno state, where the insurgents remained active (Security agent).

Item II: Government successes in combating Boko-haram insurgency

Furthermore, the researcher asked the KIIs this question: **what are some of the success stories of government's efforts in combating Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria?**

Their responses were summarized as below:

Starting in late January 2015, a coalition of military forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger began a counter-insurgency campaign against Boko Haram. In Feb the Chad Army killed over 200 Boko Haram militants (Security agent).

In 2017, the Nigerian military began what it called its "final offensive" to retake Boko Haram's last strongholds. Within the same month, the Nigerian Army had arrested about 126 suspected Boko Haram terrorists at the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camp in Damboa, Borno State (Security agent).

The Nigeria's military forces have been successful in the fight against the group, killing its members, destroying insurgent bases, disrupting their logistic networks, and freeing captives. Nevertheless, the federal government resorted to dialogue, ransom payment, and prisoner swap to secure the release of 103 abducted Chibok school-girls in 2017 and 104 Dapchi school-girls in 2018 (Security agent).

Despite repeated claims that Boko Haram has been degraded, decimated, and defeated, the group has retained headlines with a series of attacks against both military and civilian targets. Given Boko Haram's antecedent, reduction in its capacity to seize territory and launch large-scale attacks are perhaps the most significant and measurable indicators of its gradual decline. Whether the decline is terminal or temporary is hard to guess; but, should be a matter of concern to authorities in the northeastern Nigeria.

Item III: Challenges faced by government in combating Boko-haram insurgency

Furthermore, the researcher asked the KIIs the following question: **What are the challenges the government is facing in successfully combating Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria?** Their responses were summarized as below:

In some battle cases, soldiers abandoned fighting with the enemies and equipment like armoured tanks and other personal weapons. These equipment once captured by the Boko-haram group, were used to assault both the army, police force and the civilians. In fact there were instances when the terrorists became so daring that they attacked and overpowered troops inside army barracks like those located in Baga and Bama, Borno State, ransacked the armouries and carted away sophisticated arms and ammunition with which they prolonged the war on terror (Security agent).

It emerged at some point that there was involvement by troops who were not only selling information to the terrorists, but also donating equipment to them while also introducing religious considerations into the battle (Security agent).

The story is still fresh of how a colonel and commander of an armoured company of about four tanks who, as advance leader for an onslaught to finish advancing terrorists from Madagali/Michika axis, abandoned the tanks midway and told his men to do the same. Though the colonel claimed the tanks developed mechanical faults and could not advance to carry out the task assigned, it was gathered that Boko Haram fighters eventually took the tanks, re-mobilized them and used them to wreak fighters havoc in their march to capture Mubi and other towns in Adamawa (Human Right Expert).

The inadequate budgetary allocation envelope budget system and subsisting partial release of the funds had negatively affected the Nigerian Army from achieving almost secured environment for the citizenry (Security agent).

The northeastern side of Nigeria is very wide and Boko-haram of recent has divided into smaller groups spreading across the all of northeast and some other parts of Nigeria. This has made tracking their activities very difficult for the Nigeria army (Security agent).

The Boko-haram group in 2015 paid their allegiance to ISIL group and since then have been receiving military and financial support from ISIL. Their tactics of terrorism has been new to the military of Nigeria. On several occasions, the Nigerian army embarrassly fled scenes of war and abandoned their equipment for Boko-haram to use against them (Security agent).

Item IV: Remedies to avert government challenges in combating Boko-haram insurgency

Furthermore, the researcher asked the KIIs the following question: **What do you think the government should do in order to completely eradicate Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria?** Their responses were summarized as below:

The government should educate the masses and schooling students about the dangers of Boko-haram and make them to shun its activities in the highest level possible. This can be done by working with respected cultural leaders, media houses, religious leaders and schools (Local Leader).

The government should provide job opportunities to the youth who are redundant so as to keep them away from joining or being exploited by Boko-haram to carry out their activities. The government can achieve this by construction more industries, providing loans to youth for entrepreneurship and training them in business ventures (Camp leader).

The Nigerian government should take proactive steps to implement the plans, including the Victim Support Fund and the Presidential Initiative on the North East, for the rehabilitation and reintegration of victims of violence including students and teachers who were forcefully recruited or abducted during the violence (Human Right Expert).

Government at all levels should consider the survival and safety of the people as primary because when people are provided with the basic necessities of life they will not be cajoled into joining any unlawful association. The government also has a serious role to play in poverty alleviation. There is a saying which goes thus “a hungry man in an angry man”. In a society where people cannot afford basic needs then they would be tempted to join the enemies of the state in fighting the government (Human Right Expert).

The security agencies such as the Nigerian Police Force and the Nigerian Military Force should be provided with contemporary weapons and technology needed to combat terrorism. As a conflict method that has survived and evolved through several millennia to flourish in the modern information age, terrorism continues to adapt to meet the challenges of emerging forms of conflict, and exploit developments in technology and society. Terrorist are developing new capabilities of attack and improving the efficiency of exiting methods (Security agent).

Boko Haram is a dynamic phenomenon and a persistent societal problem ravaging the country, Nigeria. Boko Haram has become one of the worst holocausts in the recent history. It is one of the greatest calamities of cataclysmic proportions in human history. From the study, over three (3) million Nigerians were displaced, thousands abducted, schools and several property burnt and destroyed and over 100,000 killed within the 9 years of Boko Haram's program in Nigeria. Therefore, institutional mechanism should be employed to address Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research findings and draws conclusions and recommendations. The conclusions are made based on the research findings and the challenges revealed by the study, while recommendations include suggested solutions to the revealed challenges.

5.1 Summary of Findings

The study found that Boko-haram's human rights violations included: Killing, rape, abduction, forceful marriage, torture, detention, forced labor, and suicide bombings. Furthermore, study revealed that Boko-haram ruined education of northeastern Nigeria by burning down schools, destroying school property and facilities, killing and abducting both the students and the teachers, and using schools and school property to store their ammunitions and kill abductees. In addition, the study found that the federal government of Nigeria had been making the following efforts to combat Boko-haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria: Use of military offensives, negotiations, alliances with the neighboring countries and western countries such as USA and UK.

5.2 Discussions of Findings

The findings of the study were discussed following the three objectives that guided the study.

5.2.1 Human rights abuses resulting from Boko Haram activities in North Eastern Nigeria

The first objective of this study was to evaluate Boko Haram Human Rights abuses in North Eastern Nigeria. The study found that Boko-haram's human rights abuses included: Killing, rape, abduction, forceful marriage, torture, detention, forced labor, and suicide bombings.

According to Human Rights Watch (2016) report, Boko Haram's brutal campaign, which has included attacks on schools, burning of villages, and hundreds of abductions, is a response to longstanding religious tensions, political corruption, and widening economic disparity in Nigeria. The government's heavy-handed police and counterterrorism tactics are also fuel for the group's flame. Human Rights Watch (2016) reported that many of the group's activities are those typically associated with terrorism, including suicide bombings, kidnappings, and destruction of

property, particularly schools. In recent years, it has increased attacks on soft targets, or relatively unprotected places, and used more women and children as suicide bombers.

Furthermore, Boko Haram–related violence has largely been confined to Nigeria’s northeast, in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. It has been most heavily concentrated in Borno, with the brunt of the violence borne by Maiduguri, Gwoza, and Kukawa. Violence has also become common south and east of Maiduguri, along the border with Cameroon’s Far North Region, and around Lake Chad. There have been sporadic incidents in places such as Nigeria’s Middle Belt and the capital of Abuja that have been attributed to Boko Haram.

In addition, the conflict has seen numerous human rights abuses conducted by the Nigerian security forces, in an effort to control the violence, as well as their encouragement of the formation of numerous vigilante groups (for example, the Civilian Joint Task Force). For instance, Amnesty International (2013) accused the Nigerian government of human rights abuses after 950 suspected Boko Harām militants died in detention facilities run by Nigeria's military Joint Task Force in the first half of 2013. As of early 2016, according to Amnesty International, at least 8,000 detainees have died in detention facilities operated by the services.

Accordingly, Boko Haram has kidnapped several young schoolgirls in Borno, physically, psychologically and sexually abusing them, using and selling them as sex slaves or brides of forced marriages with their fighters; the most famous example being the Chibok kidnapping in 2014. In addition to kidnapping child brides, Human Rights Watch (2013) has stated that Boko Harām uses child soldiers, including 12-year-olds. According to an anonymous source working on peace talks with the group, up to 40 percent of the fighters in the group are underage soldiers (Jola, 2018).

5.2.2 The Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency on Education in North Eastern Nigeria

The second objective of this study was to assess the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on education in North Eastern Nigeria. The study revealed that Boko-haram ruined education of northeastern Nigeria by burning down schools, destroying school property and facilities, killing and abducting both the students and the teachers, and using schools and school property to store their ammunitions and kill abductees.

Boko Haram has in many cases used schools for various purposes in areas where it has seized control, such as to harbor stolen goods, and for military aims, including to detain captives and to store and manufacture weapons. Insurgents have also used schools to store stolen materials and as sites to harbor and kill captives. According to media reports in December 2014, Boko Haram insurgents rounded up and killed at least 50 elderly people in Government Day Secondary School and Uvaghe Central Primary School in Gwoza (Olugbode, 2014). In the same month, Boko Haram released a video in which rows of men lying face down in what appeared to be an undisclosed dormitory were shot and killed which later discovered to be Umar Ibn Ibrahim El Kanemi College of Education, Science and Technology, Bama, a Borno town (Haruna, 2014).

According to Adebusuyi (2015), by early 2012, Boko Haram's initial tactics to enforce the rejection of Western education by issuing threats and intimidating and harassing students, teachers, and parents became more severe. The insurgents began to destroy, burn and pillage school buildings and property, mostly at night and during non-school hours, further impacting education. But worse was to come. From late 2013, Boko Haram began to deliberately target and kill teachers, school administrators, and education officials. In October 2015, the Nigerian National Union of Teachers said over 600 teachers had been killed in the Boko Haram conflict in northern Nigeria (Adebusuyi, 2015).

The United Nations (2015) reported that students were also increasingly targeted, with male students often killed or forcibly recruited and female students abducted. In his 2015 annual report on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, quoting education authorities in Borno state, said that 314 school children had been killed between 2012 and 2014 (UN, 2015). According to UNICEF (2016), 952,029 school-age children have been forced to flee the violence and more than 600,000 have lost access to learning due to the conflict. UNICEF (2016) further reports that Boko Haram's attacks have been particularly devastating for school-age children largely among the nomadic people of northern Borno, near Lake Chad and the border with Niger, where educational opportunities have long been limited.

Indeed the Low levels of education and literacy in north east Nigeria have been exacerbated by the Boko Haram insurgency. The group has targeted teachers and schools, with more than 910 schools destroyed between 2009 and 2015, and 1,500 forced to close. In addition, government

security forces have also used schools for military purposes, further reducing children's right to education. Mohammed (2015) examined the effect of insurgency on girl's education in north eastern Nigeria. The finding revealed that the insurgency has affected girl-child education negatively in north eastern Nigeria, because the school girls have been hurt in the presence of other students during attack in their school, as such female student were afraid from going to school.

Furthermore, a study by Abdullahi and Terhema (2014) conducted in some schools in Damaturu, the capital city of Yobe State, revealed that the insecurity in the region has caused a further reduction in school attendance. Borno State has had the most devastating experience since the Boko Haram insurgency, with a huge negative impact on basic education. Despite the ordinarily low primary and secondary school attendance level in the state (35 and 28 per cent respectively), a recent study revealed that the insurgency has affected basic education, as school attendance has been drastically reduced owing to attacks on schools which have left many children hurt and the abduction of over 200 Chibok girls, and also because many children and teachers have narrowly escaped death during the attacks on their communities (Abdulrasheed, Onuselogu, & Obioma, 2015).

5.2.3 Federal Government's Efforts in Combating Boko Haram Insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria

The third objective of this study was to examine Federal government's efforts in combating Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria. The study found that the federal government of Nigeria has been making the following efforts to combat Boko-haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria: Use of military offensives, negotiations, alliances with the neighboring countries and western countries such as USA and UK. Due to these strategies, the government recorded success such as arrest of Boko Haram fighters, secured release of abducted civilians, killing of Boko-haram leaders and followers, and regaining of Boko-haram controlled towns and schools. However, there have also been cases where the government military failed miserably to the disappointments of many Nigerians.

As regard negotiations with Boko-haram, many Nigerians believe it is not effective and should not even be given room in the first place. This is because, if it is true, such talks provide a

glimmer of hope for an end to the ongoing carnage in northeast Nigeria, but important questions still remain. Boko Haram appears to be divided into factions, one of which is led by Abubakar Shekau and another by Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Both factions aim to overthrow the secular Nigerian state and to establish an Islamic state with the strict enforcement of Islamic law. Where they differ is their treatment of other Muslims. The al-Barnawi faction sees Shekau as too ready to label Muslims as apostates and to kill them.

Nigerian administrations have attempted to open negotiations with Boko Haram, but Shekau has refused and is credibly accused of having murdered those of his followers who sought to do so. Al-Barnawi, on the other hand, has apparently been open to negotiation. It is likely that the school girls from Dapchi were kidnapped by the al-Barnawi faction. The vast majority of the 110 or so girls taken were returned, but five were reportedly killed and one girl, the only Christian of the group, refused to convert to Islam and is still in captivity. It is likely that any negotiations by the government would be with the al-Barnawi faction. But, if there are negotiations, what exactly are they over? Is any faction of Boko Haram prepared to set aside its ultimate goal of the destruction of the secular state and the establishment of an Islamic polity?

According to Baba-Ahmed (2012), it is difficult to see how any meaningful negotiation could be carried out with Boko Haram, since it has variously slain its own members who have attempted to open negotiations with the government or grant interviews to the press. Furthermore, Dada and Ejue (2012) reported that Boko Haram's Islamist agenda of implementing Sharia law in Nigeria and the violent means it has employed to make known its intent are all breaches of Nigeria's constitution and indicative of the fact that the sect is highly contemptuous of constituted authorities.

Having assessed the foregoing policy attempts used by the Nigerian state to extinguish Boko Haram terrorism, the overwhelming public view still remains that the government has failed in tackling the mayhem because it lacks a proper blueprint for action.

Nonetheless, other proponents believe that Nigerian security forces have made sizable gains against Boko Haram with the help of neighboring states, but the momentum to stamp out the insurgent group appears to have slowed in recent years, and communities in the country's northeast remain beleaguered (Alobo & Obaji 2016; Itumo & Nwefuru 2016; Oyewole 2017;

Dunn, 2018). For instance, in 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan launched a major offensive against Boko Haram, declaring a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States. While national forces claimed some success in pushing militants out of cities, attacks in rural areas continued with regularity and Nigerian troops were accused of human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings.

Furthermore, Boko Haram attacks escalated in 2014 and 2015, raising doubts about the government's progress toward containing the group. In particularly brazen operations, the group claimed a bombing of an Abuja bus station that killed nearly one hundred people on April 14, 2014, the same day it abducted more than two hundred schoolgirls from the northeastern town of Chibok (BBC, 2015). The latter attack prompted an international outcry and evoked harsh criticism among many Nigerians of the Jonathan administration's slow response.

On the other hand, the elected president in 2015, Muhammadu Buhari made some modest reforms to improve the military's effectiveness against Boko Haram. Buhari, a former military dictator (1983–1985), moved the military's headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri, increased funding for operations in the area, and appointed new military leadership.

Due to Boko-haram fighting strategies and Nigeria's inability to totally wipe them, they had to seek for military support from its neighbors, who increasingly suffered attacks during Boko Haram's upsurge. Since 2015, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have deployed thousands of troops as part of a multinational force authorized by the African Union. The coalition has been credited with helping the Nigerian military retake much of the territory claimed by Boko Haram and reduce violence linked to the group to levels seen prior to 2014.

Furthermore, security partners beyond Africa have also come to Nigeria's aid. The United States designated Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization in late 2013, but at times Washington has withheld military assistance out of concern over Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy and alleged human rights abuses. Following the abductions in Chibok, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States pledged additional assistance, including equipment and intelligence support. U.S. assistance related to Boko Haram totaled more than \$400 million by early 2016. In early 2018, U.S. President Donald J. Trump pushed through a roughly \$600 million deal to sell a dozen Super Tucano aircraft to Nigeria to support its counterterrorism efforts.

However, even with the support of neighboring countries and western countries, Boko-haram still remains a big problem due to internal weakness on the side of Nigeria government. For instance, Ikpe (2017) reports that military efforts to prevent further Boko Haram attacks are hugely challenged by the sheer size of the territory in which the group operates and its continued ability to launch attacks.

In addition, ongoing corruption issues further undermines efforts to defeat the group. Significant resources have been diverted towards military efforts. Nigeria's state governors in December 2017 approved the withdrawal of \$1 billion from the excess crude account to combat Boko Haram through the purchase of equipment, training of military personnel and provision of logistical support. However, there have been several cases of officials siphoning off funds and resources meant for the region.

5.3 Conclusion

Objective one: Human rights abuses resulting from Boko Haram activities in North Eastern Nigeria

The study found that Boko-haram's human rights abuses in northeastern Nigeria, specifically, in the States of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa included: deprivation from the right to life, education and healthcare. Boko-haram insurgency has since 2009 led to the killing of thousands of people, displacement of millions of people from their homes, and detention and torture of innocent civilians. In addition, many health care facilities have been looted, burned down and completely destroyed. Hundreds of health workers have also been killed, abducted or detained in Boko-haram camps thus leaving most of the healthcare settings inaccessible to most of the populace in the States of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Thus the lesson learnt here is that Boko Haram insurgency has been detrimental to the existence of humanity by violating human rights.

Objective two: The Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency on Education in North Eastern Nigeria

The study revealed that Boko-haram destroyed education of northeastern Nigeria by burning down schools, destroying school property and facilities, killing and abducting both the students and the teachers, and using schools and school property to store their ammunitions and kill abductees. And yet the protection of children affected by armed conflict is the primary duty of

states, but the Nigerian government has not been impressive in its response to the humanitarian needs of children affected by the ongoing insurgency. Despite the government's acknowledgement of the importance of education to national development, no significant attempt has been made to ensure the provision of education to children affected by the insurgency. Nigeria has ratified the *Kampala Convention* and has various relevant commitments under international human rights law, yet the government has failed to provide adequate protection of the children affected by the insurgency. The lesson learnt here is that due to Boko Haram insurgency, the teaching and learning at schools have been largely affected by destroying the smooth flow of the education system.

Objective three: Federal Government's Efforts in Combating Boko Haram Insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria

The study found that the federal government of Nigeria has been making concerted efforts to combat Boko-haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria by: use of military offensives, negotiations, alliances with the neighboring countries and western countries such as USA and UK. Indeed due to these strategies, the government recorded success such as arrest of Boko-haram militia, recovery of abducted civilians, killing of Boko-haram leaders and followers, and recovery of Boko-haram controlled towns and schools. However, there have also been cases where corruption and army desertion from the war areas marred the defeat of Boko-haram insurgents.

In conclusion, civilians have been trapped in the theatre of violence in the north-eastern part of Nigeria and have often fallen victims to violent attacks by both security forces and insurgents. Attacked by security forces for allegedly harbouring insurgents, and killed by insurgents for assisting security forces with information that often leads to the arrest of their members. The host communities have thus become the common target of both the joint task forces and the insurgents who carry out retaliatory attacks on civilians, schools and their property at the slightest suspicion of giving assistance to their adversary. Violent confrontations between operatives of JTFs and insurgents have therefore resulted in a cycle of human rights abuses, extra-judicial executions, forced disappearance of civilians and wanton destruction of human habitations and sources of livelihood.

5.4 Recommendations

Objective one: Human rights abuses resulting from Boko Haram activities in North Eastern Nigeria

The Ministry of Justice should establish a unit to document the prosecution of Boko Haram suspects at all levels of government, and to collate information of insurgency related arrests, detentions, and extrajudicial killings to aid future prosecutions.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice should investigate and prosecute, based on international fair trial standards, those who committed serious crimes in violation of international law during the conflict, including members of the government security forces and pro-government vigilante groups.

Similarly, the Nigerian Police Force should take reasonable steps in line with Nigeria's responsibility under international human rights law to protect students, teachers, schools, and all those in Nigeria's territory from violence, but should not use excessive force, mistreat and torture detainees, or conduct arbitrary arrests in quelling the Boko Haram threat.

Objective two: The impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on education in North Eastern Nigeria

Government should impartially investigate and appropriately prosecute Boko Haram leaders responsible for recruiting or abducting children and other abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law, including unlawful attacks on schools, students, and teachers.

Furthermore, the Federal and States Ministries of Education should ensure that students deprived of educational facilities as a result of the conflict are promptly given access to accessible temporary alternative schools, including with suitable school equipment, and adequately trained teachers, while their own schools are repaired or reconstructed.

In addition, the Federal and States Ministries of Education should ensure availability and accessibility of schools, effectively implement the Safe Schools Initiative, and work with school authorities, community leaders and parents to ensure better security for the northeast region's schools.

Similarly, the Federal and States Ministries of Health and Women Affairs should ensure that teachers and students, and women and girls generally, who experienced sexual violence receive trauma support and ongoing counseling, as well as immediate access to treatment for injuries, emergency contraception, post-abortion services, and access to sexual and reproductive health and psychosocial support. They should also develop a plan to assist children born from rape to ensure adequate services and protection for them and their mothers.

Likewise, the commanding officers of the Nigerian military should not use school buildings or school property for military purposes such as camps, barracks, deployment, or weapons, ammunition, and supply depots.

Additionally, the International Community should support appropriate child protection activities, and large scale rehabilitation, and reintegration programs that include vocational training programs, education programs, and medical and psycho-social counseling activities for abducted returnees and school-aged Boko Haram defectors.

Objective three: Federal Government's Efforts in Combating Boko Haram Insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria

The use of the military in fighting the insurgency is commendable, but the government needs to pursue a more comprehensive strategy that addresses the economic and social roots of the crisis. Measures should address the prevalence of poverty and unemployment and low level of education among youths in the north, because this group is a potential weapon in the hands of the insurgents. The government should expose and bring to justice Boko Haram activists, their funders, and those who are benefitting from the conflict. The Nigerian immigration service needs to be effectively equipped to guard especially the Nigeria-Chad and Nigeria-Cameroon borders to prevent the influx of illegal aliens that support the insurgent group.

Likewise, Boko-haram should halt all attacks against non-combatants and release immediately all civilians in custody. They should as well cease the abduction and recruitment, forced or otherwise, of anyone under age 18 into the armed group for any purpose. In addition, they should cease all attacks on schools, killing of students and teachers or threats that undermine children's right to education.

Furthermore, as security cannot be promoted at the expense of human rights, the counter insurgency operations should uphold the rule of law and abide by international human rights standards. The military must ensure that it conducts its operations more professionally in order to minimize collateral casualties and damage to livelihoods and police should be involved in investigation and prosecution. There is a need for the adoption of the draft policy on IDPs as the absence of a law and policy framework that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities hampers the coordination of humanitarian and development efforts to mitigate the effects of displacement on children.

The Nigerian government should undertake a national security policy that will be gender based and protect the rights of women and girls in order to assess and mitigate the impact of insurgency. A gender perspective should also be adopted into counter-insurgency operations through the increase in the number of female law enforcement practitioners. It is opined that female law enforcement personnel will understand gender sensitivities and will therefore be able to extract intelligence and accomplish results.

Furthermore, the federal government should provide insurance policies to its soldiers so as to promote motivation. The insurance to cover compensation when a soldier dies in a battle field and his family members should be well facilitated in the areas of education, health, food and shelter.

5.5 Contribution to Knowledge

The study contributed to the body of knowledge by reviewing how the activities of Boko-haram has impacted on education and more specifically, girl-child education. These activities have impeded education attainment due to incessant kidnapping of students, particularly girls, forcefully marriage of abductors among others. Also it made a significant contribution to knowledge by relating cognitive dissonance theory, which defines the propensity of terrorist behavior to the study of Boko Haram activities

5.6 Areas of Further Research

This study looked at Boko-haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria and its impact on human rights in the same area, however, future studies should look at:

- The impact of Boko-haram activities on human rights activities in neighboring countries such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon.
- The economic impact of Boko-haram activities in northeastern Nigeria.
- Post-psychological behavior of former Boko-haram abductees and Boko-haram rehabilitated soldiers in resettlement camps.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What kind of Human Rights abuses are committed by Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria?
2. Why do you think there are too many cases of human rights abuses by Boko Haram group?
3. Which states in Northeastern Nigeria are human rights abuses by Boko Haram so rampant and why?
4. How has Boko Haram insurgency affected education in North Eastern Nigeria?
5. Comparing the girls and the boys, which gender's education seems to be most affected by Boko Haram insurgency and why?
6. Which level of education seems to be highly affected by Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria in terms of primary level, secondary level, and higher learning level? Why do you think the level you have chosen is highly affected by Boko Haram insurgency?
7. What has the government done to combat Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria?
8. What are some of the success stories of government's efforts in combating Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria?
9. What are some of the challenges the government is facing in successfully combating Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria?
10. What do you think the government should do in order to completely eradicate Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria?

The End